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 Notes on Chinese Names, Terms, and 
Transliteration
This book adopts Chinese pin-yin transliteration. In most of the text, an 
English translation is provided f irst, followed by either Chinese pin-yin 
transliteration or (traditional) Chinese characters, or by both, when the 
Chinese characters f irst occur.
Some well-known Chinese names and places or those related to Taiwan and 
Hong Kong may use other spelling systems to accommodate local dialects; 
for instance, Sun Yatsen, Taipei, and Taiwanese authors of this book. In most 
cases, Chinese characters are provided after the transliteration.
All Chinese names retain the Chinese order of family name f irst, followed 
by the given name.
Chinese names and places use normal font; Chinese terms are italicized.




‘(Jesus) got up and rebuked the winds and the sea, and it became perfectly calm. 
The men were amazed, and said, “What kind of a man is this, that even the winds 
and the sea obey Him?”’
Matthew 8:26-27; New American Standard Bible
Dense smog and cloud constantly hovered over Beijing all year long. But on 
3 September 2015, the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of the People’s 
Liberation Army, a ‘military-parade blue sky’ (yuebinglan 閱兵藍) was all over 
Beijing. Even though it lasted for only one day, the whole world was amazed: 
What kind of a State is this, that even the winds and the smog obey Her?
Cheng-tian Kuo
The above comparison illustrates a new pattern of religion-state relations 
called religious nationalism in China and its impact on those in China, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. It is no longer the state versus religion, but hybrid 
mixtures of religion and nationalism in these three Chinese societies.
On a hot summer day in June 2015, I received a mysterious long-distance 
phone call from the Chinese government in Beijing. The off icial asked me 
whether I would be available to attend a conference in early September. 
I thought the conference would be the long-overdue National Religious 
Conference which had been held once every ten years. So I immediately 
said OK. Then, the off icials whispered a sentence to conclude our short 
communication: ‘There will be a military parade!’ I cheerfully replied: 
‘That’s great! I have never been invited to a military parade before.’ But 
why would the Chinese government hold a military parade in September, 
not on 1 October – National Independence Day – like they had always done? 
I wondered. It must be because of the National Religious Conference for 
which I have been invited, I naively thought. In the following two months, 
I did not receive any concrete confirmation about this secretive invitation 
until one week before my scheduled flight. One off icial solemnly gave me 
very detailed instructions about the security measures I should follow once 
I arrived in Beijing, because ‘the entire city will be under martial rule.’
I arrived in Beijing three days earlier so that I could do some interviews 
with my academic friends and give a talk at the State Administration for 
Religious Affairs (SARA). On the day of my arrival, the sky was packed with 
dense smog as usual, but the street traff ic was unusually light due to the 
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martial rule. All the shops were closed, including the beverage vending 
machines in the massive subway system. Governmental off icials received 
last-minute orders to strictly limit their use of off icial cars during the 
week and to promptly leave town in the early afternoon of 2 September; 
otherwise, they would have to stay one long night in their off ice. My talk 
at the SARA was f irst postponed, then, canceled at the last minute. The 
entire central government in Beijing was almost shut down and ordered to 
do nothing else except to accommodate the military parade.
At f ive o’clock in the morning on 3 September, some other guests and I 
went through the waterproof security checks at the secluded hotel, boarded 
the designated buses to the parade platform, and waited for other distin-
guished guests to arrive. The sky began to reveal a golden light and crystal 
blue with only a few traces of white cloud. Everyone in the audience started 
to praise the blue sky as if they had the luck to see the aurora of the North 
Pole. Not for long, though. The next morning when I opened the curtains 
at my hotel, the sky was packed with dense smog and acid drizzle again; 
so was the next day and the next. On my airplane back to Taipei, I jotted 
down the verses from Matthew above and applied them to the ‘miracle’ of 
the military-parade blue. After all, the military parade was not just a secular 
ceremony but also a sacred religious ritual for the Chinese Communist 
Party-State in search of political-religious legitimacy. It is a religious ritual 
of the state religion, which I call ‘Chinese Patriotism’.
This book discusses the origin, development, content, and implications 
of religion-state relations in contemporary Chinese societies, i.e. mainland 
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. On the one hand, state policies toward 
religions in these societies are deciphered and their implications for 
religious freedom are evaluated. On the other hand, Chinese Buddhism, 
Tibetan Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, Islam, and folk religions are 
respectively analyzed in terms of their theological, organizational, and 
political responses to the nationalist modernity projects of these states. 
What is new in this book on religion and nationalism in Chinese societies 
is that the Chinese state has strengthened its control over religion to an 
unprecedented level. In particular, the Chinese state has almost completed 
its construction of a state religion called Chinese Patriotism. But at the same 
time, what is also new is the emergence of democratic civil religions in these 
Chinese societies, which directly challenge the Chinese state religion and 
may signif icantly transform their religion-state relations for better or for 
worse.
This book could not have been published without the compassionate 
support of the following persons and institutions, to whom I express my 
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most sincere appreciation. The International Institute for Asian Studies 
(IIAS) and the Ministry of Education of the Republic of China in Taiwan 
jointly sponsored a Taiwanese Chair of Chinese Studies program, which 
enabled me to convene the conference on New Religious Nationalism in 
Chinese on 21-22 April 2016 in Leiden, the Netherlands. Most of the chapters 
in this book are revised versions of these conference papers. Deputy Director 
Willem Vogelsang and staff members (in particular, Martina van den Haak 
and Sandra van der Horst) of the IIAS provided the most cozy and eff icient 
working environment. The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International 
Scholarly Exchange and the National Chengchi University provided ad-
ditional funding to the conference to bring in more Taiwanese scholars 
than the previous Taiwanese Chair programs. It also generously funded 
the production of this book. Research assistants Huang Yuchia, Chang 
Chenghao and Huang Iwei added extraordinary warmth and comfort to 
the conference, like the tulip blossom in the Netherlands. Huang Iwei, Song 
Chunli, and Chen Li painstakingly corrected all the style problems in these 
book chapters. At Amsterdam University Press, Dr. Stefania Travagnin of 
the University of Groningen, Commissioning Editor Saskia Gieling, and 
copy-editor Roger Nelson patiently guided us through the laborious editing 
and publication process. Finally, on behalf of all the authors of this book, 
I express my most sincere gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers who 
provided very helpful and detailed comments on each chapter of this book.

1 Introduction




Originating in the common responses to threats of modernity in the 
beginning of the twentieth century, three models of religion-state rela-
tions have respectively taken shape in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and 
each has important implications for both internal stability and external 
relations. In China, a totalitarian state religion of Chinese patriotism has 
been under construction and has almost fully established itself. In Taiwan, 
the initiation and consolidation of democracy after 1987 has contributed 
to the rise of a civil religion shared by many religions that provides for 
healthy checks-and-balances between the state and religion. In Hong 
Kong, there has been increasing confrontation between the totalitarian 
Chinese patriotism and a fragile civil religion.
Keywords: China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, religion, nationalism
Three models of religion-state relations in Chinese societies
Since modernity started threatening the Chinese nation at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, three models of religion-state relations have taken 
shape in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and each has had important 
implications for both internal stability and external relations. The ‘Rise 
of China’ has been fanatically propelled by a state religion called ‘Chinese 
patriotism’.1 An ‘imagined community’ of ‘China’ serves as the supreme 
God to be worshipped by all Chinese.2 The core catechism of this state 
religion is a political Trinity: patriotism, socialism, and the rule by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). All other religions should be submissive 
to this state religion and integrate the Trinitarian political theology into 
their respective theologies. Freedom of religion, although in incremental 
1 For the debate on the ‘peaceful’ rise of China, see Guo (2006).
2 Anderson (1991). 
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progress, remains confined within the glass ceiling of Chinese patriotism 
and is meticulously restricted to pre-approved clergy, time, and place.
In Taiwan, checks-and-balances between the state and religion have 
largely replaced the state’s dominance over religion. Taiwanese religious 
groups probably enjoy more freedom and autonomy than their counterparts 
in Western democracies.3 They also regularly exercise signif icant influ-
ence over state policies and in democratic elections. The Taiwanese state 
maintains effective legal instruments to curtail illegal activities of fanatic 
religious groups, at the same time promoting normal religious activities 
without ‘excessive entanglement’ or ‘discrimination’.4 In turn, most religious 
groups have gradually adapted to democracy by integrating democratic 
values into their theologies and organizational structures. They begin 
to endorse a ‘civil religion’ which is not closely linked to either Chinese 
patriotism or Taiwanese nationalism.5 Harmony and cooperation, rather 
than conflict, characterize the relationships between not only the state 
and religion but also among religious groups in Taiwan.
By contrast, religion-state relations in Hong Kong are moving precari-
ously between the Chinese model and the Taiwanese model. Emanating 
from the Christian community, a fragile civil religion is under construc-
tion by Christian leaders, intellectuals, independent mass media, and 
democratic parties. They also organize various democratic movements to 
challenge the Hong Kong government and the Chinese state. In response to 
these challenges to Chinese patriotism, the Chinese state and Hong Kong 
government have rapidly tightened their leash on Hong Kong’s Christian 
community and civil religion.
Inherited from the common responses to the threats of modernity, why 
have China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong developed such different models of 
religion-state relations? What has happened during the past one hundred 
years that may have caused these differences? And what are the practical 
and normative implications for religion-state relations, political stability, 
and external relations of these Chinese societies?
Before proceeding to the next section and to other chapters of this 
book, let me define the core concepts used in this book: religion, the state, 
nationalism, and religious nationalism. A common definition of ‘religion’, 
3 U.S. State Department, Religious Freedom Report (Taiwan), annual issues.
4 Since Lemon vs Kurtzman (1971), these two criteria have been considered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in cases related to violation of the principle of separation of state and religion.
5 ‘Civil religion’ refers to citizens’ strong commitment to democratic values and institutions, 
not necessarily linked to particular religions. The term was coined by French philosopher Jacques 
Rousseau but was made popular by Bellah (1967).
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especially for Chinese religions, is the one offered by C.K. Yang, who put 
most Chinese religions into a continuum between ‘institutional religion’ 
and ‘diffused religion’. An institutional religion is ‘a system of religious 
life having (1) an independent theology or cosmic interpretation of the 
universe and human events; (2) an independent form of worship consisting 
of symbols (gods, spirits, and their images) and rituals; and (3) an independ-
ent organization of personnel to facilitate the interpretation of theological 
views and to pursue cultic worship’. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism 
as practiced by the Chinese dynasties, temples, and shrines fall into this 
category. A ‘diffused religion’ is ‘a religion having its theology, cults, and 
personnel so intimately diffused into one or more secular social institutions 
that they become a part of the concept, rituals, and structure of the latter, 
thus having no signif icant independent existence’. Various folk religions 
(including folk Confucianism, folk Buddhism, and folk Daoism) fall into 
this category.6 Yang’s def inition of religion is largely applicable to most 
Chinese religions but may encounter problems when some folk religions (e.g. 
Yiguandao discussed in Chapter 8 of this book) become institutionalized 
in response to modernity. Nevertheless, Yang’s def inition appropriately 
directs our attention to the cores of any religion, namely, theology, ritual, 
and clergy, no matter how institutionalized or diffused they are.
The ‘state’ (sometimes, ‘government’) in the Chinese context refers not 
only to traditional dynasties or kingdoms before 1911 but also to the modern 
states of the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), although this definition is not intended to imply China’s unif ication 
or Taiwan’s independence. The Hong Kong government (not a modern state) 
was a colonial government of the United Kingdom before 1997, and a local 
government of the PRC since then. The core of a traditional Chinese state is 
the emperor and his/her royal family. A bureaucracy (including the military) 
is established to serve the interests of the royal family. The territory and 
subjects are regarded as the properties of the emperor, and are frequently 
subject to expansion or contraction because of war with other kingdoms. A 
modern state is defined by political scientists as a political entity consisting 
of a f ixed territory, a people (including different ethnic groups) living within 
the territory, a government governing the territory and the people, and the 
sovereignty of the government to govern its territory and the people without 
the permission of other states.
Adapted from the def initions provided by scholars of nationalism, a 
‘nation’ (minzu 民族 or guozu 國族) is def ined as ‘an imagined political 
6 Yang (1961, pp. 294-295).
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community’ bounded together by ‘imagined’ common history, people of 
ethnic ties, culture, religion, language, government, sovereignty, and territo-
ry.7 A nation is imagined because it does not necessarily meet, nor exclude, 
scientif ic evidence or international laws. Nationalism is thus an ideology 
that combines and elaborates these imaginations. Again, nationalist im-
aginations are different in kinds and degrees across temporal and spatial 
contexts. Furthermore, according to the above definition, the concept of 
nationalism is applicable to the nationalism of traditional kingdoms before 
the eighteenth century, whose people and territory frequently changed 
ownerships and definitions, as well as to the modern nationalism that origi-
nated in the early eighteenth century, which has distinctive components 
of people’s sovereignty and f ixed territory.
As noted above, there are two Chinese translations of ‘nation’: minzu 民
族 or guozu 國族. In Chinese politics, academics, and mass media, minzu 
has been the favorite term since it was invented more than one hundred 
years ago by Liang Qichao 梁啟超 to refer to the newly imagined ‘Chinese 
nation’ (zhonghua minzu; see Chapter 2 of this book for the origins of the 
Chinese nation). But Liang and most Chinese also use minzu to refer to 
the f ifty-six ethnic groups, which together constitute the one and only 
Chinese nation. To differentiate a nation from an ethnic group, a growing 
number of the Chinese elite, including CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping, 
have employed guozu to refer to the Chinese nation and minzu to refer to 
any one of the f ifty-six ethnic groups.8
The combined term of religious nationalism refers to the interpenetration, 
overlapping, or syncretism of religion and nationalism. It consists of two 
subcategories: a nationalism that incorporates existing religious elements or 
develops a new state cult in nationalist ideologies, state bureaucracies, public 
education systems, and national holidays; and a religion that incorporates 
nationalist imaginations in its theology, ritual, and religious organization. 
The former can be labeled as religious nationalism; the latter, nationalist 
religion. There are different kinds and degrees of religious nationalism as 
well as nationalist religion across temporal and spatial contexts. Unless 
specif ied, the concepts of ‘religious nationalism’ and ‘nationalist religion’ 
are used interchangeably in this book in order to emphasize the mutual 
influence between religion and nationalism in both traditional and modern 
7 Anderson (1983, pp. 6-7); Gellner (1983, pp. 5-7); Hastings (1997, pp. 3-4); Hobsbawm (1992, 
pp. 5-13).
8 Kuo (2014, pp.10-13); Xi Jinping inaugural address (17 March 2013), http://lianghui.people.
com.cn/2013npc/n/2013/0317/c357183-20816399.html. 
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China, as compared to the one-sided dominance of the state over religion 
described by the modernity approach discussed below.
Rogers Brubaker calls our attention to religious nationalism in the 
development and studies of state-religion relations. Most of the studies 
on state-religion relations belong to one of three types: those that treat 
religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena, those that use religion 
to explain nationalism, and those that treat religion as part of national-
ism and analyze their interpenetration and intertwining. The emerging 
religious nationalisms in Algeria, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Northern Ireland, 
Palestine, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States, however, are different 
according to Brubaker. It is ‘a distinctively religious type of nationalist 
program that represents a distinctive alternative to secular nationalism’. In 
religious nationalism, religion ‘provides a distinctive way – or a distinctive 
family of ways – of joining state, territoriality, and culture’.9 Brubaker’s 
def inition covers the f irst subcategory of religious nationalism used in this 
book but does not refer to the second subcategory of religious nationalism 
(i.e. nationalist religion). While consistent with Brubaker’s insights on 
religious nationalism, most chapters of this book keep a balance between 
these two subcategories.
Two theoretical approaches: Modernity and revisionism
Since John Locke started promoting the thesis of separation of state and 
religion four hundred years ago, the modernity approach has been the 
dominant explanation and prescription for religion-state relations in the 
world.10 It postulates that the state should be free from the interference of 
religion in secular matters so that the state and society may mobilize their 
resources and talents more effectively to build up a modern nation-state. 
During the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant further degraded religion 
as something irrational and harmful to modernity; religion was better 
confined to the private sphere of families and religious compounds. Emile 
Durkheim similarly treated religion as superstition harmful to modernity 
and would f inally be replaced by the development of rationality-based 
science.11
9 Brubaker (2015, pp. 102, 113-14).
10 Locke (1685/1955). 
11 Kant (1999); Durkheim (1995).
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The modernity approach deeply influences how major historians (re-)
interpret the rise of nationalism in Western countries. Since modern state-
building is regarded as scientific and religion is viewed as anti-scientific, the 
two cannot be compatible. Religion is treated either as anti-state-building 
or is totally absent from analyses. Instead, the modernity scholars prefer to 
focus their analysis on the factors of industrial revolution, military technol-
ogy, printing, and rational bureaucracy, which allegedly contributed to 
modern state-building.12
Applying the modernity approach to religion-state relations in modern 
China, Chinese intellectuals and politicians around 1900 promoted various 
modernity programs to reform or to eliminate religions in order to build up 
a powerful Chinese state. Most folk religions in the countryside or religions 
of the ethnic minorities were regarded as superstitious and needed to be 
replaced by modern schools teaching science. This modernity program is 
almost as ‘colonizing’ and ‘missionizing’ as the Western powers, as Julia 
C. Schneider in this volume argues. Large institutional Buddhism and 
Daoism underwent reforms following the model of Western Christianity. 
Neo-Confucians made great efforts to ‘reimagine’ Confucianism as a secular 
and rational philosophy compatible with modernity programs. However, 
none of these religious reforms would appease Chinese atheists who aimed 
to eliminate all religions, including Christianity, which allegedly came to 
China under the aegis of Western imperialism. As the following sections 
demonstrate, the modernity approach continues to influence the academic 
analysis and religious policies in contemporary Chinese societies.13
In retrospect, the modernity approach is only partially correct in terms 
of empirical evidence and normative implications. Recent scholarship on 
religion-state relations argue that the traditional Chinese state was a ‘reli-
gious state’ (or ‘religio-political state’), the Chinese society was a ‘religious 
society’, and the state sponsored a ‘state religion’ of Confucianism.14 Even 
when the Chinese state (e.g. the powerful Ming Dynasty) tried to control 
12 Anderson (1991); Gellner (1983); Hobsbawm (1992). 
13 Wang (1977); MacInnis (1989). Ashiwa and Wank’s book (2009) applies Talal Asad’s seculariza-
tion thesis to modern Chinese religion-state relations and is another exemplar of the modernity 
approach. Mayfair Yang’s book (2008) tries to distance itself from the modernization theory 
by emphasizing the modernity’s discursive process between the modern Chinese state and 
religions. Although its major arguments are closer to the revisionist school, I would still put 
Yang’s book in the modernity school because it underestimates the mutual influence (albeit 
asymmetrical) of state and religion in both traditional and modern China.
14 These ‘revisionist’ works include: Chau (2011); Goossaert and Palmer (2011); Lagerwey (2010); 
Dean (2009); Platt (2007); Yang (1961); Yang (2012); Yu (2005). 
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religion, its efforts were short-lived and ineffective. In Chinese history, vari-
ous religions permeated Chinese politics from the basic political/religious 
unit of family up to the imperial court. Religious freedom and tolerance 
were largely maintained in the dynastic government and in society. Fur-
thermore, the authority and legitimacy of centralized Chinese dynasties 
were buttressed by various major religions. Chinese religions also provided 
political justif ication for the mobilization of rebellions against weak and 
corrupt dynasties. Therefore, religion is not necessarily anti-state-building 
but may become complementary to state building, which became the core 
of the modernity program in the Republican era. In this volume, Adam 
Yuet Chau describes how, in the early Republican era, the Chinese literati 
tried to incorporate ‘religion in the nation’ and ‘the nation in religion’. In 
fact, a nationalist program based purely on secular appeals may soon run 
out of steam, as Robert D. Weatherley and Qiang Zhang’s chapter in this 
volume demonstrates.
The normative and empirical validity of the revisionist approach gets 
a boost from the recent and fast developments in neurotheology, an in-
terdisciplinary study of religious behaviors. Although still in its infancy 
of academic development, neurotheology has generated a vast amount 
of scientif ic evidence to support the theses that ‘rationality is a slave to 
emotion’ (an argument f irst proposed by David Hume), that religious/
spiritual thinking is part of human nature (just as rationality and emotion 
are), and that ‘religious (god) brain’ (or ‘religious circuits’ in the brain) 
may enhance or constrain human rationality and emotion.15 This religious 
brain consists of various circuits connecting different functional parts of 
the brain to generate religious feelings, theological thinking, and images 
of transcendental gods. The thalamus receives incoming religious signals 
from sensory organs (eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and skin) and forwards these 
signals to different parts of the brain for response. The amygdala sends out 
quick emotional responses of anger, aggression, fear, and sexual desire to 
religious signals. The septum reinforces or regulates religious anger, fear, 
and pleasure generated by the amygdala. The hippocampus compares and 
learns new religious signals based on memory. The frontal lobe conducts 
rational thinking on religious signals and produces theological or moral 
arguments. The anterior cingulate generates a sense of peace, loving, and 
compassion associated with religion. And the parietal lobe enables humans 
to construct spatial and temporal dimensions of religion as well as of other 
15 Barrett (2011); Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts (2009, pp. 293-326). Jeeves (2013); Newberg and 
Waldman (2009); Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998).
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transcendental ideologies, aliens, and mystical powers. It strengthens and 
prioritizes the thinking circuits related to these concepts as guiding prin-
ciples to emotional and rational behaviors. Thus, humans get feelings of 
holiness and unity with supernatural powers when these concepts are 
stimulated by external signals.
Thus, neurotheology challenges the very foundation of the modernity 
approach, its zealous faith in rationality, and its empirical and normative 
controversies. For instance, the fundamentalism research project led by 
Martin Marty regards the rise of religious-political fundamentalisms around 
the world in the 1980s as temporary irrational responses to modernity 
that would be withered away by modernity.16 But if rationality, emotion, 
and religious thinking are all interrelated and interdependent parts of 
human nature, then, the explanation and normative goals of any modernity 
program should be revamped, to include all these facets of human nature. 
If religion is a cause of the ‘clash of civilizations’, it should also be a part of 
the solution.17
Neurotheology puts emphasis on individuals’ religious behaviors. But 
individuals live in institutional settings and are molded by the institutions, 
such as family, clan, school, work place, and most important of all, religion 
and the state. Thus, in addition to neurotheology, empirical and norma-
tive claims of the revisionist approach get another boost from theories 
of institutions.18 The symbiosis of the state and religion is ubiquitous in 
human history.19 Anthropologists have traced the importance of religion 
to political leadership in primitive societies. The evolution of human 
societies from primitive tribes, ethnic groups, kingdoms to dynasties was 
accompanied and supported by the development of various religions. The 
rise of Western nation-states since the early eighteenth century, which was 
the core of the modernity program, also witnessed the symbiosis of the 
state and religion. No modern state was established without the support of 
a dominant domestic religion or without creating a new state religion for 
its own sake. For example, the Church of England independently created 
the religious/national identity of England; French nationalism claimed its 
origin in Joan of Arc’s divine calling to f ight against the English; the United 
States established the f irst democratic state because most Americans 
16 Marty and Appleby (1995). 
17 Huntington (1996).
18 Classical works on institutionalism include North (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991); March 
and Olsen (1979). Ashiwa and Wank’s book (2009, pp. 6-12) applies this institutionalism to the 
analysis of state-religion relations in China.
19 Cook (2005); Davis (2005); Diamond (1999).
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believed it to be the ‘New Heaven and New Earth’ on earth; the Protestant-
turned-Eastern-Orthodox Catherine II transformed Russia into a modern 
state with the blessings of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Meiji 
reform installed the State Shinto for the very purpose of social and political 
modernization.20 Even the atheist communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
transformed Marxism into a state religion in order to consolidate their 
legitimacy and to facilitate modernity programs.21 Since the 1980s, the 
‘Third Wave of democracy’ has contributed not only to the establishment of 
democracies but also ‘religious nationalisms’ in developing countries, which 
rebeled against secular nationalism and its modernity programs.22 Finally, 
Robert Bellah points out the rise of a ‘civil religion’ in Western democracies, 
despite the general decline of Christian religiosity in these democracies. 
Citizens develop strong emotional commitment to democratic institutions 
and values through education, mass media, public museums, laws, and 
national holidays. According to Yang’s def inition of religion discussed 
before, civil religion can be regarded as a ‘diffused religion’ merged into the 
political system, society, and institutional or diffused religion. Strengthened 
by theories of neurotheology and institutionalism, this chapter (and most 
chapters of this book) take various revisionist perspectives to reassess the 
interpenetration and interdependence of the state and religion in modern 
Chinese societies.
A revisionist interpretation of religion-state relations in modern 
China
Based on the neuro-institutional assumptions, a revisionist interpretation 
of the emergence of modern ‘China’ can be traced to one hundred and 
thirty years ago when modern nationalism was f irst introduced to China, 
or to traditional Chinese dynasties. The Chinese modernists would argue 
the impetus to the rise of Chinese nationalism and nation-state probably 
should not be traced back to any time earlier than 1900. A simple reason is 
that modern nationalism and the nation-state emerged in Western Europe 
only in the early eighteenth century and were not introduced in China 
until the late nineteenth century. But before then, as Chishen Chang says 
in this volume, there were already various dynasties (chaodai 朝代) and 
20 Tocqueville (1969); Hardacre (1989); Hastings (1997); O’Brien (1999).
21 Crossman (1949); Gentile (2001).
22 Juergensmeyer (1993). 
22 CheNg-tiaN Kuo 
different interpretations of China (zhongguo 中國), mostly of Han ethnic 
rulers governing flexible amounts of territories and subjects in East Asia. 
On the one hand, these dynastic governments were religious states in the 
sense that they maintained their legitimacy by mixing secular governance 
with various institutional religions: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. 
On the other hand, local elites and the people regularly mixed their reli-
gious rituals and values into their secular lives, and constituted a diffused 
religious society. The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), ruled by the Manchu ethnic 
group, was the last religious dynasty before the modern Chinese state (the 
Republic of China) was established in 1911.
Chinese intellectuals and political leaders began to ‘imagine’ a political 
community called ‘China’ only in the late nineteenth century when the 
Qing Dynasty failed to stop the repetitive invasions by other modern states. 
The incompetent Qing Dynasty signed a series of unequal treaties with 
other modern states, and surrendered a signif icant part of its territory or 
sovereignty to them (Great Britain in 1840, 1858, and 1886; France in 1858, and 
1884; Russia in 1858, and 1864; and Japan in 1872 and 1895). Together, these 
treaties shattered the traditional sacred image of the Chinese dynasty being 
the ‘central territory’ (zhongtu 中土) or ‘all-under-heaven’ (tianxia 天下).
Emulating the Japanese State Shinto modernity program, neo-Confucian 
reformers of the Qing Dynasty responded to external threats by promoting 
a State Confucianism in order to modernize the whole nation around a 
god-like emperor.23 Bart Dessein’s chapter in this volume provides a detailed 
analysis of this State Confucianism as a state religion. At the same time, 
it aimed to reform, if not eliminate, folk religions that deviated from State 
Confucianism and were deemed as ‘evil cults’ (yinci 淫祠).24 But this moder-
nity program, called the Wuxu Reform (wuxu bianfa 戊戌變法, 1898, also 
called ‘Hundred Days’ Reform’), flew in the face of the ambitions of Empress 
Dowager Cixi 慈禧 who was the de facto supreme ruler of the dynasty but 
did not f it into the patriarchal neo-Confucianism. She found an alternative 
source of political and religious legitimacy in the traditional folk religion of 
White Lotus (bailian jiao 白蓮教) which worshipped the Mother of No Birth 
(wusheng laomu 無生老母) as the omnipotent creator of the universe. The 
Queen Mother staged a palace coup, terminated the neo-Confucian reform, 
and instructed the White Lotus to exorcize all foreign ‘demons’ out of the 
‘central territory’. The White Lotus led the Boxer Rebellion (quanluan 拳亂) 
against the foreign demons from 1898 to 1900. In 1900, a military alliance 
23 Kuo (2008); Yang (2008, pp. 65-84).
24 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 27-50).
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of eight nations (Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia, Prussia, 
Austria, and Japan) swiftly crushed the Boxer Rebellion and threw the Qing 
Dynasty into anarchy. Dr. Sun Yatsen 孫逸仙 took advantage of the anarchy 
and led a Han-ethnic revolution to establish the Republic of China in 1911.
But the Republic of China was actually a republic of convenience made 
possible by the anarchy and a truce among different religions and political 
forces. The very concepts and legitimacy of both the Republic and China 
were unfamiliar to most Chinese people and were contested among political 
leaders and intellectuals. The neo-Confucians’ repeated attempts to estab-
lish State Confucianism came to a halt in 1916, because all other religions 
and the atheists opposed it. Since Sun Yatsen was a Christian, along with a 
high percentage of Christian presence in the Republican government, all 
other religions and the atheists were suspicious of a Christian Republic on 
the rise. Buddhism and Daoism had decentralized structures in traditional 
China and were too weak to challenge the rising modern state. White Lotus’ 
claim to integrate Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in one religion 
only served to discredit their scientif ic nature of modernity. Furthermore, 
most Tibetan Buddhists and Xinjiang Muslims did not want to be part 
of the Republic or the Chinese nation due to their distinctive religious 
traditions of theocracy and distinctive ethnicity. In this volume, Antonio 
Terrone traces various ways in which Tibetan Buddhists resisted China’s 
nationalist modernity program.
The political and religious anarchy in the early Republican era contrib-
uted to the rise of a new state religion, called ‘Chinese nationalism’. China 
became the new god above all other gods (Buddha, Confucius, Laozi, Jeho-
vah, Allah, Mother of No Birth, and others). The Chinese state off icials and 
intellectuals became the greatest prophets and priests among all religious 
clergy, although they were free to take on other religious identities. All 
other religions were supposed to serve this supreme god and obey the new 
political revelations of its prophets and priests. Following neo-Confucian 
Liang Qichao’s creative definition, the ‘Chinese nation’ (zhonghua minzu 中
華民族) now included not only the ethnic Han people, but also the Manchu, 
Mongolian, Muslim, and Tibetan.25 All of them were given, voluntarily 
or otherwise, membership to this new state religion overnight. The holy 
national land became the f ixed territory inherited from the Qing Dynasty, 
including Taiwan which was ceded to Japan in 1895.
The catechism of Chinese nationalism was based on a creative her-
meneutics of the separation of state and religion. Around 1900 when the 
25 Liang (1936). 
24 CheNg-tiaN Kuo 
phrase ‘separation of state and religion’ was f irst introduced to China, it was 
translated into zhengjiao fenlí 政教分離, rather than zhengjiao fenlì 政教
分立, by most Chinese intellectuals and politicians and has been the most 
popular translation since. The former translation connotes that the state 
and religion are segregated entities and have no interaction between them 
while the latter accurately captures the authentic meaning of the American 
separation of church and state. Even worse, influenced by the French law 
of laïcité (‘secularization’) passed in 1905, Chinese political leaders and 
intellectuals used the former translation to justify the state’s arbitrary 
intervention in internal affairs of religion while forbidding religion from 
intervening in the state. The separation of state and religion thus became a 
one-way separation.26 Hence, the modern Chinese state was fully justif ied 
by this political catechism to intervene in all religions while forbidding 
religion to intervene in politics.
The f irst component of the religious modernization program promoted 
by the KMT government was to turn temples and shrines into schools of 
modern education. Christian churches were left out because they were 
protected by unequal treaties with Western states. Besides, Christian 
organizations brought in their own modern education systems complemen-
tary to the modernity program. The second component of the modernity 
program was to organize traditional religions into hierarchical national 
religious associations so that the state could promote other modernity 
programs through them. However, some political leaders and intellectuals 
inserted a third component in the modernity program, that is, to eliminate 
all religions but Chinese nationalism. After all, all religions are exclusive 
to some extent against other religions. If the god of Chinese nationalism is 
the supreme and true god, what is the use of all other minor or false gods?27
Christian General Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石 (or Chiang Kaishek) defeated 
Chinese warlords and unif ied China in 1928. By mixing neo-Confucianism 
and Christianity in the modernity program, he ushered in the Golden Ten 
Years of rapid economic growth and social transformation under the guid-
ance of an authoritarian Chinese state, which was legitimized by Chinese 
nationalism.28 Unfortunately, Japan’s invasion in China from 1937 to 1945 cut 
short Jiang’s modernity program. After World War II, the civil war between 
the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang 國民黨; KMT) government and the CCP 
26 Kuo (2016). 
27 On religion-state relations in the Republican era, see Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 50-63); 
Duara (2008, pp. 43-64).
28 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 69-79).
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from 1945 to 1949 could be interpreted as a contest for orthodoxy within 
the Chinese nationalism. Mao Zedong 毛澤東 won the contest, and Jiang 
Jieshi’s views became political heresy. From then on, three different models 
of religion-state relations developed in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
In China, religion-state relations went through three periods of trans-
formation.29 The f irst period, from 1945 to 1957, saw the gradual withdrawal 
of the United Fronts strategy by which the CCP formed an amicable alli-
ance with almost all major religious groups, including Daoism, Buddhism, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, and folk religions. The United Fronts 
strategy respected the autonomy of religious groups, which in turn provided 
religious justif ication for the CCP’s f ights against the Japanese and the 
KMT before 1949. At the same time, Chinese communism began to develop 
its quasi-fundamentalist religious form. Describing the Chinese religious 
nationalism during the Yan’an Period (1942-1946), David E. Apter and Tony 
Saich said they were amazed by what was contained in ‘its logocentricism 
certain proto-religious characteristics intertwined in a secular theory of 
politics that identif ied logos with power’. In fact, as ‘compared to most 
religious movements,’ they argue, ‘the Yan’anites may have been more 
deeply sincere’.30 It was this type of religious nationalism that signif icantly 
contributed to the establishment of the PRC. After 1949, the United Fronts 
strategy shifted gear and aimed to reeducate various religions in order to 
rally them behind this emerging Chinese communist state religion.
Radical communists in the CCP did not tolerate the existence of religion 
under communism. Therefore, the second period, from 1957 to 1979, saw 
attempts to eliminate all religions during the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, for the purpose of promoting a communist modernity 
program. During this period Chinese nationalism further developed its 
socialist theology along with the Mao cult.31 CCP chairman Mao Zedong was 
treated as the Pope, if not the god, of Chinese nationalism. He was praised 
as the Great Helmsman, the Great Teacher and the Messiah of Workers. His 
pictures were displayed and worshipped in government off ices, factories 
and family living-rooms. His speeches were edited into the Little Red Book, 
to be recited by all Chinese people performing worship rituals in front of 
Mao’s pictures. The zealous Red Guards served as religious police spying 
on anyone who might show contempt for Mao’s picture or for the Little Red 
29 The following discussion on the Chinese case draws from Goossaert and Palmer (2011, 
chapters 6 and 7).
30 Apter and Saich (1994, pp. 3, 179).
31 For the Mao cult, see Myers (1972, pp. 1-11); Zuo (1991, pp. 99-110); Overmyer (1986).
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Book. Transgressors were subject to public criticism, imprisonment or the 
death penalty. The death of Mao and the downfall of his radical vanguards 
called an end to the second period of religion-state relations and ushered 
in the third period, from 1979 to the present.
The third period of religion-state relations witnessed the return of the 
United Fronts strategy with a new political theology of Chinese nationalism. 
The reformers at the central government needed a new source of legitimacy 
to justify reform policies because the old political theology of radical social-
ism was discredited due to economic disasters. The massacre of students in 
1989 further accelerated the theological reform of Chinese nationalism.32 It 
got a slightly different name, Chinese Patriotism (aiguo zhuyi 愛國主義). 
‘China’ remained its supreme god but with increasing tolerance of other 
religions under the condition that they internalize Chinese patriotism into 
their theology and organizational structures. Richard Madsen calls it the 
‘CCP’s neo-imperial sacral hegemony’.33 I call this new political theology the 
‘Chinese Trinity’: China, socialism, and the CCP are the three holy personas 
in one god. China is socialism; socialism is the CCP government; and the 
CCP government is China. One cannot love one without loving the other two 
personas. Conversely, one cannot reject one without rejecting the other two. 
In the minds of CCP leaders, the constitution of the PRC is not the supreme 
law of the land; the Chinese Trinity is. Applied to religion-state relations, 
the Chinese Trinity requires all other religions to place ‘love your state’ 
above ‘love your religion’ (aiguo aijiao 愛國愛教). The political theology of 
Chinese Trinity takes precedence over the theology of each religion, and 
the latter should be modif ied in order to integrate the former. More details 
of this Chinese patriotism are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
In Taiwan, religion-state relations started similarly but evolved quite 
differently from those in China. Defeated by the CCP in mainland China, 
the KMT government had already lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Taiwanese people who still had a vivid memory about the massacre of 
Taiwanese elites by the KMT military in February 1947. Trained as a model 
communist, Jiang Jingguo 蔣經國, the eldest son of President Jiang Jieshi, 
promoted an extensive reform of the KMT and the state, and merged the 
two into a Leninist party-state, similar to the one in communist China. The 
party-state organized various religious groups into hierarchical associations 
whose leaderships were appointed or approved by the KMT. Being afraid of 
possible persecution by the atheist CCP in China, many leaders of various 
32 Zhao (2004). 
33 Madsen (2010, pp. 58-71).
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religions fled to Taiwan along with the KMT government, including Daoism, 
Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. They had no choice but 
to support the KMT party-state and help it consolidate its legitimacy among 
the Taiwanese believers.34
The state religion of Chinese nationalism, which the KMT government 
promoted in mainland China before 1949, was kept intact afterwards 
but with a new political theology. First, the asymmetrical religion-state 
relations of the Republican era in China were transplanted to Taiwan. 
Secondly, similar to the Chinese Trinity, the KMT party-state merged the 
KMT with Chinese nationalism but minus socialism and the CCP rule; 
Taiwan was part of China, and China needed the KMT rule. And thirdly, 
the same level of religious freedom as in traditional China was also applied 
to Taiwanese religious groups, except for those which carried a different 
political agenda than the KMT’s, as in the case of the Presbyterian Church 
in Taiwan. The KMT party-state did not and could not eliminate Taiwanese 
religions because neo-Confucian President Jiang Jieshi became a devout 
Christian after 1949, Jiang Jingguo was a nominal Christian, and the United 
States, pressured by domestic human rights groups, always looked over the 
KMT’s shoulder.
The KMT’s state religion of Chinese nationalism began to crumble during 
the political democratization during the mid-1980s. Both the god of China 
and the priestly KMT were severely challenged by the rise of Taiwanese 
nationalism adorned with a religious fever. In fact, it was the Presbyterian 
Church in Taiwan (PCT) that led the religious/political challenge to the 
KMT’s state religion. In a series of public statements addressed to both the 
Taiwanese people and the international community, the PCT promoted 
democratic reforms to challenge the life-long priestly role of the KMT, and 
it espoused Taiwan’s independence as an alternative god to China.35 Under 
pressure from both the domestic democracy movement and the U.S., the 
KMT party-state f inally lifted martial law in 1987.
From 1987 to the present, the state religion of Chinese nationalism continu-
ously lost its believers. After President Jiang Jingguo died in 1988, his successor 
Li Denghui 李登輝 (or Lee Tenghui), a Presbyterian, began to promote a state 
religion of Taiwanese nationalism.36 In 2000, he helped the candidate of the 
opposition party (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) Chen Shuibian 陳水
扁, who was also a believer in Taiwanese nationalism, to topple the KMT 
34 Kuo (2008, pp. 9-14).
35 Rubinstein (1991).
36 Li (2013). 
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government. During the Chen regime, the state actively promoted Taiwan-
ese identity in the mass media and the education system through revising 
Taiwanese history, propagating the Taiwanese dialect, and subsidizing those 
‘homeland’ (xiangtu 鄉土) cultural activities. Although the returned KMT 
regime tried to rejuvenate Chinese nationalism from 2008 to 2016 in order to 
contain the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, more and more Taiwanese were 
attracted to the latter. There seems to be a revival of Taiwanese nationalism 
since DPP President Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 took power in 2016.
Concomitant with the decline of Chinese nationalism and the rise of 
Taiwanese nationalism has been the gradual consolidation of a civil religion 
shared by the majority of Taiwanese religious groups. Although not as ac-
tive democrats as the PCT, Buddhist Compassion Relief Association (Ciji 慈
濟 or Tzu Chi), Buddha’s Light Mountain (Foguanshan 佛光山), Dharma 
Drum Mountain (Fagushan 法鼓山), and the Enacting Heaven Temple 
(Xingtiangong 行天宮) helped smooth Taiwan’s democratic transition by 
promoting peace and tolerance among contending political forces.37 After 
1987, religion-state relations in Taiwan experienced fundamental transforma-
tion as a result of democratization. Various religious groups are no longer 
subject to the guidance of Chinese nationalism nor the strong state. Due to 
their significant influence in increasingly competitive democratic elections, 
they have developed a checks-and-balances relationship with the democratic 
state. Inter-religion relations in Taiwan are best characterized as tolerant, 
harmonious and cooperative (e.g. in ethical issues and in disaster relief works).
As for the antagonism between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese na-
tionalism, most Taiwanese religious groups seem to keep an equal distance 
from both so as not to offend either the Chinese or Taiwanese nationalists. 
On the one hand, they eagerly explore the astronomical religious market in 
China and do not want to blaspheme Chinese patriotism with Taiwanese 
nationalism. On the other hand, Taiwanese nationalism has yet, if ever, to 
develop into a solid state religion. Except for the PCT, which constitutes only 
two percent of the Taiwanese population, no other major religious groups in 
Taiwan publicly endorse Taiwanese nationalism. It is more like the New Age 
movement in Western societies: it has many audiences but few believers.
In Hong Kong, religion-state relations have taken yet another develop-
mental path, different from both China and Taiwan. The British colonial 
government fully respected religious freedom of all religions and did not 
establish any state religion in Hong Kong from 1898 to 1997. Although many 
Chinese religious groups fled to Hong Kong after 1949 and enriched Hong 
37 Madsen (2007).
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Kong’s religious market, the principle of two-way separation of state and 
religion was maintained. The Anglican Church was treated as equal to 
other Christian denominations as well as other Chinese religions. It was an 
extension of the economic laissez-faire principle of the British government 
to religious affairs. Religion’s participation in public policies was rare and 
limited to educational and charity projects.38
The British and the Chinese governments began negotiation on the 
handover of sovereignty in 1979. China’s supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, laid 
down the principle of ‘one country, two systems’ (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制) 
in 1984 and promised that existing political, social, and economic systems 
in Hong Kong would not be altered in the next f ifty years. Most religious 
groups in Hong Kong took Deng’s promise on face value and welcomed 
the handover of sovereignty. After all, they thought the CCP state would 
be just another colonial master to live with. The Protestant and Catholic 
community, which together constituted about seven percent of the Hong 
Kong people, had a brief discussion about whether to support or oppose 
the handover of sovereignty, or whether Hong Kong independence was an 
option to be placed on the negotiation table. A consensus was soon reached 
to support the handover of sovereignty, because the other two options were 
simply unrealistic.
However, many of the Protestant and Catholic leaders still had a vivid 
memory of the persecution of Chinese Christians during the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The massacre of students in 1989 
only heightened their concern for religious freedom. At the same time, 
Taiwan lifted martial law in 1987 along with any restrictions on religious 
freedom. The guarantee for religious freedom, Hong Kong Christian leaders 
thought, would be better provided by a democratic government in Hong 
Kong rather than by the promise of the diseased Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping. Therefore, an annual political ritual is established on 1 July every 
year; while the Hong Kong government holds a celebration ceremony at the 
Chief Executive Off ice in memory of the Chinese promise, the Christians 
lead a massive pro-democracy demonstration marching toward the Chief 
Executive Off ice in fear of a broken promise anytime soon.
Furthermore, influenced by the political theology of Social Gospel, Hong 
Kong Christian leaders began to promote a ‘public theology’ (gonggong 
shenxue 公共神學) which, they frequently commented on, was based on 
political, social, and economic policies, such as human rights, democratic 
38 Kuo (2012a, pp. 123-144).
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governance, gender equality, income equality, and immigrant welfare.39 They 
also expanded their proselytism from Hong Kong to China via the convenient 
access across the border, because they soon realized that their religious 
freedom would ultimately depend not on Hong Kong’s democratization alone, 
which was always fragile, but on the growth of the Christian population in 
China. That is why Christian theological seminaries in Hong Kong generously 
offer fellowships and scholarships to Chinese Christians and actively provide 
training lessons for both three-self churches and family churches in China.
The Chinese government is aware of the political and religious activities of 
Hong Kong Christians in both Hong Kong and China and is not likely to toler-
ate them forever under the iron canopy of Chinese patriotism. Particularly, 
the Umbrella Movement in 2015 probably stepped on the last nerve of the 
Chinese government. In addition to the regular democratic slogans, some 
leaders of the Umbrella Movement made contact with social activists and 
DPP politicians in Taiwan, and some even proposed Hong Kong independence 
in order to speed up democratization in Hong Kong as the opposition move-
ment did in Taiwan in the 1980s. And many of the leaders of the Umbrella 
Movement are Christian pastors and elders. It is not a surprise that since 2015 
the Chinese government has tightened its control over Christians in Hong 
Kong and Guangdong Province, which shares the border with Hong Kong.
The above narrative describes the evolution of religion-state relations 
in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. How will they evolve in the near fu-
ture? What are the implications for religious freedom, domestic political 
development and regional relations? The next section tries to answer these 
questions from the perspective of f ive issues (signs) of religious nationalism 
being developed in these Chinese societies: state religion, separation of 
state and religion, religious autonomy, traditional religion as superstition, 
and applicability of democracy to Chinese societies. Although interrelated, 
these issues consist of idiosyncrasies that deserve separate treatments.
Signs of new religious nationalism in Chinese societies
The construction of state religion
By 2015, the Chinese government had almost completed the construction 
of a full-fledged state religion, called ‘Chinese patriotism’. The god of this 
state religion is ‘China’ (zhongguo 中國; or Chinese state). Its aliases include 
39 Jiang, Yang and Liang (2008); Deng (2015); Zhao (2013). 
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Han, Dragon or the Yellow Emperor. It has a Trinitarian political theology: 
China is socialism, socialism is the CCP rule, and the CCP rule is China.40 
The great prophets of this state religion include Marx, Lenin, Mao Zedong, 
Deng Xiaoping, and former and current general secretaries of the CCP. 
Usually, the incumbent general secretary is the greatest prophet because 
it is he who interprets and reinterprets what earlier prophets have said. 
Their writings and speeches constitute the holy scripture to be studied and 
memorized by all CCP members throughout the year. All CCP members, 
schoolteachers, and religious leaders serve as political priests to proselyt-
ize the holy scripture to all Chinese people. Its religious holidays include 
30 May, 1 July, 7 July, 1 August, 3 September, 18 September, and 1 October to 
pay tribute to the martyrs of Chinese patriotism. These ‘patriotic education 
bases’ of museums and memorial halls in major cities are holy places where 
these national holidays are held and local school pupils and government 
off icials are required to visit them regularly. The devils and arch enemies 
of Chinese patriotism are Japan, the United States, national separatists (in 
Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), and democracy activists, who 
blaspheme or rebel against Chinese patriotism. The People’s Liberation 
Army is given, through rituals like the military parade on 3 September 2015, 
a special religious status of guardian angel for the protection of China and 
the holy war against domestic and foreign devils.41
Xi Jinping 習近平 summarized well the religious nature of Chinese 
patriotism in his speech delivered to Politburo members on 30 December 
2015: ‘We need to raise the patriotic feeling and consciousness of the people 
through memorial activities of major historical events, patriotic education 
bases, Chinese traditional holidays, and national funerals and rituals’.42 
The same thesis was elaborated in his speech to the National Religious 
Conference held on 22-23 April 2016, which would serve as the concrete 
guideline for future Chinese religious policies.43
The Chinese communist state’s paradoxical attitude toward religion prob-
ably exposes the fundamental differences between atheist patriotism and 
40 One of the major ‘hymns’ promoted by the CCP is ‘No CCP, No New China’. Chinese Com-
munist Party News, http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64156/64157/4544006.html, accessed 9 March 
2016.
41 I owe the last point to Petra Andelova of the Metropolitan University at Prague for her 
helpful comment.
42 Chinese Communist Party News, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1231/c64094-27997763.
html, accessed 9 March 2016.
43 ‘Xi Jinping’s Important Speech at the National Religious Conference’. http://www.sara.gov.
cn/xwzx/tplb/333676.htm, accessed 25 April 2016.
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nationalist religion, as well as the limits of political mobilization of atheist 
patriotism. According to the neurotheology discussed in the second section 
of this chapter, it is the belief and emotion associated with supernatural 
powers that effectively inspires believers to take altruist behaviors like 
patriotism. But atheist patriotism relies much more on non-theist emotion 
and rationality and too little on the supernatural powers of religious circuits 
in the brain. Hence, the political legitimacy of an atheist state is constantly 
under challenge when it fails to deliver economic performance or when it 
encroaches upon the autonomy of major religions.
However, one should not push the above argument too far and suggest 
that Chinese religious groups (Christians in particular) may follow their 
counterparts in Western societies to become signif icant political forces 
of democratization in the near future, as the modernity approach might 
imply.44 The major differences lie in the Trinitarian nature of the Chinese 
state: the unity of the Leninist state, communism, and patriotism. This 
‘perfect dictatorship’, as Stein Ringen calls it, is a Leviathan strengthened by 
its quintessential religious patriotism which permits only complementary 
political influence but strictly and effectively prohibits political challenge 
from religious groups.45
By contrast, Taiwanese nationalism has not yet developed into a full-
fledged state religion. It has a big curious audience but few devoted believ-
ers. Although about sixty percent of the Taiwanese identify themselves as 
distinctive from the Chinese,46 ‘Taiwan’ is only a vague object of identif ica-
tion and has not acquired a holy status as a god. Paul Katz describes it 
as only one (and probably not the strongest) of the various identities of 
Taiwanese people.47 After all, the off icial name of the Taiwanese state is 
still the Republic of China, not the Republic of Taiwan. Who are the great 
prophets of this ‘state religion’? A list of potential prophets may include Lin 
Xiantang 林獻堂, Jiang Weishui 蔣渭水, Li Denghui (popularly dubbed 
the ‘Moses of Taiwanese Exodus’), and Chen Shuibian (the self-proclaimed 
44 In retrospect, Carsten T. Vala’s optimistic assessment of the Protestant Shouwang Church 
to challenge the Chinese state has turned out to be the proverbial exception that only proves 
the rule. The Church has failed to conclude a business contract to buy a meeting place, and half 
of its believers have left the Church since an open confrontation with the state broke out about 
ten years ago; see Vala (2012).
45 Ringen (2016).
46 Election Study Center National Chengchi University. The Distribution Trends of Taiwanese/
Chinese Identity of Taiwanese People (June 1992-October 2015). http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/
news.php?Sn=166, accessed 6 April 2016.
47 Katz and Rubinstein (2003). 
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‘son of Taiwan’). But there is no general consensus about this list, not to 
mention that Chen Shuibian has been serving a jail term for corruption. 
The DPP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the newly formed New Power 
Party may qualify as its political priests. But the DPP is losing its zeal to 
pursue Taiwan independence because of the fear of invasion by China. 
There is a national holiday on 10 October, but it belongs to the Republic of 
China. The memorial day of Taiwan’s retrocession to China on 25 October is 
not viewed as an appropriate day for Taiwanese nationalism. The national 
holiday of 28 February, in memory of the massacre by the KMT military, 
is probably the only religious holiday of Taiwanese nationalism, and the 
228 Memorial Hall may be its only political temple. However, it is a private 
organization sparsely visited by domestic and foreign tourists. Taiwanese 
nationalism used to treat f irst-generation mainlanders as devils, and 
second-generation as devil’s children, both of whom were strong believers 
in Chinese nationalism. Since most of the f irst-generation mainlanders 
have passed their average life expectancy and many second-generation 
mainlanders have Taiwanese spouses, Chinese patriotism and the CCP have 
become the greatest devils. Chinese married to Taiwanese, as well as the 
one million Taiwanese living in China since 1987, are seen as untrustworthy. 
However, most Taiwanese do not support such a fundamentalist version of 
Taiwanese nationalism, which violates universal human rights – the gods 
of Taiwan’s rising civil religion.
Probably, one can say that a civil religion, not a Taiwanese religion, is in 
the early stages of consolidation in multi-ethnic and multi-religion Taiwan, 
which bestows godly status to universal human rights and democracy 
rather than Taiwanese nationalism or Chinese patriotism. Theories of 
democracy and experiences of Western democracies constitute the political 
theologies of the civil religion. In the past thirty years, this civil religion 
has been tenaciously promoted by intellectuals, civic groups, families, 
education system, mass media, students, political parties, the state, as 
well as religious leaders. They freely commemorate these democratic gods 
on national holidays, at regular elections, in schools, and in the streets 
(like the Sunflower Movement in 2014, which almost decimated the KMT 
in the subsequent elections because of violating a democratic procedure 
in the legislature).48 Major religious groups have started to incorporate 
democratic values into their theologies, and democratic institutions into 
their organizational structures. For instance, all the four largest Buddhist 
48 ‘Sunflower Movement’, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/tag/sunflower-movement/, 
accessed 7 April 2016.
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organizations in Taiwan adopt Humanistic Buddhism (renjian fojiao 人間
佛教) and are developing international lay-believer organizations. Most 
Protestant churches are governed by boards of directors who are elected 
by the congregation. Lay believers are given more decision-making powers, 
while clergy are made accountable for their professional performance. Even 
the supreme god of Jade Emperor (Yuhuang dadi 玉皇大帝) of folk religions 
is being reinterpreted as a rotating position to be elected by common gods.
The civil religion has become the most popular state religion after three 
turnovers of ruling parties in 2000, 2008, and 2016. Its guardian archangel is 
the United States; Japan may soon become another one in the aftermath of 
it having expanded its national security zone to cover Taiwan in September 
2015. The devils threatening the growth of this civil religion include the CCP 
and domestic human-rights abusers of the past and present.
It appears that Taiwan’s civil religion is more powerful and resilient than 
Chinese patriotism or Taiwanese nationalism. However, this optimism 
needs to be checked by four caveats. First, it is a new religion, only thirty 
years old. It takes generations for a new religion to consolidate and establish 
itself. Secondly, with growing human and material resources, Chinese 
patriotism and Taiwanese nationalism are competing with Taiwanese civil 
religion in the political/religious markets. Thirdly, major religious groups 
in Taiwan are still in the early stages of adapting to democratic values and 
behaviors. Finally, like atheist Chinese patriotism, which relies too much on 
secular emotion and rationality, a civil religion without strong support from 
major religious groups may quickly reach the limits of political mobilization 
and face political challenges to its legitimacy whenever it fails to deliver 
economic performance or whenever it encroaches upon religious autonomy.
In Hong Kong, despite the emerging whispers of Hong Kong independ-
ence, there is little trace of a state religion of any kind. Joseph Y.S. Cheng 
points out that (state) Confucianism might have contributed to Hong Kong’s 
political stability and economic development before 1997. Even if it did, it 
no longer exerts influence after 1997.49 In its place, there is an embryonic 
civil religion, modeled after its Taiwanese counterpart, promulgated by 
intellectuals, mass media, students, democratic parties, and the minority 
Christian community. Mariske Westendorp’s chapter in this volume further 
demonstrates that some Buddhists have also embraced this public theol-
ogy and support the democracy movement. Its political theology consists 
of Western democratic theory and Christian ‘public theology’ which has 
its roots in American Christian fundamentalism of the 1980s. This civil 
49 Cheng (2015, pp. 161-196).
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religion annually celebrates its holidays on 4 June (in memory of the 4 June 
massacre of Chinese students in 1989) and 1 July (to protest the handover 
of sovereignty from Great Britain to China without a democracy being 
installed in Hong Kong). It conducts its religious activities in universities, 
streets, churches, and at the June Fourth Museum. The devils are the CCP 
and Hong Kong’s pro-China political and business leaders. However, this 
civil religion is not shared by most religious groups in Hong Kong, not even 
by the majority of the Christian community.
It is the god of Chinese patriotism who looms large over Hong Kong and 
the civil religion is its arch nemeses. Since 1997, the Chinese government has 
gradually taken over Hong Kong’s mass media, intimidated intellectuals, 
and restrained the expansion of democratic parties. During the days when 
the Umbrella movement was at its peak in 2015, Hong Kong democrats were 
nervous about whether the Chinese military and the armed police, which 
are the guardian angels of Chinese patriotism, would intervene.50 In March 
2016, the June Fourth Museum announced that it would close for business 
on 4 June due to constant harassment by the Hong Kong government.51 An 
escalated blow to Hong Kong’s civil religion came in November 2016 when 
the Executive Committee of the People’s Congress in Beijing delivered a 
constitutional opinion to disqualify two newly-elected councilors of the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council due to their pro-Hong-Kong-independence 
statements at the inauguration ceremony. Without political prophets, 
priests, and temples, Hong Kong’s civil religion is not likely to have many 
believers in the near future.
Separation of state and religion
In China, the one-way separation of the state and religion of the Republican 
era is totally discarded. All other religions are parts of the state and serve 
the state religion of Chinese patriotism. Accordingly, all other religions 
should demonstrate their loyalty by incorporating Chinese patriotism into 
their respective theologies and by joining the national religious associations 
created by the state. Under the guidance of the State Administration for 
Religious Affairs (SARA), the goal of patriotic education in theological 
seminaries is to ‘establish an army of clergy who have passion for the state, 
accept the guidance of the Party and the government, insist on the socialist 
50 Hannah Beech, ‘The Umbrella Revolution’. Time, 13 October 2014.
51 United Daily News, http://udn.com/news/story/7331/1589123, accessed 7 April 2016.
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way, and are able to communicate with the people’.52 Following a master 
textbook of religious education of Chinese patriotism, SARA has cooperated 
with national religious associations, theological seminaries, and religious 
scholars of the f ive official religions to publish a series of religious textbooks 
of patriotism.53 Together, they would consolidate the hegemony of Chinese 
patriotism over every other religion in China. The table of contents of the 
master textbook, Textbook of Patriotism (Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaocheng 愛國主義
教程), spells out clearly the Trinitarian theology of Chinese patriotism 
to be incorporated into each religious textbook. Chapter One explains 
why Chinese patriotism urgently needs to be promoted in the current 
environment. Chapters Two to Four reimage the history of ‘China’ and how 
important the CCP was to the state-building of China. Chapter Five explains 
the constitutional foundation of Chinese patriotism while Chapters Six and 
Seven elaborate the reasons why all religious groups need to support the two 
personas of Chinese patriotism (socialism and the CCP rule). Chapters Eight 
and Nine urge the readers to support the national unity and sovereignty of 
the third persona, i.e. the god of China.
Nevertheless, there seems to be some resistance from other religious 
textbooks to accept everything said in the master textbook. Absent from 
all other religious textbooks is the role of the CCP in each religion’s history 
and theology. Nor is socialism an important subject in these textbooks. 
The only persona of the Trinitarian Chinese patriotism discussed in great 
length in other religious textbooks is China, not socialism, not the CCP rule. 
All other religious groups claim to have made great contributions to the 
establishment and consolidation of the Chinese state, and commit to do so 
continuously.54 This persistent religious autonomy and political concession 
is well analyzed by Tsai Yenzen’s chapter on Chinese Christianity and by 
Hsieh Shuwei’s chapter on Chinese Daoism in this volume.
The administrative subordination of religions to the CCP state is clear 
from its chain of commands and controls. Each religious group has to 
join the state-sponsored local religious association; only one association, 
per religion, exists at a particular administrative level. A local religious 
52 SARA (2005, p.3); Kuo (2011, pp. 1042-1064).
53 Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association and Bishops Conference of Catholic Church in China 
(2002); State Administration for Religious Affairs (2005); National Committee of Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China and China Christian Council (2006); 
Islamic Association of China (2006). Two more patriotic textbooks of Chinese Buddhism and 
Tibetan Buddhism are scheduled for publication.
54 More arguments of civil religions are presented at the Center of Religious Study of State 
Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C. (2010).
iNtRoduC tioN 37
association is a mandatory member of a higher-level religious association. 
So on and so forth, until they all belong to the national religious association. 
SARA has set up four departments to supervise Buddhism and Daoism (First 
Department), Protestantism and Catholicism (Second Department), Islam 
(Third Department), and other religions as well as theological seminaries 
(Fourth Department).55 SARA also has branch offices at each administrative 
level, although not necessarily at the town level due to shortage of personnel. 
Parallel to the SARA administrative system is the party’s United Fronts 
administrative system, which supervises both SARA’s work and religious 
groups. Appointments of clergy and theologians in religious groups need 
prior approval from SARA.56
In Taiwan, the one-way separation of state and religion has been gradu-
ally replaced by the American version of checks and balances between state 
and religion.57 Even during the martial law period, most religious groups 
maintained high autonomy in theological and management matters. The 
KMT party-state kept only the power for appointment of the leadership 
of the National Buddhist Association and the National Daoist Associa-
tion. After 1987, the state has confined itself to maintaining contacts with 
religious groups on public policies applicable to all social organizations, 
such as taxation, land use, building safety codes, f inancial fraud, and sexual 
harassment. Gone are the state’s interference in personnel and management 
of religious groups, nor does the state adjudicate theological disputes among 
different religious denominations. The state regularly provides small-scale 
subsidies to promote religious activities without discrimination. At the 
other end of religion-state relations, not only do Taiwan’s religious groups 
openly support different party candidates in elections, they also cooperate 
to organize demonstrations and lobby groups on ethical policies such as 
abortion, prostitution, gambling, divorce, and homosexual marriage.
In Hong Kong, due to its colonial heritage, the state and religion are 
largely separated in the sense that the state and religion interfere with 
each other’s business as little as possible. The exception is the Christian 
community, which regards its divine calling to intervene in public policies 
and to protest restraints on religious freedom by the Hong Kong government 
as well as the Chinese state. After the Umbrella Movement, the Chinese 
government started imposing restrictions on some Hong Kong theologians 
55 State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C., http://www.sara.gov.cn/index.htm, 
accessed 24 March 2016.
56 Chan and Carlson (2005).
57 Kuo (2013, pp. 1-38).
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who provided training courses to Chinese Christians in both China and 
Hong Kong. But no clear restriction by the Hong Kong government on 
religious freedom in Hong Kong has been reported.58
The conflict between state sovereignty and religious autonomy
This controversy is mainly associated with the Chinese Catholic community 
but is intertwined with religious policies for Islam and Tibetan Buddhism. 
The Vatican has insisted on its religious autonomy and the right to appoint 
bishops in all Catholic communities around the world. But the Chinese 
government has insisted that this would violate the state sovereignty of 
China. The Chinese government continues to appoint Chinese bishops with 
or without the Pope’s approval. This controversy is more complex than a se-
mantic debate about whether the Vatican is referring to religious ‘autonomy’ 
(zizhuquan 自主權) while China has invented a new term called ‘religious 
sovereignty’ (zongjiao zhuquan 宗教主權) and deems the two incompat-
ible. There is no such term as ‘religious sovereignty’ in political science 
textbooks or in international laws. But this does not prevent the CCP state 
from injecting nationalism into Chinese religions. In fact, the Chinese state 
is reluctant to seek a compromise with the Vatican on this issue for three 
possible reasons associated with Chinese patriotism.59 First, during the civil 
war from 1945 to 1949, the Vatican publicly sided with the KMT government 
and moved its embassy to Taiwan afterwards. The Vatican is still one of the 
two-dozen states that recognize Taiwan as an independent state. Second, 
the Vatican is not only the headquarters of the global Catholic community 
but also a sovereign state recognized by most states in the world. How can 
a foreign state have the right to appoint religious clergy in China? Chinese 
nationalists ask. Thirdly, due to the national trauma of imperialist invasion, 
the CCP government has insisted that all Chinese religions should follow the 
three-self principles of self-finance, self-management, and self-proselytizing 
(ziyang zizhi zichuan 自養,自治,自傳), and not to receive f inancial help or 
managerial direction from foreign religious groups. Over the past sixty 
years, this policy has helped to establish a vast group of Chinese bishops and 
their followers who have vested interests in maintaining the status quo to 
counter those who have maintained underground churches accepting the 
Vatican’s authority. Finally, the Polish revolution in 1989 is dubbed by the 
58 US State Department. Religious Freedom Report: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and 
Macau), annual reports. Accessed 6 April 2016.
59 For a more nuanced critical view of China-Vatican relations, see Leung and Wang (2016).
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CCP leadership as an ‘unholy alliance’ between the Polish Catholic Church 
and the American Central Intelligence Agency. Beijing has no intention to 
encourage the Chinese Catholics to follow the Polish exemplar.
Since 2000, Catholic experts in Beijing have frequently mentioned an 
incoming establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the 
Vatican because the two sides had reached a consensus over the appoint-
ment of bishops. That is, the Chinese government would propose a list of 
bishop candidates and the Pope would pick only from this list, the person 
whom he deemed able to please God. Then, the Chinese government and the 
Vatican would simultaneously announce the appointment to save the face 
of both governments. The Chinese government also wanted the Vatican’s 
embassy in Taiwan to move to Beijing immediately. If that should happen, 
it would constitute a watershed of religion-state relations in China, and not 
just a breakthrough in Beijing-Vatican diplomatic relations. But is Beijing 
ready to concede on the def inition of religious sovereignty? Will Beijing 
apply the new principle to leadership successions in other Chinese religions? 
Will the vested interests of the Chinese Catholic clergy not impede this 
arrangement? This controversy about religious sovereignty is also applicable 
and linked to Tibet over the appointment of the Dalai Lama, although it is 
only a smaller part of a more heretic problem of Tibetan independence.60
In the Taiwanese Catholic community, which constitutes less than one 
percent of the population, religious autonomy has never been an issue since 
1949. Most of the f irst-generation Taiwanese Catholics came from mainland 
China after 1949 and demonstrated their consistent loyalty to the KMT state. 
The state fully respected the religious autonomy of the Catholic Church, 
through which Taiwan could still have a voice, albeit small, in the world 
community. Even if China establishes a diplomatic relationship with the 
Vatican, it is not likely that the Catholic Church in Taiwan would make a 
loud political noise about it.
In the post-1997 era, Hong Kong’s Catholic community has been in close 
cooperation with the Protestant community to implement its Social Gospel 
agenda. During his tenure as Hong Kong’s bishop from 2002 to 2009, Bishop 
Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun 陳日君 assumed a critical role in transforming the 
social and political roles of Hong Kong Catholics. He frequently commented 
on religious freedom, social justice, and democratization in Hong Kong as 
well as human rights in China. The appointment of Bishop Zen seemed 
to be a unilateral action by the Vatican, amidst a low point of diplomatic 
relations between China and the Vatican. It is not clear whether Bishop 
60 Han and Paik (2014, pp. 69-98); Crowe (2013, pp. 1100-1135). 
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Zen’s successor Tang Han 湯漢 was jointly appointed by China and the 
Vatican or not. The fact that Bishop Tang has kept a low political prof ile 
while Cardinal Zen continues active engagement in social and political 
issues would further make China think twice before making concessions 
on religious ‘sovereignty’. The last thing Beijing wants to see under the iron 
canopy of Chinese patriotism is a Polish-style ‘unholy alliance’ replicated 
in Hong Kong.
The ‘superstition’ of Chinese traditional religions
The CCP government continues to follow policies hostile to folk religions of 
the Republican era. The fact that the Boxer Rebellion caused the national 
humiliation during the Eight-States Alliance War has become an institu-
tional memory of the CCP: folk religion is not a politically reliable religion, 
it is a superstition, and the CCP has no intention to see the reincarnation of 
the White Lotus in communist China. The CCP has developed two strategies 
to control folk religions since 1949. One strategy is to deny the existence 
of any folk religion. Previous folk religions were either merged into Dao-
ism or Buddhism, or forcefully eliminated. Folk religion is not among the 
f ive off icially recognized religions. The other strategy is to explain the 
controversy away. The term ‘folk religion’ is replaced by ‘folk custom and 
culture’ (mingsu wenhua 民俗文化). Since 1979, economic liberalization has 
resulted in the resurgence of folk-religion activities in the countryside, such 
as religious rituals held for the opening of businesses, weddings, funerals, 
and on traditional religious holidays. Most local off icials and party cadres 
have failed to stop this wave of resurgence in intensity and in quantity, but 
fear that the Beijing government may reprimand them for not suppressing 
these activities. Therefore, they have invented this new hermeneutics of 
‘folk custom and culture’. In fact, even the Boxer Rebellion is given a new 
nationalist interpretation. ‘They demonstrated the extraordinary courage 
and sense of justice of the Chinese people even in front of the enemy’s 
butcher’s knife’.61 Finally, folk religions now belong, de facto, to the jurisdic-
tion of the Fourth Department of SARA. And some provinces (e.g. Hunan) 
have adopted experimental regulations on folk religions, making them 
semi-off icial. But Falungong remains solidly on the blacklist of evil cults.
In Taiwan, the KMT party-state also maintained the anti-folk-religion 
policies of the Republican era. Similar to the CCP, the party-state put pres-
sure on folk religions to join either the Daoist Association or the Buddhist 
61 SARA (2005, p. 4).
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Association. Otherwise, they would be subject to harassment by local police, 
tax authorities, and the f ire department. However, due to the deep-rooted 
popularity of folk religion among local elites, the pressure was not high and 
implementation of the hostile policies was lax, as in traditional dynasties. 
Furthermore, similar to the CCP’s second strategy toward folk religion, 
local off icials of the KMT state called these folk-religion activities as ‘folk 
custom and culture’. Even after 1987 when religious freedom was fully 
guaranteed, some government off icials preferred to keep the term ‘folk 
custom and culture’ to avoid criticism for violating the state’s neutrality 
when they provided subsidies to these activities. For instance, the annual 
parade of goddess Mazu is very often called a ‘folk custom and culture’. 
Other than this, the Taiwanese state and society have largely abandoned 
the Republican era’s treatment of folk religion as superstition and accept 
it as one of regular religions protected by the constitution. Furthermore, 
different Mazu temples have actively played important political roles, both 
in the Taiwan independence movement and in the China unification move-
ment, as Chang Hsun’s chapter in this volume aptly analyzes.
Another example is Yiguandao, which is a syncretistic folk religion 
combining Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. It was declared an ‘evil 
cult’ by both the CCP government from 1949 to the present and by the KMT 
party-state from 1949 to 1987. Yiguandao had an ambiguous relationship 
with the White Lotus in terms of its major deities, rituals, and catechism. 
During WW II, it proselytized in east and northeast China occupied by 
Japanese forces. Therefore, both the CCP and the KMT declared it an ‘evil 
cult’. After WW II, it proselytized to KMT off icials in order to exonerate 
its ‘political crimes’ during the war. But it bet on the wrong political side 
again; the CCP won the civil war, and major leaders of Yiguandao fled to 
Hong Kong or Taiwan. The KMT government did not grant Yiguandao the 
status of a legal religion until after the lifting of martial law, while the CCP 
has not off icially removed it from the blacklist of evil cults.
In Hong Kong, the British colonial government did not bother Chinese 
folk religions. Neither has the Hong Kong government done so since 1997. 
Most folk religions are not involved in the debate over democratization, 
unif ication, Hong Kong independence, human rights, or other social issues. 
They also keep a safe distance from the activities of Falungong.
The applicability of Western democracy in the Chinese context
In light of the above analysis, the CCP government is not likely to reverse its 
staunch objection to Western democracy applied to China’s religion-state 
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relations. Western democracy severely challenges, if not blasphemes, 
every sacred component of Trinitarian Chinese patriotism. In the eyes 
of China’s political prophets and priests, democracy would diminish the 
sacred status of the Trinitarian god of ‘China’ by promoting multiple gods 
of other religions; democracy would discredit socialism; and democracy, the 
worst evil of all, would abolish the CCP rule. Although during the Hu Jintao 
regime from 2002 to 2012, the CCP government encouraged the ‘deepening 
of democratization’ to allow greater religious freedom, judicial justice, and 
civic participation in public policies, it was promoted under the iron canopy 
of Chinese patriotism.62 Even worse, in the past f ive years of the Xi Jinping 
regime, a rearguard phenomenon orchestrated by the ‘fundamentalists’ of 
Chinese patriotism seem to have replaced the liberal Chinese patriotism. 
There has been little talk about the ‘deepening of democratization’ in the 
mass media or in the academic community. In its place is the ‘seven no-talks’ 
(qibujiang 七不講; CCP Document #9 May 2013) forbidding university pro-
fessors and the mass media to discuss subjects related to universal values, 
freedom of press, civil society, civic rights, historical errors committed by 
the CCP, privileged capitalist class, and judicial independence.63
In Taiwan, democracy is the new game and the ‘only game in town’.64 
Although religious freedom was relatively well-protected during the mar-
tial law period, it is much better protected by the democratic institutions 
of independent courts, elections, energetic civic organizations, schools, 
autonomous mess media, and subsidiaries of international NGOs in Taiwan. 
After three peaceful turnovers of government, Taiwan’s democracy has 
been consolidated considerably and provides for a healthy checks-and-
balances relationship between the state and religion. However, the phantom 
of Chinese patriotism constantly scrutinizes Taiwan’s democracy from the 
other side of the Taiwan Strait. As long as Taiwan’s democracy does not 
off icially declare independence, Chinese patriotism is not in a hurry to 
start a holy war against it.
By contrast, it is a very different story in the case of Hong Kong’s religion-
state relations. After all, China exercises full sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
Democracy in Hong Kong is still a dream to be realized, if ever, because it 
directly challenges the ‘China Dream’. Although the Chinese government 
62 Kuo (2014).
63 BBC China. Xi Jinping New Deal: Sixteen requirements after seven no-talks. http://www.
bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/05/130528_china_thought_control_youth, accessed 6 April 
2016.
64 Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 5-14) argue that only when strategic elites unanimously regard de-
mocracy as ‘the only game in town’ does this new democracy become a consolidated democracy.
iNtRoduC tioN 43
has announced that popular elections of the legislature would be held in 
2020 and direct elections of the chief executive off icer would be held in 
2017, new constraints have been imposed on these ‘democratic’ elections. It 
is to the credit of democratic movements (particularly the Christian com-
munity) that a civil religion is on the political horizon. But the democratic 
movements in Hong Kong since 1997 seem to justify Beijing’s concern that 
democratic movements are getting out of hand and are corrupting the 
minds of believers in Chinese patriotism. In the mind of Chinese political 
prophets and priests, is it not much easier to convert the seven-million Hong 
Kong people to Chinese patriotism, than to convert the 1.3 billion Chinese 
people to Hong Kong’s civil religion?
Conclusion and chapter outlines
What is new about religious nationalism in Chinese societies, and what are 
the implications for their internal stability and external relations? Theoreti-
cally speaking, this chapter contributes to the study of religious nationalism 
through the revisionist approach strengthened by neurotheology and new 
institutionalism. It assumes that religious thinking is part of human nature 
and is an integral part of empirical analysis as well as of the normative 
prescription for religion-state institutional relations.
In China, aided by the omnipresent and omnipotent Leninist state, the 
state religion of Chinese patriotism is close to becoming the hegemonic 
religion of all religions, not only requiring all other religions to be submis-
sive to it but also to integrate Chinese patriotism into their theologies and 
organizational structures. Thus, the Leninist state’s totalitarian control 
over religion has reached a historically high point never seen in traditional 
and modern China, or elsewhere in the world. However, the religious text-
books of patriotism also reveal some new resistance to this omnipotent 
and omnipresent state religion. While expressing support for China’s glory 
and unif ication, most religions are reluctant to integrate socialism and the 
CCP rule in their theologies and organizational structures. Quite a few 
arguments related to civil religion are competing with Chinese patriotism 
in these textbooks. It remains to be seen whether Chinese patriotism will 
tolerate (and if yes, to what extent) the emergence of civil religion in the 
society. But the prospects for resolving China’s territorial disputes with its 
neighbors do not look bright; after all, these territories have been sanctif ied 
by Chinese patriotism as the ‘holy national lands’ (shensheng guotu 神聖
國土).
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In Taiwan, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism since the 1970s reached its 
zenith during the DPP regime (2000 to 2008), lost its momentum during 
the KMT regime (2008 to 2016) and came back strongly after the DPP took 
over the government again in 2016. Chinese nationalism f illed the minds 
of most Taiwanese from 1945 to 1987, and it was rejuvenated during the 
KMT regime from 2008 to 2016. KMT lost power in 2016 but it may rise from 
near extinction with the help of the Chinese state, which worries about the 
independence-leaning tendency of the DDP regime. Squeezed between 
Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism, a young civil religion is 
shared by many religions which gradually adapt to political democratiza-
tion by incorporating democracy in their theologies and organizational 
structures, and exercise a healthy checks-and-balances relationship with 
the democratic state. It may take generations for the Taiwanese civil religion 
to consolidate their religious and political support, barring a unif ication 
war in the Taiwan Strait.
In Hong Kong, what is new about religious nationalism is that it includes 
an embryotic civil religion and Hong Kong nationalism. However, these two 
religious nationalisms are not widely nor deeply shared by Hong Kong’s other 
religious groups, which tilt more toward Chinese patriotism. Furthermore, 
given the special political relationships between Hong Kong and China, 
political theologies of religious nationalisms of the two clash head-on with 
Chinese patriotism. Lacking a geographical and political buffer zone like its 
Taiwanese counterparts, the Chinese state and the Hong Kong government 
are not likely to respond kindly to these political ‘heresies’.65
Finally, for the general theoretical and normative question about compat-
ibility between religion and democracy, the Taiwanese model probably 
provides a moral and practical alternative to existing theories of religion-
state relations, such as the state’s dominance over religion (the modernity 
approach), religious fundamentalism, and the strict separation of state 
and religion.66 In particular, it may help to gradually transform Chinese 
patriotism into a civil religion with Chinese characteristics for the benefit 
of Chinese people and neighboring countries.
The fourteen chapters of this book are divided into three parts. After an 
introductory chapter, Part I analyzes the origins of Chinese religion-state 
65 In an immediate response to the announcement on the internet about the establishment 
of the Hong Kong Nationalist Party, the China Liaison Off ice in Hong Kong sternly warned that 
it would not tolerate its existence. United Daily News, 1 April 2016.
66 Juergensmeyer (1993, chapters 7 and 8) proposed legal suggestions for the coexistence of 
religious nationalism and democracy but could not f ind workable cases to substantiate his 
proposal.
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relations before 1949. Part II discusses the contemporary religion-state 
relations in China. Part III explores contemporary religion-state relations 
in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Chapter 1 (Religion, State, and Religious Nationalism in Chinese Socie-
ties) compares the modernity approach and the revisionist approach of 
religion-state relations in China. Building on the revisionist approach but 
adding theories of neurotheology and institutionalism, it compares three 
models of religious nationalism in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Five 
different dimensions of this religious nationalism are further elaborated 
in order to lay down the common theoretical and empirical foundations of 
all the chapters in this book.
Part I (Chinese Religion and Nationalism before 1949) explores the origin 
of religion-nationalism relations in the late nineteenth century to the early 
twentieth century when Western nationalism was introduced to China. 
Chapter 2 (Idea of Chineseness and Ethnic Thought of Wang Fuzhi) studies 
the f irst Chinese theory of nationalism by Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692). Wang 
employed a Daoist concept of ‘ether’ (qi 氣) to define a Chinese nationalism 
that goes beyond traditional loyalty to dynastic rulers. His def inition of 
Chinese nationalism inspired many nationalist intellectuals around 1900. 
Chapter 3 (Missionizing, Civilizing, and Nationizing: Linked Concepts of 
Compelled Change) makes convincing arguments that the contents of 
Chinese nationalism in traditional and modern China are very similar to 
those of Christianity in the colonial era. Both aimed to convert the inferior 
cultures (religions)to their superior ones. Chapter 4 (The Nation in Religion 
and Religion in the Nation) studies how the Chinese nation and religion 
construct each other by the conception of ‘religious sphere’ (zongjiaojie 宗教
界). However, the end result is mutual influence and resistance of the nation 
and religion. It helps to explain, among many Chinese cases of state-religion 
conflicts, why the CCP state has invented and insisted on the principle of 
‘religious sovereignty’ in negotiating with the Vatican on the appointment 
of bishops in China. Chapter 5 (History and Legitimacy in Contemporary 
China: Towards Competing Nationalisms) studies two nationalist incidents 
in modern Chinese history (the destruction of the Old Summer Palace in 
1860 and CCP-KMT relations in the Republican era) which the current CCP 
state has reinterpreted for the promotion of new nationalist programs. It 
demonstrates vividly that when these nationalist programs are promoted 
only in a rational manner without religious devotion and holiness, they 
easily fall into endless rational debates which ironically undermine these 
nationalist programs and the very legitimacy of the CCP state. Chapter 6 
(Pilgrimage and Hui Muslim Identity in the Republican Era) explores how 
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the Chinese Muslim developed both Chinese nationalist and cross-national 
identities in the Republican era through the Islamic pilgrimage ritual (hajj).
Part II (Religion and Nationalism in Contemporary China) focuses on 
contemporary religion-state relations in China, although traditional and 
Republic relations are not ignored. Chapter 7 (Religion and the Nation: Con-
fucian and New Confucian Religious Nationalism) discusses the religious 
aspects of New Confucianism promoted by the contemporary CCP state. 
State Confucianism existed in Chinese dynasties and continues to exist 
in modern China in the form of ‘orthopraxy’ (the center of all religions) 
but not in the form of ‘orthodoxy’ (the hegemonic religion excluding all 
other religions). In contrast to the CCP’s State Confucianism, Chapter 8 
(Yiguandao under the Shadow of Nationalism) demonstrates that a religious 
Confucianism (Yiguandao) may be more popular and sustainable among the 
Chinese. But State Confucianism in both China and pre-1987 Taiwan had 
persecuted this religious Confucianism for its cooperation with external 
and internal political enemies. Chapter 9 (Daoism and Nationalism in 
Recent and Contemporary China) analyzes the efforts by contemporary 
Daoist leaders to promote Daoism in order to build a community, forge 
cultural self-identity, and strengthen the nation-state. It concludes that 
the CCP state’s effort to modernize Daoism according to the Christian 
model has resulted in the serious reduction of complexity and dynamics of 
Daoism, which is the only native religion among the f ive off icial religions 
recognized by the state. Chapter 10 (Nationalism Matters: Among Mystics 
and Martyrs of Tibet) uses two case studies (Tibetan Buddhist encamp-
ments and self-immolations) to demonstrate that Tibetan Buddhists have 
a choice between moderate fundamentalism and militant nationalism 
in response to Chinese religious nationalism. Chapter 11 (‘We Are Good 
Citizens’: Tension between Protestants and the State in Contemporary 
China) analyzes all the major religious policies and church confessions in 
contemporary China. It concludes that both the CCP and house churches 
support Chinese nationalism but emphasize different parts of it, resulting 
in their antagonistic relationships in the past and in the foreseeable future.
Part III (Religion and Nationalism in Taiwan and Hong Kong) studies 
contemporary religion-state relations in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Chapter 
12 (Religion and National Identity in Taiwan: State Formation and Moral 
Sensibilities) compares the Buddhist Foguanshan which subscribes to Chi-
nese identity, and the Presbyterian Church which is an active proponent of 
Taiwan independence. These two cases clearly demonstrate that the bound-
ary between the sacred and the secular is easily transgressed, and that the 
state and religion continuously construct each other. Chapter 13 (Multiple 
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Religious and National Identities: Mazu Pilgrimages across the Taiwan Strait 
after 1987) analyzes a cross-strait pilgrimage from Xingang Mazu Temple 
(Taiwan) to Yongchun (China) which resulted in the establishment of a 
Taiwanese branch temple in China. It demonstrates how local politicians 
employ the pilgrimage for both religious and political purposes, not neces-
sarily consistent with the nationalist programs of the central governments. 
Chapter 14 (Salvation and Rights in Hong Kong) compares Catholicism and 
Buddhism (more emphasis on the latter) as major proponents of a civil 
religion against the Chinese state religion of patriotism during the Umbrella 
Movement in 2014. However, unlike their Christian counterparts who were 
motivated by a common political theology, Hong Kong Buddhists were mo-
tivated by personal salvation. Therefore, this chapter not only demonstrates 
that the state and religion are neither dichotomous nor conflictual, such as 
the modernity approach assumes, but they can be coherent institutional 
actors as well as diffused individuals, thus, making the study of Chinese 
religious nationalisms even more nuanced and fascinating.
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Chinese Religion and Nationalism before 1949

2 The Idea of Chineseness and Ethnic 
Thought of Wang Fuzhi
Chi-shen Chang
Abstract
This chapter explores Wang Fuzhi’s ethnic thought from new perspectives.1 
First, I will analyze three connotations of Chineseness – geographical, 
cultural, ethnic – upheld in the history of Chinese ethnic thought. Second, 
Wang’s major contributions to the development of Chinese ethnic thought 
is outlined, such as presenting new concepts concerning the nature of 
the Chinese and the ‘barbarians’, and the new ethics that regards the 
protection of the Chinese interest as the ultimate good and the supreme 
natural law. Finally, I will compare Wang’s ethnocentric ideas to the idea 
of ‘Chinese nation’ advocated by Liang Qichao at the turn of the twentieth 
century, and examine the impact of Wang’s ethnocentric works on the 
intellectuals in late nineteenth-century China.
Keywords: Wang Fuzhi, ethnicity, Chinese nationalism, Chineseness
Levenson’s thesis and the connotations of Chineseness
Regarding the origins of Chinese nationalism, the most influential view, in 
terms of insight and originality, might be that proposed by Joseph Levenson. 
According to Levenson, Chinese nationalism was mainly the product of the 
crisis of Chinese culture which was, in turn, the product of the Western 
impact on premodern China. In his presentation of the famous ‘culturalism 
to nationalism thesis’,2 Levenson outlined the historical process of the 
emergence of nationalism in early twentieth-century China. He argued 
that Chinese nationalism originated from a change in the object of loyalty. 
Before the nineteenth century, the ethically legitimate object of loyalty 
was Chinese culture or ‘human civilization’ (tianxia 天下; or all-under-
heaven) for the cultivated elite, and the ‘dynasty’ (chaodai 朝代) for the 
1 In this chapter, the term “ethnic thought” has two meanings: the thought on ethnicity and 
ethnocentric thought.
2 Townsend (1996).
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masses. Challenged by the West, Chinese culture lost its appeal of universal 
validity. As the Chinese intellectuals could not bear to accept a China 
inferior to the West, and Chinese culture could not serve as the base for 
regaining superiority, they turned to the Chinese ‘state’ (guo 國) as the 
new object of loyalty, and the masses were mobilized to follow. The result 
was the birth of Chinese nationalism. But the story did not end there. The 
shift from culturalism to nationalism produced an identity crisis, as the 
allegiance to the Chinese state could not satisfy the Chinese intellectuals’ 
need for a cultural identity, and neither could Western culture, as it would 
never be regarded as their own. The spiritual schism caused by the need of 
abandoning the previous cultural identity on the one hand, and the sense 
of homelessness in a Westernized world on the other, caused the Chinese 
intellectuals trapped in a state of spiritual rootlessness, and formed the 
essence of modern Chinese intellectual history.
Despite its originality and insightfulness, Levenson’s thesis has some 
drawbacks which have drawn a great deal of criticism. Especially its 
theoretical simplicity at the expense of historiographical accuracy received 
major criticism. Scholars have pointed out that there was a tradition in 
Chinese history which emphasized the ethnic distinction between ‘Chinese’ 
(hua 華) and ‘barbarians’ (yi 夷).3 This distinction dated back to the South 
Song period (1127-1279) or even earlier, a fact which was either silenced by 
Levenson in his thesis, or distorted when he portrayed the late Ming thinker 
Wang Fuzhi and the late Qing thinker Zhang Binlin 章炳麟 (1869-1936) as 
culturalists.4 Schwartz, Lin, Cohen, Duara, and Townsend also pointed out 
the methodological prejudice, misunderstanding, or inadequacy inherent 
in the ‘tradition-modern’ and ‘emotion-reason’ dichotomies employed by 
Levenson as the analytical framework of the thesis.5
Considering the def iciency of Levenson’s thesis in accounting for the 
emergence of Chinese nationalism, other more accurate and hence less 
controversial approaches might be worthwhile. I have attempted such an ap-
proach , which focuses on the connotations of the term ‘China’ (zhongguo 中
國) that were formed and used in Chinese history before the eighteenth 
century, and analyzes the change of primacy among these connotations. 
3 For instance, Tillman (1978); Dikötter (1992); Duara (1995, p. 58-61); Townsend (1996, pp. 3-4, 
13-14); Lodén (1996); Chang (2009b); and Yang (2014). I am indebted to Professor Hoyt Tillman for 
informing me about Yang’s PhD dissertation in his Wang Meng Ou Lecture delivered at National 
Chengchi University on 2 November 2015. 
4 Levenson (1968, pp. 96-97).
5 Schwartz (1972); Lin (1979, pp. 104-105); Cohen (1984, pp. 61-79); Duara (1995, pp. 89-90); 
Townsend (1996, pp. 1-24). 
the idea of ChiNeSeNeSS aNd ethNiC thought of WaNg fuzhi 57
According to a ‘cultural language approach’,6 there were three major con-
notations of the term ‘China’ in Chinese history, namely the geographical, 
the cultural, and the ethnic.7 Before the Song period, the most often used 
connotations were either the geographical or the cultural ones. But from 
the Song period on, a gradual shift took place and the ethnic connotation 
of China became more and more prominent in some intellectuals’ use of 
the term. The idea that ‘China’ (the geographical-political China) was the 
China of the ‘Chinese people’ (zhongguoren 中國人) and should not be ruled 
by aliens eventually appeared from the late Yuan period on. It gathered 
momentum during the Ming period, but was suppressed under the Manchu 
reign. In the last years of the Qing period, that idea rapidly peaked due to 
the provocative propaganda by anti-Manchu revolutionaries. From then 
on, the ethnic connotation of China became the primary connotation, and 
the other two were assimilated into it and eventually lost the autonomy 
they used to enjoy in def ining China and Chinese identity. This change of 
primacy among the three connotations of China marked the emergence of 
Chinese nationalism.8
The merit of this approach lies therein that it partly incorporates 
Levenson’s insights but without his historical inaccuracies. Levenson was 
correct in partly identifying two connotations of Chinese identity, namely 
the cultural one (tianxia) and the geo-political one (guo), but he missed 
the ethnic one. He was therefore inclined to overemphasize the factor of 
culture, taking the crisis of Chinese culture as the decisive force in the 
shift of loyalty from culture to state. What he ignored was the importance 
of the ethnic connotation of China in def ining Chinese identity, and it was 
the mobilization of this connotation that largely caused the change of the 
content of Chinese identity, which then led to the emergence of Chinese 
nationalism.
Focusing on the changes of Chinese identity reflected in the changing 
primacy of the connotations of China, the above approach might shed a 
different light on our understanding of the modern intellectual history of 
China, since the latter was situated in the longue durée of Chinese history 
viewed as a history of identity (similar to Levenson’s approach) or ethnic 
thought. Understood in this way, modern Chinese intellectual history would 
no longer be viewed as a dilemma caused by the diff icult transition from 
6 Chang (2009b, pp. 8, 18).
7 Chang (2015, p. 6).
8 Regarding the change of primacy among the three connotations of China from the sixth to 
the seventeenth century, see Chang (2009b, pp. 227-323).
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tradition to modernity, but instead as the creative endeavor in search of 
new connotations of China and hence new meanings of Chinese identity.9 
In contrast to Levenson’s thesis, which asserted that it was the crisis of the 
cultural China that resulted in the shift of loyalty to the political China,10 I 
would suggest that it was the connotation ethnic China (China as an ethnic 
polity) which overtook geographical and cultural China and, once mixed 
with the new idea of modern ‘state’, became the primary connotation in 
the early twentieth century. This idea then of the ethnic Chinese nation 
drove the historical Chinese culture to transform and rejuvenate. This 
stage of ethnic-driven cultural transformation could be viewed as the latest 
development in the long history of Chinese identity.
The clarif ication of the three connotations of Chineseness would thus lay 
the foundation for a new theoretical framework, which is different from that 
of Levenson, for understanding the formation of Chinese nationalism. In the 
second section of this chapter, I attempt to explain these connotations. Such 
understanding will also be used as a guide to analyze the ethnic thought of 
Wang Fuzhi. In addition, I examine the impact of the circulation of Wang’s 
ethnocentric works on the educated elites between 1840s and 1894.
A few words regarding the Chinese term of zhongguo 中國 in this chapter 
might be necessary. It is well-known that the term ‘China’ might be etymo-
logically related to Qin 秦, and thus was probably a term used by peoples 
outside China to refer to geographical China. If that was indeed the case, it 
means that there might have been no such term as ‘China’ before the Qin 
period. On the other hand, the term zhongguo had been used in pre-Qin 
texts, thus to render it as ‘China’ might be susceptible to a certain form of 
anachronism, if the term is discussed in the pre-Qin context. Moreover, 
when the term zhongguo was used in post-Qin historical texts, in some cases 
it referred to the ‘Central Plain’ (zhongyuan中原), in other cases it referred 
to a culture which stood for the human civilization. In both cases, to render 
the term as ‘China’ would make it diff icult to convey the above meanings, 
since ‘China’ is normally understood as referring to a geographical-political 
domain rather than a culture, and the scope of this domain is much larger 
than that of the ‘Central Plain’. Nevertheless, to replace ‘China’ with zhong-
guo would be rather awkward in style. To balance conceptual accuracy 
and style, the tentative solution I adopt is to render the term as zhongguo 
whenever necessary (e.g. when dealing with its connotations in the pre-Qin 
9 Duara (1995, p. 90) expressed a similar opinion. 
10 Regarding ‘state’ (guo 國), Levenson did not distinguish the political regime which ruled 
geographical China from ethnic China, which was regarded as an ethnic polity.
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period, or when rendering it as ‘China’ might be misleading), and use ‘China’ 
in the remaining parts of this chapter.11
Zhongguo and its three major connotations
The term zhongguo had already appeared in the Western Zhou period 
(1046-771 BC). Its earliest use might have either referred to the former 
domain of the Shang polity (1675-1046 BC)12 or to luoyi 雒邑, also known as 
Chengzhou 成周. It might also mean ‘the city that was located in the middle 
of the peoples or polities, with medium distance to them from all direc-
tions’.13 During the ‘Spring and Autumn’ (chunqiu 春秋, 770-476 BC) period, 
zhongguo had about six meanings: (1) the domain of the king of Zhou 周; (2) 
the political bloc with the king of Zhou and his guardian vassals as its heads 
(zhuxia 諸夏); (3) the political-geographical domain of the zhuxia bloc; (4) 
the area inside the city walls of a polity’s capital; (5) the domain of a polity; 
(6) human civilization.14 In the Warring States (zhanguo 戰國, 403-221 BC) 
texts, zhongguo developed at least eight meanings: (1) the zhuxia bloc; (2) 
the Central Plain; (3) Nine Provinces ( jiuzhou 九州); (4) the area of the Three 
Jins (三晉); (5) the capital of legendary sage-kings; (6) the area within the 
bounds of a state or one’s homeland; (7) a medium-size state; (8) a cultural 
community which symbolizes the human civilization.15 When used in the 
third meaning, zhongguo was equivalent to Nine Provinces, ‘four oceans’ 
(sihai 四海), or ‘inland among surrounding oceans’ (hainei 海內), and all 
three of the latter terms referred to a geopolitical land mass estimated to 
be a quadratic domain with 3,000 Chinese miles (li 里) on each side.16 It is 
11 I would like to thank Professor Cheng-tian Kuo for his suggestion concerning this issue.
12 The rendering of zhongguo as ‘the Central State’ by Hsu and Linduff (1988, p. 96) seems to 
be an example of this view. 
13 Chang (2009a, pp. 172-184) listed three meanings of zhongguo during the Western Zhou 
period: (1) luoyi; (2) one of Zhou’s capitals; (3) central state (Shang polity).
14 Chang (2009a, pp. 185-190). Regarding the connotation of zhuxia, see Chang (2009c).
15 Chang (2009a, pp. 218-233). For a somewhat comprehensive list of all the entries in the 
Warring States texts in which zhongguo was used (there are 108), see Chang (2009c, pp. 219-233). 
In the recently published critical edition of Zhan Guo Zong Heng Jia Shu 戰國縱橫家書, there 
is one additional entry: 「秦雖強, 終不敢出塞流河, 絕中國而攻齊」 (In spite of its superior 
force, Qin dares not to go out of the fortress and march along the river, cross the Central Plain 
and attack Qi. Zhan Guo Zong Heng Jia Shu, No.8, p. 215), in which the term zhongguo might refer 
to the Central Plain. For the cultural and quasi-ethnic connotations of the concept of China 
during the Warring States period, see Chang (2009a, pp. 166-180).
16 Chang (2011, p. 32). The above content was taken from Chishen Chang and Kuan-Hsin Chen 
, ‘Tracking Tianxia: on Intellectual Self-Positioning’ in Wang Ban ed. 2017. Rethinking Chinese 
60 Chi-SheN ChaNg 
noteworthy that, although zhongguo has been translated as ‘the Central 
State’, ‘the Central Country’ or ‘the Middle Kingdom’ in later times, there 
seems, in the Warring States texts, to be no example of the term being used 
to refer to these meanings.17 In other words, during the Warring States 
period, it seems that the term was not used to refer to a unitary political 
community.
Among the above eight meanings, the second (zhongguo = the Central 
Plain), third (zhongguo = Nine Provinces) and the eighth (zhongguo = a 
cultural community) could be regarded as the origins of three major con-
notations of Chineseness in later times. The second and the third meanings 
formed the political-geographical connotation of Chineseness, whereas the 
eighth meaning formed the cultural connotation of Chineseness. As for 
the ethnic connotation of Chineseness, it was derived from the political-
geographical one. The three connotations of Chineseness are explained 
as follows:
The political-geographical connotation of Chineseness
Zhongguo = the Central Plain. The meaning of zhongguo as referring to 
the Central Plain (the area which has today’s Henan 河南, western part of 
Shandong 山東 and eastern part of Shanxi 陝西 as its core) could be traced 
back to its meanings in the Western Zhou 西周 period and the Spring and 
Autumn period, which respectively referred to the area of the ex-Shang 商
polity and the political-geographical domain of the zhuxia polities. The 
Central Plain had been the center of the political world from Shang to 
the Spring and Autumn period, and therefore enjoyed a privileged status 
compared to other areas. Polities or peoples in this area tended to consider 
themselves as China, and considered those in other areas as ‘barbarians’.18
Zhongguo = Nine Provinces. The idea of Nine Provinces had several origins 
as well as versions.19 According to the most famous version, i.e. The Tribute 
of Yu (禹貢), Nine Provinces was created by the god-sage Yu.20 Legend says 
that Yu terminated the Great Flood (the metaphor of chaos and disorder) 
with a divine hydro-engineering work, which had the strong metaphorical 
Visions of World Order, Durham: Duke University Press.
17 Fairbank (1974, p. 2).
18 The primary meaning of yidi during this period might be ‘outsiders of zhuxia’ rather than 
‘barbarians’. See Chang (2009c).
19 Chang (2009c, pp. 200-205); for detailed citations of these versions, see Chang (2009b, 
appendix 11).
20 See Legge (1935/2000).
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implication of creating a new order. After the work was done, Yu established 
the restored lands into nine provinces within the political framework of 
a unitary kingdom.21 It has been pointed out by many scholars that the 
locations of these provinces reflected the geo-political reality from late 
Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States period, which suggests 
that these versions of the Nine Provinces probably appeared during this 
time.22 If that is the case, the significant implication of Yu’s establishment of 
Nine Provinces is that, at least from the late Spring and Autumn period on, 
a notion was gradually forming that envisioned a unitary kingdom where 
the major polities of the time were its local administrative units. In other 
words, the discourse of Nine Provinces emerging from a multi-polity system 
presented an imagination of a unitary kingdom. When such a kingdom 
became a reality from the Qin period on, Nine Provinces also became the 
symbol of the territorial domain of China. One example could be found in 
a text from the Han 漢 period:
The reason why the Annals of Spring and Autumn emphasized the Unity 
was that, due to the Unity, the world within the six limits shared the same 
customs, and Nine Provinces were ruled under the same set of principles.23
As both the Central Plain and Nine Provinces could be symbols of China, 
it might be convenient to call the former the ‘symbol of China in the nar-
row sense’ and the latter the ‘symbol of China in the broad sense’. The 
Central Plain as the ‘symbol of China in the narrow sense’ had particular 
signif icance during the period of multiple kingdoms. During such periods, 
since no kingdom was able to rule the whole domain of Nine Provinces, the 
kingdom that ruled the Central Plain enjoyed a more prestigious status as 
the legitimate ruler of China than the others.24
The cultural connotation of Chineseness
At least by the late Warring States period, a notion had been formed that 
zhongguo stood for a cultural community in which its peoples shared a 
common culture. The oft-mentioned characteristics of this common culture 
included language, costumes, customs, and values. In the case of language 
21 I follow Legge’s rendering of zhou as ‘province’.
22 Chang (2009a, pp. 200-206).
23 Rao (2003, p. 26).
24 Chang (2009b, p. 222; 2015, pp. 12-15).
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and costumes, the idea that zhongguo was a domain where peoples within 
it shared the same language and costume could be found in The Springs 
and Autumns of Mr Lü (呂氏春秋):
The size of the domain composed with polities where their peoples wore 
the same costume of hats and sashes, reaching each other easily by boats 
and carriages, and could communicate with each other with no need of 
translators, was about a square with 3000 li on each side.25
In the debate kindled by king Wu lin of Zhao about converting Chinese 
costume to that of Hu 胡, one opponent’s argument showed that China was 
regarded as a cultural community with a civilization higher than that of Hu:
Prince Chen said: ‘… According to your servant’s knowledge, China is the 
realm in which the wise and intelligent men live, to which the variety of 
resources and wealth flow and converge, in which the teachings of sages 
was taught, the values of benevolence and righteousness, the culture 
delivered through classics like Books of Poetry, Historical Documents, 
Rites and Music, is practiced, and the excellent arts of all sorts are applied. 
It is, therefore, a realm to which peoples from afar come and learn, and 
a role model for barbarians to follow’.26
From the Han period on, the idea of zhongguo as a unitary cultural com-
munity continued to be held, and the content of this culture was more or 
less f ixed:
Language (spoken and written): Chinese
Type of economy: sedentary agriculture
Type of polity: a monarch rules over peasants with bureaucrats as aides.
Value system: Confucianism (with sages kings and sages as its symbolic 
f igures) and sacred classics as the core; a doctrine of ethical relations 
between the ruler and the ruled, parents and children, husband and wife, 
the elder and the junior, and between friends; the cultural performance 
of rites and music; the political doctrine of benevolent rule.
One example in the text of the Song period showed this connotation of 
zhongguo:
25 Lü Shi Chun Qiu Xin Jiao Shi, p. 1119.
26 Zhangguo Ce Jian Zheng, p. 1047.
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China (zhongguo) is the world which has been ruled by teachings of sages, 
where its inhabitants were practicing four major occupations and wore 
the civilized costumes … where life is regulated by morality, people are 
cultivated by civilized rites and music, with the principles regarding f ive 
ethical relations prevalent as their norm.27
The ethnic connotation of Zhongguo
Wang Mingke has pointed out that, by the Warring States period, a notion 
had emerged which considered the mythical f igure of Yellow Emperor 
(Huangdi 黃帝) as the common ancestor of various clans living in China.28 
According to this notion, for a people to be regarded as ethnic Chinese, their 
recent ancestor must be acknowledged as the descendent of Yellow Emperor. 
Otherwise they would be regarded as ethnic ‘barbarians’. In this chapter, I 
use ‘ethnic Chinese’ to denote peoples imagined as one homogenous ethnic 
group living in the domain of China, and ‘ethnic China’ to denote China 
understood (or imagined) as an ethnic polity, namely, a political body 
composed of people of the same ethnicity.
It is noteworthy that from the Qin period on, the notion of ethnic Chinese 
was, conceptually speaking, simply the derivative of that of geographical 
China. The reason for this is as follows: since Yellow Emperor was the ances-
tor of the ethnic Chinese, he was the very f irst Chinese and there could be 
no Chinese prior to him. But if there could be no Chinese prior to Yellow 
Emperor, he could not be a descendant of any Chinese, how then could he 
be claimed to be ethnic Chinese? It seems that the only reason to claim so 
was that he was born and lived in the domain of geographical China. In 
other words, for the concept of ethnic Chinese to be a reasonable one, it 
has to build on the concept of geographical China. This means that there 
could be no concept of ethnic Chinese until the concept of geographical 
China came into existence. Therefore, in the case of China, the concept of 
ethnic Chinese and that of geographical China were not two independent 
concepts, but rather the former was intimately connected with the latter. 
The inner connection of ethnicity to geography seems to be somewhat 
particular of China, and might call for further attention.
27 Shi Jie, ‘Deviant Creeds’, f irst essay, Writings of Mr Shi of Zulai, Book 5, p. 60.
28 Wang (2006, pp. 75-86). It appears that, for the term ‘di’ in Haungdi 黃帝, ‘Lord’ might 
be a better translation than the conventional ‘Emperor’, as the latter was the translation for 
Huangdi 皇帝, a term coined by the First Emperor of Qin by combining ‘huang’ and ‘di’. 
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A note on the relationship of the notion of ‘ethnic Chinese’ with ‘the Han’ 
or ‘ethnic Han’ might be of some interest. First of all, the term zhongguo 
was used in the Warring States text to refer to the people living in the 
geographical zhongguo, who were different in nature to peoples of outside 
areas: ‘Peoples in the areas located in the f ive cardinal directions, such 
as zhongguo, rong, yi, are of their own respective natures. Among these 
natures, none of them may be applied to any other’.29 The term zhongguo 
in the text apparently had an ethnic connotation, referring to a people 
whose ethnicity was different from other peoples. Compared to this, the 
term ‘the Han’ or ‘ethnic Han’ appeared later, as it was the product of the 
establishment of the Han Dynasty. Second, summarized in a very general 
way, two terminological pairs used to refer to the ethnic Chinese and other 
peoples of different ethnicity could be found in the texts of historical China. 
One pair is ‘Chinese versus yidi’.30 The above-quoted Warring States text 
provides an example of its use. The other pair is ‘X versus Han’, in which 
X could be any ethnic group, while Han referred to the ethnic Chinese. It 
appears that the ‘Chinese versus yidi’ pair, when used by the ethnic Chinese 
literati, often implied a certain sense of superiority to yidi. According to my 
limited knowledge of Wang Fuzhi, in his works he very rarely, if ever, used 
Han to denote ethnic Chinese.31
With the three connotations of Chineseness as a tool, researchers 
can discern two ways in which the term zhongguo was used in Chinese 
historical materials. One of them is referential, using the term China to 
refer to a political-geographical domain, a unitary cultural community, 
or an ethnic group. The other way is normative or identity-laden, using 
the term zhongguo to express the user’s opinion about what zhongguo is 
supposed to be, or the zhongguo with which the user identified. These two 
ways may be independent from each other, but sometimes they coincide. An 
example of zhongguo used to denote a political geographical domain could 
be found in the following early Tang 唐 text: ‘The First Emperor (of Qin) 
built fortresses in remote areas, which contributed to the disintegration 
of China’.32 Another middle-Tang text showed that zhongguo was used to 
denote a unitary cultural community (represented by the zhuxia bloc): ‘In 
29 ‘Sagacious King’s institutions’, in Book of Rite, p. 247. See Chang (2009c, p. 226, n. 88, entry 75).
30 Terms like man蠻, yi, rong戎, di狄 appeared in the Warring States records of ideas of the 
Spring and Autumn period. One of their original meanings might simply be ‘outsider’ rather 
than ‘barbarian’. See Chang (2009c).
31 I would like to thank one of the reviewers of this chapter for raising the question of ‘Han’ 
for discussion.
32 Chu Suiliang , ‘Pleading against the stationing of troops in Gaochang’.
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his Annals of Spring and Autumn, Confucius treating those vassals who 
adopted the rites of “barbarian” as “barbarian”, whereas treating those who 
upgraded themselves by following the rites of the Chinese as Chinese.’33 
As for China used in the form of ‘people of China’ (zhongguo zhi ren 中國
之人, the Chinese) to denote an ethnic group, the following late Yuan text 
provided an example: ‘Because, regarding the people of our China, Heaven 
would certainly mandate men of China to well look after them. There is no 
possibility that a “barbarian” would be allowed to rule them’.34
Wang Fuzhi’s major contributions to the development of Chinese 
ethnic thought
More than half a century ago, Etienne Balazs already described Wang’s Dis-
courses on The General Mirrors (Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑑論) as ‘impregnated 
with a nationalism’, and remarked that some contentions in Wang’s Book 
of Yellow manifested a ‘nationalist tribune’.35 In 1968, Vierheller published 
his study of Wang’s ethnic thought and called it ‘proto-nationalism’.36 In 
the same year, McMorran also completed a PhD dissertation on Wang’s 
thought as a whole, focusing on his philosophical thought on ‘ether’ (qi 氣
or chi) , treating his ethnic thought as an application of his theory of ether 
to ethnic issues.37 McMorran called Wang’s ethnic thought ‘nationalism’, 
which emphasized the distinction between Chinese (hua 華) and ‘barbar-
ians’ (yi 夷) and urged that ‘the Chinese must preserve their integrity as 
a nation’ by strict observance of the rule of separation which kept China 
and the ‘external barbarians’ separated from each other.38 In this chapter, 
I shall deal with Wang’s ethnic thought in the following way. 1) Outline 
the major contributions made by Wang to the development of Chinese 
ethnic thought. 2) Analyze the similarity of Wang’s ethnic thought to and 
its difference from the nationalist ideas in early nineteenth-century China.
As mentioned before, in the history of Chinese ethnic thoughts before 
Wang, the term zhongguo had two prevalent meanings: one referred to the 
political regime which ruled over geographical China (either in its narrow 
or broad sense), the other referred to the unitary cultural community which 
33 Han Yu, ‘Yuan dao’, Annotated Works of Han Chanli, Book 1, p. 20.
34 Song Lien, ‘Yu Zhong Yuan Xi’, Ming Shi Lu, vol. 26, p. 404.
35 Balazs (1962, pp. 46, 49). See Townsend (1996, p. 14, n. 40).
36 Vierheller (1968); see Lodén (1996, p. 276, n. 14).
37 McMorran (1968).
38 McMorran (1968, pp. 199, 205-208).
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was located in geographical China and was the center of human civilization. 
This cultural community was open to anyone (regardless of the person’s 
ethnicity) who was willing to join it, and whoever could preserve this 
cultural community was entitled to rule geographical China.
Wang’s signif icant contributions to the development of Chinese ethnic 
thought, which to a certain extent were linked to the formation of Chinese 
nationalist thought in the early 1900s, are as follows.
First, he upheld the ethnic meaning of zhongguo as the term’s primary 
meaning, a contention very much against the traditional meanings of the 
term. In this ethnic meaning, zhongguo was understood as a geographical 
domain which belonged to the ethnic Chinese alone.
Second, to support the above claim (i.e. China belongs to the Chinese 
alone), he argued that the Chinese as an ethnic group were formed due to the 
‘geographical ether’ (diqi 地氣) of geographical China. The ethnic character 
of the Chinese was determined by the latter, and was, therefore, different 
from that of the ‘barbarians’, whose ethnic character was determined by 
their respective geographical ethers, and these geographical ethers differed 
from that of geographical China.
Third, he proclaimed that to separate the Chinese from the ‘barbarians’ 
and to protect the former from being violated or confused by the latter was 
the primary raison d’être of the regime established by the Chinese.
Fourth, he reinterpreted the meaning of the cardinal Confucian virtues of 
‘benevolence’ (ren 仁), ‘righteousness’ (yi 義) and ‘loyalty’ (zhong 忠) from the 
above ethnocentric standpoint. Regarding benevolence, he argued that the 
essence of ‘benevolence’ consisted in defending one’s own ethnic fellows from 
the violation by the other ethnic groups, and that of ‘righteousness’ in ethnic 
self-rule (ruled by one’s own ethnic people for the interest of the ethnic polity). 
As for ‘loyalty’, Wang maintained that loyalty was not supposed to be practiced 
towards whatever regime that ruled geographical China, but must be devoted 
to the ethnic polity and the ethnic regimes alone, and never to alien regimes. 
He also reinterpreted another significant concept of ‘orthodoxy’ (zhen 正 or 
legitimacy),39 arguing that the regimes which enjoyed the highest degree of 
orthodoxy were those which defended the Chinese from being violated by 
the ‘barbarians’. If a regime pursued its own interest at the expense of the 
interest of the Chinese (e.g. making the polity of China too weak to defend 
itself against the invasion of the ‘barbarians’, thus paving the way for the 
latter’s conquest of geographical China and consequently subjugating the 
39 For a recent study dealing with this concept and other relevant issues, see Chang 2015.
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Chinese), it had committed a crime against China (understood as an ethnic 
polity). We shall elaborate the above ideas in more detail.
The f irst important expression of Wang’s aforementioned ideas was an 
unpublished book, Book of Yellow (Huan Shu 黃書),40 a work which was said 
to be completed when Wang was 38. The term Yellow has several meanings: 
it refers to the color yellow; situated in the context of the legendary lineage 
of China, it refers to Yellow Emperor, the common ancestor of the Chinese; 
in the context of the discourse of Five Elements (wuxin 五行), it refers to 
the central position (zhong 中), as yellow is the color of the earth, and the 
positon of the earth is in the center. In other words, Book of Yellow as the title 
implied that it was a book written for the Chinese who were the descendants 
of Yellow Emperor. If the book was written for the Chinese, for what purpose? 
The central aim was to urge that the protection of the Chinese from offences 
by the ‘barbarians’ was the foremost raison d’être of the regime established 
by the Chinese. In the postscript of Book of Yellow, Wang says:
Whoever becomes king by recapitulating the spirit inherent in the 
legacies from antiquity and following the principle of Nature, if he ruled 
according to the way set up by Xuan Yuan 軒轅 and established the 
China of the Chinese, and sheltered her from the disasters caused by alien 
species made of secondary ethers, upholding and nurturing China so she 
could fully realize her resources, the Way of governance is exhausted.41
The reason for interpreting the Way (note: “the Way” with a capital W is a 
term commonly used in English works of Chinese intellectual history. For 
example, please see Schwartz, Benjamin. 1996. China and Other Matters. 
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, p. 59, para.2, line 6) 
of governance as sheltering one’s own kind from the disasters caused by 
alien kinds was premised by a cosmological theory presented at the very 
beginning of the book. Wang argued that, although Nature nurtured all 
the living beings with various resources via their endless and boundless 
mutual intercourses and interactions, it was also the primary law of Nature 
to distinguish different species from each other and to protect each from 
the invasion by or confusion with the others. He admitted that species 
originated from the same primordial unity, but argued that due to the 
difference of the environments where they live later on, they developed 
into different species and must thenceforth not mix with one another. 
40 This date was based on 劉毓崧 Liu Yusong’s opinion (Chuan Shan Quan Shu 16, p. 204).
41 Huan Shu, Postscript, p. 538.
68 Chi-SheN ChaNg 
According to Wang, it was against Nature’s design that creatures differenti-
ated from their original unity into diverse species. However, since Nature 
could do little to stop that, the self-boundaries drawn up by each species 
was, consequently, the primary law of Nature for each species to follow. That 
the sage was said to embody the gracious deeds of Nature was precisely due 
to their dutifully following the above-mentioned primary law of Nature:
If we observe the Beginning in Nature, we cannot but be amazed by the 
grandness of its design. How great that there were metals that shone, 
woods that supported, earth that accumulated, with illuminating f ire, 
blowing wind, and moisturizing water to nurture them, letting these 
elements mutually nourish and impregnate one another, separating and 
combining them by continuous and abundant movements of melting 
and compression. Thus the mighty grace prevails boundlessly with no 
ending. Nevertheless, it is also Nature’s work to clarify creatures of the 
same kind, closing the boundaries between each other, setting up their 
own positions and sheltering them, which appears to be Nature’s greatest 
concern. This is why mountain creatures have cloven hoofs and those 
in the marshes have webbed feet; why the strengths of animals used for 
riding and animals used for ploughing lie in different directions; why 
the method of wet-cultivation is suited to the southland, and that of 
dry-cultivation to the cold climate in the northland. It is not because 
Nature is so cruel to make creatures dissolve from their original unity and 
ramify from their primordial lineage, but it could do nothing to stop that. 
So Nature does the above things to ward off disasters from their invading 
each other. Therefore the sage who, having observed that all species do 
so and each encloses its own boundary against the other, undertook the 
position of master of the world, carried out the work of distinguishing 
the intelligent from the brute, clarifying the similarity in appearance, 
building high citadel walls when the boundaries were badly maintained, 
in order to ward off the disasters of invasion and make members of the 
same species save themselves collectively. In this sense, the saying ‘the 
sage’s greatness coincides with the grace of Nature’ is no exaggeration.42
42 Huan Shu, 501. Parts of this passage were translated by De Bary (1999, p. 34). I adopt one 
sentence from his translation with some minimal changes (the sentence about mountain and 
marsh creatures and the methods of cultivation). The rest of the translation is mine, and I alone 
am responsible for any errors.
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Almost three decades later, Wang repeated this cosmological theory again 
in his Explanatory commentaries on Zhang Zai’s Correct Introduction to 
Knowledge (Zhang Zi Zheng Mong Zhu 張子正蒙注). In his annotation of the 
sentence ‘the ether of Nature, despite its immensely diverse movements of 
agglomeration, dispersion, attraction, and repulsion, expresses rules which 
are natural and not abnormal’, he explained that
When the ether agglomerates, its existence is visible, but when it is dis-
persed one may suspect that it is non-existent. Once it has agglomerated 
and assumed forms and images, then as regards talents, matter, nature, 
and feelings, all accord with their own categories. They accept what is 
similar and oppose what is different; thus all things flourish in profusion 
and form their several categories. Moreover, the formation of each of 
these categories has its own organization (tiao li 條理).43 So it is that dew, 
thunder, frost, and snow all occur at their proper times, and animals, 
plants, birds, and f ish all keep to their own species. There can be no frost 
or snow during the long summer days, nor can there be dew or thunder 
in the depth of winter. Nor can there be between man and beast, plant 
and tree, any indiscriminate confusion of their respective principles.44
In ‘On Unity and Division’ (li he 離合), Chapter Seven of Book of Yellow, 
Wang presented his theory of geographical ether and its connection to the 
ethnic character of the Chinese. He outlined the domain of China (roughly 
corresponding to the domain directly ruled by the Ming Empire),45 arguing 
that the geographical ether of this domain was different from those of the 
areas adjacent to it. He pointed out that this domain of China belonged 
to the Chinese with Yellow Emperor as their common ancestor. He then 
made a rather interesting claim that among the descendants of Yellow 
Emperor, some dwelt in geographical China, others in areas outside it. Due 
to the difference in geographical ether, they gradually formed into peoples 
of different ethnicities. Despite them being brothers at the beginning, 
with the passage of time they lost the memories of their original kinship 
and slaughtered each other as alien species. Although this is a tragedy, 
Wang lamented, it must be accepted as the outcome of Nature, and it was 
43 Tiao li has the connotation of ‘rule’ or ‘principle’.
44 De Bary (1999, pp. 28-29); also see McMorran (1968, pp. 193-194).
45 It is noteworthy that Manchuria, Mongol, Xinjian, Tibet, and Taiwan were not included in 
the geographical zhongguo outlined by Wang.
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particularly important to consolidate the barriers between them to save 
one’s own kind:
From the ancient sage kings onward, some clans were granted with names 
and prided themselves as the noble ones, whereas some of the others 
declined and moved to the desert areas. Therefore, the peoples who scat-
tered in South and North and had very different customs were actually 
descendants of the same few clans at the beginning. Originally, they 
carried the same lineage, sharing the same blood, being closely bounded 
by inter-marriages, and were in cordial terms with one another, like 
arms and armpits. After their bonds dissolved and were forgotten, they, 
who were brothers and kin in the past, fought each other in the f ield and 
received blades (note: the original Chinese means “blades of weapons”) 
from each other, with flesh and blood splattering around and clans an-
nexing and conquering each other. Are these not the heart-breaking 
tragedies over which Nature deeply mourned? However, acknowledging 
the harms caused by alien species, Nature let it be and moved along out 
of necessity (meaning: cannot but do so). For Nature, it was particularly 
worrisome that the boundaries were too demolished to save the survivors, 
so there were mountains and plateaus as walls and rivers as gaps to stop 
invaders.46
It is noteworthy that this view was repeated in another of his unpublished 
works: Discourses on The General Mirrors (Du Tongjian lun), which later 
became his most widely known work:47
Nature begot all creatures with the primordial ether, and the geographical 
environments confined them within different areas, which resulted in the 
transformation of the creatures’ natural endowment and the differentia-
tion of their natural dispositions … The difference in terrains defined the 
attributes of the creatures’ natural endowments. These attributes suited 
their transformed nature, and constituted the principles of their life.48
46 Huan Shu, p. 535.
47 It is almost certain that the work was written in his late years (see Chuan Shan Quan Shu 
16, p. 74). Evidence from 1687 indicates that he might have been composing this work in this 
year. See Chuan Shan Quan Shu 16, p. 371.
48 Du Tong Jian Lun, p. 485.
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But, in Discourses on The General Mirrors, he further expressed an interest-
ing view, maintaining that the Chinese and the ‘barbarians’ were of the 
same species (which differentiated into different kinds), whereas the greater 
people ( junzi 君子) and the lesser people (xiaoren 小人) were of different 
kinds. The difference between the Chinese and the ‘barbarians’ was mainly 
that of ethnicity rather than nature, and their respective ethnicities were 
shaped by the geographical ether of the geographical areas where they lived:
In this world, there are two fundamental forbidden lines: that between 
the Chinese and the barbarians, and that between the greater men and 
the lesser men. It is not that they were of no difference originally but the 
ancient kings created artif icial forbidden lines between them.
The Chinese and the barbarians are born in different areas. Since their 
areas are different, their ethers (natural endowments) change accordingly 
into different ones. Since their ethers differ, so do their habits. With their 
habits being different, their knowledge and conducts could never be the 
same. In each species, some members are superior and some inferior. 
However, since species are conf ined by their respective geographical 
boundary, and their ethers are different, so species must not confuse 
together.49 Confusion like this would result in the destruction of the hu-
man pole,50 and the people of China would consequently be overwhelmed 
by them (i.e. the ‘barbarians’) and suffer. The reason for preventing that 
at the very beginning was to maintain the human pole by which the life 
of human beings is protected, and such an endeavor was in accordance 
with Nature.
The greater men and the lesser men are born of different kinds. That 
they are of different kinds are due to their difference in nature. Since 
their natures differ, so do their habits. As their habits are different, their 
knowledge and conducts could never be the same. It is true that within 
the same kind there are those who are clever and those who are brute. 
However, since people are born of different kinds, and different kinds 
prefer different things, different kinds must not confuse together.51 
Such a confusion would result in the travesty of humanity, and the poor 
and the vulnerable would consequently be overwhelmed and suffer. 
49 I.e. the superior members of ‘barbarian’ species must not cross the boundary to rule the 
Chinese.
50 ‘The human pole’ signif ies the boundary between human beings (i.e. Chinese) and uncivi-
lized lesser humans (i.e. the ‘barbarian’). 
51 I.e. the clever members of the lesser men must not replace the clever members of the greater 
men to rule.
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The reason for preventing such a confusion from being prevalent was 
to preserve humanity and to ensure the abundance of human life, and 
such an endeavor was in accordance with Nature. Alas! The confusion 
of the lesser men with the greater men was no different from that of the 
‘barbarians’ with the Chinese, but some people did not take it seriously, 
without knowing how disastrous it would be!
Among the lesser men, the clever ones and the brute ones formed differ-
ent types. The brute ones are content to stay in their brute state and be 
trapped in it without harming others, whereas the clever ones use their 
cleverness to harm others. The brute ones are the farmers and gardeners 
who trapped themselves without harming others … The merchants are 
the clever ones among the lesser men, and their disregard for humanity 
and harming others’ lives is to the utmost extent. Because their ethers and 
the barbarians’ ethers constantly attract each other, and their essence and 
that of the barbarians constantly get along with each other, the barbar-
ians’ rise to power and the merchants’ rise in status are concomitant …
To summarize, there are two fundamental forbidden lines in this world, 
but their essence is one. Of what does this one essence consist? The 
distinction between righteousness and interest … Therefore, although 
all of them are humans, barbarians differ from the Chinese by their 
geographical difference, whereas the greater men from the lesser men 
by their kinds, and the forbidden lines between them cannot but be 
strictly maintained.52
According to this view, the Chinese and the ‘barbarians’ were of the same 
species but of different ethnicities (their ethnicities were due to the respec-
tive geographical ethers), while the greater persons and the lesser ones were 
of different kinds in spite of their sameness in ethnicity. Wang asserted that 
the ethnic character of the ‘barbarians’ was akin to the nature of the clever 
part of the lesser persons (i.e. the merchants), so the two got on well. He 
also proclaimed that the Chinese culture was intimately linked with the 
geographical ether of China’s geographical domain, and, consequently, was 
not suitable for the ‘barbarians’ to adopt or follow.53
With the theory of ethnic difference as the justification for the separation 
of the Chinese and ‘barbarians’, Wang asserted that to separate the Chinese 
from the ‘barbarians’ and to protect the former from being violated or con-
fused by the latter was the primary raison d’être of the regime established by 
52 Du Tong Jian Lun, p. 502-503. For another translation, see De Bary (1999, pp. 32-33).
53 Chang (2009b, pp. 315-316).
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the Chinese. He urged every Chinese regime to do everything necessary to 
protect the Chinese from being ruled by the ‘barbarians’, including allowing 
itself to be usurped or overthrown by another Chinese regime:
Therefore, either one’s intelligence is no greater than looking after oneself, 
or one’s strength is great enough to conquer the world, whoever can 
protect one’s own kind deserves to be the latter’s ruler, and whoever can 
defend one’s own kind deserves to be the latter’s great lord. Therefore, 
the sage, by f irst granting all the clans their legitimate titles, showed his 
unrivaled prestige (as the sole ruler of the Chinese). He then protected 
this seat of prestige, rectif ied the disorders, and left this seat to his 
descendants or sages in later generations. This seat could be succeeded 
by abdications, inheritance, or revolutions, but must never be taken by 
the alien kinds.54
Measured by this principle, he condemned the rulers of those regimes 
in Chinese history, who, driven by the suspicion that the subjects might 
become too powerful and would eventually take the throne, adopted the 
policy of centralization of power which weakens the strength of the local 
districts, making the latter vulnerable when confronting the invasions of 
the ‘barbarians’. The prominent examples of such regimes were Qin and 
Song, which, in Wang’s opinion, had committed great crimes against the 
Chinese.55
In the Postscript of Book of Yellow, Wang presents a reinterpretation 
of the meanings of benevolence and righteousness, the core virtues of 
Confucianism. He argues that, against the traditional understanding of 
their meanings, these virtues must serve the interest of the ethnic polity for 
the sake of the latter’s preservation, rather than serve the universal human 
civilization without ethnocentric concern:
At the beginning, human beings relied on their rulers to unite them and 
establish institutions, so that the latter could set up boundaries for their 
own groups, keep themselves away from those who were hostile and 
harmful, and ward off the alien kinds. Therefore, benevolence means 
54 Huan Shu, p. 503.
55 See McMorran’s translation (1968, pp. 197-198) of a famous passage from ‘On the Essence 
of the Pole’, Huan Shu, p. 504. The main theme of Chapter Two of Huan Shu, ‘Gu Yi 古儀 On the 
ancient model of institutions’ , was criticism of the policy of centralization of power, with the 
Qin and Song dynasties as typical examples.
74 Chi-SheN ChaNg 
loving one’s own kind, and righteousness means setting up the rules and 
norms for one’s own kind to follow, so that the polity was well constructed 
and could support itself on its own strength. Both of the virtues have 
as their common aim the nurturing of the vital ether of the Chinese 
composed of descendants of Yellow Emperor. For the moment, if a people 
could not defend themselves, what is the point to advocate meanings of 
benevolence and righteousness other than the above ones?56
In a similar vein, Wang criticizes the ‘sagacious’ statesmen of East Jin ( 
東晉, 317-420) who made a great effort to discourage the military leader 
Huan Wen’s 桓溫 plan of northern expedition to recover the Central Plain, 
worrying that if Huan succeeded, he would gain enough prestige to usurp 
the royal throne. According to Wang, they misunderstood the meaning of 
loyalty as being loyal to the sovereign, without realizing that loyalty should 
be devoted to preserving the integrity of one’s own ethnic polity:
Their primary concerns lies with … preventing the possible usurpation 
of the seat of the Heaven’s Son, and the public opinions at that time all 
concurred with their concerns as self-evident. The opinions of the later 
time followed those of earlier times and thus expressed no disagreement. 
Alas! If they would have taken into account the fundamental forbidden 
line in this world, the fundamental distinction between humans and 
animals, and the great lineage descending from the ancient sage kings 
(of China), they would realize that if Huan Wen’s military success would 
eventually lead to his success in usurpation, this would still be prefer-
able to allowing the alien kind be the ruler of the Central Plain (which 
crossed the forbidden line, blurred the demarcation, and terminated 
that lineage).57
Another novel as well as shocking idea proposed by Wang is that the crime 
of violating the political obligation of the subjects to their monarch is lesser 
than that of violating the political obligation of the Chinese to China. There-
fore, if a regime established via usurpation has done well in defending the 
Chinese from being violated by the ‘barbarians’, it is more legitimate than 
those which failed to do so, despite the latter being established via less 
illegitimate ways. He thus praised the Song Dynasty established by Liu Yu 
as the dynasty which had the highest degree of orthodoxy during the period 
56 Huan Shu, Postscript, p. 503.
57 Du TongJjian Lun, p. 487.
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between Han and Tang, as Liu Song had done well in both attempting to 
and succeeded in recovering parts of the Central Plain.58
Before Wang Fuzhi, the ethnocentric strand of Chinese ethnic thought 
had developed for at least several hundred years.59 Wang’s major contri-
bution consisted in his stern assertion of a type of Confucianism with 
prominent ethnocentric characters. In the very f irst few years of the 
twentieth century, when Chinese nationalism was germinating while 
Confucianism was still the commonly held intellectual orientation, it was 
this kind of ethnocentric Confucianism which served revolutionaries like 
Zhang Binlin as an ideological canon against the loyalist Confucianism 
upheld by Kang Yuwei 康有為. With the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the 
birth of the Chinese Republic which had been constantly hard-pressed and 
eventually invaded by foreign powers, this ethnocentric Confucianism 
developed into a nationalist Confucianism which replaced the culturalist 
Confucianism as the mainstream Confucianism for most of the surviving 
adherents of Confucianism. Thus viewed, Wang’s ethnic thought did play 
a signif icant part in the formation of Chinese nationalism.
Wang’s view regarding the relation between religion and 
ethnicity
If Confucianism was regarded, by some Confucians (Wang Fuzhi seems 
to be one of them), as a type of religious alternative to God-worshipping 
religions such as Buddhism or Daoism, this would raise an interesting ques-
tion about the relation between religion and ethnicity. Once we take into 
account that Confucianism is conventionally regarded as the essence of 
Chinese culture, and that the performers of Chinese culture were conven-
tionally regarded as Chinese regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, as well 
as that Confucianism was regarded by some as an alternative religion, the 
connection between Confucianism and Chinese ethnicity would be as that 
between religion and ethnicity, provided that ‘being Chinese’ is regarded 
as an ethnic identity.
What was Wang Fuzhi’s view on the connection between religion and 
ethnicity in the above sense? One passage in his Du Tong jian lun deserves 
58 ‘漢之後, 唐之前, 唯宋氏猶可以為中國主也 In the period after Han and before Tang, Liu 
Song was, in comparison with other dynasties, the only dynasty that deserved to be the head 
of the ethnic Zhongguo.(Du Tong Jian Lun, p. 549)
59 Chang (2009b, pp. 256ff).
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some attention. In this passage, Wang comments on the construction of 
culturally symbolic buildings by the ‘barbarian’ ruler Shile 石勒.60 In his 
comment, he mentions two concepts – ‘the lineage of reign’ (zhitong 治統) 
and ‘the lineage of Dao’ (daotong 道統), in which the former referred to the 
seat of the son of Heaven whereas the latter refers to Confucian teaching. 
According to Wang, both of the lineages were so important that they should 
not be appropriated illegitimately, and whoever do this eventually would 
be punished by Heaven. He then condemned the corrupted Confucians for 
selling the lineage of Dao to the barbarians and bandits by suggesting such 
illegitimate rulers to adopt the Confucian teaching. Once they performed 
some symbolic practices (e.g. construction of symbolic buildings, such 
as Mingtang 明堂) which were closely related to Confucian tradition, 
they were eulogized as sage kings by those corrupted Confucians, who 
then were rewarded by those rulers. Nevertheless, Wang argues that such 
symbolic buildings and rituals were not essential to the lineage of Dao, 
which explains why the aforementioned illegitimate rulers could easily steal 
them and were willing to do so. As for its essence, this could not be stolen, 
as it consisted in distinguishing ethical relations, educating people, ruling 
people benevolently, placing virtue above all other concerns, learning how 
to improve one’s reverent attention constantly, etc. Since these teachings 
were all about self-discipline and cultivation, they, according to Wang, could 
not possibly be welcomed by the illegitimate rulers and were unlikely to be 
adopted by them, thus they could not be stolen by them.
What Wang says in the above comment could be interpreted as dealing 
with the issue of the relation between religion and ethnicity. The core of this 
issue lies in this question: if the barbarians were Confucianized (religion), 
does that mean they were already sinicized, and thus should be regarded 
as Chinese (ethnicity)?
Wang’s answer to this question might be more ambiguous than his confi-
dent tone let on. If the barbarians were merely Confucianized at the formal 
level, it is relatively easy to judge that they were not truly Confucianized, and 
therefore not truly sinicized. But, what if they were Confucianized at the es-
sential level? Would they be consequently judged as indisputably sinicized? 
According to Wang’s view expressed in the above comment, he could not 
but concur, which would, however, contradict with his ethnocentrism. It 
seems that, to maintain a consistent ethnocentrism, Wang would have to 
claim that religion does not grant ethnicity, only other elements do, and the 
geographical ether seems to be the foremost among them. This interesting 
60 Du Tong Jian Lun, p. 479.
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example indicates that, if in Europe from the Westphalian Treaty onwards, 
religion determines nationality, in Wang Fuzhi’s thought, religion does 
not determine ethnicity (understood as proto-nationality).61 Moreover, if 
Wang’s view of the distinction between the formal and essential levels of 
Confucianism was applied to contemporary China, one might say that the 
so-called revival of Confucianism in mainland China might be merely in 
the formal sense.62
The similarity and difference between Wang’s ethnic thought 
and early twentieth-century Chinese nationalism
Despite that Wang’s ethnocentric thought has been widely seen as the 
forerunner of Chinese nationalism, little research has endeavored to 
fathom either its qualif ication as ‘nationalism’ or its relations to Chinese 
nationalism as it emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. This is 
understandably so, since both questions are not easy to answer. Here I will 
try to tackle both of these questions in a very rudimentary way.
It has been commonly recognized that nationalism as a concept is notori-
ously diff icult to def ine. One of the causes of this diff iculty, it seems to me, 
might be that it is a term people use to refer not to a single thing but a wide 
variety of phenomena. Each definition of nationalism refers to some of the 
phenomena and leaves more out, while any attempt at proposing a broad 
enough definition would be too broad to def ine anything.
To give the title of this section meaning without going astray in order to 
f ind an ideal definition of nationalism, I shall compare Wang’s ethnocentric 
thought to a historical phenomenon that took place at the turn of the twenti-
eth century and which has been generally described as Chinese nationalism. 
The salient features of this phenomenon include: the apprehension that 
the Chinese state would become colonies of foreign countries, the fear of 
extinction in the Darwinist sense of natural selection among countries and 
races, the consensus that to change the political order of the Chinese state 
from an imperial organization to a national one was the primary way out 
of the endangered situation.
Compared to Chinese nationalism, Wang’s ethnocentric thought shares 
some of the former’s features. In the latter, there is also the fear of being 
61 I would like to thank Professor Lennert Gesterkamp for raising the question of the relation 
of religion and nationality.
62 See the fourth and f ifth sections of Professor Bart Dessein’s article in this volume.
78 Chi-SheN ChaNg 
conquered by the ‘barbarians’, and of the fall of civilization as its conse-
quence. The conquest of the Chinese state by aliens was of their gravest 
concern, as was the possible extinction of the ethnic Chinese. Neverthe-
less, Wang did not seek to change the imperial order of the state, while 
the nationalists did. He utterly rejected the possibility of people ruling 
themselves without a monarchial sovereign leading them.63 Accordingly, 
if both Wang and the late-Qing nationalists had ethnic self-government as 
their primary concern, they were different at least in one point: the former 
understood ethnic self-government as ‘China ruled by an emperor who is 
Chinese’, whereas the latter as ‘China ruled not only in the name of but by 
the Chinese nationals’.64 With respect to the idea of popular sovereignty, 
Wang’s ethnocentric thought is in direct opposition to the Chinese national-
ists. This is one of the reasons why Cheng-tian Kuo questioned the claim 
that Wang’s ethnocentric ideas are the origin of Chinese nationalism.65
To illustrate the aforementioned difference, some reference to the way 
Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929) introduced the conception of ‘nation’ to 
his fellow Chinese at the eve of the twentieth century might be helpful. The 
difference may be summarized as follows: China was imagined by Wang as 
an ethnic imperial state, whereas by Liang as a popular nation, with ethnic 
Han as its core component but civic in its nature.66
In an essay On the General Picture of Competition among the Nations and 
the future of China (Lun jin shi guomin jin zheng zhi da shi ji zhongguo qian 
tu 論近世國民競爭之大勢及中國前途), Liang argued that the Chinese in 
the past had been familiar with the term guojia 國家 (the polity) for a long 
time, while completely ignorant of the concept of guomin 國民 (nation). 
The difference between the two, according to Liang, was that with guojia, 
the state was considered as the private property of the royal house, whereas 
with guomin the state was understood as the public goods of the people 
(remin 人民).67
63 Du Tong Jian Lun, p. 1048.
64 Townsend pointed out a salient feature of modern nationalism: that all the subjects of the 
state were citizens, ‘holding formally equal rights and obligations within it’ (1996, p. 24). The 
essential link of nationalism to the idea of popular sovereignty was noted by Hobsbawn (1990, 
p. 18-19). The f irst anti-Manchu revolutionary propaganda journal Guo Min Bao 國民報 (founded 
in 1901 in Tokyo) had as its English: ‘The Chinese National’. 
65 Kuo (2014, pp. 174-175). It should be noted that such a claim was cautiously avoided in Chang 
(2009b).
66 I would like to thank one of the reviewers of this chapter for raising the question of ‘popular 
sovereignty’ as a way to examine the difference of Wang’s ethnocentric thought from Chinese 
nationalism.
67 Liang (1899, p. 309).
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The difference in conceptions about the nature of the state, Liang argued, 
led to the difference in political outcomes. In guojia, members of the people 
or the subjects did not identify with the state (since it was someone else’s 
private property), thus the strength of the state lay merely in its ruling 
house. In contrast, members of the people or the subjects in guomin strongly 
identif ied with the state (since it was their own property), and the strength 
of the people formed the strength of the state. Since the Darwinist competi-
tion between China and other countries in his day was that between guojia 
and guomin, Liang warned anxiously that China as a guojia was doomed to 
be overwhelmed by other guomin.68
Liang’s distinction between guojia and guomin was later rephrased, with 
a somewhat confusing use of terms, as that between guojia (i.e. guomin) and 
tianxia (all under heaven), chaotin 朝廷 (dynastic regime), respectively. In 
his 1900 essay On the Causes of China’s Perennial Weakness (zhongguo ji ro su 
yuan lun 中國積弱溯源論), Liang argued that the primary cause of China’s 
current problems was the lack of idea of guojia (i.e. guomin), which had 
resulted in the erroneous attitude in foreign affairs, the mistaken devotion 
of political loyalty to the dynastic regime rather than to China as a nation 
(guojia, i.e. guomin), and the non-existence of an essential identif ication 
of the people (in this essay, Liang confusingly called them guomin) with 
the state.69
In Liang’s 1901 essay On the Change of the Idea of Nation and the Similarity 
and Difference among them (Guojia si xiang bian qian yi tung lun 國家
思想變遷異同論), he continued to upheld the guojia-guomin opposition 
proposed in 1899, but restated it as that between the ‘complete state’ (wan 
quan guojia 完全國家, i.e. guomin in his 1899 essay) and incomplete state, 
respectively.70 Classif ied under the category of the incomplete state were 
states formed according to the principles of patriarchy, chieftainship, and 
imperial rule. This category stood for the initial stage of evolution in politi-
cal organizations, and was followed by the stage marked by the category of 
‘complete state’. Included in this latter category were states characterized 
by the principles of nationalism (minzu zhuyi 民族主義) and national 
imperialism (minzu diguo zhuyi 民族帝國主義). The next stage which 
superseded the stage of complete state would be the one characterized by 
cosmopolitanism (wanguo datong zhuyi 萬國大同主義).71
68 Liang (1899, p. 311).
69 Liang (1900, pp. 413-414).
70 Liang (1901, p. 26).
71 Liang (1901, p. 30).
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If, instead of being preoccupied by Liang’s confusing use of terms like 
goujia and guomin, one focused on the idea he endeavored to articulate 
behind these terms, one might conclude that the conception he eagerly 
advocated was to reimagine China as a ‘nation’ which would consider the 
Chinese state as their own property. For Liang, the key to realizing such a 
state was democracy, the political institution characterized, according to 
Liang’s depiction, by people’s rights and power (minquan 民權).72
It is noteworthy that in Liang’s discourse about guomin (nation) and 
minzu zhuyi (nationalism), the former was viewed by him as the foundation 
of the latter:
Since guojia (i.e. the complete state – CS) is built by the contract of 
consent of the people, the people should be entitled to unlimited power, 
and the government cannot but obey the will of the people. This is the 
driving force of min zu zhu yi.73
Such a view might explain why Liang oddly summarized, in a misleading 
if not twisted way, the core idea of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen as the principle of national unity and independence:
A guomin (i.e. nation) which by their own will wishes to live under the 
same law must not be under a foreigner’s jurisdiction. Moreover, this 
nation, either in whole or in part, must not be ceded to foreign countries, 
since guomin is independent and indivisible.74
In other words, the idea of nation proposed by Liang as the model image 
for a new Chinese state was characterized by its civic nature.
In contrast to the civic concept of guomin, Liang discussed the concept 
of minzu 民族, presenting the latter as an ethnic concept. In his 1903 essay 
Teachings of the Master Political Scientist Bluntschli (Zheng zhi xue Daj ia 
Bo lun zhi li zhi Xueshuo 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說), he emphatically 
maintained the distinction between the concept of guomin and that of 
72 The term ‘minquan’ had already appeared in Liang’s 1899 essay ‘On Patriotism’ (aiguo lun 愛
國論), in which he made the following contentions: ‘What is guo? The conglomeration of people. 
What is the governance of guo? The people govern their own affairs. What is patriotism? The 
people love themselves. Therefore, the rise of minquan (people’s rights and power) would be 
followed by the establishment of guoquan 國權, (the state’s rights and power). Accordingly, any 
discussion of patriotism must start from promoting people’s rights and power’ (1899a, p. 273).
73 Liang (1901, pp. 30-31).
74 Liang (1901, p. 31).
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minzu. Referring to Bluntschli’s def initions, Liang claimed that guomin 
was both a political personality and a legal corporate,75 whereas minzu 
was a people with common territory, blood, physical appearance, spoken 
and written language, religion, customs, and economy.76 In his vision of a 
future Chinese state, it was guomin (or guojia as its equivalent) rather than 
minzu which served as her model image. By imagining China as guomin, 
Liang pleaded with ‘great nationalism’ (da minzu zhuyi 大民族主義; unit-
ing several minzu within a state into one guomin) and dismissed ‘small 
nationalism’ (xiao minzu zhuyi 小民族主義; opposing one minzu against 
another minzu within a state).77
The lineage as well as legacies of Wang’s ethnic thought for modern China 
seem to have remained an under-researched topic. In the historical context 
of the political separation of Manchu from the ethnic Han imposed by the 
Qing government, Wang’s ethnocentrism seems to serve the ethnic Han 
revolutionaries well in fanning the hatred among the ethnic Han against 
the Manchu, as the ethnic Chinese in Wang’s discourse were automatically 
understood as ethnic Han and the ‘barbarians’ the Manchu in the Qing 
context. In an essay Clarifying the Meaning of Hatred against the Manchu 
(zhen cho man lun 正仇滿論) published in 1901 (probably the f irst public 
utterance of anti-Manchuism in the late Qing period), Zhang Binlin made a 
direct rebuttal against Liang’s On the Causes of China’s Perennial Weakness, 
in which, as mentioned above, Liang attributed the primary cause of China’s 
current problems to the lack of an idea of ‘nation’. It is interesting to note 
that, instead of discrediting Liang’s argument with a frontal attack, Zhang 
quietly left it unchallenged and adopted a strategy of spinning it around: 
making an alternative claim to account for the lack of identif ication of the 
Chinese subjects with the state. According to Zhang, this lack was due to 
the state of the ethnic Han being ruled by aliens. Upon close examination, 
this claim does not succeed in discrediting Laing’s, as Liang argues that the 
people could not identify themselves with a state which was not their own 
property, and this lack of identif ication was found in Chinese history not 
only in the periods of alien rule, but also in the periods of ethnic Chinese 
rule. In this debate, if Liang had the Western idea of nation as his theoretical 
source, Zhang seemed to rely on nothing but an ethnocentrism with Wang 
Fuzhi as its most recent source.
75 Liang (1903, p. 1068).
76 Liang (1903, pp. 1067, 1069).
77 Liang (1903, pp. 1069-1070). On this issue, see the second section of Professor Julia Schneider’s 
article in this volume.
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History shows that it was Zhang’s ethnocentric appeal that eventually 
triumphed over Liang’s discourse of nation among the revolutionaries, 
which seemed to give Wang Fuzhi’s ethnic thought the upper hand in the 
solution of the Alien Rule Question. Nevertheless, history also shows that 
the same ethnic thought was considered unf it for an ethnic Han state 
established by the 1911 Revolution. From the Republican period onwards, 
Wang’s theory of geographical ether and the demand of ethnic self-rule as its 
corollary were quietly ignored, as it would make the Chinese government’s 
sovereignty or territorial claims over Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Taiwan, and the South China Sea unfounded (not to mention his proclama-
tion that Vietnam shares the same geographical ether with geographical 
China, and thus should be annexed by China).
The immediate impact caused by Wang’s ethnic thought after its dif-
fusion in the mid-nineteenth century remains another under-researched 
topic. To end this chapter, I shall deal with one aspect of this topic in a very 
brief way.
In 1842, Wang’s Huan Shu was already listed among his known works, and 
Du Tong Jian Lun was already in limited circulation in 1858.78 Both works 
were prominent in delivering Wang’s urge for an ethnic self-government. 
After the publication of Wang’s major works in 1865 by Zeng Guochuan 曾
國荃 (金陵節署本 Jin Lin high Commission edition), Huan Shu and Du 
Tong Jian Lun became accessible to a wider public.
It is noteworthy that, from 1865 to 1895, the ethnocentric hostility against 
barbarian rule and the strong urge for ethnic self-government expressed in 
these two works seemed to arouse little resonance in their literati readers 
and little concern in the Manchu government. A diary entry in 1867 by Zhoa 
Liewen 趙烈文 summarized the main theme of Huan Shu with comments 
which showed an understanding but no agreement.79
In 1876, Guo Songtau 郭嵩燾 asked the government to grant Wang a ritual 
position of “subordinate worship’ (congsi 從祀) in the Confucian temple. 
The reason upheld by Guo was that Wang was distinguished in his Classics 
studies, Li shue 理學 and virtues. The suggestion was turned down by the 
Ministry of Rites, not because of Wang’s hostility against the barbarians 
(including Manchu) but, to Guo’s surprise and disappointment, because of 
his Hunan country fellow Li Huan 李桓, who maintained that Wang was 
underqualif ied and disapproved such an honor.80 In 1895, another similar 
78 Deng (1842); Chuan Shan Quan Shu 16, p. 613.
79 Chuan Shan Quan Shu 16, p. 619.
80 Chuan Shan Quen Shu 16, p. 582, 603.
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attempt was made by Kong Xianglin 孔祥霖.81 In his memorial, Kong praised 
Wang’s Du Tong Jian Lun for the following merits:
As for his discourses on political history, they contained insights and 
knowledge on affairs from antiquity to the recent times. In these dis-
courses, he analyzed the causes of success and decline, good governance 
and corruptions of polities. Apart from that, he also emphasized the 
supremacy of kingship and the importance of expulsing the ‘barbarians’, 
and condemned the factional politics. His opinions were so profound 
and incisive that they made readers of them thrilled and take them as 
reminders. Thus they could be regarded as valuable teachings for endless 
generations. That was why during the periods of Xianfeng and Tungzhi, 
half of the military leaders who ended the Taiping Rebellion were lit-
erati from Hunan,82 which must be largely attributed to the teachings 
of Wang’s posthumous works … The Hunanese earnestly followed the 
teachings from his works, so most of them were well-informed in the 
art of warfare and capable of military affairs, which eventually led to 
their success in ending the great disaster of the Taiping Rebellion … Thus 
judged, Wang was indeed a senior loyalist of the Ming Dynasty, but he 
was also a contributive subject to our dynasty.83
Kong’s eulogy of Wang is noteworthy in at least three aspects. First, it raises 
questions regarding to what extent and in what way the leaders of the 
Hunanese army were influenced by Wang’s Du Tong Jian Lun. As mentioned 
above, Zeng Guochuan’s consultant Zhoa Leiwen had already read this work 
in 1858, and Zeng Guofang 曾國藩 might have received a copy of the work 
in 1861.84 According to Zeng Guofang’s diary, he seems to start reading Du 
Tong Jian Lun in 1862 for two months, and did not resume reading it until 
1866, after the Taiping Rebellion had been ended in 1864.85
It is well known that the Taiping Rebellion made an ethnocentric appeal 
to the Chinese against the ‘Manchu barbarian monsters’ in 1852, and the 
ethnocentric ideas contained in it, despite being similar to those of Wang 
Fuzhi, more likely may have come from the influence of Tiandi Association 
81 He (1996, p. 82).
82 Hunan was Wang’s home province.
83 Chuan Shan Quan shu 16, p. 686.
84 Zeng Guofang 曾國藩 started his campaign against the Taiping Rebellion in 1854, see Guo 
Tingyi (1969, p. 113); Chuan Shan Quan shu 16, p. 579.
85 Chuan shan quan shu 16, pp. 564-569.
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(天地會).86 However, there seems to be no evidence indicating that Wang’s 
ethnocentrism made any visible impact on either Zhoa Liewen or Zeng 
Guofang from 1858 to 1862.
Second, if Taiping Rebellion’s ethnocentric appeal was similar to that of 
Wang Fuzhi, Zeng Guofang’s effort in crushing it was utterly contrary to 
Wang’s ethnocentric urge. Taking this into account, Kong’s eulogy appeared 
to be hilariously ironical in attributing the Zeng brothers’ success in sup-
pressing an anti-Manchu regime to Wang’s teachings on the one hand, and 
calling Wang ‘a contributive subject’ to the Manchu regime on the other.
Third, the fact that Kong, in his memorial submitted to the Manchu 
emperor, dared to list Wang’s emphasis on the expulsion of the ‘barbarians’ 
among the valuable parts of his discourses seems rather curious. What was 
equally curious was that his memorial seems not to have been reprimanded 
by the court, despite his suggestion being turned down.87 These facts 
strongly suggest that Wang’s ethnocentric statements might have been 
received with little concern by the Chinese literati and the Manchu ruler, 
at least before 1895. How his ethnocentric thought was used to facilitate the 
revolutionary propaganda in the f irst few years of the twentieth century 
will be the subject of a more extensive research.
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3 Missionizing, Civilizing, and 
Nationizing
Linked Concepts of Compelled Change
Julia C. Schneider
Abstract
This chapter tries to clarify two sets of conceptual connections. On the 
one hand, Chinese discourses of compelled change, i.e. civilizing, and 
practices of conquest and colonialism are compared to the European 
discourses on missionizing, and their conceptual similarities are dem-
onstrated. On the other hand, connections between Chinese ideas of a 
‘Confucian civilizing mission’ as change of moral, cultural, and ethnic 
identity from the Ming and Qing dynasties are linked to later Chinese 
ideas of ‘nationizing’, i.e. integration of non-Chinese people into the 
Chinese nation by assimilation of language, script, way of living, and 
other cultural and ethnic markers.
Keywords: Confucian civilizing mission, Christian missionizing, internal 
colonialism, southern and southwestern China, Ming and Qing Dynasties
Introduction
This chapter aims at drawing connections between the three sets of dis-
courses on the colonial integration of others into the self and its legitima-
tion: f irst, the Chinese nationalist discourse on ‘China’s assimilative power’, 
second, its pre-discursive root or dispositif, the ‘Confucian civilizing mission’, 
and, third, European Christian missionizing. The chapter is divided into 
two main parts. In the f irst part, I will go into detail about the post-1900 
nationalist discourse and highlight how the idea of ‘China’s assimilative 
power’ was developed due to the demands of Chinese nation-building. In 
the second part, I will argue why I see a theoretical connection between the 
ideas of ‘Confucian civilizing’, assimilation or ‘sinicization’, and Christian 
missionizing, particularly in the context of colonialism and imperialism.
Chinese scholars and historians began to write ‘general histories’ (tongshi 
通史) and ‘history textbooks’ (lishi jiaokeshu 歷史教科書), as well as essays 
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and articles, shedding light on certain aspects and eras of history and 
historiography in a nationalist style since the 1900s. At that time, national-
ism, that is, the theory that nation and state should be congruent and that 
every nation should have a state, became known among Chinese reformist 
political thinkers and quickly gained popularity. Ernest Renan’s question 
‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ (‘What is a nation’)1 in its particular Chinese 
form – ‘What is the Chinese nation?’ – was indeed an urgent question at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Nationalism had originated in 
Europe and, as stressed by Benedict Anderson, in Creole Middle America, 
and it became more and more popular all over the world in the course of 
the nineteenth century.2 Since the 1890s, Chinese thinkers learned of its 
theories, mostly f iltered through Japanese translations and adaptations of 
Western works on politics, history, and society.
The question of how to define one’s own nation was by no means limited 
to the Chinese experience, but was posed by political thinkers around the 
globe since they came to support nationalism. This is an expression of a 
paradox of nationalism detected by Anderson: nationalism is a universal 
concept, but at the same time it is irremediably particular in its concrete 
manifestations.3 Although many political and scholarly elites asked 
themselves what defined their nations, their answers to this question were 
necessarily different. Furthermore, differences not only existed between, 
for example, def initions of the French and the Chinese nations, but also 
within the discourse on the Chinese nation opinions differed on how to 
def ine this particular nation.
When I refer to Chinese scholars and thinkers in late imperial and early 
republican times, I refer to people who spoke one of the Chinese languages 
or dialects, who mostly grew up in traditional elite environments with 
regard to their education during childhood and adolescence, in families 
of some fortune, rich enough to allow their sons to learn and study for a 
rather long time. Until the abrogation of the imperial examinations in the 
course of New Policies (xinzheng 新政) in 1905, Chinese education had had 
the ultimate objective of participating in the examinations and of gaining 
access to a career as an off icial. However, also after 1905, it provided the 
opportunity to a career, for example in politics, academia, press, and media.
At the end of the nineteenth century, it was from the ranks of these 
scholars and thinkers that the bold political attempt was made to reform the 
1 Renan (1882), trans. Renan (2008).
2 Anderson (2006, pp. 192-194).
3 Anderson (2006, p. 5).
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Qing Dynasty (1636/1644-1912) and change it into a constitutional monarchy. 
Reform-minded scholars like Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927), his disciple 
Liang Qichao 梁啓超 (1873-1929), and several others persuaded the young 
Guangxu 光緒 Emperor Dezong 德宗 (1871-1908) to go against his aunt, Em-
press Dowager Cixi 慈禧 (1835-1908). However, their Hundred Days’ Reform 
(wuxu bianfa 戊戌變法) failed due to the intervention of the conservative 
circles in the government backed up by the Empress Dowager. Kang, Liang, 
and others who had directly participated in the reformist attempt or had 
supported it publicly like Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 and Zhang Binglin 章炳
麟 (1868-1936), had to emigrate. Those who wanted to or had to remain 
in the Qing Empire, i.e. Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865-1898), were put to death. 
Most of the escapees went to Japan where reformist Japanese politicians 
and political parties offered them shelter and the opportunity to continue 
their political work. From their Japanese exile, Liang Qichao and Zhang 
Taiyan continued their struggle for reform by publishing extensively. Their 
interest in nationalist theories grew due to the fact that they gained better 
access to Japanese translations, adaptations, and analyses of Western works 
on politics, history, and society on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
could study the outcome of the Japanese Meiji Reforms which had been 
implemented by the Meiji 明治 Emperor (1852-1912) since the beginning 
of his reign in 1868.
China’s assimilative power
Liang Qichao’s nationalism
In his Japanese exile, Liang Qichao published several famous essays, among 
them Teachings of the Great Political Scientist Bluntschli (Zhengzhixue 
Dajia Bolunzhili zhi Xueshuo 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說) on the Swiss 
political theorist Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-1881).4 Bluntschli was well 
known among Japanese scholars, because his works had been translated 
into Japanese by the political scientist Kato Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 (1836-1916) 
already in the 1870s. Liang, however, copied large parts from a more recent 
translation of Bluntschli’s German Political Science for the Educated Public 
(‘Deutsche Staatslehre für Gebildete’, 1874) by Azuma Heiji 吾妻兵治 (dates 
of life unknown), Science of the Nation (Kokkagaku 国家学 1899).5 Crucial 
4 Liang (1903).
5 Bastid-Bruguière (2004, p. 118). 
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for my analysis here, however, are passages which Liang added to Azuma’s 
translation of Bluntschli’s text. They refer to the particular situation of the 
Qing Empire and question the validity of Bluntschli’s theories for the case 
of the Chinese nation.
Based on Bluntschli’s approach to the different ways in which states, 
nations, and ethnicities could be linked, Liang developed his well-known 
theory of ‘greater nationalism’ (da minzuzhuyi 大民族主義) opposed to 
‘lesser nationalism’ (xiao minzuzhuyi 小民族主義).6 ‘Greater national-
ism’ meant that what ‘all ethnicities, aboriginals and those originating 
from other places, who are united in the [Qing] Empire, [feel] regarding all 
ethnicities outside the empire’ 合國內本部屬部之諸族以對於國外之諸
族.7 ‘Lesser nationalism’, on the other hand, was what ‘the Han [Chinese] 
ethnicity [feels] regarding other ethnicities within the [borders of the Qing] 
Empire’ 漢族對於國內他族.8 Geographically, ‘greater nationalism’ thus 
referred to the whole Qing Empire, ‘lesser nationalism’ only to the Chinese 
inhabited regions within the Qing Empire, also called ‘China proper’ (benbu 
本部; guannei 關內). In confronting ‘greater’ with ‘lesser’ nationalisms and 
taking a stance against the latter, Liang gave his answer to the question, 
what the Chinese nation was. However, his comparison between ‘greater’ 
and ‘lesser’ nationalisms shows that the answer was a matter of debate and 
did not come naturally.
Accordingly, two different conclusions were drawn from the Qing situ-
ation. One conclusion was that the existing Qing state def ined the nation. 
This was the basis of Liang’s ‘greater nationalism’. The ‘greater nation’ was 
based on political and territorial considerations, which meant that those 
living within certain (political) borders were part of the Chinese nation. One 
could say that this idea equated the Qing Empire with ‘China’ (zhongguo 中
國) and that this was the basis for defining the Qing Empire as a ‘Zhonghua 
[Chinese] nation’ (zhonghua minzu 中華民族) . The other conclusion was 
that the Chinese or Han ethnicity (Hanzu 漢族) def ined the nation. The 
‘lesser nation’ was based on a mixture of language, culture, tradition, place 
of residence, in short, ethnic markers, which meant that the Chinese nations 
were only those who were Han (漢) in the Qing Empires rendering. This 
clearly was a narrower understanding of the nation. Lesser nationalism 
diminished the territory of a future nation-state in comparison with the 
6 Liang (1903/1983, Wenji 13, p. 75)
7 Liang (1903/1983, pp. 75-76).
8 Liang (1903/1983, p. 75).
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f irst option. For diverse reasons, most political thinkers and scholars opted 
for the f irst idea of the Qing Empire as the nation-state.
Liang Qichao’s definition of the Chinese term minzu 民族 in his essay on 
Bluntschli (or rather, that of Azuma Heiji) was a translation of Bluntschli’s 
German Nation. The German Nation, however, was def ined by Bluntschli 
himself as the English ‘people’ and the French peuple. (The German Volk was 
def ined as ‘nation’ in English and nation in French.) Based on Bluntschli, 
Liang also defined what conditions were needed in order to form one minzu. 
He gave the following list:
Same place, same blood relation, same physical appearance, same lan-
guage, same script, same religion, same tradition, same way of living. 
Language, script, and tradition, however, are the most important [criteria] 
among them.9
How does Liang’s def inition of minzu inform the term ‘nationalism’ (min-
zuzhuyi 民族主義), or, in other words, how do Liang’s two definitions of 
the nation come together: nation with regard to people (as underlying the 
term minzu) and nation in geographical terms (as underlying his idea of 
‘greater nationalism’)? On the one hand, Liang assumed that a feeling of 
national unity within the borders of the Qing Empire (guonei 國內) was not 
only possible, but desirable. On the other hand, he defined minzu in a rather 
narrow way: ethnicities or identity groups which are genealogically linked 
and share a place of living, blood relation, physical appearance, language, 
script, religion, tradition, and way of living. Would not this latter definition 
of minzu as the basis of the nation-state exclude those ‘other ethnicities 
within the [borders of the Qing] Empire’ (guonei tazu 國內他族)10 from the 
minzu of a Chinese nation-state which according to the concept of ‘greater 
nationalism’ was supposed to include many non-Chinese peoples?
Liang justif ied his idea of a Chinese nation-state within the borders of 
the Qing Empire with the efficacy of an ‘assimilative power’ (tonghuali 同化
力), which the Chinese possessed and which he called ‘China’s assimilative 
power’ (zhongguo tonghuali 中國同化力).11 With the unconscious eff icacy 
or conscious application of this power, the ethnic definition of minzu could 
become congruent with the territorial def inition of ‘greater nationalism’.
9 Liang (1903/1983, p. 75, pp. 71-72). 
10 Liang (1903/1983, p. 75).
11 Liang (1903/1983, p. 76).
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Liang had discussed the theory of ‘assimilative power’ already in 1902 
in the essay About the General Tendency of Ethnic Struggles (Lun Minzu 
Jingzheng Zhi Dashi 論民族競爭之大勢).12 Its validity was based on the 
assumption that there were ‘superior ethnicities’ (youqiang minzu 優
强民族) which could ‘swallow inferior, weak ethnicities and erase their 
frontiers’.13 In 1903, Liang identif ied the Chinese ethnicity as one of these 
superior ethnicities. The assumption that their superiority enabled them 
to change other people’s identity was based on older Chinese culturalist 
assumptions, such as the late imperial reading of the Mengzi 孟子, (372-289 
BC) motto ‘using the Xia [Chinese] to change the Yi [barbarians]’ (yong Xia 
bian Yi 用夏變夷), and on social Darwinist ideas of people being divided in 
superior ones and inferior ones, with the former having the natural right to 
rule and dominate the latter. Already Bluntschli had used social Darwinist 
classif ications of people and had followed the general idea of dominant or 
superior people being able to assimilate and to change others especially in 
order to unify the people of a nation, and at the same time to withstand 
change by others.14 Bluntschli particularly referred to several people who 
possessed such power, the Romans and the Greeks in antiquity, and the 
contemporary United States of America (as a nation) as well as the French 
and the Russians.15 One important precondition according to Bluntschli 
was that this kind of assimilation ‘only succeeds where the dominant people 
are decidedly superior to the rest in education, mind, and power’.16 Liang 
did not fully accept this precondition. Although he agreed that superiority 
in power was useful, he assumed that only superiority of education and 
mind was indispensable.17
Consequently, Liang meant by ‘China’s assimilative power’ that the 
Chinese, which by his def inition were the Hanzu 漢族, were capable to 
transform everyone, groups as well as individuals, and assimilate them 
into Chinese (Han) culture and ethnicity. According to Liang, irrespective 
of the Chinese political, social, and military situation, their culture would 
always put them in the superior position and enable them to assimilate 
others under all circumstances.
Liang applied the theory within two f ields, historiography and political 
strategy. As a political strategy, Liang used the theory of ‘China’s assimilative 
12 Liang (1902).
13 Liang (1902/1983, Wenji 10, p. 11).
14 Bluntschli (1886, p. 108); translation Bluntschli (1895/1971, p. 101).
15 Bluntschli (p. 108); translation Bluntschli (p. 101).
16 Bluntschli (p. 109); trans.(p. 101).
17 Liang (1903/1983, Wenji 13, p. 76).
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power’ to argue for the possibility of integrating non-Chinese peoples 
into the Chinese nation and nation-state in his contemporary times. As 
a historiographical theory, Liang used ‘China’s assimilative power’ as a 
basis to evaluate all kinds of contacts between Chinese and non-Chinese 
in all periods of time. Rather than analyzing these contacts in detail, he 
claimed that all had the same outcome: the non-Chinese peoples could 
not help but assimilate into the Chinese. His strongest argument was his 
interpretation of the histories of dynastic empires founded by non-Chinese 
peoples who conquered Chinese-inhabited regions, later called ‘foreign 
conquest dynasties’. (The label ‘conquest dynasties’ of course only holds 
true from a limited perspective and otherwise strengthens the ‘monolithic 
assumption that there were “Chinese” dynasties that were somehow not 
conquest dynasties’.18) This argument was particularly strong, because, 
according to Liang, although non-Chinese conquerors were politically, 
socially, and militarily superior, even they could not avoid their assimilation 
into the Chinese culture and people. The assumption of their assimilation 
thus meant that in the end every people, irrespective of their position with 
regard to politics, military, or social stratif ication, could be assimilated 
into the Chinese due to the Chinese superior culture and identity as an 
ethnicity or people.
The application of the theory of ‘China’s assimilative power’ in the f ield 
of historiography was in fact based on the necessity to prove its validity 
as a political strategy. With selected examples from history, Liang tried 
to provide evidence for the applicability and successful prospects of as-
similation into the Chinese when ‘China’s assimilative power’ was used 
strategically to build and to unify the Chinese nation. Since the 1920s, the 
terms Hanhua 漢化 or Huahua 華化 (sinicization, or Sinif ication) became 
to be used to refer to the specif ic processes of (assumed) assimilation into 
Chinese culture and people.
Chinese political thinkers and nationalisms
Like Liang Qichao, most Chinese political thinkers accepted the idea 
that states with a homogenous nation were more likely to be strong and 
successful in the contemporary situation. Their approach towards national-
ism was thus closely linked to the wish to withstand imperialist threats 
especially of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan. 
Based on his reading of Bluntschli, Liang had defined the unifying aspects 
18 Crossley (1999, pp. 29f).
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of a people based on place, blood relation, physical appearance, language, 
script, religion, tradition, and way of living, emphasizing language, script, 
and tradition. Liang’s strategy was to claim that the assimilation of most 
of the non-Chinese people in the Qing Empire had already happened in 
the past without revealing substantial proof for this claim. Based on older 
sinocentric approaches to other cultures and peoples, Liang’s claim was gen-
erally accepted. This is reflected in the new genres of history textbooks and 
general histories published since the 1900s. History books of these genres 
had the purpose to educate and from the start they had strong nationalist 
tendencies, not only in the Qing Empire or the Republic of China but also 
in Japan and in the countries of their origin in Central and Western Europe.
Zhang Taiyan offered an alternative approach. He accepted the existence 
of ‘China’s assimilative power’, but doubted that the Tibetans, Mongols, and 
Turkic Muslims (later called Uyghurs) were in fact already assimilated. He 
thus accepted the possibility of a contemporary, but not so much historical 
effectiveness of ‘China’s assimilative power’. Like Liang, he found language 
and script important aspects of national unity. He stressed a second aspect, 
‘[way of] living, eating, and occupation’ ( jushi zhiye 居食職業), which might 
be comparable to Liang’s aspect of ‘tradition’ ( fengsu 風俗). However, there 
is no detailed description, neither by Liang of ‘tradition’ nor by Zhang of 
‘living, eating, and occupation’, so it remains unclear what they meant by 
these terms. Zhang moreover added a third aspect, ‘laws and orders’ ( falü 
fuling 法律符令).19 He found Tibetans, Mongols, and Turkic Muslims all 
lacking particularly with regard to one of these three aspects. If they were 
to become part of the Chinese nation-state, meaning political participa-
tion, it would be necessary for them to adjust to Chinese ways.20 Although 
Zhang stated that every people should decide on their own if they wanted 
to found a nation-state or become part of another, he left no doubt that he 
found the integration of all three peoples, Tibetans, Mongols, and Turkic 
Muslims, highly desirable and expected them to be sensible enough to see 
how unwise a separation from the Chinese would be.21
According to Zhang, the processes of assimilating Tibetans, Mongols, and 
Turkic Muslims could be finalized within twenty years, given that there was 
a concrete state program providing education in Chinese language and cul-
ture, promoting Chinese ways of living, eating, and occupation, especially 
19 Zhang (1907/1984, IV, p. 257).
20 Zhang (pp. 257-258).
21 Zhang (p. 262).
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in the f ield of agriculture, and implementing a Chinese legal system.22 In 
contrast to Liang, he did not f ind it necessary to refer to history to prove 
that people living in the Qing Empire had already been assimilated into the 
Chinese people and culture in the past. Zhang’s argument was based on 
the simple power-political equation that the larger a state’s territory was, 
the more powerful the state would be. At the same time, he assumed that 
the people in this state’s territory had to be unif ied as a nation, because 
the size of the state was only an advantage when it was based on national 
unif ication. He did not base his acceptance of the possibility of siniciza-
tion on historical arguments like Liang did, but on the sheer necessity of 
unif ication – what had to be possible, was possible.
Nationalism as religion: Nationizing as missionizing?
I f ind the theory of ‘China’s assimilative power’, as used in early Chinese 
nationalist discourse, close to religious concepts of missionizing. To ap-
proach Chinese nationalism based on the suggestion that nationalisms 
are like or are religions, as done by several scholars, means that it might 
be reasonable to apply concepts of missionizing to the theory of ‘China’s 
assimilative power’ and the idea of sinicization.23 To what extent does the 
idea of sinicization resemble certain aspects of religious missionizing as 
transformation and change of a peoples’ identity in discourse and in reality?
Scholars such as Frank Wright write that ‘nationalisms are not merely 
“like” religions – they are religions’,24 and Joseph R. Llobera claims that 
‘nationalism has become a religion – a secular religion where god is the 
nation’.25 Both statements are about western European nationalisms and 
they both refer to the fact that these appeared at a time when religious 
identities – Christianity and Judaism alike – were losing their attractiveness 
to people in Europe and North America. This crisis of religion happened 
due to the Enlightenment and scientif ic f indings and inventions.
In the Western context, changes of identities due to cultural assimilation 
and changes due to processes of religious missionizing seem not to have 
been analyzed in parallel so far. In the Chinese discourse on national assimi-
lation, its drawing on earlier ideas of Confucian civilizational assimilation 
22 Zhang (p. 257).
23 Wright (1988); Llobera (1994, p. 143); Anderson (2006, p. 5).
24 Wright (1988, pp. 128-148).
25 Llobera (1994, p. 143).
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are much more evident. By revealing its roots in earlier ideas of civilizational 
assimilation, the Chinese nationalist discourse reveals that the mechanics 
and underlying discourses, both on Confucian civilizational assimilation 
in Ming and Qing dynasties and on Chinese national assimilation in late 
Qing and Republican eras, are built on one another.
By this understanding of Chinese discourses on assimilation, linking 
pre-nationalist discourses with those after the idea of nation-building 
became part of these discourses, it becomes obvious that also in Europe 
two discourses which have not been interpreted as being related, might 
be more closely related than previously thought: Christian missionizing or 
Christian religious assimilation on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
processes of active or passive ‘nationizing’ in the course of nation- and 
state-building, nationizing being understood as imagined and real processes 
of integrating people into a nation and nation-state who have so far not been 
part. Whereas the connection between Western discourses on Christian 
missionizing and nationizing cannot be discussed within the frame of 
this essay, parallels between the Chinese and the Western discourses are 
analyzed further below.
The superiority of the Chinese as a people and a culture
In the Western context, nationalism and Enlightenment developed in 
parallel. Similarly, in parallel to the development of theories of Chinese 
nationalism since the late nineteenth century, Chinese thinkers became 
frustrated with traditional Chinese philosophies, ethics, and morals. This 
refers to several layers with regard to the wish for reforms which developed 
chronologically in parallel to political and historical events. Like in the 
Western context, the idea of identity shifted from one based on general 
ethics and moral to a nationalist idea of identity based on a specif ic ethnic 
belonging.
In the late nineteenth century, Chinese reformers wished for a strong 
Qing Empire. It was not considered to be a major obstacle that the Qing 
emperors were of Manchu ethnic background, as long as a reform towards 
constitutionalism was possible. However, the Hundred Days’ Reform proved 
unsuccessful and important reformist thinkers like Kang Youwei, Liang 
Qichao, and Zhang Taiyan had to leave the Qing Empire. In their Japanese 
exile and based on their discussions of nationalism, more and more came 
to believe that the problem was exactly the non-Chinese identity of the 
Qing emperors and ruling elites. It came to be understood that the Qing 
Empire’s desolate situation was the fault of the Manchu emperors, of whom 
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the Chinese thinkers now thought as conquerors or even as colonizers.26 
Chinese nationalist reformers and revolutionaries alike argued that due to 
the Manchus’ assumed ethnic and cultural inferiority, imperialist powers 
had been able to overrun the Empire in the nineteenth century. (They also 
blamed their Chinese fellow subjects for their passivity in letting themselves 
be ruled by non-Chinese conquerors). Under the preconditions of a growing 
anti-Manchuism, it was claimed that the Chinese as a cultural and ethnic 
group were superior to non-Chinese, especially to non-Chinese within the 
Qing Empire. Therefore, they did not aim at a constitutional monarchy with 
Manchu emperors anymore, but at a republic with a Chinese ruling elite 
who would lead the non-Chinese inferior people towards their integration 
into a Chinese nation-state. This integration would be based on ‘China’s 
assimilative power’ which the Chinese possessed because of their cultural 
and ethnic superiority.
When the Republic of China (ROC), the f irst Chinese nation-state, 
was f inally founded in 1911, it became obvious that ‘China’s assimilative 
power’ and the attraction to be part of a powerful, united nation-state 
under Chinese dominance were obviously not as appealing as previously 
thought. Non-Chinese peoples, especially Tibetans and Mongols, later also 
Turkic Muslims, who began to call themselves ‘Uyghurs’ under Soviet rule 
in the 1920s, developed their own ideas of nation-building or at least of 
state-building. They aimed at independent (nation-) states and did not 
want to be part of a Chinese dominated nation-state. Liang Qichao and 
Zhang Taiyan had assumed that non-Chinese would be naturally inclined 
to remain part of a Chinese successor state of the Qing Dynasty before 
1911. Now, their hopes were proven incorrect. In the 1920s, Liang Qichao 
nevertheless worked even harder on this theory of ‘China’s assimilative 
power’, renaming it ‘assimilative power of the Zhonghua [Chinese] eth-
nicity’ (Zhonghua minzu tonghuali 中華民族同化力).27 Instead of asking 
why the Chinese people and culture were not as attractive as assumed, he 
concentrated on showing that at least in the past, the ‘assimilative power 
of the Zhonghua [Chinese] ethnicity’ had worked indeed as smoothly as he 
had claimed in the 1900s.
Others, however, paid more attention to the process of weakening of 
the Chinese nation-state. Nearly from the start, the ROC had been in a 
complicated situation, because of the influence of Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 
(1859-1916) and his Beiyang Army clique, who jeopardized the Republican 
26 Karl (2002, pp. 166-167).
27 Liang (1922/1983, p. 32).
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government and ruled the ROC more and more autocratically. Already 
before the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, when the allied powers of World 
War I gave the German concessions in China to Japan, Chinese thinkers, 
especially the younger ones, had become disappointed by the Western 
states, which for them lost their model character to some degree. They 
became engaged in the May Fourth Movement (1915-1925), whose aim was 
to reform Chinese culture and enable it to resist imperialism. One part was 
that they wanted to lessen the influence of Chinese traditional ideology, 
often called ‘Confucianism’ in English.
Traditional ideology, which was the moral and ethnic basis of government 
and ruling, of social organization and hierarchy in general, embraced in 
fact more than Confucian ideology based on the Four Books and the Five 
Classics (Sishu Wujing 四書五經). It also contained legalist, Neo-Confucian, 
and even Mongol and Manchu ways of government and ruling. However, 
(Neo-) Confucian ideology certainly was its decisive part. By critically 
judging traditional ideology and aiming at abrogating certain parts of it, 
the participants of the May Forth Movement not only wanted to reform 
Chinese culture, but they also aimed at changing and reforming the whole 
Chinese way of life with regard to society and politics.
The point I want to make here is, that like Christian ethics and morals 
were criticized in the context of Enlightenment and then nationalism, 
traditional ways of ethics and morals also were criticized in the Chinese 
nationalist and reformist discourses. The triggers for turning away from 
traditional ideologies differed from those in the West. In the West, sci-
entif ic and technical developments and thus a new way of looking at the 
world played a great role. Among Chinese thinkers, however, the political, 
economic, and social decline since the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury shook the belief in Confucian ethics and f inally resulted in a general 
disappointment of Chinese traditional ethics and values in the late 1910s. 
Although I am not sure if one can label traditional Chinese ideology, or 
rather ideologies as ‘religion’, I nevertheless f ind the parallelism of the 
developments, which ultimately lead to nationalism and a new way of 
narrating identities in Western and in Chinese contexts striking. In both 
settings, the older traditional/religious and younger enlightened/national, 
identities were based on, f irst, certain ways of behavior linked on the one 
hand to social rules of ethics and moral and on the other hand to cultural 
markers, such as language, dress, way of living and eating, occupations, 
etc., and second, an imagined genealogical connection and the idea of same 
descent. However, the emphasis of the markers shifted, and social rules, 
language, dress, way of living and eating, occupations, and particularly the 
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idea of descent changed. New ways of imagining identity were embedded 
into the framework of a national identity.
Did nationalism offer a new ‘religious’ way of identif ication? Can na-
tionalism be described as a new ‘religion’ in the Chinese context, too, as 
claimed by scholars working on West European nationalisms? And can 
the wish to assimilate non-Chinese peoples into the Chinese nation, their 
‘nationalization’, be seen as a way of missionizing, as ‘an organized effort 
for the propagation’28 of Chinese nationality?
Assimilation as missionizing in the context of Ming and Qing 
colonialism
In a pre-1900 context, general concepts of Chinese-Confucian civilizing and 
change of identity indeed seem to resemble the idea of Western-Christian 
missionizing. Rites, rules, and morals based on the respective traditions, 
whether Confucianism or Christianity, were considered to be ultimately 
true, correct, and infallible by the bearers of the respective tradition. The 
assimilation of non-Confucians into the Confucian community, their adop-
tion of Confucian rites, and the acceptance of certain rules and morals, in 
connection with the ability to read Chinese (at least among the upper social 
strata) are similar to Christianization and the Christian mission, the process 
of becoming part of the Christian community, based on education not only 
with regard to Christian ideology, but also to language and other subjects 
considered necessary knowledge in the context of Christian missionizing.
The similarities increase, if Chinese concepts and realities of pre-1900 
‘Confucian civilizing missions’ and its legacy in post-1900 assimilation and 
nationizing by ‘China’s assimilative power’ are compared to approaches to 
Christian missionizing in the context of colonialism, especially since the 
nineteenth century, when ideas of racial inequality were brought into the 
debate. It is undeniable that the process of Christian missionizing has run 
parallel to that of colonization with regard to time and space since the f irst 
seafarers, f inanced by and supported by European powers, left Portugal 
and Spain for new continents in the f ifteenth century.29 Colonial rule and 
the ‘Christian “conquest of the world”’30 went hand in hand, and European 
Christian churches declared that European expansionism was ‘God’s plan’ 
28 I use a modif ied definition of ‘mission’ given in the Encyclopedia Britannica: ‘in Christianity, 
an organized effort for the propagation of the Christian faith’, www.Britannica.com.)
29 Gründer (2004, p. 7).
30 Gründer (p. 7).
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to propagate the ‘Kingdom of God’ in the world. They thus readily used 
the protection of the colonial states for their missions.31 At the same time, 
colonial states often transferred the task of pacif ication of the colonies 
to the missionaries, who consequently became central to colonial power. 
Missionaries and colonial powers worked together in order to achieve the 
embedding of the colonized into the colonial system and structure with 
regard to rites, rules, and morals, which were to provide the base for a 
political, administrative, economical, and also linguistic integration. This 
integration would, however, not be an integration on eye level, but one 
resulting in the economical exploitation of the colonies. The pacif ication 
of the colonies managed by missionaries was thus especially based on an 
education of the conquered and colonized people which supported obedi-
ence and labor.32 Christianity consequently was the ‘ideological and ritual 
accompaniment of Western imperialism’.33
Processes of enforced change and assimilation based on education, 
together with the seizure of power from local power holders and often 
with a displacement of the local populations, such as happened in the 
colonies of European imperial powers, are comparable to the processes of 
change in Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan since the 
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), when the growth of population in the Chinese 
(Han) inhabited regions caused increasing migration of Chinese people 
into these areas. Ming colonization was linked to a claim of a ‘Confucian 
civilizing mission’34 or ‘civilizing project’35 whereby ‘civilizing’ actually 
meant assimilation of the local non-Chinese/non-Confucian population 
into Chinese ways of living with regard to rites, rules, and morals, but 
also with regard to politics, administration, economy, and language. As 
described by John E. Herman, the off icial slogan of a ‘Confucian civilizing 
mission’ in fact concealed the Ming’s military role in this conquest, which 
was an ‘uninterrupted campaign of state-sponsored violence’.36 In the case 




34 Herman (2007, p. 13). 
35 With regard to China, Stevan Harrell uses the term ‘civilizing projects’ to describe ‘a series 
of attempts by dominant powers to transform them [“peripheral peoples” or “minorities”], to 
make them more like the transformers, or, in the parlance of the transformers themselves, to 
“civilize” them’. He especially refers to ‘at least four such civilizing projects’, conducted by the 
three ‘Chinese governments’ as well as by ‘Western missionaries’ between 1842 and today: the 
Confucian, Christian, and Communist projects. See Harrell (1995, p. 3 and p. 17). 
36 Herman (2007, p. 13).
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the armies of the colonial powers. Similarly, the ‘missionaries’ of Chinese-
Confucian culture, military off icials, and civil servants, who engaged in 
the building of schools and temples to educate, civilize, and ‘missionize’ 
the locals, followed the military conquest immediately.
In the case of European colonialism, the purpose of educating and 
missionizing the colonized was based on the assumption that they were 
inferior to the Europeans and generally lacked culture, civilization, and, 
of course, the correct faith. Since the introduction of social Darwinism 
and Lamarckism into the discourse on colonizing and missionizing, the 
colonized peoples’ alleged inferiority was additionally explained by their 
racial condition and also by their environments, which were now under-
stood as the causes of their cultural and civilizational inferiority. Christian 
missionaries would compare local people, whom they perceived of as ‘less 
gifted’ races, to children in need of a fatherly education. Stevan Harrell 
argues that the ‘child’ metaphor demonstrates not only the inferiority of 
the other, but also their ‘civilizability’, thus giving further legitimacy to 
Christian or any other civilizing mission.37 The integration and dominance 
of colonies was furthermore justif ied by an evolutionary progressing image 
of history and culture, which argued that these people, as long as they were 
inferior, had to be dependent on and lead by the superior colonial power, like 
children were dependent on and lead by their parents (or rather, fathers).
A similar narrative can be found among Chinese scholar-off icials in the 
Ming and Qing dynasties. They, too, argued that the non-Chinese people 
in the south and southwest were uncivilized and thus in need of guidance. 
This guidance would naturally be that of the Chinese people, who had 
achieved a superior culture. It was thus the duty of the respective central 
state to support the civilizing of these ‘barbarians’ in order to pacify the 
regions.38 At the basis of both, the Christian and the Confucian missions, 
lay the assumption of European39 respectively Chinese superiority. One 
outcome was a depiction of non-Europeans/non-Chinese peoples as inferior, 
uncultivated, barbarian, even as inhuman and beastlike. In both contexts, 
the outsiders’ group was portrayed in contrast to the insiders’ group, thereby 
creating a highly simplif ied dichotomy between self and other.
37 Harrell (1995, p. 13).
38 Herman (2007, p. 230).
39 I use the term ‘Europe’ in a broad general sense here. It has to be mentioned, that ‘Europe’ did 
not necessarily refer to everyone on the continent of Europe, because especially in imperialist 
contexts, only peoples in the imperialist states were perceived as truly civilized, whereas other 
people in Europe were only seen as partly civilized. 
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Stevan Harrell gives three different sets of metaphors, which are used in 
Chinese discourses to refer to the non-Chinese people until today, especially 
in the south and southwest, and have been in use at least since late Qing 
times and in some cases much longer. These three metaphors reveal the 
Chinese imagination of a hierarchical, but also dichotomous relationship 
of themselves with the non-Chinese, by positioning themselves and the 
non-Chinese in certain hierarchical settings with regard to family rela-
tions (father-child), gender relations (male-female), and temporal relations 
(contemporary-ancient).
The f irst metaphor, which resembles how Christian missionaries viewed 
their colonized ‘f locks’, is that of the non-Chinese as ‘children’. In Chinese 
discourses, the child metaphor as a reference to non-Chinese people is, in 
fact, still in use in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) today for certain 
‘minority nationalities’ (shaoshu minzu 少數民族). Its function is to mark 
a clear position of the non-Chinese as children in relation to the Chinese 
as fathers, a relationship today also reformulated as that of ‘older brother/
younger brother nationalities’ (xiongdi minzu 兄弟民族).40 Like in the 
context of Christian missions, the ‘child’ metaphor refers to a patriarchal 
relation between family members and moreover stands for educability and 
civilizability.
The second metaphor Harrell mentions, identif ies the non-Chinese 
as inferior, too, but adds another connotation. It is the metaphor of non-
Chinese as women.41 As Harrell points out,
sexual relations, seen as a man doing something to a woman, are a 
pervasive metaphor for a variety of relations of domination in many 
cultures, but they are particularly noteworthy in the imagery of civilizing 
projects.42
Basically, uncivilized people are imagined as erotic, but also as promiscuous 
due to their inferior level of civilization. This image has several aspects. 
First, in both contexts, Christian missionizing and Confucian civilizing, 
rules of sexual propriety and of sexual repression, but also a high degree 
of hypocrisy are obvious. In the Chinese context, this imagining of non-
Chinese peoples as erotic and as demonstrating improper sexual behavior 
has been continued under Communist rule. Second, the non-Chinese 
40 Harrell (1995, pp. 13-15).
41 Harrell (1995, pp. 10-13).
42 Harrell (1995, p. 10).
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peoples are imagined as erotic and as sexually desirable in their feminized 
version. This is an aspect not found in the discourse on the ‘uncivilized 
people’ in the context of Christian missions, however, it is a trope found in 
a Western Orientalist approach were the ‘Orientals’ frequently appear as 
erotic and female. Third, particularly in pictorial representations, many 
non-Chinese people are depicted as women, who wear colorful, ‘exotic’ 
clothes (or, in fact, do not wear many clothes at all). In such pictures, non-
Chinese women do not only function as the carriers of non-Chinese culture, 
but the reductionist tendencies of this portrayal deny the non-Chinese 
people ‘in a male-dominated society, […] full male status’.43
The third metaphor mentioned by Harrell is that of non-Chinese peoples 
as ‘ancient’.44 Although this metaphor was sometimes used in the pre-1949 
Chinese context, it gained prominence in the Communist state on the basis 
of historical materialism, but it has also been and still is prominent not only 
in the Christian missionizing context, but also in Western discourses on 
‘aboriginal’, ‘natural’, or ‘primitive people’. The ‘ancient’ metaphor serves 
to explain why uncivilized people indeed have no civilization, but are at 
the same time civilizable. This metaphor gained acceptance when racial 
arguments fell short. The latter could be used to explain why people were 
uncivilized, but they could not satisfyingly explain why these people then 
could be civilized, because according to racial theories savagery was inborn. 
Therefore, another explanation was needed. With historicism, that is, the 
idea of a universal pattern of linear progressive history, interpreted as a 
cultural, material, political, and social progress, different stages of civili-
zational development could be explained. At the same time, civilizability 
was ensured.
Until late imperial times, an often-used metaphor for non-Chinese people 
in the Chinese discourse similar to the ‘ancient’ metaphor was not that of 
a temporal but a spatial distance from the Chinese people and thus the 
civilizational center of the world. This spatiality was as symbolical as the 
temporality of the ‘ancient’ metaphor, because it did not mean that by com-
ing closer to the civilizational center physically the ‘far-away’ status of the 
non-Chinese could be changed. Only if they approached the civilizational 
center with regard to morals, behavior, ethics, etc. could they come closer 
to civilization in the end.
The metaphors given by Harrell can be supplemented by the important 
‘animal’ metaphor, which is a reinforced ‘hierarchization’. Horst Gründer 
43 Harrell (1995, p. 12).
44 Harrell (1995, pp. 15-16).
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mentions e.g. Manoel da Nóbrega (1517-1570), a Jesuit, who equated Brazilian 
Indians with ‘dogs’ and ‘pigs’.45 According to Frantz Fanon, the colonized 
subject ‘is reduced to the state of an animal. And consequently, when 
the colonist speaks of the colonized he uses zoological terms’.46 Indeed, 
‘describing colonized people as animals who lack the ability to reason is a 
long-standing tradition in colonial texts’, states Deborah Root.47
Within Chinese thinking, the equation of non-Chinese peoples with 
animals, based on the categorization of the Explaining Simple and Analyzing 
Compound Characters (Shuowen Jiezi 說文解字, 121 AD), was indeed a very 
old one, and groups of non-Chinese people were regarded as stemming from 
dogs, pigs, and other animals, symbolically or in reality, until the twentieth 
century.48 Although on f irst view the functions of the ‘animal’ metaphor 
seem to resemble that of the ‘children’, ‘woman’, and ‘ancient’ metaphors 
as it equally creates a strong hierarchy, an important difference lies in the 
factor of ‘civilizability’, which in case of the ‘animal’ metaphor cannot be 
ensured. Thus, in both, the Christian missionizing and the Confucian and 
Chinese contexts this metaphor could not be used to show the possibility of 
civilizing, missionizing, or assimilating the other, but rather that ‘natural’ 
borders between the human self and the ‘animal’ other had to be obtained. 
Therefore, the ‘animal’ metaphor seems not to have been part of the wider 
discourse on civilizing and missionizing, but rather of a different, although 
related discourse on the violence against the ‘other’ and its justif ication.
Another noteworthy parallel is the ideal of the ‘noble savage’ in the 
European context with its Chinese counterpart in the assumption of the 
non-Chinese being ‘pure’ in their ‘simplicity’. In both cases, however, the 
image of the other in the end serves to criticize the culture of the self. The 
characterization of the ‘noble savage’ as pure and naturally good or human 
opposes the Europeans, who were corrupted despite their civilization. In 
the Chinese context, the non-Chinese barbarians’ simplicity can on the one 
hand aim at deploring that the Chinese people are too soft in contrast to the 
barbarians, who are able to endure extreme hardship and thus be military 
more successful. On the other hand, the succession of chieftainship among 
tribal people was represented in the Chinese discourse as quasi-democratic. 
These representations could serve as criticism of autocratic and centralized 
forms of government like that of the Ming and Qing dynasties.
45 Gründer (2004, p. 11).
46 Fanon (2004, p. 7).
47 Root (1996, p. 178).
48 Zhang (1900/1984, III, pp. 21-22; ch. 11 ‘Yuan ren’ 原人); Liu (1903/1997, II, pp. 3b-4a).
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In the discourse on nationalism and the integration of non-Chinese 
people into the Chinese nation-state these metaphors come to the surface 
only rarely, although they certainly informed Chinese thinkers and provided 
a background for their image of non-Chinese peoples. Indeed, they were 
influenced by many different ways of imagining the non-Chinese ‘other’, 
based on older concepts of culturalism, social Darwinism, and pseudo-
scientif ic racism, personal experience, and the assessment of the Manchu 
emperors and regents, etc. However, the ultimate aim of most of these 
thinkers was an inclusion of the non-Chinese people and territories and thus 
the acceptance of the possibility to assimilate them. This acceptance was 
again based on older narratives of the effectiveness of the Ming and Qing 
‘Confucian civilizing missions’ (and also on the historical interpretation of 
non-Chinese conquest dynasties as assimilated by their Chinese subjects, a 
topic which I discuss elsewhere),49 which were thought to have contributed 
signif icantly to the integration of the southern and southwestern regions.
Herman argues, that a ‘Confucian civilizing mission’ could only really 
have been successful, if the Chinese social and state institutions would truly 
have been open to non-Chinese people, which they were not in the case of 
non-Chinese people in the south and the southwest.50 Based on Michael 
Hechter’s study, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development, 1536-1966,51 which focuses on the UK and Ireland, Herman 
claims that the Ming government in fact created a ‘cultural division of labor’, 
instead of allowing or even supporting real inclusion and integration by 
their acclaimed ‘Confucian civilizing mission’.
The term ‘cultural division of labor’ was originally introduced by Hechter 
to describe attempts to ‘stabilize and monopolize [a superordinate group’s] 
advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization and perpetu-
ation of the existing stratif ication system’.52 Herman uses the term to de-
scribe a certain situation in the preindustrial Ming Empire, whereas Hechter 
originally used the term to describe how cleavages between ‘advanced and 
less advanced groups’, or ‘core and peripheral groups’ developed due to 
the ‘uneven wave of industrialization’ in the UK and Ireland in particular. 
Nevertheless, Herman’s use of the phrase for the situation in the southern 
and southwestern provinces of the Ming Empire makes sense, because the 
49 Schneider (2017).
50 Herman (2007, p. 13).
51 Hechter (1975).
52 Hechter (1975, p. 39).
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precondition for this kind of division of labor was an ‘internal colonialism’, 
which Hechter equally describes for the case of the UK and Ireland.
Ming and Qing expansionisms as colonialisms
The migration of Chinese settlers to the south, which had begun before 
1368, but was institutionalized and off icially supported, also by military 
action, under Ming rule and further professionalized under the Qing, has 
been labeled ‘colonialism’ by scholars of China’s history since less than two 
decades. According to Emma Jinhua Teng, Peter Perdue, and others who 
contributed to a special issue of The International History Review titled 
‘Manchu colonialism’ were the first scholars who used the term ‘colonialism’ 
for Qing expansionism.53 Since then it has been used especially for the Qing 
Empire’s administration of conquered regions, but in recent times it has also 
been applied to the Ming Empire’s inclusion of southern and southwestern 
regions into its provincial administration. With regard to Ming and Qing 
expansionism into the south and southwest, the term ‘internal colonialism’ 
has been applied as a specif ication of ‘colonialism’.
Teng criticizes the use of the adjective ‘internal’ for Qing colonialism.54 
According to her, the term ‘internal colonialism’ seems to imply that Qing 
colonization, for example of Taiwan and Tibet, was somehow domestic, 
which strengthens ‘the ahistorical conception of the Qing frontiers as es-
sentially “Chinese”’.55 The application of the term ‘internal colonialism’ 
to the Ming and Qing cases can make sense, however, if one differentiates 
between two meanings of colonialism based on two different processes. 
First, colonialism refers to the process of conquering territories, depriv-
ing local rulers of their power, and establishing a rudimentary colonial 
administration with certain instruments of military, political, and eco-
nomic dominance. This process is concluded shortly after the conquest. 
Generally speaking, in this process, the conquerors and colonial powers 
are the main actors, whereas the conquered and colonized people are often 
forced to react. Second, colonialism also refers to a process, which begins 
with the conquest, continues long afterwards, and is at the same time more 
irreversible than the f irst. This is the process of enforcing and increasing the 
53 Perdue (1998); Teng (2005, p. 253).
54 The term ‘internal colonialism’ has been in use at least since the 1950s, but became only 
influential since the mid-1960s through Pablo Gonzalez Casanova’s article ‘Internal colonialism 
and national development’. See Casanova (1965).
55 Teng (2005, p. 254).
miSSioNiziNg, CiviliziNg, aNd NatioNiziNg 109
colonizers’ social, cultural, and mental dominance. In this second process, 
the colonized people are not only as active as the colonizers, cooperating 
unconsciously or consciously in order to achieve their respective aims in 
the colonial system by accepting exactly this system, they are moreover 
decisive to this process.56
The term ‘internal colonialism’ as used by Hechter referred explicitly to 
the second process in a specif ic setting. This setting was that of a colonial 
power, England, which integrated immediately adjacent regions as colonies: 
Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. The term ‘internal’ was maybe an unfortunate 
choice, and Teng is right to point to the fact that it seems to imply that the 
colonies were somehow domestic even before they were colonized in the 
f irst process. However, Hechter’s main point, I think, was to differentiate 
between processes of colonialism in ‘external’ colonies, which are on an-
other continent and governed in a set of administration, military, economy, 
and also culture and education largely different from the colonial state, 
from ‘internal’ colonies, which are not only spatially close, but which also 
seem to be fully integrated with regard to politics, administration, military, 
economy, culture, and education. Hechter argues that due to the closeness to 
England, the Irish, Welsh, and Scots should long ago have been absorbed into 
the English nation. That this has not happened, Hechter argues, is because 
of structures of ‘internal colonialism’ and the resulting ‘cultural division of 
labor’. Against this background of Hechter’s explanations, the term ‘internal 
colonialism’ becomes at least partly meaningful for the Ming and Qing 
cases. However, one important difference between ‘internal colonialism’ on 
the British Isles and Ming-Qing colonialism in the south and southwest are 
the differences between colonizers and colonized with regard to customs, 
language, religious beliefs, way of living, etc., which in the case of China’s 
south and southwest are much bigger than in the case of the British Isles. 
In this respect, Ming-Qing colonialism comes closer to European overseas 
colonialism and distances itself from British ‘internal colonialism’.
Teng’s second critique of the term ‘internal colonialism’ is that it implies 
a fundamental difference between Qing colonialism and Western colonial-
ism in that the former was ‘only’ the colonization of ‘fellow Orientals’.57 
Instead, Teng argues that the colonization and integration of the southern 
and southwestern regions into the Qing Empire functioned according to 
the same logics as European imperial colonialism. Her conclusion is that 
the study of Qing colonialism
56 Bhabha (2004).
57 Teng (2005, pp. 254-255).
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is important precisely because it destabilizes the dichotomy between 
the West/colonizers and the non-West/colonized, a dichotomy that has 
largely continued to structure our common sense perception of global 
power configurations and cultural differences well past the end of formal 
imperial rule.58
Whereas I have just shown that by using the term ‘internal colonialism’ it 
is not necessarily implied that Asian colonialism is ‘fundamentally differ-
ent’ from Western colonialism as the term has in fact been created for a 
European case, I agree that, indeed, not only Ming and Qing expansionism, 
but non-European processes of expansion and conquest in general have 
not been discussed under terms of colonialism and under the impression 
of post-colonial discourses on a general level. Only very recently a post-
colonial discourse has been set into motion with regard to the Ming and 
Qing expansions and conquests. Among others, one reason for that, I think, 
lies in the fact that colonialist structures are still in existence in today’s 
PRC, as Shu-mei Shih claims for the Tibetan, Mongol, and Uyghur inhab-
ited regions.59 One might add to that list the southern and southwestern 
regions of the PRC, and the regions inhabited by the ‘original inhabitants’ 
(yuanzhumin 原住民) in Taiwan (which originally was, of course, the whole 
island of Taiwan). The PRC and the Republic of China (Taiwan) are the 
successors of the Qing Empire, also with regard to the territories which 
the Qing conquered militarily and integrated colonially, or took over from 
the Ming, ‘Outer Mongolia’ being the only larger conquered region which 
effectively broke apart.
Confucian civilizing mission and Christian missionizing
Not only the notion of a ‘Confucian civilizing mission’, but also the history of 
military conquest and political integration of the southern and southwest-
ern regions supports the assumption that Ming and Qing expansionism can 
be interpreted as colonialism and can thus be analyzed based on similar 
theories and methods as Western colonialism. For some regions this has 
been done already, for example by Emma Jinhua Teng,60 who analyzes 
the images of Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty, and by John E. Herman,61 
58 Teng (2005, p. 257).
59 Shih (2011, pp. 710-711).
60 Teng (2005).
61 Herman (2007).
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who provides a history of Guizhou’s colonization from late Song until early 
Qing times.
With regard to the question to what extent and on what level Christian 
missionizing and Confucian civilizing can be compared, I f irst would like 
to point out differences, in order to clarify if they can weaken the above-
mentioned conclusion that European and Ming and Qing expansionisms 
and their accompanying civilizing projects are similar. One difference 
seems to lie in the spatial characters of the Christian and the Confucian 
communities. They are not only of different size and dispersion, but the 
Christian community seems to be transcultural and trans-ethnic from the 
start, presenting itself as non-ethnic due to its allegedly unlimited validity, 
whereas the Confucian community seems to be more closely linked to a 
certain group of people, the Chinese, who are def ined and define them-
selves based on characteristics which are usually linked to ethnicity, that 
is, culture, language, genealogy, traditions, etc. Today, the perception of 
Confucianism as ‘nationally Chinese’ is further supported by the foundation 
of ‘Confucius Institutes’ as a means of transporting Chinese culture into 
the world outside the PRC. Confucius and the philosophy based on his 
teachings, Confucianism, thus appear as something ‘Chinese’. However, 
Chinese and other Asian peoples of pre-1900 or pre-nationalist times would 
not necessarily have agreed with this representation of Confucianism as 
Chinese, although the relations were strong.
An important Christian idea which accompanied colonialist and imperi-
alist expansions was that mission as part of colonialism was the propagation 
of the ‘Kingdom of God’ or ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ in the whole world, whereby 
this godly kingdom was the realm where God’s will prevailed. Similar to the 
Christian ‘Kingdom of God’ was the fundamental Confucian belief in the 
‘Way of [Benevolent] Kings’ (wangdao 王道) to govern ‘all under heaven’ 
(tianxia 天下), that is, the whole world, whereby similar to the Christian 
idea, this government was transcendental and indirect. The respective mis-
sionizing or civilizing only reinforced these godly rights, which according 
to both were already there. Like Christians, Confucians too perceived of the 
Confucian philosophy as unlimitedly valid and thus trans- or non-ethnic. 
Therein, in fact, lies the most important reason for the idea of the mission-
izing or civilizing of others, so that they also become part of and accept 
the universality of the respective worldview. Like Christians thought and 
think of their ethics and morals as universal, the followers of the Confucian 
world view believed the same premise. Nevertheless, despite these universal 
claims, both, the Christian worldview underlying colonialist Christian 
missions and the Confucian worldview underlying the ‘Confucian civilizing 
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mission’, are irremediably particular (and thereby resemble nationalism as 
described by Benedict Anderson, see above). Like Christianity ‘could be de 
facto classif ied as the religion of Europe’ (‘faktisch als die Religion Europas 
gelten konnte’)62, a ‘white man’s Church’63, especially when its entangle-
ment with colonialism and imperialism became inextricable, Confucianism 
was an explicitly Chinese worldview, ‘Chinese’ here being understood as a 
cultural space, not a political one. This became obvious when the ‘Confucian 
civilizing mission’ was used to justify the Ming and Qing conquests and 
colonialism in the south and southwest and thus Confucianism became 
closely linked to Ming and Qing expansionism.
Conclusion
In the post-1900 political discourses, the question of how to build a Chinese 
nation-state was a dominant one. The idea of a successful ‘Confucian civiliz-
ing mission’, which was thought to work via superior ethics and morals, 
implemented by force if necessary, was reformulated and reformed as the 
idea of ‘China’s assimilative power’. Liang Qichao assumed this power would 
work unconsciously, in contrast to Zhang Taiyan, who thought that it had to 
be supported by off icial educational and political measures. The belief in 
its effectiveness became a basis for Chinese approaches to nation-building 
within the borders of the Qing Empire.
Before 1900, the discourses on civilizing and assimilation of non-Chinese 
people did not link this process to ethnic identity, but connected it to uni-
versally valid morals, rites, and a spiritual identity. At the beginning of the 
Qing Dynasty, however, there were theories of a Chinese identity based on 
ethnicity, for example by philosophers like Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692), 
which implied that ‘Confucian civilizing’ was not possible after all. However, 
these theories disappeared into (off icially supported) oblivion. Only in the 
late Qing Dynasty, the works of early Qing philosophers were reprinted and 
became widely read among political reformers and nationalist thinkers. At 
the same time, Chinese identity became connected to an ethnic aff iliation 
in a way it had not been before. Confucianism at f irst remained part of this 
identity, but was not the most important part of the ‘civilizing mission’ 
anymore, which became rather a ‘nationizing mission’. In the course of the 
May Fourth Movement, Confucianism was even supposed to be removed 
62 Gründer (2004, p. 7).
63 Fanon (2004, p. 7).
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from Chinese identity altogether.64 Based on the fact that different thinkers 
imagined the nation differently, the content of this ‘nationizing mission’ 
necessarily differed accordingly. However, education of the non-Chinese in 
Chinese ways, whatever these ways were, was usually an important part. 
This was based on similar assumptions, such as the belief in the legitimacy 
of a ‘Confucian civilizing mission’. In the same way as Confucianism had 
been considered to be superior to other worldviews and approaches to 
ethnic and morals, Chinese culture and ethnicity were considered to be 
superior to non-Chinese cultures and ethnicities. And like in the setting of a 
‘Confucian civilizing mission’ it was also thought to be the duty of superior 
people to help inferior ones to gain a ‘higher’ level with regard to culture and 
ethnicity. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the court and officials referred to 
the ideal of a ‘Confucian civilizing mission’ in order to justify the violence of 
the colonization of the southern and southwestern regions for a Confucian 
audience. The real cause for the mission, – the acquisition of land and 
settlement areas at the expense of non-Chinese people – was downplayed. 
Against the background of the Chinese nation-building project, the ideal of 
a national and cultural superiority of the Chinese people was understood 
to inform a duty to guide others towards this superiority and thus include 
them in the nation-state. It was put forward to equally justify the military 
and political violence needed for this ‘nationizing project’ and to conceal 
the real cause for it, which was the strong belief in power politics based on 
the size of a state and its unity.
As described, seemingly different discourses and approaches resemble 
each other and are linked to each other over time and space. In the Chinese 
discourses, the late imperial idea of ‘nationizing’ is closely linked to the 
Ming and early Qing approaches of ‘Confucian civilizing’. ‘Confucian civiliz-
ing’ and its link to the conquest and colonization of non-Chinese regions, 
on the other hand, resembles European Christian missions in European-
dominated colonies on other continents, especially South Asia, Africa, and 
South and Central America. All attempts to integrate the other through a 
change of identity with regard to ethics, morals, and other markers of the 
self within the framework of Christian missionizing, ‘Confucian civilizing,’ 
or Chinese nationizing are linked by a general assumption of the superiority 
of the self, versus the inferiority of the other, an understanding which seems 
to be a universal link between discourses on identity and integration.
64 Zarrow (2005, pp. 137-140).
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Two very different yet related phenomena in China’s transition from a 
dynastic regime to a modern nation will help us better understand how 
the modern Chinese nation impacted on and was in turn impacted by 
religion. The f irst case is about how a rising consciousness of the nation 
and its impending peril allowed some grassroots literati in the early 
twentieth century to assign added religious signif icance to a traditional, 
primarily literati-oriented practice thus justifying, reformulating and 
accentuating certain religious practices (hence ‘the nation in religion’). 
The second case is about how the nation provided the sociopolitical frame 
for religion while the nation itself was constituted by the ‘religion sphere’ 
(zongjiaojie 宗教界) (hence ‘religion in the nation’).
Keywords: religion sphere, religious sovereignty, cherishing lettered 
paper, script fundamentalism
Introduction
In this chapter I will attempt to look at two very different yet related 
phenomena in China’s transition from a dynastic regime to a modern na-
tion that are relevant to our understanding of how the modern Chinese 
nation impacts and is in turn impacted by religion (were it not to sound too 
cumbersome I would have subtitled this chapter ‘How the Modern Chinese 
Nation Made Religion and Was at the Same Time Made by Religion’). The 
chapter consists of two parts. The f irst part is about the revaluing of a 
traditional religious practice at a time when Chinese civilization and the 
Chinese nation faced grave danger at the end of the nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the twentieth century. This case study reveals how 
a rising consciousness of the nation and its impending peril allowed some 
grassroots literati in the early twentieth century to assign added religious 
signif icance to a traditional literati practice thus justifying, reformulating 
and accentuating certain religious practices (hence ‘the nation in religion’). 
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The second part of the chapter is about how the newly-founded modern 
Chinese nation was constituted in crucial ways by various ‘spheres’ ( jie 
界), including the ‘religion sphere’ (zongjiaojie 宗教界). It shows how the 
nation provides the sociopolitical frame for religion while the nation itself 
is constituted by religion and other ‘spheres’ (hence ‘religion in the nation’).
The nation in religion: Civilizational/national crisis and the 
cherishing of Chinese characters1
In the late Qing period, China as an empire was under assault from Western 
imperialist powers. At the same time Chinese civilization was under assault 
from Western Learning (xixue 西學). In a very short time the cultural and 
civilizational foundations of China were questioned and the majority of 
grassroots literati trained in the now-useless Confucian classics faced the 
challenge of a new cultural-political order, one in which they could not see 
a viable role for themselves. At this crucial moment one religious practice 
came to the fore as a possible solution to dampen the process of wholesale 
conversion to Western culture and to reassert the primacy of Chinese 
civilization. In fact, the fate of the Chinese nation seemed to rest upon 
this religious practice. This religious practice is the ‘cherishing of written 
characters’ (xizizhi 惜字紙), which involves the reverence for the written 
word, especially the peculiar practice of picking up any scrap paper with 
any writing on it (i.e. ‘lettered paper’ 字紙) and burning it respectfully in 
a special furnace, usually located in the grounds of a temple dedicated 
to Lord Wenchang (Wenchang dijun 文昌帝君), the patron deity of the 
traditional literati.2
Merits and demerits, rewards and punishments: Cherishing written 
characters in its earlier forms
Cherishing written characters as a practice probably began during the Song 
Dynasty and became more popular during the Ming and Qing dynasties.3 
Xizi 惜字 practices were originally largely conf ined to the literati class. 
Scholars revered writing and worshipped Lord Wenchang in the hope of 
excelling in the civil service examination. Exam candidates were known 
1 This section is drawn and excerpted from Chau (2013).
2 For a study on Wenchang see Kleeman (1994).
3 See Leung (1994) and McDermott (2006).
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to sleep overnight at a Wenchang temple hoping that Lord Wenchang 
would reveal the exam topics to them in a dream. Some literati members 
kept ‘ledgers of merits and demerits’ (gongguoge 功過格) that included 
items relating to xizi practices.4 However, the connection between xizi 
and Wenchang seemed to be a rather late invention; the autobiography of 
Wenchang supposedly written through spirit-writing in the late twelfth 
century, which Kleeman translated and studied, did not mention xizizhi 
practices at all, though it did mention at the end of the autobiographical 
narrative that he (i.e. Wenchang) was put in charge of the examination 
results and off icialdom prospects (danguiji 丹桂籍). The practice of xizizhi 
has almost completely died out in all Chinese communities, except in a few 
communities in Taiwan (especially among some Hakka communities, e.g. 
in Meinong 美濃 county).5 But it is worth noting that some older people 
still hold deep reverence for lettered paper.
In the Ming and Qing dynasties as well as in the twentieth century, 
spirit-writing was one of the most common ways new scriptures and divine 
messages were produced.6 Many of the xizizhi texts indicated that they 
were produced by spirit-writing, almost invariably through possession 
by Lord Wenchang. For example, in order to help people concretize the 
merits of cherishing lettered paper, Lord Wenchang announced through 
spirit-writing the different levels (or more accurately, quantities) of rewards 
for those who cherish lettered paper and punishments for those who do not 
cherish lettered paper. The following schema is translated from Examples 
of Merits and Demerits Relating to Cherishing Written Characters Sent by 
the Lord Wenchang through Spirit-Writing (文昌帝君降乩惜字功過例).
Spending all one’s life buying lettered paper and bringing it home, wash-
ing it with fragrant water and burning it: ten thousand merits; additional 
twelve years added to life; will enjoy prosperity and honor for a long time; 
descendants (sons and grandsons) will be honored and illustrious.
Spending all one’s life collecting lettered paper, washing it and burning 
it: f ive thousand merits; twelve additional years added to life; will attain 
prosperity and honor; descendants will all be virtuous and f ilial.
Spending one’s life collecting much lettered paper, washing and burning 
it; sending the ashes far away in clean creeks, big rivers, or the ocean: one 
thousand merits; descendants will be many and prosperous.
4 Brokaw (1991).
5 See Zhang (Chang) (2006); Wu (2010).
6 See Jordan and Overmyer (1986); Kleeman (1994); Clart (1996); Clart (2003).
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Print and publish xizi-related books and pamphlets and distribute them 
widely in the world: f ive hundred merits; many sons.
Copying and writing xizi-related books and instructions; the entire 
household cherishing lettered paper: three hundred merits; descendants 
will be rich.
When ones sees a text advocating cherishing letter paper, one keeps it so 
as to show one’s descendants while at the same time oneself believing and 
respecting the practice and spreading it to others: one hundred merits; 
leads a peaceful life with no misfortunes.7
There is an equal number of items for demerits warning the reader of the 
dangers of not respecting and cherishing lettered paper.
Because of the society-wide reverence for learning and literacy, the 
general populace was also exhorted to cherish written characters, though in 
ways that were different from those practiced by the literati. For example, in 
one xizi-related morality ‘book’ (pamphlet; shanshu 善書) published in the 
late Qing entitled Perfected Interpretation on Cherishing Written Characters 
by Lord Wenchang (Wenchang dijun xizi zhenquan 文昌帝君惜字真詮) 
(probably composed by spirit-writing), there are twelve practices targeting 
the literati and eighteen practices targeting the humble folk.
For those who could read and write and were therefore in positions of 
power and could potentially abuse the power of the written word, their 
way of cherishing characters primarily involved being aware of the power 
of writing and therefore being extremely careful when committing words 
to paper. One was advised to ‘cherish’ writing (i.e. be extremely careful to 
the point of not writing at all) in the following situations: when someone’s 
life is at stake; when someone’s reputation is at stake; when someone’s civil 
service exam results are at stake; when involving someone’s private life 
or causing divorce; when causing the alienation and separation of fam-
ily members; when causing harm to others to benefit oneself or robbing 
someone’s livelihood; when bullying those who are weak and young; when 
deliberately ruining someone’s plans as a result of personal vengeance; when 
7 This schema is found in an anthology of miscellaneous morality tracts entitled Jiutian kaihua 
zhuzai yuanhuang silu Hongren Wenchang dijun yinzhiwen zhu’an 《九天開化主宰元皇司錄
宏仁文昌帝君陰騭文註案》 (Morrison Collection catalogue info: (明) 顏正註釋, (明) 顏文瑞
補案, (明) 顏章敬校刊, (清) 趙松一校; 清嘉慶二十一年 (1816) 刻本, [粵東省城] 心簡齋藏版; 
版心題《丹桂籍》), which the author consulted in the Robert Morrison Collection of Chinese 
Books (馬禮遜藏書), collected by Robert Morrison (a missionary for the London Missionary 
Society between 1807 and 1834), now held in the Special Collections of the library of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies.
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causing people to have grievances against each other and when writing 
suits for others; when deliberately reversing right and wrong and harming 
innocent people; when writing erotic poems and songs or poking fun at 
others; when revealing someone’s secret and causing him dishonor and a 
lifetime of regret.8
For members of the general public (including the literate) who did not 
wield the powerful brush there were eighteen don’ts or ‘taboos’ ( jie 戒) to 
observe regarding lettered paper: selling torn books to others; throwing 
lettered paper in the dirt; stepping or stomping on lettered paper; covering 
windows and walls with lettered paper; covering vats with lettered paper; 
using lettered paper to hold up paintings; using lettered paper to wipe desks 
and ink stones; using lettered paper to wipe dirt; using lettered paper to 
make a torch at night; using lettered paper to wrap things; using lettered 
paper to light cigarettes/the pipe; cutting lettered paper with a knife or a pair 
of scissors; tearing up lettered paper while in a rage; using books as pillows; 
giving books/lettered paper to women to hold needles and threads; chewing 
lettered paper into a paste and spitting it out; sticking lettered paper into 
cracks in the wall; burning lettered paper into ashes and throwing them 
on the ground.
The Confucian elite in late imperial China had a theory about ‘moral 
teaching’ ( jiaohua 教化). They believed that for the educated one needed to 
persuade them with reason, but for the uneducated masses one needed to use 
stories of ‘divine retribution’ (yinguo baoying 因果報應) to lure them with 
rewards and scare them with punishments. Most of the xizizhi literature 
included stories of divine retribution. It seemed that they were targeting 
the lower end of the literati and the masses (including the merchant class). 
(Apparently the so-called ‘grand literati’ [tongru 通儒] needed no such silly 
stories or indeed wanted to have nothing to do with the more vulgar forms 
of xizizhi.) For example, the Perfected Interpretation on Cherishing Written 
Characters by Lord Wenchang mentioned above included a few such stories 
as vivid illustrations. Such narrative format of ‘proof’ (zhengyan, 證驗) 
of the eff icacy of cherishing (and not cherishing) lettered paper became 
standardized for later xizizhi literature; in fact, some of the earlier stories 
8 Perfected Interpretation on Cherishing Written Characters by Lord Wenchang (‘Wenchang 
dijun xizi zhenquan’, 文昌帝君惜字真詮. This is one of the miscellaneous morality tracts col-
lected in an anthology entitled ‘Selections from the Three Teachings’ 《三教擇錄》 (Morrison 
Collection catalogue info: (清) 陸逢泰擇錄; 清嘉慶十一年 (1806) 陸逢泰等刻本,  [粵東省城] 
合璧齋藏版), which the author consulted in the Robert Morrison Collection of Chinese Books 
(馬禮遜藏書)  at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Unfortunately I do not have more 
detailed publication information on the original morality tract.
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were even reused and recycled (sometimes with modif ications and embel-
lishments) in later compilations.
Xizizhi becoming a single-issue practice
While in earlier times xizizhi might have been a virtuous practice among 
many other practices that a person could engage in with a view to accruing 
merits, towards the late Qing and the early twentieth century it became 
what might be called a single-issue practice, meaning engaging in this 
practice alone was supposed to bring good rewards. The analogy can be 
made using a modern example: it is as if simply engaging in recycling is 
enough to make one a good environmentalist and good eco-conscious 
citizen. Thus, xizizhi was advocated as a self-cultivational practice involv-
ing a single-minded devotion to written characters in the belief that such 
devotion will bring life-transforming benefits. The most common form of 
the practice in the late Qing period and the early twentieth century was 
to either personally do the rounds in the streets or to hire people to collect 
stray lettered paper. These lettered papers were collected in bamboo baskets 
and then brought to be burned at a specially designed ‘pagoda-shaped 
furnace’ (shengjiting 聖蹟亭 or jingziting 敬字亭), usually in a Wenchang 
temple. The ashes would be collected regularly and either buried in clean 
soil or scattered in rivers or the sea. It was believed that the long-term effects 
of cherishing written characters in this way included examination success 
(also for modern schools and universities), longevity, good fortune, good 
health, blessings, numerous and successful sons, etc. On the other hand, 
if one did not respect and cherish written characters, one would suffer 
ill health, poverty, misfortunes, early death, early death of one’s family 
members and children, etc.
The nation’s fate lies in writing: Xizi zhengyanlu 惜字徵驗錄 and 
script fundamentalism
One of my current projects is a study and translation of a morality book 
entitled Xizi zhengyanlu 惜字徵驗錄 (Cherishing Written Characters: Stories 
of Evidence of Its Effects). Besides a number of introductory materials, the 
bulk of the book consists of eighty illustrated stories of xizi-related divine 
retributions that were published in 1934 by Mingshan Publishers (Mingshan 
shuju 明善書局) in Shanghai. (However, some of the stories seem to have 
been culled from earlier works, which is a quite common practice among 
compilers of morality books.) The version I am working with is a slightly 
the NatioN iN ReligioN aNd ReligioN iN the NatioN 123
augmented 1967 reprint edition of this earlier work that was published in 
Taiwan by Ruicheng Publishers/Bookstore (Ruicheng shuju 瑞成書局) in 
Taizhong 台中, a bookstore specialized in publishing and selling religion-
related books, including a large number of morality books.
The introductory materials preceding the illustrated stories included 
short essays explaining why one should cherish lettered paper. Judging 
from the rhetoric of these essays, we can tell that the xizi practice received 
renewed impetus during China’s transition into the modern era, as modern 
printing technologies, journalism, and advertising were perceived to have 
cheapened the written word, and Western imperialism and social Darwinian 
discourse posed grave threats to China’s civilizational superiority. Updated 
and reissued in the early twentieth century, the Xizi zhengyanlu blended 
new nationalist discourse with traditional moral values and provides a 
unique window into the aspirations and anxieties of the last generation 
of the traditional, grassroots Confucian elite. Below are excerpts from the 
introductory essay that give a flavor of the compiler’s ideological orientation, 
especially how he thought that the fate of the Chinese nation is intertwined 
with that of the Chinese writing system:
After having done extensive surveys I have come to the conclusion 
that over the tens of thousands years of human history and across the 
hundred thousand miles of human territories, there has been no occasion 
when writing (literally ‘characters’, zi 字) was not essential, and there 
has been no place where writing was not at the foundation of lives. In 
primeval times people knotted ropes to help them govern their lives: 
knots on big ropes for big matters and knots on small ropes for small 
matters. It was an age without writing, and people were ignorant and 
unenlightened, so even if records were inadequate there was not much 
they could do, until one stroke (of character) revealed the secrets of 
heaven and earth, and the shapes of characters were formed by observing 
the conf igurations (of stars). It was then that the usefulness of writing 
became abundant. Characters gave rise to writing (wen 文; composition) 
and writing became a vehicle for the Way (dao 道). This one [i.e. f irst] 
character opened the window to rites, music, government, and law; this 
one character brought about the transformations of morality and social 
order; this one character influenced the shape of material civilization; 
this one character set the guidelines for the f ive constants (relationships) 
and eight virtues; this one character created the ancient classics; the 
one character judged between the loyal and the treacherous, praised 
the good and condemned the bad.
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That is to say there was writing first and then there was a country and 
a society; there was writing f irst and then there was the relationship 
between father and son, husband and wife; there was writing f irst and 
then there were agriculture, craftsmanship, commerce, and learning. In 
addition, no social interaction does not make use of writing as its means, 
and no transmission of knowledge from the past to the present does not 
depend on writing as a treasure. How great has writing been to the human 
world! Alas, ever since the menacing storm of Europe and America [literally 
‘European wind and American rain’; oufeng meiyu 歐風美雨] blew hard 
on our country, the fortune of our writing has gone down precipitously. 
All over the country lettered papers are strewn about in a mess, being 
stepped on by whomever. The situation [for lettered paper] has become 
so dire that not a year passes without droughts, f loods, epidemics, locust 
plagues, wars, earthquakes, and landslides. Of course one cannot say that 
not cherishing lettered paper alone has caused all these disasters, but 
writing results from the hard work of sages and virtuous men; it is the 
essence of heaven and earth; it is what our national treasures depend on; 
and it determines the fate of our culture. If we look down upon writing, 
it not only will not be allowed by the sages and virtuous forebears but it 
will also not be tolerated by heaven and earth […].
Whether or not writing is valued or debased affects the rise and fall of the 
national fortune in critical ways; whether or not writing is treated well 
determines our lives’ fortunes. I have long wanted to make everyone 
aware of the necessity of respecting and cherishing writing in order to 
recover from degeneracy and to cultivate our vitality.9[italics added]
9 Here is the original Chinese text: 閒嘗盱衡, 古今數萬年, 縱橫十萬里, 無時而不以字為
要需, 無地而不以字為命脈。上古結繩為治, 大事結大繩, 小事結小繩。無字時代, 草昧未
開, 記載闕然, 此亦無可如何者也。逮至一劃開天地之祕, 觀象造文字之形, 則字之效用於
焉丕備。字以成文, 文以載道, 禮樂政刑一字之所啟牖也, 彝倫攸序一字之所開化也, 物質
文明一字之所薰陶也, 五常八德一字之所繩墨也, 邱墳典索一字之所創造也, 忠奸臧否一字
之所褒貶也……是以有文字而後有國家社會, 有文字而後有父子夫婦, 有文字而後有農工商
學, 甚至往來交際無不以文字為筌蹄, 今古流傳靡不以文字為珍寶, 夫其有益於人世不亦重
且大哉……慨自歐風美雨咄咄逼人, 文字之景運頓遭挫折, 而字紙之狼藉, 大地皆然, 任情踐
踏, 日趨日下, 以致旱潦瘟蝗, 兵戈水火, 地震山崩, 無年不現, 雖不僅為不惜字之一端, 而文字
為聖賢之心血, 天地之精英, 國粹所賴, 文化攸關, 茍其卑視, 固為聖賢所不許, 亦為天地所不
容……字之貴賤, 國運之興衰攸關; 字之臧否, 人生之休咎所繫。予欲家喻戶曉俾人盡知所敬
惜有以挽頹風而培養元氣宣示久矣…… Excerpted from introductory essays written by Tang 
Guangxian 唐光先 and Shugu laoren 述古老人 in Cherishing Written Characters: Stories of 
Evidence of Its Effects (‘Xizi Zhengyan Lu’, 惜字徵驗錄), pp. 1-2. (Highlighting added)
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The f irst thing one notices about this rhetoric that differs from the earlier 
xizi literature is that the author does not claim to be Lord Wenchang, 
which is to say that this is no longer composed through spirit-writing. The 
second, and the most prominent feature of this rhetoric, is the connection 
of Chinese writing with the fate of the Chinese nation, which was perceived 
to be under threat from Euro-American imperialism (both cultural and 
military). It seems that there was an effort to enshrine Chinese writing as 
the foundation of Chinese civilization, which is why I call this effort (maybe 
even movement?) script fundamentalism. China’s traditional Confucian 
literati were faced with the gravest challenges to their identity and ways of 
life in the early twentieth century, when the ‘civil examination’ (keju 科舉) 
system was abolished in 1905, China’s national sovereignty was challenged 
by foreign powers, Western Learning became de rigueur for an emerging 
new educated class, and both state and private rituals – many of which had 
involved the active participation of the literati elite – were either abolished 
or their legitimacy and necessity questioned. It is in the context of such 
momentous transformations that grassroots literati in many parts of China 
renewed and revamped the practice of xizizhi.
Looking at the illustrated stories in the Xizi zhengyanlu, one notices some 
shifts in the intended audience as well as the emphasis on the benefits and 
harms relating to the xizi practices compared to late imperial versions of 
morality books of the same genre. In the Xizi zhengyanlu there are many 
stories of poor and even illiterate individuals who were rewarded with 
good fortune as a result of their devotion to xizizhi. There are also many 
stories in which the protagonists were merchants and small traders and 
shopkeepers. One may say that there was a democratization of the xizizhi 
practice as all members of society were thought to be capable of benefiting 
from the practice, and that indeed all members of society should be engaged 
in the practice.
This downward spread of the practice – at least in ideological terms if not 
necessarily in actual practice, i.e. targeting the lower segments of society 
rather than demonstrating that they actually adopted this practice – began 
in the Qing period, but became more insistent in the late Qing and the 
Republican period. Both Angela Leung and Joseph McDermott suggest that 
this downward spread of the practice reflected an effort to ‘Confucianize’ 
society, to galvanize an otherwise increasingly immoral/amoral society 
around a concrete practice that would yield concrete results.10 However, 
if we look at the stories in the Xizi zhengyanlu, we will see that there is 
10 See Leung (1994) and McDermott (2006).
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much emphasis on the magical qualities of xizi practice, which is quite un-
Confucian. In fact, the whole xizi practice is heavily indebted to Buddhism 
(the core notion of karmic retribution) and Daoism (the magical and exorcist 
qualities of the zizhi ashes). These karmic reward and retribution stories are 
a continuation of a long tradition of Confucian elites using them to cajole 
and scare the lower classes into line while not necessarily believing these 
stories themselves.11
Here is a sample story from the Xizi zhengyanlu about a company man-
ager who, because of his practices of disrespecting writing, became a dog 
in the US after he died. The loss of face for the family is made to parallel 
the humiliation of China by the West (Westerners, Americans) as well as 
Japan (which invaded China and caused the destruction of the shop with 
writing-disrespecting practices). Below is a translation of the text:
Story 22. An advocate of cigarette cards turned into a dog
There was a certain manager of a certain tobacco company in Zhabei 
of Shanghai County of Jiangsu Province. He was the f irst to promote 
cigarette cards, putting as cover titles the ancient characters from books 
such as The Journey to the West, The Story of the Three Kingdoms, The 
Enfeoffment of the Gods, The Story of Jigong, The Red Lotus Monastery, 
The Water Margins, The Legends of Yue Fei, Seven Swords and Thirteen 
Knights-Errant, The Story of the West Chamber, The Dreams of the Red 
Chamber, etc. On the back of these cards were written, in standard script 
tiny as the heads of flies, the stories of these characters. As soon as people 
f inished smoking the cigarettes, these cigarette cards mostly got thrown 
away. One cannot have cases of disrespecting and dirtying writing worse 
than this! When this manager died, he went to the United States and be-
came a foreign-breed dog. On its belly there was writing indicating the 
name of this manager of such and such company. When people called its 
name the dog would wag its tail and shake its head as if responding to 
the call. They then named the dog with the name of the manager. This 
manager’s brothers and nephews caught wind of this story. In order to 
protect and save their family’s face they spent a lot of money buying the 
11 What is interesting is that sometimes the elites did not mind admitting this strategy openly. 
For example, an apparently spirit-written preface to a morality book produced in Taiwan in 1937 
has the following passage: ‘One should talk about the wondrous with superior people, morality 
with middling people, and stories of karmic retribution with inferior people’ (與上等人談玄妙, 
與中等人語道德, 與下等人說因果). The morality book is entitled Golden Needle that Awakens 
(‘Huanxing Jinzhen’, 喚醒金針), produced in the Venerate Virtue Hall of the Deng’an Society in 
Penghu (澎湖文澳登岸社禮善堂), see Li (2008, pp. 285-286). See also Leung (1994, pp. 112-113).
the NatioN iN ReligioN aNd ReligioN iN the NatioN 127
dog, brought it back home, and tied it in a room. In year twenty-one of 
the Republican era (1932), Japan forcefully occupied Shanghai. Just as soon 
as the war broke out, this company burnt down. Those people who were 
in the know recognized that it was divine punishment for the manager’s 
having initiated using cigarette cards. We plead that other companies 
will quickly change their ways and not follow his bad example. Then 
they will earn many karmic merits, benefiting themselves and society at 
large. [italics added]
The nation, language ideologies, and religious efficacy
Imagine that you are an early twentieth-century literatus in China, having 
spent years, even decades studying and memorizing passages from the 
Confucian classics in preparation for the civil service examinations and sud-
denly the examination system is abolished and everything you have learned 
so far has become completely useless. Not only are your chances of upward 
social mobility ruined, but your entire sense of identity and personhood 
is put under serious threat. What will you do? What will millions of other 
people caught in the same situation do? Of course many late-Qing literati 
were reform-minded and eager to jettison the old system for an entirely new 
educational system so as to strengthen the nation and to expel the foreign 
imperialists. But the majority of the literati, especially the vast number 
of grassroots literati whose livelihood and social standing depended so 
much on their being embedded in the Confucian social and moral order, 
were deeply conservative. Therefore it is not surprising that many of these 
conservative literati, when faced with such grave challenges and threats, 
became reactionary and searched desperately for some straw to hang on to. 
The ‘cherishing-lettered-paper’ practice seemed to be a perfect tool for these 
civilizational preservationists to elaborate on and to advocate as a practice, 
because even if they had lost the Confucian tradition as an anchor, they 
could still hope to hold on to the Chinese writing system as something that 
would never falter or fail them.12 Little did they realize that at around the 
12 Constructing one’s language as the foundation of a nation’s identity has a long pedigree. 
During the so-called Romantic period and afterwards, when many nations in Europe were in 
the process of formation, one crucial ingredient of their nationalist striving was language, i.e. 
the genius of one’s mother tongue. However, such nationalist linguistic ideology was primarily 
based on the national vernacular language as a system of spoken sounds, while the script or 
orthographic system was rarely mobilized as a key idiom of difference and differentiation. After 
all, very few European languages possessed a writing system entirely their own. The newly 
elaborated early twentieth-century Chinese nationalist linguistic ideology, on the other hand, 
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same time there were radical reformers who were calling for the abolition 
of the Chinese writing system and to adopt an alphabetic system based on 
Latin letters, and that also around the same time the Chinese language 
was being ‘trans-lingualized’ by Japanese-invented expressions under the 
cloak of Chinese characters.13
In the minds of the early twentieth-century conservative literati who 
advocated ‘cherishing lettered paper,’ it was a meritorious practice not just 
for some select segments of society (e.g. the educated) but for the whole of 
the Chinese people. It is as if while the British taught the Manchu Qing some 
‘English lessons’ (as James Hevia has characterized the British ‘pedagogy of 
imperialism’)14 with the Opium Wars and the siege and looting of Beijing 
in the wake of the suppression of the Boxers, these grassroots literati were 
busying themselves teaching the Chinese people another lesson, the lesson 
of civilizational self-preservation via the practice of ‘cherishing lettered 
paper.’ Here we have an example of the fusion of the Chinese nation with 
Chinese civilization, both being conceived as resting upon the Chinese 
writing system, which could only be saved by the practice of cherishing 
lettered paper, a traditional practice now endowed with nation-centric 
valences and heightened religious eff icacy.
Religion in the nation: The religion sphere in Modern China
The constitution of modern society through ‘sphere-ization’ and the 
rise of the ‘religion sphere’ in modern China
In the political constitution of the modern Chinese state (from the republican 
times through the Maoist times to the current era), a process emerged that 
was very much driven by a desire to conform to international (i.e. Western) 
standards and practices. This process involved the recognition and produc-
tion of different functional spheres in society that are similar to (or rather 
imitative of?) the functional constituencies or interest groups in Western 
was based entirely on the writing system (and had nothing to do with the spoken language[s]), 
which is why this cultural movement could be labeled script fundamentalism. Such script 
fundamentalism was later found in Korea, whose two regimes after the Korean War both 
attempted to rid written Korean of Chinese characters altogether and enshrine the Korean 
alphabet system hangul (and of course King Sejong who invented hangul) as the genius of the 
Korean nation.
13 Liu (1995) and Liu (2004).
14 Hevia (2003).
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liberal states. These spheres included the education sphere ( jiaoyujie 教
育界), health and medicine sphere (yiliaojie 醫療界), the manufacture 
and commerce sphere (gongshangjie 工商界), the labor sphere (laogongjie 
勞工界), the intellectual sphere (zhishijie 知識界), the scholarly sphere 
(xueshujie 學術界), the women’s sphere ( funüjie 婦女界), the minority-
nationalities sphere (minzujie), the overseas-Chinese sphere (qiaojie), the 
Taiwanese compatriots sphere (taibaojie), the arts sphere (yishujie), the 
science sphere (kexuejie 科學界), the sports sphere (tiyujie 體育界), the 
political sphere (dangzhengjie 黨政界), etc.15 And of course, along with 
these spheres one f inds the ‘religion sphere’ (zongjiaojie 宗教界).16 I have 
opted to translate zongjiaojie into ‘religion’ sphere rather than ‘religious’ 
sphere because I want to avoid any inadvertent misunderstanding of the 
nature of the sphere itself as religious, which it clearly is not (see below for 
a discussion on how the religion sphere presumes and helps constitute the 
secular state).
The political utility of the concept of the religion sphere in contemporary 
China is manifest in its frequent appearances in the speeches of the PRC 
top leaders as well as off icial press. For example, in recent years there have 
been debates within the CCP about whether or not the Party can welcome 
religious leaders into its membership (e.g. allowing a number of religious 
leaders and religious elites into the Party17) despite the fact that in the Party 
constitution it says explicitly that a Communist Party member must be an 
atheist. And in a recent United Front speech President Xi Jinping spoke 
of the importance of mobilizing the religion-sphere leaders for building 
socialism.
Surprisingly there has not been any scholarly attention on the emergence, 
constitution, and transformation of these spheres in China, or indeed how 
15 In more recent years new spheres have emerged, e.g. the law sphere (‘falüjie’, 法律界), the 
qigong sphere (‘qigongjie’, 氣功界), the stocks and securities sphere (‘zhengquanjie’, 證卷界), 
the charity sphere (‘cishanjie’, 慈善界), the classical learning sphere (‘guoxuejie’, 國學界), the 
NGO sphere (NGO‘ jie’, NGO界), and even the internet sphere (‘wangjie’, 網界).
16 I am still trying to determine the earliest appearance of the term zongjiaojie in the Chinese 
context. It is possible that this was one of the ‘translingualized’ terms that originated in Meiji 
Japan (see Liu 1995) or was coined in late-Qing China by translators and writers connected to 
missionaries. It seems that the term was already common usage as early as 1910. For example, an 
article in the Chinese-language missionary periodical The True Light Monthly (‘Zhenguangbao’, 
真光報) in 1910 (volume 9) was entitled ‘On the Shortcomings of China’s Religion Sphere’ (論中
國宗教界之缺點). [I thank Ya-pei Kuo for bringing my attention to this article.] The True Light 
Monthly was a periodical published by the Guangzhou-based China Baptist Publication Society 
(美華浸信會印書局). (See http://www.zsbeike.com/cd/40736491.html).
17 The Chinese original is: 允许一部分宗教界的领袖人物和精英入党.
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China as a sociopolitical space has been constituted by these spheres. One 
main reason why this ‘sphere-ization’ of Chinese society has not been 
studied is due to the fact that ‘spheres’ ( jie 界) as a term does not have any 
legal or institutional existence (though it certainly has implications for the 
legal management of affairs within different ‘spheres,’ and spheres in fact 
contribute to the production of institutions). In fact, I am prepared to argue 
that this ‘sphere-ization’ of Chinese society is one of the most interesting 
and exciting topics to study if one wants to understand how Chinese society 
works, especially relating to state-society relations.
A sphere is a relatively fuzzy, semi-formal sociopolitical domain compris-
ing certain politically recognized social actors accompanied by related 
institutions and activities.18 Each sphere is comprised of social actors who, 
consciously or unconsciously, construct and help maintain the sphere so 
that they can gain from their membership, or association with, the sphere. 
Some of these social actors have been assigned or appointed to occupy their 
positions within this sphere by the authorities (not always the government) 
while some others self-appoint or have fought their way into it. Many other 
social actors not operating within a sphere can also exert considerable 
influence over the development and shape of that sphere. For example, jour-
nalists, scholars, and bloggers can have discussions on the activities within 
a sphere and thus contribute to the overall construction of this sphere (e.g. 
witness the recent controversy in China over the improper management of 
NGOs in China). Sometimes particular individuals or a group of individuals 
outside the sphere can have more power than some of those actors inside 
the sphere in influencing the sphere’s development. To the extent that the 
different spheres are constructed by actors and forces from both off icial 
and civil realms they might be said to constitute what Philip Huang calls 
‘the third realm’, a realm of negotiation between formal state power and 
local elites wielding informal power.19 However, the spheres seem to have 
much greater conceptual concreteness than ‘the third realm’.
18 A big dilemma for this study is how to translate the word jie 界. This character denotes 
boundaries and the area marked out by these boundaries (as in, e.g. 法界, 三界, 世界, 疆界, 邊
界, 界限, 界分, 界定, 租界, 界外, 境界, 界畫, 動物界, 劃分界線). Depending on the context and 
intended usage the character denotes a sector, a community, a constituency, a sphere, a circle, a 
realm, a f ield, a zone, a world, a commons, a public, etc.? It is interesting to note that the word 
jie has a heavy Buddhist connotative baggage since it is used to refer to the different ‘planes of 
existence’ in the Buddhist conception of the ‘universe’ (trailokya). See Liu (2004).
19 See Huang (1993). I thank Kuo Cheng-tian for having alerted me to the relationship between 
the spheres and ‘the third realm’. I shall explore this relationship in more detail in future 
publications.
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The shape, size, and conf iguration of each sphere are always in f lux 
(hence its inherent fuzziness). It is usually inchoate in the beginning of its 
formation (inchoate because there was great confusion or disagreement 
over what this sphere should consist of), but as more and more people and 
institutions become interested in building this sphere, it will take a more 
definitive and seemingly solid shape. Over time the ‘rules of the game’ might 
also become more stabilized and clear (though of course always subject 
to change). Since each sphere is supposed to be the structural-functional 
equivalent of other spheres, those spheres that were formed earlier will serve 
as models for the new sphere to emulate or, if necessary and expedient, to 
modify. This explains why the overall shapes of these spheres are quite 
similar to one another. On the other hand, since all spheres are supposed 
to be functionally different, each sphere also engages in a constant process 
of differentiation from the other spheres for fear of possible mergers, hostile 
takeovers or elimination. But this differentiation is often about the contents 
within, rather than the form of, these spheres (i.e. they remain more or 
less structurally isomorphic). Sometimes spheres do disappear, as a result 
of a decline in societal interest or by force (for example, the qigong sphere 
cum sphere disappeared in the wake of the forceful suppression by the 
government of Falungong and many other qigong denominations in the 
late 1990s).20
In theory the totality of the nation-state is to be composed of the seam-
less working-together of these various spheres as structural-functionalist 
components, together forming the nation-state’s socio-taxonomical order 
(though admittedly this taxonomy is not as explicitly articulated as, for 
example, the taxonomy on minority nationalities in the PRC). Each sphere 
is a structural-functional equivalent of all the other spheres, while within 
each sphere there are sub-spheres which are in turn structural-functional 
equivalents of one another. For example, within the religion sphere in 
China today one f inds, based on the f ive off icially recognised religions, 
the Buddhism sphere ( fojiaojie 佛教界), the Daoism sphere (daojiaojie 道
教界), the Protestantism sphere ( jidujiaojie 基督教界), the Catholicism 
sphere (tianzhujiaojie 天主教界), and the Islam sphere (yisilanjiaojie 伊斯
蘭教界). Of course the different spheres did not emerge all at once; some 
spheres were invented earlier than others. Nor did the various spheres 
follow the same logic; for example, some constitute themselves along the 
lines of professions (e.g. educators, health professionals) while others by 
assigned sociopolitical status (e.g. women, minority nationalities) or by a 
20 See Palmer (2008).
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recognized set of specialized activities (e.g. sports, arts, religion). In other 
words, even though these spheres bear structural and organizational simi-
larities, they are in fact characterized by heterogeneous constitutive logics 
(e.g. depending on the sphere’s degree of legitimacy within the polity, e.g. 
formal education versus religion; the degree of fuzziness of the boundaries 
around spheres).
The way in which Chinese society is constituted by this multitude of 
spheres has its origins in the transition of China from a dynastic polity to 
the modern nation-state form it assumed in the early twentieth century 
(around 1910s to 1930s). This transition saw the flourishing of civil-society 
organizations in a climate of enthusiastic embrace of a modern liberal 
nation-state in which different social groups scrambled to be recognized by 
the state and be given voices in an exuberant social f ield (accompanied by 
the rise of mass print media, heightened commercialism, the penetration 
of imperialist and colonial influences, the import of Western models of 
social and political forms, etc.). The f irst ‘spheres’ emerged during this time, 
including the religion sphere. In fact, the religion sphere during this time 
was so vibrant that dozens of new sects were founded (what the historian 
Prasenjit Duara has called ‘redemptive societies’).
This effervescence of social-organizational mobilization was interrupted 
by the long war resisting Japan’s invasion of China (from 1937 to 1945) and 
the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists (1945-1949). The 
newly emergent spheres did not disappear during these war years; instead, 
they consolidated themselves and often made themselves useful for the 
war efforts. One may say that the national emergencies during the war 
years were beneficial to the formation and consolidation of these spheres 
since the different regimes at war needed to mobilize these social forces 
for their respective purposes (this was true as well for Japan at the time). 
Notably, for example, the (patriotic) religion sphere in war-time China 
came together as one voice when they conducted memorial rituals for the 
Chinese war dead, especially the fallen soldiers.21 After the Communist 
victory in 1949, the Nationalists f led to Taiwan, but both regimes, being at 
their core Leninist, became more authoritarian and suppressed the growth 
of civil society. In mainland China during the Maoist era the Communist 
party-state took the initiative to form and mold certain spheres, but these 
spheres were little more than instruments in the state’s effort to mobilize 
society for building socialism. However, the construction of these spheres 
did contribute crucially to the perceived legitimacy of the new regime since 
21 See Nedostup (2010).
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the party-state wanted to form alliances with all useful elements of society 
(as part of the United Front strategy). For example, the historian Thomas 
Mullaney has detailed how the urgent need for representatives of minority 
nationalities to participate in the f irst People’s Congress in the early 1950s 
formed the impetus for the Nationalities Identif ication (minzu shibie 民
族識別) project,22 which was essential to the further consolidation of the 
‘minority nationalities sphere.’ In Taiwan, various spheres were subjected 
to a similar fate, to help the Nationalist regime prepare for f ighting back 
to retake the mainland.
Becoming ‘persons of the religion sphere’ (zongjiaojie renshi 
宗教界人士)
As mentioned above, within the religion sphere in the PRC one f inds the 
Buddhism sphere, the Daoism sphere, the Protestantism sphere, the Catholi-
cism sphere, and the Islam sphere. [In fact there is also the so-called ‘sphere 
of the religions of the minority nationalities’ (minzuzongjiaojie 民族宗
教界) but this sphere is primarily managed by the Nationalities Affairs 
Commission, though of course it has multiple links to the religion sphere 
proper as well and therefore can be included in the religion sphere.] Even 
though in theory the religion sphere should include all citizens practic-
ing these different religions, but in practice and in off icial and common 
understanding when the religion sphere is mentioned it usually refers to 
the top representatives who represent their respective religions in the of-
f icially approved religious associations and in the media. These people are 
referred to as ‘persons of the religion sphere’ (zongjiaojie renshi 宗教界人
士). These representatives (sometimes self-appointed, often appointed by 
the authorities, but almost all needing to be consecrated by the state and the 
broader religion sphere) do have the power to speak on behalf of the religious 
constituencies they represent (or they are made to represent). On the one 
hand they are supposed to f ight for the collective interests of their sphere; 
on the other hand they understandably engage in maneuvers that advance 
their own personal political ambitions or expand the influence of their own 
particular religious orders. To survive in the sphere requires astute political 
sensibilities and willingness to engage in protracted negotiations with state 
authorities and one’s political rivals. Sometimes to protect one’s religion 
the representatives need to make signif icant compromises. For example, 
during the Maoist period, when all religions faced extremely unfavorable 
22 See Mullaney (2011).
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conditions, the leaders of the major religions voluntarily submitted their 
religions to forms of socialist institutionalization, e.g. by becoming a work 
unit (danwei 單位) just like other state-run organizations.23 While those 
designated representatives of the religion sphere are given a voice in the 
public sociopolitical realm, those other members of the religion sphere are 
deliberately or by default silenced. For example, leaders of the underground 
Christian churches are never considered legitimate representatives of the 
Protestantism or Catholicism spheres. However, given how common and 
popular unoff icial media has become in recent years, we might soon see 
the emergence of an unofficial religion sphere that is parallel to, and often 
against, the off icially approved religion sphere.
Let us briefly look at an example of how a particular sphere, in this case 
the Protestantism sphere, was formed through the efforts of activists and 
through the construction of a unified, national ecumenical body. Beside the 
explosion of social forces relating to the formation of civil society during the 
dynastic-Republican transition, the emergence of the religion sphere was 
also a direct product of political activism and mobilization in response to 
the formidable threats from the modernist regimes (late Qing, Republican 
as well as Communist) and other social forces (e.g. grassroots reformers) that 
not only encroached upon the considerable assets of the numerous temples 
and shrines but even intended to eliminate religion completely as a social 
institution. One of the consequences of these threats was the coming-to-
consciousness (at least among the religious leaders and elites) of the need to 
unify religious adherents under the banner of collective self-defense (against 
often militant secularist tendencies) and the formation of nation-wide, 
faith-based organizations.24 For example, in 1906, when Presbyterian pastor 
and Protestant leader Yu Guozhen 俞國楨 and his colleagues formed the 
Chinese Protestant Autonomous Association (Zhongguo Yesujiao zilihui 中
國耶穌教自立會) in Shanghai, their manifesto included statements such 
as: ‘Chinese co-religionists of all (Protestant) denominations will not dif-
ferentiate between one another by denomination or geographical region 
and will hopefully connect with one another (through this organization) and 
form one unified body.’25 It is clear that this unification effort was meant for 
ethnically-Chinese Protestants (huajiaoyou 華教友) in China only, excluding 
Protestant brethren outside of China and excluding as well non-Chinese 
23 See Li (2006b, pp. 652-54); Palmer (2009).
24 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011).
25 The original Chinese is: ‘各會華教友無分彼此, 不限區域. 庶幾聯絡同志, 合而為一.’(Zhang 
2015: 192)
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foreign Protestants in China. This was one of the f irst efforts to make the 
Chinese Protestant community independent from their originating foreign 
denominational authorities. This was the moment when the Protestant sphere 
in China emerged despite the fact that Yu Guozhen and his colleagues did 
not evoke such a concept at that time. The urgency of such an initiative has 
also to be situated in the immediately post-Boxers Rebellion broader context.
The construction of every sphere needed activists (what are usually called 
好事者, literally ‘persons who love engaging in social activities and rallying 
support for a cause’ or 社會活動家, literally ‘social activists’), who are 
often self-appointed representatives of the emerging constituency (sphere) 
(such as Yu Guozhen for the Protestant sphere and Taixu 太虛 for the Bud-
dhist sphere). Some of them managed to become recognized by both state 
authorities and the broader society (but never without contest or struggle) 
(e.g. Zhao Puchu, 趙樸初, for the Buddhism sphere during the Maoist and 
reform eras). Here is what Bourdieu has to say about these individuals or 
representative institutions, especially their artif iciality:
Without being completely artif icial (if it were, the building would not 
have been completely successful), each of these representational bod-
ies, which give existence to represented bodies endowed with a known, 
recognized social identity, exists by virtue of a set of institutions that 
are so many historical inventions – a ‘logo’ (sigle in French), sigillum 
authenticum, as the canonists put it, a seal or rubber stamp, an off ice 
and a secretariat having a monopoly over the corporate signature and 
plena potentia agendi et loquendi, etc.26
What Bourdieu is referring to is precisely the kind of ‘representational 
bodies’ such as the Chinese Protestant Autonomous Association founded 
by Yu Guozhen and his colleagues that ‘pretended’ (in the sense of assert-
ing a claim) to represent all ‘two hundred and sixty thousand domestic 
Protestants’27 as a collective body. The different regimes in modern China 
also prefer to endorse the formation of such representational bodies (e.g. 
the officially endorsed national religious associations) because these bodies 
and their leaders help make religious communities and their practices 
more ‘legible’ to the state and therefore more amenable to control and 
potential mobilization.28 It is not a surprise that ‘persons of the religion 
26 Bourdieu (1985, p. 739). Plena potentia agendi et loquendi means ‘full power to act and speak’.
27 The original Chinese is: 二十六萬本國耶穌教徒. (Zhang 2015: 202).
28 On state and legibility see Scott (1998).
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sphere’ (zongjiaojie renshi 宗教界人士) as an expression most often refers to 
the leaders within these off icially endorsed national-religious associations.
The liberalization of society and the religion sphere in the reform era29
Both mainland China and Taiwan became much more liberalized from the 
1980s onward. In China during the reform period (in the past thirty years), 
civil-society forces have grown considerably, coupled with the differentia-
tion of societal interests along diverse lines. The liberalization of the media 
and the leaps in the sophistication in communications technologies have 
all contributed to the bourgeoning of a multitude of spheres because it 
has become much easier to identify a potential sphere, name it and then 
formalize it (with institutions, personnel, money, and other resources, 
activities, symbols, and discourses, etc.). The state still plays a major role in 
recognizing and consecrating these spheres, but it sometimes plays catch-up 
when new spheres are forming faster than it anticipates.
At this point it is worth noting that the Chinese conception of the religion 
sphere is very different from Pierre Bourdieu’s analytical concept of the 
‘religious f ield’ (see Bourdieu 1971). For Bourdieu, the religious f ield is a 
relatively autonomous social f ield with relatively clear ‘rules of the game’ 
about the value of symbolic goods. His case study is the Catholic Church in 
France, which, in addition to being a centralized religious body with clear 
boundaries, has benefited from a long history of relatively stable develop-
ment and consolidation (including during periods of relative suppression 
under French republicanism), resulting in a condition amenable to the kind 
of analysis Bourdieu deploys.30 The religion sphere in China, on the other 
hand, is much messier and in much greater flux.
The (off icially sanctioned) religion sphere proper as it stands today in the 
PRC–but note that this is only a portion of the overall religion sphere, which 
consists of a lot of persons and institutions that are merely tolerated by the 
state but not off icially recognized – has three key components: ‘persons of 
the religion sphere’ (zongjiaojie renshi 宗教界人士), religious organizations 
(zongjiao tuanti 宗教團體), and ‘venues for religious activities’ (zongjiao 
huodong changsuo 宗教活動場所). In other words, in order to become 
an institutional player in the religion sphere (i.e. in order to register to be 
29 A much fuller treatment of the rise of the religion sphere in modern China and how it works 
in contemporary China (including the recent emergence of a ‘popular religion sphere’) can be 
found in Chau (forthcoming).
30 See Dianteill (2003).
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recognized as a legitimate religious entity) one has to have these elements. 
This presents some problems for popular religious temples, which usually 
do not have any proper ‘religious personnel’ (shenzhi renyuan 神職人員) to 
speak of; but this requirement might urge local communities to f ind proper 
religious personnel to man their temples (or at least present themselves 
as if they had such personnel). All temples must also register to become 
‘venues for religious activities,’ though in reality the vast majority of local 
temples in rural China go under the label ‘superstition’ and are not granted 
such privilege. In other words, the religious activities that take place at 
these unregistered temples are considered by Chinese law to be illegal.31 
People who conduct religious activities in places not designated as venues for 
religious activities run the risk of getting arrested by the police and jailed. For 
example, Buddhist monks and nuns are allowed to conduct Buddhist rituals 
within the confines of their registered temples, but they are not allowed to 
conduct the exact same rituals outside the temples. In other words, religion 
is literally put in its proper ‘place’. Of course a vast amount of rituals do take 
place outside of the limited number of officially approved venues for religious 
activities. The local authorities have simply chosen to turn a blind eye.
The religion sphere, the nation, and state secularism
One of the most revealing aspects about the religion sphere (as well as all 
the other spheres) is how it fills up the sociopolitical space of the nation. 
Precisely because the religion sphere has to be coextensive with the na-
tion (in its institutional and imaginary reach), it is as much an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1991) as the nation: a lay Buddhist practitioner or 
a Protestant church-goer is led to imagine himself or herself as a member 
of the Buddhism sphere or Protestant sphere of China. In theory a nation 
can have only one religion sphere (even if underneath this umbrella sphere 
there can be a multitude of local spheres or a number of sub-spheres, e.g. 
the Shanghai religion sphere is a local religion sphere subordinate to the 
national religion sphere), and each sphere can only occupy one nation. 
The very act of the sphere-ization of society is to accentuate and solidify 
the boundaries of the nation. We may even go as far as saying that the 
formation of the spheres is necessary to the construction and maintenance 
of the sovereignty of the nation (hence ‘religion in the nation’ in the title 
of this chapter). Each nation has its own spheres. One nation’s sphere of a 
31 See Chau (2006) for a case study of how a popular religious temple came to be registered as 
a Daoist temple, thus gaining off icial protection.
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certain kind (e.g. religion) can interact with its analogous bodies in other 
nations but they do so based on the principle of nation-based, ‘sphere-ized’ 
autonomy. The religion sector in China should never be invaded by foreign 
bodies. This is one of the conceptual-structural reasons why the Chinese 
state is so wary and intolerant of any foreign interference with affairs within 
its own religion sphere; the nation’s ‘religious sovereignty’ (i.e. the inviolabil-
ity of the [imagined] borders of the nation’s religion sphere) is coextensive 
with the nation’s political sovereignty and neither is to be violated.32
Another revealing aspect of the religion sphere is that it is constitutive 
of the overall construction of secularity (the very existence of the religion 
sphere as a discrete social category attests to the eff icacy of state secular-
ism); i.e. the existence of the religion sphere qua sphere presumes secularity. 
In fact, China’s state secularism stands out as an exception amongst many 
Asian nations. In contrast, most other Asian countries have placed far more 
emphasis on the nation’s religious identity: modern Japan from the Meiji 
era to the end of World War II, with Shinto enshrined as the state’s spiritual 
foundation; post-colonial/Independence India, with the nation considered 
fundamentally Hindu; post-colonial/Independence Indonesia, with the 
requirement that all citizens must believe in God and belong to one of f ive 
off icially recognized religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hindu-
ism, and Buddhism; post-colonial/Independence Malaysia, with Islam as 
the ‘religion of the Federation’; modern Thailand, with Theravada Buddhism 
as quasi state religion; not to mention Pakistan and Bangladesh, with Islam 
as state religion, or Nepal up to 2006, with Hinduism as off icial religion.33
Conclusion
Religion and nation have had a complicated relationship in history. Reli-
gious adherence (especially the exclusivist, confessional kind) was often the 
foundation of ethnic group identity, which could serve as the foundation of 
32 This ‘religious sovereignty’ should not be confused with any sense of autonomy which is 
the goal of some religious practitioners; the latter refers to autonomy from state interference. 
Autonomy is an important attribute of religious sovereignty but it is about the religion sphere 
as a key-constituting element of the nation being autonomous from foreign influence.
33 One of the manuscript reviewers pointed out that PRC secularism ‘was/is based on its 
monopoly power or control over cosmological truth’. I think such a monopoly was only true 
during the high Maoist era but is no longer true today. The considerable liberalization in the 
religion sphere has produced a plethora of cosmological truths, the monitoring of which by the 
reform-era state is nearly impossible.
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nationhood (especially in early modern Europe). The nation, once formed, 
often served as the territorial and institutional basis for fostering and 
elaborating a nation-centric religiosity and religious identity (from Henry 
VIII’s Church of England to Emperor Meiji’s state Shinto, Ghandi’s Hindu-
ism, and even Taiwan’s island-wide Mazu cult). Though not historically 
inevitable, such nation-centric religiosity and religious identity often led 
to more explicit forms of religious nationalism in which religious actors 
and institutions engaged in explicitly pro-home-nation, patriotic practices.
Neither of the two cases presented in this chapter are about religious 
nationalism per se but they demonstrate that the relationship between 
religion and nation in modernity is much more complicated than the notion 
of religious nationalism can capture.
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5 History and Legitimacy in 
Contemporary China
Towards Competing Nationalisms
Robert D. Weatherley and Qiang Zhang
Abstract
This chapter examines how the Chinese Communist Party is using Chi-
nese history to bolster its nationalist legitimacy. Drawing on two case 
studies ‒ the Anglo-French destruction of the Old Summer Palace (1860) 
and the legacy of the Republican era (1912-49) ‒ we identify two different 
types of nationalism. The f irst is a confrontational form of nationalism, 
emphasizing the trauma associated with the Old Summer Palace incident 
and intended to incite public resentment towards ‘hostile’ foreign powers. 
The second is more consensual, emphasizing common ties with the KMT 
and intended to demonstrate a commitment to peaceful reunif ication 
with Taiwan. However, in both cases, an energetic public debate has 
arisen in which critics have accused the CCP of inadequately safeguarding 
Chinese sovereignty.
Keywords: China, history, legitimacy, nationalism
Introduction
The use of historical memory to stimulate popular nationalist sentiment 
is second nature to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The harrowing 
and often bitter memories associated with the First Opium War,1 the 
Second Sino-Japanese War2 and the Korean War3 are comprehensively 
documented in the annals of CCP history and frequently articulated by the 
state-controlled media. Sometimes the trigger for an off icial reminder is to 
commemorate the anniversary of an event epitomizing China’s subjugation 
by foreign powers or to mark the end of an imperialist war, be it Japanese, 
1 Lovell (2011). 
2 Mitter (2000).
3 Hays Gries et al. (2009).
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Korean or otherwise. Sometimes the reminder is precipitated by a perceived 
act of foreign aggression or a diplomatic slight against China. On other 
occasions, there is no obvious reason. The aim is just to keep the memory 
fresh in Chinese minds.
The f irst part of this article examines a particularly traumatic event 
in China’s historical memory ‒ the destruction of the Old Summer Palace 
(Yuanmingyuan 圓明園) by British and French forces in 1860 in retaliation 
for the kidnap, torture, and in some cases murder of a small delegation of 
Anglo-French representatives who had arrived in Beijing to enforce the 
terms of the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin.4 Since the early 1990s, there have been 
increased reminders of this incident in an effort to whip up a sense of public 
indignation not only towards Britain and France, but towards other former 
imperialist powers for the wrongs that they inflicted on China during the 
Century of Humiliation. This in turn enables the CCP to highlight the suc-
cess with which it liberated China from that traumatic era and transformed 
the country into a major international power. We refer to this approach as 
confrontational nationalism.
The second part of this article examines a more conciliatory nationalist 
position adopted by the CCP in relation specif ically to the Nationalist Party 
(KMT 國民黨) and Taiwan. Here again, the emphasis is on China’s recent 
history, but rather than concentrating on humiliation, the focus is more 
upbeat and optimistic, looking at the achievements of the Republican era 
when the KMT intermittently ruled China. In contrast to Yuanmingyuan, 
the CCP has not taken the lead in articulating a clear off icial line on the 
era. Rather it has relaxed the parameters of permissible debate to allow the 
public to do so. But the broad objectives are equally as nationalistic with the 
party seeking to present itself as flexible, tolerant, and with the interests of 
national unity and reunif ication with Taiwan as its core interest.
However, these attempts by the CCP to fortify its nationalist credibility 
are not proving to be altogether successful because in both of our exam-
ples the party has precipitated a response from members of the scholarly, 
media and online (or ‘netizen’) communities that is critical of the party 
and has even questioned its nationalist credentials. On Yuanmingyuan, 
some sceptics have accused the party of deliberately fabricating the off icial 
narrative of the incident for political purposes, of wasting time and public 
4 Twenty members of the group died in captivity, including a correspondent for the London 
Times. The other sixteen, including the British envoys Henry Loch and Harry Parkes, were 
released after surviving for almost two weeks in the infamous Board of Punishments. For more 
information on the prelude to the Yuanmingyuan incident see Wolseley (1862) and BBC (2015a). 
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money on the restoration of the site and ultimately of failing to protect 
China against foreign domination despite more than 60 years of party rule, 
drawing parallels with China’s weakness under the Qing Dynasty. Critics 
have been even more vocal on the Republican era debate, accusing the CCP 
of withholding basic civil freedoms in contrast to those enjoyed during the 
Republic, of holding the country back economically and of inadequately 
safeguarding Chinese sovereignty after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 in comparison to the KMT’s pre-liberation 
record. Ironically, instead of augmenting its nationalist legitimacy, the CCP 
has set in motion a process that is serving to erode its legitimacy.
Confrontational nationalism – Yuanmingyuan
Despite the often anti-Western rhetoric of the Mao regime, off icial denun-
ciations of the Yuanmingyuan incident were surprisingly rare under Mao. 
The apparent lack of signif icance attached to this incident was further 
reflected in the physical neglect of the site, with little effort being made to 
protect it, despite the area being declared a municipal park at the request 
of Zhou Enlai 周恩來. This led one disgruntled observer to comment that:
This sacred site – ‘the garden of all gardens’ – has now become a fester-
ing ground crowded with garbage heaps, vegetable plots, pigsties, and 
bean curd presses! Motley groups of peasant and migrant families have 
converged here in the thousands to make a living and to multiply in a 
disorderly and slipshod manner, generating pollution at a shocking speed 
and hastening the f inal deterioration of Yuanmingyuan.5
It was only during the 1980s that the CCP began to turn its attention to 
Yuanmingyuan. A government bureau and a scholarly committee was 
formed, symposia and writing forums were held and the party reclaimed 
Yuanmingyuan as a historical site, authorizing the creation of the Yuan-
mingyuan Ruins Park which has been open to tourists for some time.6 The 
west side of Yuanmingyuan was moderately renovated in 2005, several small 
temples have been rebuilt and there are a number of tourist attractions 
including a museum, a small funfair, countless souvenir shops and even 
Jet-Ski rides on one of the main lakes. Tourists are allowed to trample around 
5 Wang (1999, p. 800).
6 Lee (2009, p. 156).
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and touch the ruins with no apparent restrictions placed on photography. 
Julia Lovell believes that the CCP is f inally capitalizing on the propaganda 
value of the Yuanmingyuan ruins, ‘replacing the pigsties and piles of rub-
bish with new signs littered across the gardens reminding visitors of what 
would have been there, if the British and French had not burnt or stolen it 
f irst’.7 But taken as a whole, the site remains largely untouched as the CCP 
contemplates what to do with it.
Constructing a historical legacy
In contrast to the current uncertainty over the physical fate of the site, the 
party has acted much more decisively over its historical legacy, placing the 
Yuanmingyuan incident f irmly on the Chinese political agenda by keeping 
it in the public memory. This was f irst apparent with the launching of the 
Patriotic Education Campaign in the early 1990s. For example, the 1991 
Circular on Fully Using Cultural Relics to Conduct Education in Patriotism 
and Revolutionary Traditions made direct reference to the destruction 
of Yuanmingyuan and stressed the importance of retrieving the stolen 
antiques, describing this as the ‘patriotic duty’ of all Chinese citizens. As 
the campaign spread into the education sector, school children, including 
those at primary school level, were (and still are) taught in detail about 
the indignity of Yuanmingyuan within the wider context of the Century 
of Humiliation and students of all ages are required to visit the site, of-
f icially designated as one of several ‘patriotic education bases’.8 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that students are encouraged to articulate their feelings of 
disgust towards Western states both at the site and back in the classroom. In 
addition, numerous signs have been erected in and around Yuanmingyuan 
reminding visitors of the incident and there is even a ‘Never Forget National 
Humiliation’ memorial wall on which details are inscribed of ‘the sordid 
history of European and American incursions into China, of opium deal-
ing, and the imposition of unequal treaties that made up the century of 
humiliation’.9
Another way that the party has sought to preserve the traumatic 
memory of Yuanmingyuan is to recall the incident whenever it believes 
that foreign powers are still acting aggressively towards China, using the 
state-controlled media to articulate its views. So, for example, following the 
7 Lovell (2011, p. 345).
8 Wang (2008, p. 796).
9 China Beat (2009).
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US-led NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, an 
article published in the People’s Daily made a direct comparison between 
the bombing and the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, stating dramatically 
that ‘through the Embassy riddled with bullet holes covering the charred 
building, I can see reflected the destroyed ruins of the Yuanmingyuan’.10 
Another People’s Daily article angrily insisted that China would never again 
be downtrodden by Western powers, citing the burning of Yuanmingyuan 
as one in a series of past humiliations that must never be repeated:
This is not a period when Western forces can plunder the imperial palace 
at will, burn down the Yuanmingyuan and snatch Hong Kong and Macao, 
nor is it the same period as when the corrupt Qing government or Jiang 
Jieshi 蔣介石(or Chiang Kaishek) ruled. China has already stood up.11
Similar impassioned analogies to the Yuanmingyuan incident were made 
to mark the tenth and f ifteenth anniversaries of the US attack.
The hosting of international events in China has also been used by the 
CCP to resurrect the memory of Yuanmingyuan. This was f irst apparent 
during the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing when a number of newspaper 
articles made reference to the incident. One article suggested that China 
was much stronger in 1990 than it was in 1860 and was in a much better 
position on the world stage as it moved towards the 21st century.12
There were even more references to Yuanmingyuan in the build-up to 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Xinhua News Agency used the Olympics to 
draw a symbolic and rather exaggerated comparison between the ruins of 
Olympia and the ruins of Yuanmingyuan and an even more exaggerated 
comparison was made between the flames of the Olympic torch and the 
flames that engulfed the palaces.13 The state media’s tone became confron-
tational in reports about overseas demonstrators disrupting the Olympic 
torch relay in protest at China’s human-rights record in Tibet. Particular 
venom was directed towards French protestors and the perceived support 
given to them by the French government and media, who were accused of 
gross hypocrisy in the context of Yuanmingyuan. As the People’s Daily put 
it ‘if France wants to talk to China about human rights, they f irst need to 
apologize for what they did to Yuanmingyuan and then return the great 
10 Renmin Ribao (1999a).
11 Renmin Ribao (1999b).
12 Jiefangjun Bao (1990).
13 Xinhuashe Zhongwen Xinwen (2008).
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quantity of Chinese relics that they stole’.14 Following this, opinion polls 
in China (cited gleefully in the People’s Daily) showed a sharp decline in 
positive feelings towards France15 and a sudden increase in the public 
boycotting of French goods, suggesting that the media campaign against 
France was succeeding.16
The media often publishes dramatic personal accounts made by visitors 
to the site. One article claims that ‘in Yuanmingyuan’s scorched ruins, I 
see a pool of blood’.17 Another article laments Yuanmingyuan’s ‘former 
imperial glory that has been reduced to a royal scar’.18 A report in China 
Aviation News describes the ruins as ‘like a bleeding wound, still tingling 
in each Chinese descendant’.19 Even articles which refer f leetingly to Yu-
anmingyuan rarely fail to make mention of its destruction. For example, a 
seemingly innocuous article about the completion of the Beijing Number 
4 subway line observes how the new line passes through Yuanmingyuan 
and then automatically defaults to anguished and protracted descriptions 
of its annihilation, completely changing the original focus of the article.20
The media interest in Yuanmingyuan reached its peak in the build-up 
to the 150th anniversary of its destruction on 17 October 2010. The f irst 
commemorative articles started appearing as early as January 2010, with 
the Wenhui Bao suggesting (somewhat controversially as it turned out) that 
China was considering inviting an Anglo-French delegation to attend the 
anniversary ceremony.21 This was followed by a plethora of other articles 
and new reports about, for example, the month-long schedule of events prior 
to the anniversary date culminating in a live performance by Jackie Chan22 
and a salt sculpture exhibit in Taipei replicating the looted and much-
heralded twelve ‘zodiac animals’, thereby emphasizing the cross-straits 
signif icance of the anniversary.23 These zodiac animals were removed after 
the Democratic Progressive Party took over the Taiwan government in 2016.
14 Renmin Ribao (2008a).
15 Renmin Ribao (2008b).
16 Xinhua Wang (2008).
17 Renmin Ribao (2009).
18 Renmin Ribao (2010a).
19 Zhongguo Hangtian Bao (2010).
20 Guangzhou Ribao (2009).
21 Wenhui Bao (2010).
22 Xinhuashe Zhongwen Xinwen (2010a).
23 Zhongguo Xinwenshe (2010).
hiStoRY aNd legitimaCY iN CoNtemPoRaRY ChiNa 149
The nationalist rationale
The rationale for resurrecting the memory of Yuanmingyuan in such a 
deliberate and concerted manner draws directly on the CCP’s quest for na-
tionalist legitimacy. Following the crisis of economic legitimacy that led to 
mass nationwide demonstrations in spring 1989, particularly in Tiananmen 
Square, the CCP was forced to diversify the basis of its popular legitimacy to 
include nationalism. As overseas governments lined up to criticize the party 
for using military force to disperse the Tiananmen protestors, the party 
looked to position itself as the sole defender of Chinese national interests in 
the face of a seemingly hostile West. A key aspect of this approach has been 
to utilize the legacy of Yuanmingyuan which it has done in two interrelated 
ways. Firstly, Yuanmingyuan reminds the Chinese people of just how ‘bad’ 
life was during the Century of Humiliation. The destruction of the palaces, 
with their ruins still visible today, is ideal for these purposes, carefully 
depicted as the living epitome of a terrible period in China’s history. By the 
same token, Yuanmingyuan is a reminder of just how ‘good’ life is under 
the CCP. After ‘liberating’ China from foreign imperialism in 1949, the CCP 
is guiding China single-handedly towards superpower status and restoring 
China to its rightful place in the world. So the dual objective is to create 
public antagonism towards the West and public gratitude towards the CCP.
Much of the party’s rhetoric bears this out. We noted earlier a reference in 
the People’s Daily to the West no longer being able to ‘plunder the imperial 
palace at will, burn down the Yuanmingyuan and snatch Hong Kong and 
Macao’. The message is clear: the Century of Humiliation is now over and the 
CCP ended it. Similarly, the claim that ‘China has already stood up’, drawing 
conveniently on Mao’s words at the Gate of Heavenly Peace on 1 October 
1949, strongly implies that the CCP is responsible for this. Likewise, the 
references to Yuanmingyuan when China hosts major international events 
such as the Beijing Olympics is intended to contrast the humiliations of the 
past with the triumphs of the present, again brought about by the CCP. The 
Olympics was depicted as a prime example of national rejuvenation, proof 
that China, under the CCP, is no longer the ‘sick man of Asia’.
Returning the antiques
One of the key areas of controversy surrounding the Yuanmingyuan inci-
dent is the current location of the antiques that were stolen by the British 
and French in 1860. The precise number is diff icult to quantify. UNESCO has 
estimated that of the 1.6 million Chinese antiques stored in more than 200 
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museums across 47 countries, approximately one million were taken from 
Yuanmingyuan. These include a two-metre high Buddhist stupa currently 
housed at the Chinese pavilion in the Fontainebleau Palace near Paris and 
a painting of one of the ‘forty scenic sites’ of Yuanmingyuan displayed in 
the Paris National Library.24
With this in mind, the off icial Chinese media has campaigned hard 
for the return of the stolen antiques. Although there were sporadic efforts 
during the 1990s,25 2009 saw a considerable rise in media-influenced public 
support for the campaign after a group of Chinese lawyers working overseas 
formed a ‘patriotic alliance’, seeking to apply international law in order to 
facilitate the return of the antiques.26 The CCP has also funded teams of 
experts to travel across the world and make contact with foreign museums 
in an effort to bring back the stolen items.27
The nationalist symbolism associated with the stolen Yuanmingyuan 
treasures is palpable and has been enthusiastically developed and exploited 
by the CCP in its quest to whip up a nationalist zeal against former imperial-
ist powers. For example, the theft of the treasures is depicted as a devastating 
wound struck at the very heart of the Chinese nation whilst their return is 
portrayed as part of ‘a long and arduous road towards national salvation’.28 
Each time Yuanmingyuan antiques are returned to China this is seized 
upon as a great victory for the Chinese nation.29 But it is depicted only as a 
partial victory given that many treasures remain scattered throughout the 
world thereby constituting a continued humiliation for China.30
As noted above, the return of Yuanmingyuan antiques (often by Chinese 
bidders) is welcomed in the Chinese media. However, sometimes reports on 
foreign auctions of the antiques are designed to generate resentment and 
anger amongst the Chinese people, especially when Chinese bidders pay 
a fortune to buy back what was stolen from China in the f irst place. The 
Liberation Army Daily described these auctions as an affront to China’s 
national dignity ‘going against the spirit of international conventions and 
inflicting serious harm on China’s cultural rights and national emotions’.31 
A People’s Daily article described foreign claims that there was nothing 
24 CNTV (2010).
25 Jiefangjun Bao (1998).
26 Xinhua News Agency (2009).
27 Xinhuashe Zhongwen Xinwen (2010b).
28 Jiefangjun Bao (2009a).
29 Beijing Ribao (2011).
30 Jiefangjun Bao (2009b).
31 Jiefangjun Bao (2009b).
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wrong in auctioning the antiques as an example of the continuing ‘undis-
guised gangster logic’ and ‘cultural hegemony’ of Western nations.32
The most high-profile foreign auction of Yuanmingyuan antiques took 
place in Paris in 2009. When Christie’s tried to sell the rat and rabbit ‘zodiac’ 
heads collection owned by the late fashion designer Yves Saint Laurent and 
his business partner Pierre Berge, there was widespread condemnation in 
China and demands that the statues be given back to China free of charge. 
Particular outrage was sparked when Berge said that he would happily 
return the antiques if China promised to improve its human-rights record, 
return Tibet to the Tibetans and authorize the safe return of the exiled 
Dalai Lama.33 In response, there were numerous public protests in China 
and a number of petitions were signed demanding that the antiques be 
handed back immediately, not sold at auction. In addition, a group of 81 
Chinese lawyers f iled a suit in France in an attempt to halt the proposed 
auction.34 Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhouxu 
condemned the apparent hypocrisy of Western states on the question of 
human rights and noted that ‘Western imperial powers have looted a lot of 
Chinese cultural relics. These cultural relics should be returned’.35
In the end, the auction went ahead but ended in farce. Although the 
antiques were ‘sold’ to Cai Mingchao, an established Chinese collector 
and adviser to China’s National Treasures Fund for 15 million Euros each, 
Cai refused to pay, claiming, in what can only have been a publicity stunt 
approved by the party, that his bid was made purely ‘on patriotic grounds’.36 
Cai was hailed as a national hero back in China, but Christie’s declared his 
actions unlawful and threatened to bring a suit against him. Ownership 
of the two heads reverted back to Pierre Berge. However, in April 2013 they 
were returned to China by the family of the French billionaire François-
Henri Pinault who now owns Christie’s. Neither Christie’s nor the family 
off ice would confirm whether or not the Pinaults had purchased the heads 
from Berge prior to their return, but the gesture was a clear attempt at 
strengthening economic ties between France and China. This is because 
it coincided with an off icial visit to China by President François Hollande, 
accompanied by François-Henri Pinault.37
32 Renmin Ribao (2010b).
33 Jiefangjun Bao (2009b).
34 Weil (2013, p.132).
35 New York Times (2009).
36 BBC (2009).
37 Bloomberg (2013).
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Dissenting voices
In his book entitled What Does China Think?, Mark Leonard has described 
the destruction of Yuanmingyuan ‘as an open wound that can be salted 
whenever citizens need to be mobilized or reminded of how the Com-
munist Party saved China from foreign defeat’.38 To some degree, Leonard’s 
analysis is accurate. In response to the frequent off icial reminders of the 
incident, some people have duly expressed their outrage at the incident. The 
ultra-nationalist blogger Wei Yahua who is active on the pro-CCP website 
Utopia proclaimed in a blog entitled ‘Is the Humiliation of the Burning of 
Yuanmingyuan Repeating Itself?’ that ‘the imperialists entered the territory 
unhindered, like a wolf entering a flock of sheep. This was not a war, it was a 
slaughter’.39 One frequently made observation is that although China is on 
the rise as an international power, the Chinese people must remain vigilant 
against Western powers and must never forget Yuanmingyuan otherwise 
something analogous may happen in the future. In a blog entitled ‘The 
Regret of the Yuanmingyuan’, the writer Jia Chenxi warns that ‘we cannot 
forget our past history, otherwise the nightmare will repeat itself!’40 This 
resonates closely with the CCP’s approach, especially when it feels under 
threat by a perceived act of foreign aggression.
But not everyone automatically rallies behind the CCP at the mere men-
tion of the Yuanmingyuan incident. Some people have accused the CCP 
of deliberately doctoring the off icial narrative on the incident to suit its 
own political purposes. A particularly vocal critic known as Dai35408 has 
dismissed the off icial narrative as being riddled with ‘politically motivated 
biases and inaccuracies’ which have culminated in ‘more than half a century 
of patriotic education brainwashing’.41 The basis of this accusation derives 
from the convenient paucity of information in Chinese textbooks and media 
coverage about the maltreatment of the Anglo-French delegation prior to 
the burning and looting of the palaces.
The Shenzhen-based writer Yan Changhai has also accused the CCP 
of an unbalanced historical portrayal of the Yuanmingyuan incident. In 
a blog entitled ‘Why Don’t You Ask Why Yuanmingyuan Was Burnt’, Yan 
blames the destruction of the palaces (and indeed the start of the Second 
Opium War) on what he describes as the provocative actions of the Qing 
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government under Emperor Xianfeng, presumably a reference to the mis-
treatment of the Anglo-French delegation. Yan argues that the convenient 
omission of key facts about the incident from the CCP narrative is because 
‘corrupt CCP off icials’ are trying to use nationalism for their own political 
purposes as ‘a tool to fan up populism’.42 Yan has also been critical of the 
CCP in relation to the Republican era, as we will see later.
Just as doubts have been raised about the historical accuracy of the 
off icial narrative on Yuanmingyuan, so there are doubts about the ap-
propriateness of resuscitating the memory of the incident. Some critics 
note that the very existence of Yuanmingyuan reflected a shameful era of 
elitism and inequality. It was, after all, an inordinately expensive complex 
of palaces and gardens inhabited by an imperial royal family, built on the 
back of slave labor and yet completely inaccessible to the impoverished 
general public. As Tong Shujie puts it, Yuanmingyuan was ‘nothing but a 
place for the Qing Dynasty emperors to live a luxurious life. It’s a symbol of a 
waste of money and resources and the then imperial family’s greediness’.43
One blogger using the name Zhexuejia Gua Le (which translates as ‘The 
Philosopher is Dead’) has suggested on Weibo that the common people 
deeply resented the greed and luxury associated with Yuanmingyuan, so 
much so that when it was attacked by Anglo-French forces ‘they did not 
feel a thing and many even clapped and helped [the Anglo-French forces]’. 
It has only been in recent years, to suit the CCP’s nationalist purposes, 
that Yuanmingyuan ‘has been elevated to a national event. But actually 
burning it made ordinary people feel avenged’.44 Another blogger with the 
name Li Xiongwei’s Own Garden (Zijia Yuanzi Li Xiongwei) has insisted 
that ‘for a dynasty that did not consider the welfare of its people, the more 
beautiful and spectacular their buildings were, the worse their crimes’. 
This blogger even asserts that ‘the Western powers did not do enough by 
burning these buildings. They should have burnt their owners too’.45 Yan 
Changhai suggests that if Yuanmingyuan had not been burned down, it 
would remain inaccessible to the Chinese public, asking, in a clear dig at the 
continued secretiveness of the CCP, ‘would it not have turned into today’s 
Zhongnanhai [the central headquarters of the CCP]’? He continues, ‘as a 
42 Yan (2014).
43 Beijing Review (2011).
44 Zhexuejia Gua Le (2014).
45 Zijia Yuanzi Li Xiongwei (2013).
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forbidden area, it is better for it [Yuanmingyuan] to have been burnt. At 
least ordinary people are able to see the ruins’.46
Other people express misgivings about the continued relevance of the 
incident and the amount of column space devoted to it by the Chinese media 
in light of current social pressures, such as passing exams, f inding work, 
and raising a family.47 A f irst-hand example of this is captured by Julia 
Lovell in conversation with a visitor to Yuanmingyuan, who in one breath 
expressed his outrage at the destruction of the site, but in the next breath 
asked about opportunities to study at law school in England.48
Leading on from this, there is a feeling amongst some people that the CCP 
should not be wasting its time and public money on setting up delegations 
to scour the world for lost Yuanmingyuan treasures or on rebuilding the 
old site, albeit only partially at this stage. Instead, there are much more 
important issues to contend with, such as environmental degradation, 
spiralling unemployment, and off icial corruption, and it is these issues 
which ‘shame’ the nation. Wang Feng of the Qilu Evening News insists that, 
‘it’s more meaningful to build more quality schools than to spend so much 
money on the reconstruction program’.49
Similarly, as another blogger poignantly remarks:
What is national humiliation? It is when government buildings are 
extravagant in the extreme and village schools are shabby and leaking, 
this is national humiliation. When we believe that building the Birds 
Nest, constructing arenas and rebuilding the Yuanmingyuan are able to 
‘restore the nation’s glory’ and the dignity of the Chinese people, to take 
ignorance and treat it as honor, that is the biggest national humiliation.50
But if some people only imply that the CCP is too tentative in its dealings 
with foreigners in the context of the Yuanmingyuan incident, others are 
much more forthright in this assertion. One impassioned blogger known as 
PLANavy insists that Western imperialists are still trying to degrade and 
embarrass China as they did during the Yuanmingyuan incident and calls 
on the CCP to f inally ‘wake the sleeping Chinese dragon’.51 This blogger 
has also called for the CCP to be more assertive in its stance towards Japan 
46 Yan (2014).
47 Milkrangers (2010).
48 Lovell (2011, pp. 352-353). 
49 Beijing Review (2011).
50 Nmghongjing (2011).
51 PLANavy (2012).
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over the disputed Diaoyu islands (Senkaku islands). Similarly, Zui Huayin 
in a blog entitled ‘Forgotten Memories’ insists that ‘China must wake up! 
We cannot again lag behind, we cannot be weak again! We cannot allow 
a tragedy like Yuanmingyuan to happen again!’52 In addition, there were 
reports of widespread internet anger over suggestions that the CCP was 
considering inviting British and French off icials to the commemorative 
events marking the 150th anniversary of the Yuanmingyuan incident, with 
angry claims that China was putting ‘salt in the wounds’53 by ‘inviting the 
invading forces’.54 The scale of opposition on this issue forced the party to 
back down on its original plans.
The US presence in the South China Sea has triggered online criticism 
of China’s lack of national assertiveness via historical references to Yuan-
mingyuan. In October 2015, a US aircraft carrier sailed inside the twelve 
nautical-mile radius that China claims as its territorial waters around one 
of its recently reclaimed islands, followed shortly afterwards by a visit from 
the US Defense Secretary Ash Carter whose helicopter landed on the aircraft 
carrier. If this caused irritation within the Chinese Foreign Ministry, it was 
nothing compared to the outrage expressed by the Weibo user with the blog 
name Yike de Weibo (Stranger’s Weibo):
Having slapped the left side of your face [by sailing into Chinese territory], 
they [the US] are coming to slap the right side of your face. Let us see how 
the CCP leadership will explain this to the people. Today, it is the South 
China Sea, tomorrow it will be Tianjin Port. Yuanmingyuan has been 
burnt, Yiheyuan will be next.55
A similar level of anger was expressed following comments made by the 
former commander of the US Pacif ic Fleet Gary Roughead who made it 
clear that the US would stand by its treaty with Japan, no matter what. 
According to a blogger known only as dgc5 if in its negotiations with foreign 
powers, ‘China fails to make any progress, it would not be strange at all if 
the Eight-Nation Alliance burns Yuanmingyuan again’.56 In referring to 
Eight-Nation Alliance, the blogger means the Anglo-French Alliance, a 
common mistake made by bloggers on this subject.
52 Zui (2010).
53 Zhongyangshe Zhongwen Xinwen (2010).
54 Dongfang Ribao (2010).
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Consensual nationalism: The Republican era
Turning now to the debate about the Republican era, under Mao there was 
no debate. According to the exaggerated party line, the Republican economy 
was on the verge of collapse after ineff icient governmental handling and 
corruption led to massive unemployment, gross under-production and 
unprecedented high levels of inflation. Chinese society was portrayed as 
impoverished, fragmented, and disenfranchised and the KMT as impotent 
in the face of warlordism and highly oppressive under the auspices of the 
ruthlessly dictatorial and fascistic Jiang Jieshi. ‘Old China’, it was argued, 
was ripe for liberation and this duly came with the victory of the CCP in 
1949. After retreating to Taiwan in 1949, Jiang and the KMT remained at the 
forefront of CCP hostility as the Mao regime pursued an uncompromising, 
confrontational stance on reunif ication with Taiwan.
The political ascent of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s led to a gradual 
and deliberate repudiation of this grim off icial depiction of the Republic 
and the KMT. This was partly linked to the implementation of economic 
reform. In an effort to legitimize his radical change of direction in economic 
policy, Deng actively encouraged PRC scholars to embark on a positive 
reassessment of the Republic’s economic system. As Wright has pointed 
out, the intention was to demonstrate to the bourgeoning number of PRC 
entrepreneurs that they could learn something useful from the business 
practices and entrepreneurial acumen of Republican entrepreneurs.57 It 
was also thought that PRC entrepreneurs may feel inspired to ‘take up’ 
where their Republican predecessors had left off several decades earlier. 
As Bergere has suggested:
There was a growing feeling that Deng Xiaoping and the reformists were 
taking up the job that had been left unfinished in 1949. The Republican 
era was more and more perceived as the starting point of a forceful 
modernization drive, as a time of economic and cultural innovation 
and creativity to which contemporaries should turn for inspiration.58
The relaxation of political controls that accompanied Deng’s ascent allowed 
for academic research to be conducted on other aspects of the Republican 
era as archival materials from Taiwan and further abroad became increas-
ingly available to PRC historians. One particular area of activity focused on 
57 Wright (1993, p. 214). 
58 Bergere (2000, p. 55).
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discovering what had happened to certain high-profile KMT f igures who 
had received a cursory mention in PRC history books, but then had vanished 
without a trace from the written page. Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 (1879-1936) is 
one such example. Head of the KMT’s Legislative Yuan in Nanjing from 
1927-1931 and an important ally of Sun Yatsen, Hu’s career up until about 
February 1931 was documented in PRC history texts. It was at this point 
that Hu was placed under house arrest following disagreements with Jiang 
over the drafting of the new provisional constitution. Intrigued by Hu’s 
subsequent absence from PRC texts despite living for another f ive years, 
historian Chen Hongmin set about completing the picture as part of his 
master’s dissertation at Nanjing University which he wrote during the early 
1980s. Chen’s research showed that Hu had been airbrushed from the CCP’s 
off icial historiography after 1931 because he consistently maintained an 
anti-communist political stance. But Chen rightly noted that Hu was equally 
opposed to the Jiang Jieshi regime and to Japan’s military aggression, a fact 
that was conveniently ignored by the CCP. Chen later argued that party 
censors had acted unfairly and that Hu should be posthumously credited 
for his staunch anti-Japanese position.59
Another sign that the party was being more positive about the legacy 
of the KMT during the Republic was the off icial recognition of the KMT’s 
contribution during the Second Sino-Japanese War, a contribution previ-
ously overlooked or denied by the CCP. For example, high-prof ile KMT 
generals who had fought in the war were formally acknowledged. Zhang 
Zizhong 張自忠, the most senior general to die in the war, was posthumously 
awarded the title of ‘revolutionary martyr’ in 1982.60 Li Zongren 李宗仁, 
later Vice-President of Taiwan, was also recognized by the CCP for the lead-
ing role he played in the 1938 Battle of Taierzhuang 台兒莊 in Shandong, the 
f irst major Chinese victory of the war.61 Both Zhang and Li were estranged 
from Jiang Jieshi. Although Zhang participated in the 1927-1928 Northern 
Expedition, he never acknowledged the Jiang regime that came to power 
as a result of that campaign and repeatedly tried to displace it. Li was also 
a long-established political opponent of Jiang and after f leeing to the US 
at the end of the civil war, Li returned to China in 1965 in support of Zhou 
Enlai amidst much fanfare.62 Zhang and Li’s opposition to Jiang explains 
why they were singled out for praise and honor by the CCP. Jiang was still 
59 Chen (2011).
60 Waldron (1996).
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public-enemy-number-one in China at this time, so there was little risk to 
the CCP in recognizing Jiang’s enemies as the party’s friends. Nevertheless, 
the recognition of Zhang and Li still represented a signif icant change in 
off icial attitude towards the KMT and its role in the war against Japan.
A broader public interest in the Republican era has been apparent 
since the early 1980s. This is partly because of the Republic’s chronologi-
cal proximity to the present, making it more relevant to everyday life in 
China. It is also because of the scarcely believable off icial narrative on the 
period, espoused for so long by the CCP. Whilst KMT f igures such as Jiang 
were well known during the Mao era of the PRC, they were only known by 
their derisory ideological labels such as ‘counter-revolutionary’ or ‘national 
traitor’. Similarly negative labels were applied to the Republic. However, as 
Deng moved to ease domestic political tensions, a public demand emerged 
for TV programs, books, and magazine articles offering a less politicized 
assessment of the Republican era. This led to the screening in 1984 of a 
Hong Kong television drama entitled ‘The Bund’ based on the criminal 
activities of the 1920s Shanghai triads, which quickly became a hit with 
the Chinese public.63
At around this time, a number of books began to appear on Chinese 
bookshelves in what was known as ‘Republican exposé’. These were cheaply 
produced and low-quality books which focused on the criminal underworld 
and the lives of notorious historical f igures, such as spy chiefs and military 
off icers from the KMT’s Huangpu 黃埔 Military Academy. The book titles 
were often sensationalist, such as ‘Dai Li: King of Spies’, ‘Chen Guofu: 
The KMT Godfather’ and ‘Jiang Jieshi and the Three Heroes of Huangpu’. 
The books portrayed the Republic as an era characterized by corruption, 
internecine gangland warfare, and high-level assassinations.64
The emergence of Republican fever
During the mid-1990s, as relations between the CCP and KMT became 
strained (particularly during the Taiwan Strait missile crisis of 1995-1996) 
Beijing took a few steps back from its KMT charm offensive. However, the 
election of the pro-independence Chen Shuibian as Taiwan’s president in 
2000 precipitated an abrupt recovery in relations between the CCP and 
the KMT relations, both of whom were erstwhile opponents of Taiwanese 
independence. This, together with the deaths in 2001 of KMT General 
63 Xianfeng Guojia Lishi (2008).
64 Ibid.
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Zhang Xueliang 張學良 (instigator of the 1936 Xian incident) and in 2003 
of Song Mayling 宋美玲 (Madame Jiang Jieshi), served to intensify the 
mainland Chinese interest in the Republican era and by 2006 references 
to a new phenomenon called ‘Republican fever’ (minguo re 民國熱) began 
to appear in the PRC media. According to Zhou Weijun, the fever emerged 
following the successful launch of a series of scholarly and non-specialist 
books on the Republic including titles such as ‘The Bad Temper of His-
tory’ and ‘Waves under the Pen’.65 What differentiated these books from 
previous publications on the subject was the more optimistic portrayal of 
the Republic. Whereas previously the emphasis had been on the allegedly 
shady, dangerous and corrupt features of the Republic, these new books 
depicted an era of diversity, sophistication, and unrealized potential, as 
we will discuss in more detail shortly.
But Republican fever is not the exclusive domain of the publishing in-
dustry. Since 2000, a large number of Republican-based period dramas have 
been screened on Chinese TV to massive popular appeal.66 One such drama 
was called ‘The Grand Mansion Gate’ based on the real-life experience of 
the family who owned the renowned Chinese pharmaceutical company 
Tongrentang 同仁堂. Another was entitled ‘Like Mist, Like Rain and Like 
Wind’, a love story set in 1930s Shanghai. Some of these dramas still followed 
the conventional CCP view of history and depicted Republican society 
as oppressive. Others have adhered to the model set out in ‘The Bund’ by 
focusing on the chaos and corruptions of the Republican era. But, as a whole, 
the image of Republican society as represented in these dramas has become 
much more diverse, colorful and modern. Furthermore, the viewing public 
are often attracted to the unique elegance of the styles and temperament 
which subtly combined Chinese traditions with Western influences.
Those infused with Republican fever express themselves in a number of 
different ways, as we will see below. One notable example is the nationalist 
rituals commemorating KMT soldiers who died during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. This can be usefully linked to religion because commemora-
tion is an act of transaction with the dead. According to the research of Lin 
Zhenru carried out in Hunan Province, these rituals usually take place at 
locations where KMT soldiers are believed to have fought and perished, 
often in desolate areas such as overgrown f ields, hillsides or discarded 
65 Zhou (2008).
66 Xin Zhoukan (2010).
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wasteland.67 This enhances the symbolism of the occasion representing 
the fate of the dead KMT soldiers, largely forgotten in off icial Chinese 
history books in stark contrast to their CCP counterparts. The rituals are 
very similar to traditional Chinese funeral rites and include the reading of 
a funeral oration by a preordained ‘master of ceremonies’, the burning of 
incense and paper money, the offering of symbolic gits such as fruit and 
vegetables and a period of silent reflection and kneeling. Some participants 
or volunteers (sometimes even referred to as ‘mourners’) wear T-shirts 
bearing the flag of the KMT (blue sky and white sun) or Taiwan (blue sky, 
white sun and red background). Makeshift banners are often prepared and 
erected honoring the KMT war dead.
The creation of a more relaxed political environment that has allowed 
Republican fever to emerge can again be linked to the CCP’s quest for 
nationalist legitimacy through the utilization of history. In contrast to the 
confrontational mode of nationalism linked to Yuanmingyuan, the party’s 
positive assessment of the Republican era and forbearance of Republican 
fever reflects a more consensual mode of nationalism, with the party seek-
ing to present itself as flexible, tolerant, and with the wider national interest 
as its core interest. This effort to cultivate an image of national unity and 
harmony is part of a broader policy on reunif ication with Taiwan.
Rights and freedoms during the Republic
Academic excellence. But as with Yuanmingyuan, some people have used 
the open forum on the Republic to criticize the CCP on a number of counts, 
including its failings as a nationalist entity. One of the most commonplace 
claims made by those infused with Republican fever is that intellectual 
scholarship during the Republic was remarkably sophisticated, much more 
so than previously thought and much more so than PRC levels of scholarship. 
Writing in the Guangzhou-based Southern Window magazine, the historian 
Tang Xiaobing of Shanghai’s East China Normal University identifies numer-
ous best-selling books and periodicals published in the PRC about the demo-
cratic principles championed by Republican-era intellectuals, primarily as 
a reaction to some of the undemocratic features of contemporary China. In 
particular, Tang identifies a growing aversion towards China’s ‘authoritarian 
political culture and rising tide of consumerism and cynicism’. According 
to Tang, this also explains why modern-day Chinese intellectuals tend 
67 Lin (2016). For an analogous discussion of the ‘religious’ commemoration of the war dead 
at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall see Miyamoto (2012).
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to identify themselves with their liberal-minded counterparts from the 
Republic (e.g. Hu Shi 胡適), whilst left-wing intellectuals associated with 
the current regime (e.g. the CCP founding members Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀and 
Li Dazhao 李大釗) are often ignored or even criticized. This nostalgia for 
liberal-minded Republican intellectuals is linked to a desire amongst con-
temporary intellectuals to ‘inherit their spiritual legacy’ according to Tang, 
as well as a wish to reestablish the concepts of democracy, freedom, and 
human rights that were openly discussed by many Republican intellectuals 
and intermittently practiced during the Republican era. Indeed, the legacy 
of the Republic’s liberals and their ‘unfinished mission of enlightenment’ 
has become the starting point for many modern-day Chinese thinkers who 
want to resurrect and take forward this enlightenment, in Tang’s view.68
In an article published on the CCP’s very own People’s Daily website, 
historian Zhang Lifan suggested that post-1949 Chinese intellectuals are 
some considerable distance behind their Republican-era predecessors in 
terms of the quality of their scholarship suggesting that: ‘we have still not 
surpassed them, nor have we reached their intellectual heights’.69 Sun Yu, 
curator of the Lu Xun Museum in Beijing and author of the book ‘In the 
Republic’ is particularly forthright, claiming that ‘the academic brilliance 
created by Republican intellectuals in very diff icult times puts present-day 
intellectuals to shame’.70 Xie Yong, a professor of Chinese literature at 
Xiamen University, asserts that China’s most prominent intellectuals either 
emerged during the Republican era or received their education during 
that era, especially in the f ield of humanities and literature when ‘it was 
def initely better before 1949’.71
The education system. The admiration for Republic-of-China intellectuals 
has also led to praise for the education system that produced them and 
this has simultaneously given rise to doubts about the quality of educa-
tion after 1949. The Gansu-based writer Xue Linrong has asserted that the 
contemporary Chinese education system has a long way to go before it can 
reach the level attained during the Republic. According to Xue, the KMT 
was genuinely committed to improving education standards, as manifested 
by the f inancial investments that it made, such as unusually high salaries 
for teaching staff. Even during the socioeconomic chaos that beset China 
68 Tang (2008). 
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during the Second Sino-Japanese War, free education was available in KMT-
controlled areas.72
Zhang Lifan broadly agrees with Xue, identifying at least two reasons why 
so many reputable intellectuals were produced during the Republican era. 
Firstly, people at that time received a solid educational grounding in both 
traditional Chinese culture and Western ideas, encouraging a more diverse 
and open-minded intellectual development. Secondly, the education system 
was characterized by a free and inclusive academic atmosphere which was 
highly conducive to scholarly excellence, something not experienced after 
1949.73
Much of the praise for the Republic’s education system tends to focus 
on the quality of its universities. In his article in Southern People Weekly 
commemorating the centennial of Beijing’s prestigious Qinghua University, 
Zhang Lifan insisted that ‘the Chinese higher education institutions that 
rose in the f irst half of the twentieth century were steeped in European 
and American influences and enjoyed academic freedom’. Aiming a direct 
attack on the CCP, Zhang argued that the same is not true for the post-1949 
university sector. According to Zhang, the PRC’s university reforms of 1952 
were an ‘unprecedented educational disaster’ mainly because the Western-
oriented education system was replaced by the Soviet model which was 
designed to produce ‘instruments’ that would work for the system at the 
expense of independent thinking.74
The post-Mao era has fared little better, in Zhang’s opinion. Although the 
Soviet model has gradually been phased out with the ascent of Deng Xiaop-
ing, Chinese universities are still under CCP control and are increasingly 
subject to commercial pressure. Zhang concluded with a rather damning 
observation that on losing the independent spirit and freedom of thought 
that characterized the Republican era, China lost the potential to have great 
thinkers: ‘once the independent and free thinking spirit disappeared from 
the campus, we can only lament that there will be no more great masters 
after they left us’.75
Zhang’s positive assessment of the Republican university system is 
shared by other thinkers. In an article published in Beijing News, Hebei 
scholar Xie Zhihao noted that many contemporary Chinese intellectuals, 
especially education historians, have great respect for the way in which 
72 Xue (2010).
73 Zhang (2010).
74 Zhang, Lifan (2011).
75 Ibid.
hiStoRY aNd legitimaCY iN CoNtemPoRaRY ChiNa 163
university education flourished in Republican times. By contrast ‘contem-
porary Chinese universities are such a let-down. Republican universities, 
no matter how unsatisfactory, at least maintained a minimum standard 
of education’.76
The Phoenix TV website published an online special report about the 
post-imperial history of the Chinese university system. The report was 
extremely complimentary about Republican universities, describing them 
as having an ‘independent character and free spirit’. By contrast, universities 
during the Mao era were described as being forced to endure ‘collective 
reformation and ideological unif ication’. Things were not much better after 
the death of Mao, according to the report. Due to political and commercial 
pressure, universities have become ‘f loating duckweed without roots and 
instruments without souls’.77
Media freedom. Turning to freedom of expression during the Republic, a 
number of Chinese commentators have commented on the considerable 
autonomy of the media under the Republic, despite the CCP line suggesting 
otherwise. Zhang Ming, a professor of political science at Renmin University, 
believes that the highpoint of media freedom in China was from 1911 to 1927 
during the experimental period of constitutional democracy known as the 
Beiyang 北洋 era. At this time, Zhang notes, there was little if any off icial 
censorship of the media. In general, journalists were able to write or say 
what they wanted. Off icial censorship of the media did start to creep in 
after the Northern Expedition brought the KMT to power in 1928 under 
a single-party authoritarian system of government. In response to this, 
Zhang continues, some newspapers deliberately left blank spaces where 
paragraphs or pages had been removed by KMT censors to make it clear to 
the reading public that some words had been taken out. But this was nothing 
compared to the censorship that the media has been subjected to since 1949, 
Zhang argues. In a direct attack on the CCP, Zhang notes that in contrast 
to the practice of leaving blanks to show that the press had been censored, 
the press after 1949 ‘did not even have the courage to leave a blank’.78
Notwithstanding the media censorship enforced by the KMT after 
1928, Xin Lijian, president of a private education company called Xinfu 
Education Group, believes that there was still a considerable degree of 
media freedom back then. According to Xin, despite its overtly anti-KMT 
76 Xie (2008).
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rhetoric, the CCP-controlled Xinhua Daily was still permitted to operate 
in KMT-controlled areas between 1938 and 1947, relatively free from KMT 
intervention. This autonomy extended to ‘calling on workers and peasants 
to rise up and overthrow the KMT’ and even to ‘encouraging the KMT army 
to turn their guns on the government’. In light of this, Xin praises the media 
freedom of the Republican era and laments the fact that ‘this valuable legacy 
was cut off in 1949 and has not been reconnected since’.79
The democratic legacy. Closely related to this frank discussion of media 
freedom during the Republic is a much broader debate about the democratic 
legacy of the era, particularly the democratic ideas articulated by intellectu-
als during that period. Chinese thinkers are even more enthusiastic about 
the democratic legacy of the Republic, particularly during the Beiyang era. 
One such enthusiast is the Tianjin-based media commentator Li Shumin 
who argues that Beiyang was unquestionably the most democratic period 
of China’s entire history. In an article published in the liberal magazine 
Yanhuang Chunqiu, Li acknowledged that there were deep f laws in the 
Beiyang democratic process, but insisted that ‘the separation of powers was 
formally adopted and political power was contained, people’s rights and 
freedoms were to some extent respected and guaranteed, an independent 
judiciary was established and the freedom of speech was to some extent 
protected’. For Li, ‘the Beiyang era occupies an important position in the 
history and development of modern democratic politics in China during 
the twentieth century’. Li concluded pointedly that the CCP has much to 
learn from this period.80
This positive view of Beiyang democracy spread to a much wider public 
audience, partly (and ironically) because of the release of the off icial PRC 
f ilm commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CCP 
entitled ‘Beginning of the Great Revival’. Although the objective of the f ilm 
was to bolster CCP credibility, what really captured public attention was the 
depiction of Beiyang as an era of political dynamism. After watching the 
film, the blogger Yang Hengjun wrote of his nostalgia at seeing how ‘Chinese 
citizens enjoyed freedom of association, demonstration and protest at a time 
when many countries in the world were not very free’.81 Likewise, a widely 
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the f ilm for ‘using vivid scenes, brilliant examples and heart-warming 
details’ and listed a number of freedoms enjoyed during the era.82
But it is not only Beiyang that has received praise in China. The single-
party system established by Jiang Jieshi during the Nanjing Decade (1927-
1937) has also been more favorably reassessed. Writing in Southern Weekend, 
Qin Hui from Qinghua University stated that ‘although the Republic did 
not succeed in building a constitutional political system, it did sow the 
seeds. The progress of democratization in contemporary Taiwan cannot 
be said to have nothing to do with this’.83 Others have praised Jiang more 
directly. Hu Xingdou, an economist at the Beijing Institute of Technology, 
wrote that ‘Jiang Jieshi was the greatest man in modern China’. As well as 
leading China to victory in the war against Japan and establishing China’s 
status as a respected international power (see immediately below), Jiang 
‘formulated a f irst-rate constitution that was comparable to American and 
European constitutions’.84
The Republic’s nationalist credentials
China’s international status. Perhaps the most vociferous claims made by 
exponents of Republican fever relate to the diplomatic achievements of the 
Republic and China’s rising international status during this time. According 
to the off icial PRC view, the encroachment of foreign imperialist powers 
during the nineteenth-century Qing Dynasty reduced China to a ‘semi-
colonial society’. It was not until 1949, under the leadership of the CCP, that 
China was f inally liberated from foreign oppression and China’s sovereignty 
was f inally restored after the Century of Humiliation. Conspicuous by its 
absence, however, is any acknowledgement of the diplomatic successes 
made by the KMT during the Republican period, something which has been 
duly noted by some thinkers. According to Qin Hui of Qinghua University 
writing in Southern Weekend, Republican governments were actually ‘quite 
successful in their diplomacy and international political activities’ and it 
was during the Republican era that China genuinely ‘stood up’ on the world 
stage. Qin specif ically praised the wartime diplomacy of the era when 
‘China chose the right international alignments and became one of the 
victorious nations. These were great successes for Republican diplomacy 
82 Yang et al. (2011).
83 Nanfang Zhoumo (2011).
84 Hu (2011). 
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and had a huge signif icance in enabling China to stand up’.85 A month later, 
Qin published another article in Southern Weekend directly refuting the 
claim that the CCP was solely responsible for freeing China from imperialist 
subjugation. Qin insisted that the ‘unequal treaties’ were actually abolished 
in 1942, at which point ‘China’s sovereignty and independence had undoubt-
edly been established’.86
Another supporter of this position is the veteran liberal-economist 
Mao Yushi. In an article entitled ‘When Did the Chinese People Stand Up?’ 
published by Yanhuang Chunqiu, Mao suggests that China emerged from its 
Century of Humiliation not in 1949 as the CCP has consistently maintained, 
but on defeating Japan in 1945, following which China retrieved Manchuria 
and Taiwan from Japanese occupation and became a permanent member 
of the UN Security Council. According to Mao, ‘it was upon winning the 
War of Resistance that China truly ended national humiliation and, as Sun 
Yatsen had hoped, began to be treated fairly as a nation’.87 Mao reiterated 
this position a few years later:
Retrieving the three northeastern provinces and Taiwan, taking back the 
sovereignty over the foreign concessions in China, becoming a founding 
member state of the United Nations and a permanent member of the 
Security Council, eliminating the century-long humiliation, were done 
by Jiang Jieshi, and were the results of the Chinese people’s arduous 
eight-year long resistance.88
Just as Republican governments have been increasingly praised for wresting 
control of Chinese sovereignty from foreign powers, so questions have been 
asked about whether the CCP can be credited with any international suc-
cesses in 1949. In a speech which was widely circulated on the internet, Qin 
Hui asked in a forthright manner ‘which unequal treaty was abolished in 
1949 and what economic rights, such as customs rights, however big or small, 
were obtained in 1949? I believe no one can answer that. Indeed, nothing 
can be found’.89 Yan Changhai has accused the CCP of failing to safeguard 
Chinese sovereignty in the post-revolutionary era. In a blog carried by the 
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Zedong made with the Soviet Union when signing, amongst other things, 
the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Under this 
Treaty, Yan argued, the CCP ‘sold out Chinese territories and sovereignty’, 
such as the maintenance of Soviet control over China’s Eastern Railway in 
Manchuria and Port Arthur in Dalian. Referring to the CCP as a collection 
of ‘vested interest groups’, Yan accused them of ‘shamelessly claiming to be 
the “protector” of the Chinese nation, so that they can deceive the Chinese 
people into supporting them. But in fact, they have never really defended 
the country or the nation. On the contrary, countless facts have proved that 
they are traitors through and through’.90
Economic development. One of the most commonplace assertions about the 
Republic relates to the allegedly ruinous state of the Chinese economy. For 
many years the CCP line insisted that China’s economy under the KMT was 
in disarray and only after 1949 did China genuinely industrialize its base. 
A number of Chinese commentators have disputed this. For example, the 
Guangzhou-based newspaper New Express published a full-page feature 
rejecting the version of history contained in some PRC school textbooks 
that the economy was so weak during the Republic that China ‘could not 
even produce matches or nails’. Instead, the article argued that the roots 
of China’s industrialization can be traced back to the late Qing period and 
that during the Republican period many factories were not only produc-
ing matches and nails, but also cars, modern weaponry, gunboats, and 
even airplanes.91 Yuan Weishi, a historian at the Sun Yatsen University in 
Guangzhou, has insisted that China enjoyed rapid economic expansion 
during the Republic, with average industrial growth at 13.8 percent per 
annum in the decade after 1912.92 Xin Lijian agrees with this perspective. 
Describing the Nanjing Decade as a ‘golden decade’, Xin claims that the KMT 
oversaw an ‘economic miracle’ with annual industrial growth rates averag-
ing 9.3 percent from 1931 to 1936. From this Xin concludes that ‘without 
the foundation laid during the Nanjing decade, China could not have won 
victory in the eight year-long war of resistance against Japan. Therefore, it 
was a decade that should not be forgotten’.93
Some Chinese scholars have suggested that the Republican economy was 
actually more successful than the PRC economy in certain areas. Qin Hui 
90 Yan (2011a).
91 Xinkuai Bao (2011). 
92 Yuan (2010).
93 Xin (2009b).
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claims that industrial growth prior to 1937 was certainly no slower than 
industrial growth during the entire Mao era and was signif icantly faster 
than in the twenty years from the Anti-Rightist Campaign to the end of 
the Cultural Revolution (1957-1976). Although the post-Mao reform era has 
seen rapid economic expansion, some commentators have attributed this 
to the undoing of Maoist practices and a resumption of where the economy 
left off in 1949.94 According to Yuan Weishi, ‘what has been achieved in 
the last 30 years has been nothing more than returning to history’. Yan 
Changhai openly commended Jiang Jieshi’s record in modernizing China, 
whilst accusing the CCP of holding China back. It was circulated so widely 
that it attracted the attention of the then Taiwan President Ma Yingjiu. Yan 
argued that ‘Jiang’s defeat was not just his personal failure, but can also be 
seen as a major setback in the modernization of China’.95
A Republican national identity. Another notable aspect of Republican 
fever has been the assertion of a Republican national identity, often as an 
alternative to the PRC’s own national identity. The most daring espousal 
of this was made by a group of mainly young internet users called the 
Union of Chinese Nationalists (UOCN) now banned in the PRC. The group 
identif ied itself with Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles of the People (national-
ism, democracy, and people’s livelihood) and described its supporters as 
‘spiritual members’ of the KMT, claiming to have more than thousands of 
online registered members. The UOCN’s nationalist stance was manifested 
mainly in its opposition to Taiwanese independence which is why the group 
was also known as the China Pan-Blue Alliance and pledged to ‘work with 
the KMT for national reunif ication’. The group organized specif ic events 
that commemorated the KMT’s war effort during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War and publicly exhibited Taiwan and KMT flags in cities such as Wuhan 
and Chongqing.96
In addition to its nationalist activities, the UOCN openly advocated a 
representative form of multi-party democracy and respect for human rights. 
Some members attempted to stand for election to local People’s Congresses 
and participated in the democracy-oriented Rights Defense Movement, 
offering help to protesting workers at the Chongqing Special Steel Group. 
The group also voiced its support for the human-rights protection of the 
Falungong and other persecuted religious and minority groups. However, 
94 Qin (2005).
95 Yan (2011b).
96 Yazhou Zhoukan (2008).
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the CCP shut down the UOCN describing it as an ‘illegal organization’ 
following which it is believed that many of UOCN members were jailed.97
Despite this crackdown on the UOCN, a Republican identity narrative 
continues to be propagated online as popular interest in the Republican 
era has increased and as social networking and micro-blogging websites 
have enabled netizens to express themselves more easily. Supporters of 
the Republic are active on social media sites such as Renren.com (China’s 
equivalent to Facebook) and on the micro-blogging platform Weibo (similar 
to Twitter). They often use Republic and KMT flags as their profile pictures 
and have the KMT emblem as part of their online monikers, all of which is 
in open defiance of off icial Chinese web censors.
Proponents of a Republican national identity frequently assert their views 
on signif icant dates in China’s modern history. The Hong Kong magazine 
Asia Weekly noted how on 1 October 2011, some people posted images of the 
Republic’s flag on the internet and announced that they were boycotting the 
PRC National Day in preference for the Republic’s centennial on 10 October 
2011.98 Taipei’s China Times newspaper reported that ‘Republican fans’ 
in the PRC had celebrated the Republic of China National Day by posting 
the Republic’s f lag on Weibo and disseminating the off icial national day 
address of Ma Yingjiu. An unnamed mainland netizen was quoted in jest 
as saying, ‘when I logged onto Weibo, my computer screen was f illed with 
images of a Blue Sky with a White Sun [the KMT emblem], which almost 
made me think the mainland had been recovered [by Taiwan] overnight!’99
Challenging CCP legitimacy?
Having examined some of the dissenting views on Yuanmingyuan and the 
Republican era, it remains for us to assess the wider signif icance of these 
counter-narratives, particularly for the authority of the CCP. Certainly, it is 
not our contention that the CCP is somehow tottering on the brink of col-
lapse against the backdrop of these dissenting views. It is not even clear that 
the public backlash (if you can call it that) against the CCP forms a majority 
position in China. Although critics of the party are widespread, including 
academics, journalists, and bloggers, there are plenty of pro-CCP voices to 
be heard in the media, online, and in person. Anne-Marie Brady notes the 
97 China News Service (2007).
98 Yazhou Zhoukan (2011).
99 Zhongshi Dianzi Bao (2012).
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success with which the CCP generated a broad base of public support during 
the build-up to the Beijing Olympics as part of what she calls a ‘campaign 
of mass distraction’ away from pressing domestic issues.100 Similarly, Nyiri, 
Zhang and Varrall have illustrated the high level of support that existed 
for China’s Tibet policy amongst overseas Chinese students at around that 
time, as well as anger towards overseas pro-Tibetan demonstrators and the 
pro-Tibetan international media.101
That said, the public discord towards the CCP identif ied in this article 
should not be underestimated. There are at least three reasons for this. 
Firstly, such discord shows no obvious signs of subsiding in light of the 
growing number of people in China with access to the internet, the remote 
likelihood of being caught (particularly those who use barely decipherable 
blogs names) and the sophisticated methods that the netizens are employ-
ing to side-step the efforts of off icial online censors, despite the tighter 
political controls being applied by Xi Jinping following his insistence that 
state-run media outlets ‘are propaganda fronts and must have the party as 
their family name’.102 China’s ‘blogosphere’ comprises hundreds of millions 
of participants and with its increasingly vociferous demands for a more 
assertive China on important issues of national interest, the internet is 
fast becoming what Friedman has described as ‘the de facto voice of the 
people’.103
Secondly, leading on from Friedman’s point, some of those people who 
have doubted the party’s nationalist credentials in the context of Yuan-
mingyuan and the Republican era have also done so on other issues of 
national concern. We noted earlier how some of the Yuanmingyuan critics 
have been critical of the party over the Diaoyu islands fallout with Japan 
and China’s alleged lack of assertion against the US in the South China Sea. 
Similarly, Republican fever activists have also criticized the extent of CCP 
nationalism regarding the Second Sino-Japanese War. Following the party’s 
more positive reassessment of the role played by the KMT in winning this 
war (again as part of a more conciliatory nationalism), public anger has 
been directed toward the CCP on a number of related issues. Some people 
have accused the party of covering up the truth behind the war and for 
mistreating KMT war veterans after 1949. Others have even accused the 
CCP of betraying the Chinese nation by allowing the KMT to over-extend 
100 Brady (2009).
101 Zhang and Varrall (2010).
102 Guardian (2016). 
103 Friedman (2010, p. 25).
hiStoRY aNd legitimaCY iN CoNtemPoRaRY ChiNa 171
itself in f ighting the Japanese with minimal communist assistance and 
ordering communist soldiers to f ire on their nationalist counterparts.104
Thirdly, it should be noted that the CCP is certainly taking the views of 
its detractors seriously, as manifested by the often indignant off icial re-
sponse to the views of these detractors. For example, on the assertion noted 
earlier that the Qing Dynasty was actually to blame for the Yuanmingyuan 
incident, the party-controlled Chinese Social Sciences Today responded by 
dismissing this as ‘a typical manifestation of historical nihilism’ and ‘noth-
ing but a Chinese version of the West’s defense for its looting and burning 
of Yuanmingyuan’.105 Exponents of Republican fever have also met with 
criticism. An editorial in the state-run Global Times attacked exponents of 
Republican fever for, amongst other things, engaging in ‘brazen acts of lying’ 
and ‘an out-and-out historical falsif ication’.106 Similarly, in a 10 October 2014 
article (the anniversary of Taiwan’s National Day), the newspaper derided 
the ‘morbid nostalgia’ for the era, suggesting that a small number of ‘fanatics’ 
are ‘f ixated on beautifying that historical period, claiming that it was a time 
of “democracy, freedom and respect for wisdom”’.107
Taken as a whole, the hostility towards the CCP as identif ied in this 
article represents a real challenge to the CCP’s authority. Ironically, given 
the original objectives of CCP nationalism, such hostility is serving to 
weaken rather than fortify the party’s legitimacy at a time when it needs 
all the support it can get.
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Pilgrimage (hajj) is the f ifth pillar of Islam and the most important 
symbol of unity of the Muslim ‘Community’ (‘Ummah’). When pan-
Islamism and Chinese nationalism met in the early twentieth century, 
it is interesting to see how the Chinese pilgrims, and the Chinese Muslims 
as a whole, understood and responded to the Islamic revivalist call to 
the unity of the Community and the Chinese nationalist voice to build a 
new nation-state. This chapter explores the relationships between these 
two forces by researching original off icial documents, news reports, 
memoirs, and other biographical materials regarding the Hui Muslims’ 
pilgrimage experience. It concludes that Hui Muslim pilgrims’ choice 
is not an either/or question, but a mixture of pan-Islamism and Hui 
patriotism.
Keywords: pilgrimage, Mecca, Hui, Uighur, pan-Islamism, Wahhabi
Introduction
Islam in China has not yet been a well-explored f ield despite some ground-
breaking books and articles that have been published in Chinese, Japanese, 
and various Western languages during the last two decades. The scholars 
in this f ield have usually made their own efforts in an isolated fashion and 
have not integrated into the academic communities of either Islamic studies 
or Chinese studies. This is also true for the studies of the Chinese Muslims’ 
pilgrimage (hajj). In the two most comprehensive historical works on the 
pilgrimage – Peters’ The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy 
Places (1994) and Wolfe’s One Thousand Roads to Mecca: Ten Centuries of 
Travelers Writing about the Muslim Pilgrimage (1997) – there is no mention of 
the Chinese Muslims’ pilgrimage journey. Recently, Tagliacozzo’s ambitious 
book, The Longest Journey: Southeast Asians and the Pilgrimage to Mecca 
(2013), tries to investigate the Southeast Asian Muslims’ pilgrimage in the 
context of global history and elevates the pilgrimage studies to a new level. 
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But the title of his book is a little misleading. The Chinese Muslims’ journey 
to Mecca is even longer than the Southeast Asian Muslims’ ‘longest journey’. 
Certainly, this omission is reasonable since China is usually not included 
in the Muslim world and Islam has never been part of the mainstream of 
Chinese religions despite Muslims having settled in China for more than a 
thousand years and the Muslim population of China being more than two 
million, as much as the whole population of Malaysia. However, it is worth 
exploring how the Chinese Muslims living in the far eastern margin of the 
Muslim world have overcome so many physical, economic, psychological, 
social, and cultural diff iculties because of the pilgrimage before air travel 
became commonplace.
The pilgrimage is the f ifth pillar of Islam and the most important 
symbol of the unity of the Muslim ‘Community’ (‘Ummah’). The pilgrims 
who return to Mecca and observe the mandated rituals at the holy sites 
would have a profound feeling of having gone through a life-transforming 
spiritual experience and belonging to a global community that shares 
the same religious beliefs. My research will focus on the relationship 
between the awakening of the Chinese Muslim identity and the pilgrimage 
in the Republican Era on the basis of a large amount of original off icial 
documents, news reports, memoirs, and other biographical materials, 
as regards to the Chinese pilgrims’ responses to Islamic revivalism and 
Chinese nationalism.
The Chinese Muslim communities in the Republican era (1911-
1949)
After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the founding father of the Republic of 
China, Sun Yatsen, immediately proclaimed that the new country belonged 
equally to the f ive nationalities, including Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (in-
cluding Uighur Muslim), and Tibetan. But according to Sun’s f irst People’s 
Principle, Nationalism, all ethnic nationalities in China should eventually 
be assimilated into a new Chinese nationality. The nationalist government 
followed Sun’s nationalism and tried to implement the assimilation policy 
to the ethnic minorities. In the new historical context of pan-Islamism and 
Chinese nationalism, it is interesting to see how the Chinese pilgrims, and 
the Chinese Muslims as a whole, understood and responded to the Islamic 
revivalist call for the unity of the Community and the Chinese nationalist 
voice to build up a new nation-state.
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Hui 回 is the traditional name for all Muslim peoples in China. Although 
the PRC government has changed it as an ethnic term,1 exclusively for the 
Muslims who have scattered in every province and are more acculturated 
to the Han Chinese societies. In Taiwan and overseas Chinese communities 
Hui still refers to all Muslim peoples in China and even other countries, and 
the ‘Hui religion’ (Huijiao 回教) is another name for Islam. In the Republican 
era, most off icial documents and personal writings roughly made a differ-
ence between the Uighur Muslims, mainly in Xinjiang, and the sinicized 
Muslims in almost every other province. The latter are the descendants of 
Muslim traders, envoys, and soldiers who migrated from the Middle East 
and Central Asia via the ‘Silk Road’ on land and sea, and eventually settled 
in China. They were more inclined to accept a new Chinese nationality 
based on the model of Sun’s nationalist ideal than the Uighur Muslims, for 
geographical, cultural, and historical reasons. Due to the late integration of 
Xinjiang into the Qing imperial political system and the Uighur Muslims’ 
exposure to their Turkish Muslim brothers in the neighboring Central Asian 
region, they kept their Persian-Turkish Islamic tradition intact up to the 
Republican era. Indeed, the majority of the Uighur Muslims could not speak 
Chinese, and far less adopted Han Chinese customs, read Confucian Classics 
or took up any position in the Han-dominant bureaucratic system. But the 
sinicized Muslim elites could master all of these matters, far better than the 
elites of other ethnic minorities. The nationalist government was aware of 
the problem of the Uighur Muslims but had never been able to build up a 
strong political mechanism to integrate them until the communists took 
over mainland China in 1949. The fate of the Uighur Muslims had been at 
the mercy of local warlords in Xinjiang during the Republican era. Therefore, 
their pilgrimage experience was very different from the rest of the Chinese 
Muslims. My research on the Chinese pilgrimage literature only focuses on 
the group of the sinicized (Hui) Muslim elites, although some of their works 
contain important information on Uighur Muslims’ pilgrimage.
Perhaps for most Hui Muslims, Sun’s claim to give equal rights to the f ive 
nationalities was an ideal, not a reality. Under the shadow of the massacre 
of the Hui communities in the northwestern and southwestern regions in 
the late Qing era, they doubted that the Han majority would treat them 
1 The PRC government classif ies all Muslim peoples in China in ten ethnic groups based 
upon the Stalinist ethnology. The Hui is one of them. The other nine Muslim ethnic groups are 
Uighurs, Tartar, Kirgiz, Kazak, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Dongxiang, Salar and Bonan, and all of them, 
besides Hui, are highly concentrated in the northwestern provinces where the Han majority 
has relatively less influence on the ethnic minorities than in the eastern provinces.
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as equals. But some of them might have thought that it would be worth a 
struggle to build up a liberal, democratic, and modern China. None of the 
Hui Muslims looked back at the monarchy system. They welcomed the 
new republican system in which they no longer had to perform ancestral 
rituals, ‘prostrate’(ketou 叩頭) to the emperor and government off icials, 
or follow various sophisticated customs against Islamic tenets. Therefore, 
some Hui Muslim intellectuals joined Sun’s revolutionary party and took 
part in the general effort to reform China. They held the view that Islamic 
modernization should be part of a national effort to modernize China.2 A 
new wave of Islamic revivalist movements combining the ideology of Chi-
nese nationalism were carried out by a new generation of foreign-educated 
Hui Muslim elites in the Republican era.
A group of such new Hui Muslim elites expressed their progressive ideas 
through the new media, such as newspapers, journals, and pamphlets, 
and organized themselves into local, provincial, and national voluntary 
organizations. The new instruments of communication transformed the 
general Chinese public sphere at that time, and also created a new Muslim 
public sphere. By the 1930s, more than a hundred Muslim newspapers and 
periodicals were coming out in almost every province of China.3 One of 
the most influential periodicals was Crescent China (Yue Hua 月華), issued 
every ten days from 1929 until the Japanese invasion of North China in 1937. 
Crescent China’s approach was global and frequently included news about 
worldwide subjects, particularly from the Muslim countries. It also regu-
larly published translated essays on a variety of topics from the Al-Manar 
(The Beacon) journal and other Egyptian Islamic modernist periodicals.4 
Through the introduction of Crescent China and other new presses, the Hui 
Muslim intellectuals were familiar with Muhammad Abduh’s (1849-1905) 
and Rashid Rida’s (1865-1935) ideas of Islamic reform. These new ideas 
motivated some young Muslims to go overseas to study in order to learn 
new knowledge to build up a new China. In the context of this new national-
ism and internationalism, the Chinese Muslim communities cultivated 
their f irst generation of Azhari graduates and modernist ‘religious leaders’ 
(‘imams’), and brought forth a new wave of the pilgrimage movement in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The most well-known leaders with an Azhari diploma 
included Wang Jingzai 王靜齋 (1879-1949), Ma Songting 馬松亭 (1895-1992), 
2 Gelvin and Green (2014, p. 251).
3 Ibid., p. 253.
4 For the brief history of Islamic modernism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, see Hourani (1995, pp. 130-244).
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Pang Shiqing 龐士謙 (1902-1958). During his nine-year stay at Al-Azhar 
University (1937-1946), Pang was requested by his Azhari colleagues to 
write an Arabic book to introduce the Chinese Islamic tradition, which 
came out in 1945, entitled China and Islam. The publication of this book was 
the f irst time that the Arabic-speaking Muslim world received f irst-hand 
knowledge of Chinese Islam from a Chinese Muslim scholar.5 The founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), wrote the preface 
for the f irst Arabic edition of Pang’s China and Islam. In his memoir, Pang 
mentioned that the Muslim Brothers asked for his help to build up the 
Chinese branch of their organization. Pang told them that China already 
had similar Islamic reform organizations, but he was willing to cooperate 
more in Egyptian and Chinese Muslim reformist movements in the future.6 
Pang’s polite objection to Hassan al-Banna’s suggestion was a sign of the 
limitation of the Hui Muslims’ to take part in the transnational Islamic 
revivalism in the Republican era.
The f irst generation of Azhari graduates initiated the earliest formal 
contacts between China and Egypt in sharing the strong sense of comrade-
ship under the same yoke of Western colonialism. In this context, King 
Fù ad (1868-1936) donated money to build up an Islamic library in Beijing 
and f inanced the travel and lodging of Chinese students in Cairo through 
the aforementioned leader Ma Songting’s request.7 From then onward, 
the nationalist government saw the political value of Hui Muslims as a 
bridge between China and the Muslim world and developed diplomatic 
relations with Muslim countries through the Hui Muslim elites. Although 
the Republic of China government in Taiwan lost all off icial diplomatic 
relations with the Middle Eastern countries after the 1990s, the Hui Muslims 
in Taiwan have still been the most important agents for the ROC in Taiwan 
by maintaining some unoff icial relations with the Muslim world by way of 
the pilgrimage, studying at Muslim universities, and by doing halal business, 
and so on.
In the Republican era, the Hui Muslim intellectuals saw the connections 
with the Middle East as a renewal of traditional Chinese Islam’s ties with 
the Muslim world and a return to their Islamic origin. In this regard, the 
Hui Muslims were like their Arab Muslim brothers in the early twentieth 
century, believing that the modernization of Islam meant a return to its 
5 http://www.islam.org.hk/e15/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=32&id=6710, accessed 15 April 
2016.
6 Pang (2005, pp. 373-374).
7 Ibid., p. 370.
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original form, the true and pure Islam in the Prophet Muhammad’s time. 
Therefore, the identity of Chinese nationalism was not contradictory to 
the global unity of the Islamic Community at all; these two identities 
complemented and reinforced each other. The convergence of religious and 
political identities was especially embodied in the Hui pilgrims’ experience.
Hui pilgrims’ road to Mecca
Before the mid-nineteenth century, few people in the far eastern part of 
the Muslim world were able to make their way to Mecca for the pilgrimage, 
especially the Chinese Muslims, who had lived far from the center of the 
Muslim world and had to dedicate a year or more to the pilgrimage journey 
via the diff icult ‘Silk Road’ on land or by sea, which was a risky trip that did 
not guarantee a safe return.
The ‘Silk Road’ consisted of several routes. As it extended westwards from 
the ancient commercial centers of China, the ‘Silk Road’ on land was divided 
into the northern and southern routes.8 The ‘Silk Road’ oversea began from 
the port cities of South China, mainly Guangzhou and Quanzhou, through 
Champa, Java, Palembang or Malacca, Ceylon, Calicut, the Persian Gulf or 
the coast of Yemen.9 The f irst Hui pilgrim writing about his journey to 
Mecca was Ma Huan 馬歡 (1380-1460), who joined Zheng He’s great seven 
voyages (1405-1433) as scribe and translator, taking this route to Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, Western Asia, and East Africa. On the last voyage (1431-
1433), Zheng He’s fleets started their journey from Fujian, through Champa, 
Bengal, Laccadive and Maldives Islands, Aden, to the East African coast. 
During his return journey to China, Zheng He died off the Malabar Coast 
near Calicut. He had apparently never found time for the pilgrimage but 
did send Ma Huan and a group of Muslim sailors to Mecca. Ma Huan’s 
work, the General Survey of the Ocean Shores (Yín Ya Sheng Lan 瀛涯勝覽) 
composed in 1416, gave a brief account of his observations of people’s lives 
and customs in Mecca and most of the ports they visited. He called Mecca 
‘the Country of the House of Heaven’ (Tianfang Guo 天方國), an off icial 
name for Mecca and Arabia in imperial China. Ma admired the Muslims 
in Mecca who followed the Islamic law in a strict way, but did not provide 
much detail regarding their lifestyle and customs. His narrative focused 
on the splendid Masjid al-Ḥaram, the Grand Mosque of Mecca, but did not 
8 Ladjal, et al. (2013).
9 Ibid.
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describe the rituals performed by the pilgrims. Ma’s writing style is similar 
to that of the local gazetteers written by imperial off icials, and his feelings 
and personal comments about the holy city don’t show up in his narrative.10
After the Western colonial powers reopened the door to China after the 
Opium War (1840-1842) and used f irearms and steamships to control the 
sea routes, it was easier for the Chinese Muslims to perform the pilgrim-
age. Many researches have already related the f irst global wave of Islamic 
revival to the pilgrimage at the time of Western imperialism from the mid-
nineteenth to early twentieth century, but few of them are concerned with 
the impact of the renewed possibilities for the Chinese Muslim communities 
to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Indeed, the second earliest eyewitness 
narrative by a Hui pilgrim came out in the new context of Western colonial-
ism, in which the pilgrims from all over the Muslim world no longer took 
the traditional route along the ‘Silk Road’ to Mecca.
The Yunnanese Hui leader Ma Dexin (1794-1874) wrote his Record of 
pilgrimage (Chao Jin Tu Ji 朝覲途記) following his return to China in 1848. 
Ma’s journey began in 1841, which signified the beginning of a new era in the 
Chinese Muslim pilgrimage history. Unable to sail from Guangzhou during 
the Opium War, Ma followed an overland path through Burma and boarded 
a ship in Rangoon, sailing directly to Arabia. Ma Dexin’s narrative on the 
holy city, like Ma Huan’s, merely focused on the Grand Mosque without any 
description of the pilgrimage rituals or the Meccans’ customs.11
After performing the pilgrimage, Ma spent eight years studying at Al-
Azhar University. He was the f irst Hui leader to study in the Muslim world 
and initiated a new learning model for the new Hui ‘scholars’ (ulama) in 
the Republican era by combining the pilgrimage with studying at Al-Azhar. 
Regrettably, Ma mentioned nothing about what he had seen and learned 
at Al-Azhar, which Pang did a century later. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, regular steamships sailing from the East Asian ports to the Middle 
East and Europe completely reorganized the economy of the pilgrimage.12
In the 1920s, Shanghai became the main departure port for the Chinese 
pilgrims to go to Mecca via the sea route through the South China Sea and 
the Indian Ocean which was then under British control. This journey to 
Mecca had been standardized in the most eff icient and fast way.13 The 
Uighur pilgrims took a different route due to the long distance between 
10 Ma Huan (2005, pp. 99-104). 
11 Ma Dexin (2008, pp. 207-211). 
12 Mols and Buitelaar (2014, p. 121).
13 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
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Xinjiang and Shanghai. They kept taking the traditional ‘Silk Road’ on 
land for the f irst half of the pilgrimage, during which their Turkish Muslim 
brothers in Central Asia could help them to overcome their physical and 
psychological hardships, until they arrived in Bombay or Karachi to take 
a steamship for the rest of their journey to Mecca.
From 1930 onward, the Chinese Muslim pilgrims from almost every prov-
ince besides Xinjiang did business with a British company, the Blue Chimney 
Co., to arrange the steamship to Mecca but only after time-consuming 
negotiations with a travel agency in Shanghai. The Blue Chimney Co.’s 
monopoly of the Chinese pilgrimage journey continued until 1940, cut short 
by the Second World War.14 The Chinese pilgrims departed from Shanghai, 
traveled through Hong Kong, Singapore, Colombo, Bombay, disembarked in 
Jeddah, and then rode to Mecca on camels. It only took about four or f ive 
weeks to make the one-way trip from Shanghai to Mecca. Besides applying 
for a passport from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC government, 
getting a visa from the British embassy, exchanging foreign currency at 
the bank, and buying the ticket through the travel agency, every pilgrim 
had to be vaccinated against epidemic diseases at the quarantine station 
of Shanghai. According to Tagliacozzo the ‘aggressive European powers 
sought to manage the pilgrimage on the grounds of global epidemiological 
survival’.15
Blue Chimney Co. provided halal food for the Chinese pilgrim during 
their voyage, but they were often offended by the other travelers’ customs 
and behavior, for example the Europeans’ strange dress and – in their eyes – 
licentious interaction between men and women. At every port on the route 
to Mecca, the Chinese pilgrims witnessed their Muslim brothers, including 
Malay, Indian, and Arab, ‘enslaved’ by the British colonial power and in their 
hearts a sense of sympathy arose, humiliation and responsibility towards 
the Muslim unity.16 The Chinese pilgrims’ life-transforming experience 
was very similar to that of the pilgrims in the rest of the Muslim world. 
This journey reinforced their solidarity with other Muslim peoples and 
generated revivalist movements in their home countries. This was not much 
different in the Chinese Muslim case in spite of their status as a minority 
in their homeland.
14 My reconstruction of the standard procedure of the pilgrimage in the 1930s departing from 
Shanghai is based on the following original sources: eight Hui-run journals, including Crescent 
China, and two Shanghai-based journals, Hai Shi (海事) and the most popular and influential 
newspapers in the Republican era, Shun Pao (申報).
15 Tagliacozzo (2013, p. 134).
16 Zhao (2008, pp. 29-43, 48-59); Tang (2008, pp. 61-68, 73-108, 239-243).
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The pilgrimage experience and the reconstruction of Hui Muslim 
identity
The shift in the model of performing the pilgrimage from the pre-colonial 
to colonial era had a great impact on both the material and spiritual 
aspects of the Muslim world as Tagliacozzo shows. The rise of the Euro-
pean colonial states and technological progress enabled more pilgrims 
to perform the pilgrimage. Therefore, paradoxically, the Pan-Islamic 
consciousness was awakened in more Muslims doing the pilgrimage in 
the easy, economical, and eff icient way under the domination of West-
ern colonialism. Tagliacozzo demonstrates this paradoxical fact by his 
comprehensive study on the Southeast Asian case, especially in regard to 
epidemiological, f inancial, and geopolitical aspects. He explains how the 
pilgrimage grew in importance among Malays and how Southeast Asia 
was brought into the religious and intellectual worlds of Arabia and the 
surrounding Muslim countries. The Southeast Asian situation has some 
parallels with the Chinese case.
In the 1930s, the Hui pilgrims witnessed the historical turning point of 
Arabia and the neighboring Arab countries. After the collapse of the Otto-
man Empire following the World War I, France and Britain partitioned the 
Arab territory of the Ottoman Empire into the f ive new political entities of 
Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Furthermore, the British 
continued their policy of ‘divide and rule’ in the Arabian Peninsula and 
pitted the two most powerful Arab leaders, Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca 
and Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sà ud of Najd, against each other. But the latter, as the 
inheritor of the Wahhabi ideology and less reliant on the Western powers 
than Sharif Husayn, gathered an indigenous force of resurgent Wahhabi 
tribesmen from the Najd. Ibn Sà ud leading his enthusiastic Ikhwan (the 
brotherhood order) wanted to restore Islam among the Bedouin people, 
and to break their allegiance to local chiefs and shaykhs (elders). Their 
inf luence had penetrated into the Hijaz surrounding Mecca, so Sharif 
Husayn was gradually isolated within the holy city. The British support 
merely made him more unpopular among his Arab subjects. In September 
1924, three thousand Wahhabi warriors invaded Tà if and forced Husayn 
to abdicate his Sharifate and leave Mecca. The century-long cold war 
between the Sharifs and the Saudis was about to be decisively concluded, 
and Ibn Sà ud’s army peacefully entered Mecca. The following year Ibn 
Sà ud was crowned the King of the Hijaz and reunif ied Arabia under the 
banner of Islam. With the abdication of Sharif Husayn and the collapse of 
the Ottoman caliphate, the Muslim peoples were left without a symbolic 
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head for the f irst time in history. The Middle East was ready for the new 
tide of Arab nationalism.17
In November 1926, Ibn Sà ud issued a decree setting out the f irst com-
prehensive pilgrimage regulations, granting his regime the right to license 
and oversee all pilgrim guilds. Fixed rates for the pilgrimage services were 
published and distributed among the Muslim countries. Meanwhile, 
Europeans could not but accept Ibn Sà ud’s sovereignty in the holy city 
in exchange for maintaining their prof itable business of furnishing the 
pilgrims’ material needs.18
The dramatic political change of Mecca and the early stage of Arab 
nationalism were witnessed by the Hui pilgrims in the 1930s. The two most 
detailed memoirs in this critical period were written by two Hui pilgrims 
from Beijing: Zhao Zhen wu’s Diary of the Westward Journey (Xi Xing Ri Ji 
西行日記) and Tang Yichen’s 唐易塵 Record of the Pilgrimage to Mecca (Mai 
Jia Xun Li Ji 麥加巡禮記). These two memoirs describe their interesting 
pilgrimage experiences right after Ibn Sà udi issued the Wahhabi order of 
Mecca, following the strict rules of Shari`ah.
Zhao Zhenwu 趙振武 (1895-1937), a Hui scholar from Beijing, who was 
educated in both traditional religious school and modern secular university, 
contributed the last half of his life to build up a modern Islamic education 
in China. Zhao performed the pilgrimage in the company of Ma Songting’s 
educational mission group to Al-Azhar in 1933 when he was the editor-in-
chief of Crescent China. Zhao, Ma, and their Beijing Hui colleagues, made 
Crescent China the major voice of Islamic modernism in China. Zhao and 
Ma went to Mecca after they had f inished their mission at Al-Azhar and a 
tour around Jerusalem.
Perhaps Zhao was not very impressed by Ibn Sà ud’s rule of Mecca due 
to Zhao’s modernist view on Islam, so his narrative about the pilgrimage 
and the holy city was very brief in comparison to those of Al-Azhar and 
the old city of Jerusalem, yet King Sà ud did have a meeting with him and 
the Hui pilgrim group. Zhao arrived in Jerusalem two years after the f irst 
General Islamic Congress in 1931 and three years before the Palestinian 
Arab revolt in 1936. He was well informed about the escalating conflict 
between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Zionists. Zhao and other Hui pilgrims 
stayed at the Naqshbandiyyah Sufi order of the Indian Muslims in Jerusalem 
and had a chance to visit the Palestinian Muslim Leader and Grand Judge 
17 For the political change of Mecca in the 1920s, see Peters (1994, pp. 331-354); Wolfe (1997, 
pp. 323-326); for its context of Arab nationalism, see Hourani (1995, pp. 294-305).
18 Peters (1994, pp. 358-362); Wolfe (1997, p. 326). 
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(‘Mufti’) of Jerusalem, Mohammed Amin al-Husseini (1897-1974). Zhao 
mentioned that there were merely twenty thousand Muslims living in the 
old city of Jerusalem compared to seventy-f ive thousand Jews. He was very 
sympathetic to the miserable situation of the Palestinian Muslims and 
asserted that the large wave of Jewish immigration was a conspiracy of 
British imperialism to ruin the Muslim world.19 This was a common view 
held among the Palestinian people during the British mandate (1922-1947).20
In contrast to Zhao’s detailed narratives of Al-Azhar and Jerusalem, his 
narrative of Mecca was brief and not very exciting. The Meccan Arabs were 
portrayed as under-developed and less educated. He was offended by the 
high off icial of the Sà udi government, assigned by King Sà ud to receive the 
Hui pilgrims, and made harsh comments on the Wahhabi Islam:
We had a long talk with him, and realized his personality and the nature 
of Wahhabism very well. He thought that to be a good Muslim, one should 
only recite the Witness creed (‘Shahadah’). This is absolutely not enough! 
Although I should not regard him as disbeliever (‘kafeier’, ‘kafir’), he does 
not understand that true Islam includes observing the f ive pillars, pursu-
ing the good, prohibiting the evil, faithfulness, f ilial piety, benevolence, 
and kindness. All of them are Islamic pillars. If without these pillars, 
how will the religious house be built? Every stranger could be caught 
and commanded to recite the Witness creed. The key difference between 
Muslim and non-Muslim is always upon whether one can practice those 
pillars or not.21
Zhao concluded his memoir by emphasizing the importance of education 
for the revival of an Islamic civilization.22 Obviously, Zhao’s pilgrimage 
experience shows that the pilgrim’s spiritual union with the Community 
does not necessarily result in political solidarity with his Muslim brothers 
and sisters. Zhao’s political identity belonged to his motherland, and his 
nationalist imagination was about a modern Hui community and a new 
China through the modernist educational reform. This was the Azhari way 
of Islamic revivalism, not the Wahhabi one.
Tang Yichen’s memoir is probably the most interesting pilgrim writ-
ing of the Republican era, although his pilgrimage might be the most 
19 Zhao (2008, pp. 203-231). 
20 Hourani (1995, pp. 289-298).
21 Zhao (2008, p. 264). 
22 Ibid., pp. 328-346.
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controversial one. Tang, a Japanese-educated Hui intellectual also from 
Beijing but without the credentials of religious scholars like Zhao and Ma, 
performed his pilgrimage in 1938 during the Japanese occupation of North 
China (1937-1945). In spite of being educated at a secular university and not 
being a religious scholar, Tang expressed his religious passion and political 
stance in his memoir in a very straightforward way. He was inspired by 
reading Zhao’s memoir and enthusiastic about fulf illing his pilgrimage 
duty. During the diff icult time of the Sino-Japanese war, Tang applied for 
permission from the Japanese colonial authority. As a key member of the 
Japanese-backed Muslim association of North China, he easily obtained the 
permission to leave for Mecca. But this gift sent by the Japanese enemy gave 
him the dishonorable name of Hui traitor (Huijian) forever. As soon as Tang 
and his four fellow pilgrims were ready to depart from Beijing to Shanghai, 
the news (or more precisely, the rumor) of Tang’s pilgrim group ordered by 
the Japanese authority to go on a ‘diplomatic’ pilgrimage to the Muslim 
world reached to the nationalist government in Chungking, Sichuan. The 
nationalist government immediately ordered the Hui scholars and students 
in Al-Azhar to organize a pilgrim group to monitor Tang’s activities in Mecca 
and make anti-Japanese propaganda among the other pilgrims from all 
over the Muslim world. Tang knew this horrible situation and was afraid of 
talking to any Chinese stranger during his anxious journey to Mecca. His 
sadness and depression became heavier at seeing the British flags at every 
port on the route to Arabia, from Hong Kong, through Singapore, Colombo, 
to Bombay. His depression was not relieved until he arrived in Jeddah and 
saw the Sà udi f lag. He was very excited to get to know the holy land ruled 
by an indigenous Muslim regime and admired the Sà udi rule as an ‘Arabic 
Monroeism’, a good model to be followed by other Muslim peoples.23
But Tang’s admiration for the Sà udi Kingdom was only for her independ-
ence, not for her Wahhabi ideology. After arriving in Mecca, Tang had an 
off icial meeting with King Sà ud. Once he met the pilgrim group sent by 
the nationalist government, Tang tried very hard to explain to them that 
his pilgrimage trip was not ordered by the Japanese authority and had 
nothing to do with politics.24 In the spiritual atmosphere of the holy city, 
their political differences were soon overcome through their spiritual union 
with the faithful Community. Tang and the Hui Azhari students, led by the 
respected Pang Shiqing, made an agreement and shook hands to totally 
dissolve their distrust. Obviously, Pang did not doubt Tang’s explanation 
23 Tang (2008, pp. 111-126).
24 Ibid., pp. 126-134, 175-176.
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and they shared their sense of the Muslim unity and anti-imperialism. They 
also agreed that both Hui and Uighur Muslims had to work together to 
build up a new China.25 Tang could not speak Arabic, so an Azhari student 
translated and read his public letter to King Sà ud in Arabic when they met 
with the King.26
Tang’s narrative of the pilgrimage rituals was more detailed and expressed 
more religious passion than Zhao’s. His words demonstrated a great sense of 
belonging to the faithful Community and the bliss of the spiritual journey. 
Nevertheless, like Zhao’s modernist viewpoint, he was very uncomfortable 
with the extreme measures to regulate the pilgrimage by King Sà ud and 
the Arabs’ ‘uncivilized’ condition. Tang frankly ridiculed the Arabs’ ‘low 
intelligence’ and the Africans’ ‘poor religious performance.’27 His comments 
on his fellow Muslims were not at all moderated by his sympathy for their 
‘enslaved’ condition under British imperialism.
In Tang’s mind, there were three approaches to Islamic reform in the 
Muslim world: Turkish secularism, Sà udi Wahhabism, and Egyptian Islamic 
modernism. He strongly condemned Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s secularist 
policy and labeled the founding father of modern Turkey as ‘the destructor 
of the Muslim world’, claiming that he had ‘no sense of conscience’, and 
that he was ‘the devil bringing disorder on earth’.28 The Wahhabi approach 
of the Sa`udi Kingdom was also disappointing from Tang’s modernist 
standpoint. The luxurious life of the royal family was in sharp contrast 
to the poverty of the Arab tribesmen. Furthermore, Tang saw that the 
British hegemonic power still overshadowed the Arabian Peninsula and 
that the Saudi Kingdom was not really independent of the Pax Britannica 
dominion.29 Therefore, the Egyptian modernist approach was Tang’s only 
hope for Islamic revival and the Muslim national liberation.
In the concluding section of his memoir, Tang constructed a peculiar 
conspiracy theory to justify his political stance of anti-Western imperialism:
In recent years, many Hui people have proclaimed, ‘We have to struggle 
for religion, not for the state.’ They want to keep away from politics (…) 
In fact, this is the omen of the extinction of Islam (…) Due to their mis-
understanding, they think a good Muslim should only seek the spiritual 
25 Ibid.; Pang (2005, pp. 396-397). 
26 Tang, (2008, pp. 167-170).
27 Ibid., pp. 89-108, 172-174.
28 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
29 Ibid., pp. 239-243.
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path and not be involved in secular matters. Thus our great statesmen also 
talk about the necessity of the separation between religion and politics 
(…) Englishmen realize the apolitical mentality of the Muslim peoples 
and try to abuse it. They do their best to satisfy Muslims’ religious needs 
and take away Muslims’ political power. But most Muslims are ignorant 
and mistakenly regard Englishmen as their good friends. They do not 
know the heartless Englishmen have already sucked their blood dry but 
still keep a smile on their faces. Their maliciousness cannot be exceeded 
by other peoples.30
Tang took Palestine as the proof of his conspiracy theory and asserted 
the British imperialists had been behind the Palestinian-Jewish conflicts. 
Moreover, he also claimed the interracial marriage between Indian men and 
British women was another British conspiracy to exterminate the Indian 
national liberation movement. Tang raised the question: If the young genera-
tion of Indians born in such an interracial family have British mothers, 
how can they f ight against their mothers’ home country? He concluded 
Britain was the most malicious country on earth.31 Tang’s racist words, 
anti-secularist ideology, and Third-Worldism have been common themes 
among contemporary religious extremists or right-wing circles. Seemingly, 
many post-colonial peoples have not yet recovered from their colonial 
trauma.
Indeed, Tang’s memoir was deemed a negative textbook of a Hui traitor 
by both the nationalist and Communist historians due to his taking part 
in the Japanese-backed Muslim association of North China. But Tang was 
still a Chinese nationalist when he considered the British imperialists more 
evil than the Japanese enemies. The label of Hui traitor might have been 
unfair to Tang and those Hui people who merely wanted to ‘struggle for 
religion, not for the state’ while their home country was occupied. Tang 
did not mention how he viewed the Japanese occupation of North China. 
His memoir was published in 1943 when the Japanese army still occupied 
North China. It would have been better for him not to say anything negative 
about the Japanese authority. Tang’s case reveals a little-known aspect of 
Hui nationalism, different from the two off icial versions of the nationalist 
and Communist regimes. We need more historical materials, in addition to 
the pilgrimage literature, to illuminate the complex Hui nationalist politics 
in the Republic era.
30 Ibid., pp. 244-245.
31 Ibid., p. 245.
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Conclusion
Both China and the Arab world encountered historical turning points in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Although these two Asian peoples reconstructed their 
national identities under the enormous challenge of Western colonialism 
and moved into the new historical phase of post-colonialism, they fol-
lowed a dramatically different trajectory of nation-building. The Sà udi 
Wahhabism is a certain kind of religious nationalism which resulted in 
the theocratic nation-state, Saudi Arabia. This model has inspired many 
Islamic revival movements up to now. No matter which approach an Islamic 
movement takes, either moderate or extreme, secular-oriented nationalism 
has been an unpopular alternative, and religion is usually mixed with 
politics in the Arab countries. The Chinese nationalists chose the opposite 
way. The Hui people have been caught up between these two different 
worldviews and ideologies. However, for the Hui Muslim pilgrims in the 
historical context of Republican China, their choice would not simply be 
the choice between pan-Islamism and Hui patriotism, but a mixture of 
the two. Which approach a certain group of Hui intellectuals has taken 
depends on the context of this group’s local, national, and global problems. 
Although for the Hui intellectuals in the Republican era, the pilgrimage 
to their spiritual homeland provided a new chance and an alternative to 
create a religious nationalism going beyond the boundaries of ethnicity and 
nationality and overcoming the dichotomy of the material and the spiritual, 
such a religious nationalism did not appear due to the minority status of 
the Hui Muslims and the political and ideological limitations of Chinese 
nationalism. Chinese nationalism has been the Han-dominant ideology for 
the last hundred years, and mostly geared to the Western model of secular 
nationalism at the expense of religious traditions. The Hui Muslims cannot 
but accommodate themselves with such a dominant ideology and discourse 
under the Han Chinese political and cultural hegemony. Their religious 
freedom could be fully respected by the public authority but limited in 
their own social spaces. Religious nationalism, in the sense of building 
an independent Hui Muslim state, would never have been a legitimate 
alternative under either the democratic or socialist regime; both of them 
are secularist.
Nevertheless, the pilgrimage is a good way to see the dialectical 
relationship between religious practice and Muslim nationalism, and 
also between global and local Islamic politics. In the Hui Muslim case, 
these two sides have positively reinforced each other, although their 
transnational identity has not yet gone beyond the delimitation of the 
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nation-state. Therefore, the spiritual unity of the Community cannot be 
materialized in a secular world. At least, the spiritual identity of the Hui 
people is still in harmony with the national identity of their motherland, 
and the sacred/secular conflict has not yet occurred there. To some extent, 
the Hui experience is unique in comparison with the contemporary situ-
ation of the Muslim minorities in the European and American countries. 
In the early 21st century, Global Islamism is seemingly antithetical to 
the national identity of these countries. I think this difference is quite 
understandable considering the geographical and historical conditions 
of the Hui people.
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Religion and Nationalism in Contemporary China

7 Religion and the Nation
Confucian and New Confucian Religious Nationalism
Bart Dessein
Abstract
For Confucian rulers, maintenance of the unif ied empire they had 
inherited from the Qin in 206 BCE was not only seen as a political task, 
but also had religious ramif ications. Confucian state ritual determined 
the position of other philosophies and religions in Chinese society, and 
was given a political interpretation.
This contribution shows how the republican zeal to reestablish a unif ied 
nation after the collapse of the Qing Empire was – in its radical decline 
of Confucianism – fundamentally religious, and how also Maoism was 
shaped within the traditional politico-religious paradigm. This contribu-
tion also argues that, in its dynamic relation with a growing religious 
adherence, contemporary CCP-supported New Confucianism has become 
a religious component of the CCP nation-state.
Keywords: Confucianism, New Confucianism, imperial China, Republi-
can China, People’s Republic of China
Origins of Chinese politico-religious self-identity1
China’s so-called ‘period of regional development’ (1700-771 BCE) is char-
acterized by a series of developments that would determine the country’s 
further history:2 (1) bronze started to be used in the production of agricul-
tural tools, which made it possible to both increase the area of agricultural 
land that could be tilled and the eff iciency with which this could be done;3 
(2) society became hierarchically organized with the formation of different 
communities (Weber’s ‘Gemeinschaften’) within the layer of popular culture; 
1 The following paragraphs summarize some of the elements I addressed in previous publica-
tions. See Dessein (2011; 2012; 2014).
2 This term was coined by Stover (1974, pp. 42ff).
3 The Chinese most likely learned the casting of bronze from the northern Eurasian mobile 
pastoralists around 1700 BCE. See Fitzgerald-Huber (1995, p. 67).
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and (3) political power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
a proto-bureaucratic elite that formed a separate social and ideological 
community (‘Gemeinschaft ’).4 An increased agricultural output may have 
made it possible to feed a larger number of people, this growing population, 
in its turn, necessitated a continuous expansion of the agricultural land. 
As directly available farmland was limited to the central plain (zhongyuan 
中原) of the Yellow River (Huanghe 黃河) and its tributaries, the point 
necessarily came where expansion of the farmland of one of the many 
different feudal domains that constituted ‘China’ at that time, was only 
possible to the detriment of the neighboring domains. The economic and 
political crisis that thus ensued gave rise to the formulation of different 
‘philosophies’ in the subsequent periods of ‘Spring-and-Autumn’ (Chun-
qiu’ 春秋, 722-481) and ‘Warring States’ (Zhanguo 戰國, 481-221). These 
‘philosophies’ are basically analyses of and suggestions for solving the 
crisis. This period that is also known as the period of the ‘One Hundred 
Philosophical Schools’ in Chinese intellectual history, has therefore been of 
major importance for Chinese state building, and for the establishment of 
the peculiar and intricate relationship between ‘philosophy’ and ‘politics’ 
in Chinese culture.5 The existence of a so-called Jixia Academy ( jixia 
xuegong 稷下學宮), an assembly of political advisors founded in ca 360 
BCE by Duke Huan, ruler of the feudal ‘state’ Qi 齊, points to it that this 
period of Chinese history was, indeed, characterized by politically inspired 
intellectual debate.6 The ‘philosophies’ that were formulated in this period 
are strikingly similar in their aim to reinstall an imagined ‘golden era’. 
Chinese ‘philosophies’ are hence not only oriented towards the Diesseits, 
but they are also fundamentally oriented towards the past.7
The magnitude of the unif ication of all the different feudal states under 
one central leadership in 221 BCE by the ruler of the Qin state was such 
that he no longer referred to himself as ‘king’ (wang 王) – the name that 
had been used to refer to central authority in the previous period – but as 
Qin shi huangdi 秦始皇帝: the f irst ‘august emperor’ of Qin.8 The f irst 
4 See Weber (1978, pp. 40-41).
5 See in this respect Dessein (2001).
6 Lloyd and Sivin (2000, pp. 30-35), remark that this Jixia Academy is not a meeting place 
for intellectuals, comparable to a contemporary research center. For the interpretation of the 
Jixia Academy as a center of learning: see Makeham (1994). See also Sivin (1995, chapter 40); Lee 
(2000, pp. 44-46).
7 Bauer (2006, p. 37). This also explains why, in China, it was not the authority of demonstration 
that determined the validity of a saying, but its philosophical origin.
8 See Bodde (1986, p. 53).
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‘august emperor’ also manifested the major break with the past he had 
achieved in his choice to govern his country through applying the Legalist 
doctrine, the only political doctrine that did not take a eulogized historical 
period as example. This choice was undoubtedly also given in through the 
Legalist doctrine’s focus on law and punishment as policy guidelines, a 
characteristic that added to the practical usefulness of this doctrine to also 
effectively unify the country.9
The fall of the Qin Dynasty after having ruled for only f ifteen years was 
the chance for the former feudal lords, who had been deprived of their 
privileges by the f irst emperor, to return to the political scene. Now that 
the short-lived Qin Dynasty had proven the unsuitability of Legalism as 
guideline for practical politics, this gave room for other philosophies to come 
to the forefront in the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). Many hypotheses 
have been formulated as to why it has been Confucianism – in its ‘New 
Text School’ interpretation – that could establish itself as the new political 
doctrine. One of the elements that may have been conducive to this effect 
may be that the founders of the Han Dynasty who were of non-noble descent 
saw in the Confucian focus on the concept of ‘governing through humane-
ness’ (ren 仁) – as opposed to governing through hereditary right – an 
excellent instrument to legitimate their rule.
The transition from the Qin to the Han has been of a threefold political 
importance. Firstly, with the return to power of the former feudal lords, the 
hierarchical social structures that had existed in pre-imperial times were 
reinstalled. Secondly, after its promulgation as only orthodoxy in 136 BCE, 
Confucianism was crafted into these inherited hierarchical structures and 
a Confucian bureaucracy was installed to administer the Chinese ‘body 
politic’.10 In order to uphold the Confucian political, moral, and divine order, 
functionaries were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the Confucian 
9 See Bauer (2006, p. 37). Katz (2009, p. 43), remarks that in the Qin-Han era, ‘written legal 
texts began to be used in place of oaths in order to command assent and obedience’, and that 
this era further witnesses an increasing prevalence of state-sanctioned violence.
10 Schwartz (1985, p. 377) calls Emperor Han Wudi the ‘Constantine of Confucianism’, who 
followed the momentous advice of the New Text School ideologue Dong Zhongshu (ca 179- ca 104 
BCE) and others to establish the ‘f ive classics’ of Confucianism as the foundation of all off icial 
education and to proscribe all ‘unorthodox’ doctrines. Dull (1994, p. 3) remarks that the reign 
of Emperor Wu (140-87 BCE) of the Han Dynasty is the period in which Confucianism for the 
f irst time was recognized as the ‘ism’, ‘to the exclusion of all others, that was to be acceptable 
to the state and was to become the object of study for those who hoped for an off icial career’. 
See also Schmidt-Glintzer (1999, p. 18).
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‘canon’ of examination materials.11 A third consequence was that China’s 
typical economic landscape of hydraulic cultivation of small plots of land – 
an ecotype that was fundamentally different from the economic landscape 
of the surrounding regions, combined with its unique political structure, 
fundamentally shaped Chinese ‘self-identity’.12
That the Confucian literati saw themselves as the ‘natural’ inheritors of a 
‘national’ and ‘divine’ historical lineage is evident from the ‘Prefaces’ to the 
Maoshi 毛詩 version of the Songs (Shijing 詩經). While the songs that are 
included in the Shijing themselves go back to the tenth to sixth centuries 
BCE and depict the Chinese people as born through divine intervention,13 
and as ensuring themselves of continued divine support through ritual 
offerings, the extant ‘Prefaces’ to the songs are most likely written around 
the beginning of the Common Era and present the ‘history of China’ as one 
single development from the eleventh century BCE up to 599 BCE. This 
presentation importantly implies that the secular realm, which is referred 
to as ‘All-under-Heaven’ (tianxia 天下), is connected to the spiritual realm.14
The connection between the secular and the spiritual realm is also 
evident in the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 
fanlu), the major work of the Han-Dynasty Confucian scholar and ideologue 
Dong Zhongshu 董仲書 (ca 179-ca 104 BCE). Through developing analogies 
between heaven – the collective of deceased ancestors, earth, and man, this 
work that is conceived as a commentary on the Confucian Classic Chunqiu 
(Spring and Autumn Annals), presents ‘All-under-Heaven’ as a holistic ‘or-
ganism’ in which every part is interrelated with every other part.15 It is the 
task of Confucian rule to preserve harmony (hexie 和諧) – that is, to uphold 
the existing social order – in this organism. As Dong Zhongshu explains:
When the ancients invented writing, they drew three [horizontal] lines 
which they connected through the centre [by a vertical stroke], and then 
11 See Bauer (2006, p. 119); van Ess (2003, p. 42). Seiwert (1994, p. 532) remarks that ‘In knappster 
Form: Orthodoxie war die Voraussetzung für den Zugang zur Elitenkultur und damit die Voraus-
setzung für die Teilhabe an der institutionellen Macht, für Prestige und legalen Reichtum’.
12 See Wolf (1966, pp. 25-30).
13 Schwartz (1985, p. 30) remarks that the God (di 帝) to which the f irst stanza of the ode Sheng 
min refers is ‘the nonhuman high god who engendered the dynasty’.
14 Yu (2005, p. 34) remarks that the politico-religious narrative of Confucianism, in fact, builds 
on the system that was developed already in the Shang Dynasty (traditionally 1766-1122 BCE), 
when ancestors were transformed from kin to symbols of divine power.
15 Schwartz (1985, p. 364) has characterized this ‘cosmological Confucianism’ as a kind of 
‘phenomenalist philosophy’. ‘Phenomenalism’ is hereby understood as a belief that governmental 
and social irregularities can lead to vast dislocations in nature.
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called this wang (ruler/king). These three lines represent heaven, earth, 
and man; the connecting of them through the centre represents the way 
(dao 道) of [the ruler]. Who, if not a wang, could take the central position 
between heaven, earth, and man, so as to connect and council them? 
Therefore, a wang models himself on heaven. […] He models himself on 
its dao and thereby brings his administration into operation. He models 
himself on its will and, with it, attaches himself to humaneness (ren 仁).16
An important implication of the idea that the ruler mirrors his moral 
behavior on heaven and can therefore be a model to emulate in his own 
right is that a ‘universalizing’ potential was attributed to Confucianism, 
that is, it was thought that ‘barbarians’ could become part of the Confucian 
‘All-under-Heaven’ through education and emulation.17
Religion and Confucian nationalism
According to Pierre Bourdieu, when political or ecclesiastical elites elevate 
one religious system over another, the displaced beliefs and practices be-
come stigmatized as ‘magic’, ‘sorcery’, and ‘superstition’, and are associated 
with the vulgarity of the common people. When, in this way, a body of 
knowledge is centralized and systematized by a class of specialists, this cre-
ates a f ield of power between those who hold religious authority and those 
who do not.18 This is precisely what happened with the sole recognition of 
New Text School Confucianism as off icial orthodoxy in the Han Dynasty. 
Although Confucianism may not be a ‘full-f ledged religion’, the religious 
ramifications of the Confucian politico-religious construct described above 
transformed Confucianism – at least for the elite – into a ‘civil religion’ with 
its proper symbols, rules of behavior, and ritual prescripts. These rituals 
further had the possibility to bestow on the commoners ‘a sense of belonging 
16 Dong (1988, p. 794b). This interpretation of the role of politics can also be read in Xu Shen’s 
(ca 58-ca 147) Shuo wen jie zi (Explanation of Single Graphs and Analysis of Compound Graphs), 
the oldest extant etymological dictionary of the Chinese language (Xu, [1981] 1988, p. 7b). The 
intricate connection between the realm of secular governance and the realm of the divine is 
also reflected in the references to the Shijing (Songs) in the Confucian Lunyu (Analects). For the 
signif icance of the fact that the Lunyu refers to the Shijing: see Shryock (1966, p. 4).
17 See Levenson (1964), and Dessein (2016). Note that such a ‘model role’ is also present in the 
way the People’s Republic of China presented itself as the leader of the Communist World.
18 Bourdieu (1971, pp. 304-305, 308-309). Also see Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 10).
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to an “imagined community” of supremely civilized subjects of the realm’.19 
In this light, Clifford Geertz’s statement that religion is ‘a system of symbols 
which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of exist-
ence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic’, gains an extra meaning 
when religion and politics form an interconnected whole.20 In Confucian 
China, where religious symbols and rituals necessarily also had a political 
meaning, upholding harmony in ‘All-under-Heaven’ was as much a divine 
as a ‘national’ political mission.
That Confucianism became the only sanctioned doctrine does not 
mean that ‘China’ became philosophically or religiously homogenous. 
Analyzing the religious world in market terms, Yang Fenggang claimed 
that religious regulation leads to the development of a tripartite religious 
market: a ‘red’ market of off icially recognized religions, a black market of 
forbidden religious organizations, and a grey market of those religions that 
are not forbidden but are not orthodox either.21 Applying this model to 
imperial China, the practical outcome of the recognition of Confucianism 
as only orthodoxy to the exclusion of all other ideologies, was that Daoism, 
Buddhism, and popular religions were displaced to the ‘grey zone’ of the 
religious market – in imperial China, there was no systematic prohibition 
of religious cults. Hubert Seiwert has described this situation as follows:
As soon as we leave the domain of the ideological homogenous elite 
culture, it becomes clear that the cognitive and normative orientations 
of the elite claimed to possess universal value, but did actually not do 
so. Chinese history (not only the pre-modern one) is full of examples of 
attempts to control society ideologically, to eliminate ‘false’ (heterodox) 
doctrines and writings, and to render the correct interpretation of the 
world universal validity.22
19 Nylan, ([2008] 2009, p. 61). Yu (2005, p. 51) states that: ‘Just as the state’s recognition of 
Confucius and its continual process of canonizing his descendants were indicative of its own 
moral discernment and enlightenment, so the designated descendants’s fulf ilment of their ritual 
duties on behalf of the state betokened their acknowledgement of the regime’s legitimacy’. For 
the term ‘imagined community’: see Anderson (1991). On the religion sphere being a kind of 
imagined community as much as the nation is: see Chapter 4.
20 Geertz (1966, p. 4). Note that this phenomenon is also true for Marxism-Leninism in the 
People’s Republic of China.
21 Yang (2012, p. 85).
22 Seiwert (1994, pp. 531-532). Schmidt-Glintzer (2009, p. 27) described this as ‘die Einbindung 
des Einzelnen in die Gemeinschaft [als] Grundfärbung aller politischen Philosophie Chinas’.
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A practical outcome of the concentration of politico-religious power in the 
hands of the Confucian elite, the displacement of non-Confucian faiths 
to the grey market, and the absence of an institutionalized system of 
political opposition was that political opposition – by def inition a threat 
to the preservation of a Confucian harmonious ‘All-under-Heaven’– often 
canalized itself in religiously inspired movements. It can therefore be called 
a Confucian paradox that it is precisely because Buddhism, Daoism, and 
popular religions had been displaced to the grey zone of the religious market 
that they had become more diff icult to control.23 It was, on the other hand, 
also their position in the volatile zone of the grey market that, to the degree 
that they were (thought to be) favorable for political unity and could thus 
serve a nationalist aim, religion and religious cults were (1) appealed on 
by the political elite, and (2) could and were taken up by the Confucian 
elite themselves.24 Indeed, the elevation of Confucianism to the status 
of ‘civil religion’ did not even mean that the elite became homogeneously 
Confucian. The division of the spiritual world in Confucianism, Daoism, 
Buddhism, and popular religion and local cults remained far more complex 
than the simple socioeconomic default lines of elite vs. popular socioeco-
nomic groups.25 Non-Confucian concepts may, in themselves, not have been 
conducive to maintain social harmony, they could – and were – integrated 
in elite philosophy in so far as they did not infringe on or threaten the 
maintenance of harmony in ‘All-under-Heaven’. Hubert Seiwert has, in this 
respect, differentiated ‘orthodoxy’ from ‘orthopraxy’:
The orthodoxy, i.e., elements of the world view that could bring social 
cohesion, did not belong to one of these three traditions (i.e., Confucian-
ism, Daoism, and Buddhism) exclusively, but were shared by all – in any 
case, in so far as they were integrated in elite culture. […] What was 
expected of the members of the elite culture was not necessarily that 
they confessed to Confucianism, but rather that they confessed to the 
23 See Weggel (1980, pp. 127-128). This is ref lected in the traditional Chinese concept of law. 
Chinese law is occupied with infringements on morality and criminal cases because these are 
seen as infringements against the Confucian cosmological harmony. See Bodde and Morris 
(1967, p. 4).
24 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 22) remark that the function of the lay followers of Confucian-
ism, Daoism, and Buddhism was to ‘transmit their tradition of practice and to serve the entire 
society’.
25 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 23). Also see Chapter 1.
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basic cognitive and normative orientations of civil religion. Here we touch 
upon the meaning of orthopraxy […].26
In a situation in which the dividing lines between the red and the grey reli-
gious market were the product of a continued negotiation, non-Confucian 
belief systems had to accept varying degrees of political restrictions.27
The nineteenth century: Redefining Confucianism as ‘religion’
The Manchu Qing Dynasty was characterized by the flourishing of a variety 
of – especially non-Chinese – religions. The newly conquered region of 
Xinjiang was dominantly Muslim, Tibet and Mongolia were dominantly 
Vajrayana Buddhist, and in the Eastern and Central parts of China, Roman 
Catholicism and Protestantism were proliferating. These religions, along 
with traditional Daoism, sinicized Buddhism, and local cults, made Qing 
China a multireligious place.28 To administer this diversif ied religious 
empire, the Qing court had implemented a policy of religious pluralism, 
whereby the government, according to tradition, maintained the right to 
judge which religions were orthodox and which were not.
The incursions of European forces in China that started in the nineteenth 
century not only brought about economic and political consequences, but 
they also had a major effect on the way the spiritual world was perceived 
and organized. To qualify this change, it is necessary to f irst devote some 
space to the issue of ‘religion’ understood as zongjiao 宗教, a term that, as 
many ‘modern’ terms, was introduced in nineteenth-century China through 
Japan.29 Typical for the age of modernization in which not only political 
authorities, but also scholars and believers develop to be major social forces 
26 Seiwert (1994, pp. 531-532). For general ref lections on the processes of interactions in the 
making of modern religion in China: see Ashiwa and Wank (2009, pp. 6-8).
27 In theory, the emperor had absolute religious authority. He had the right to intervene in 
religious matters as he saw f it. In this, he could decide on the basis of his own judgment. See 
Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 27-28).
28 See Rawski (1998).
29 Coining the term ‘zongjiao’ was, in Japan (where the term is pronounced shūkyō), related 
to the adoption of religious freedom in its 1889 constitution. In this way, Shintō as national cult 
was distinguished from ‘religions’ that were, under Western influence, allowed to develop. While 
all Japanese citizens had to participate in Shintō, participation in ‘religion’ was an individual 
choice. As outlined by Hardacre (1989), religions were encouraged to modernize by adopting 
a nationalist and rational discourse. See also Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 210); Brook (2009, 
pp. 38-39).
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in the process of def ining religion, the Western presence in China also 
meant that the traditional Chinese spiritual realm started to be redefined 
in terms of the Western concept of ‘religion’ (zongjiao) – a term that was 
not surprisingly f irst used in its reference to European Christianity.30 As a 
logical consequence, the traditional division between the Confucian ‘civil 
religion’ and the large grey zone of all other ideologies and faiths that had 
prevailed in imperial history, was interchanged for a new ‘European’ divi-
sion between ‘orthodox religion’ (Christianity) and ‘superstition’ (mixin 迷
信). That is to say that the new category zongjiao also displaced Confucian-
ism to the grey zone of the religious market,31 thus showing, as expressed 
by Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank “the fluidity and contextuality of 
the boundary between superstition and religion.32 This displacement was 
also the result of the following: the traditional interpretation of Confu-
cian rule, i.e., the conviction that there is an intricate connection between 
the spiritual and the political world, necessarily implies that any change 
in the political structure of China has to lead to a change in its religious 
make-up. That is to say, when the nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
intellectuals strove to create a Chinese nation-state after Western model, 
this could not but have its ramif ications for the position of Confucianism 
– the backbone of traditional elite culture.33 It may for the great majority 
of these intellectuals have proven to be almost impossible to settle with 
a displaced Confucianism – an intellectual struggle for modernity set in.
This observation puts into perspective the general assumption that in its 
confrontation with European dominance, the Chinese elite increasingly saw 
the creation of a Chinese nation-state (guojia 國家) after Western model 
as the only possible political alternative for China to survive.34 A more 
qualif ied statement would indeed be that while some of the intellectuals 
of the f inal decades of the empire wanted to do away with Confucianism 
once and for all – it may be reminded here that Sun Yatsen (孫逸仙, 1866-
1925) and Jiang Jieshi (蔣介石, or Chiang Kaishek, 1887-1975) were Christian 
30 See Yang (2012, p. 27).
31 See Duara (1991, p. 76).
32 Ashiwa and Wank (2009, p. 9).
33 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 43).
34 This nineteenth-century Chinese nationalism can be def ined as ‘reactive nationalism’, i.e. 
nationalism, the coming to consciousness, of a group that suffered mistreatment, discrimination, 
and abuse at the hands of another group. Such a ‘reactive nationalism’ is different from ‘organic 
nationalism’ that arises naturally as a result of time, inbreeding, and geographic isolation, and 
is still different from ‘constructed (or artif icial) nationalism’ that is a deliberate and conscious 
creation by the state from above, via the systematic mass dissemination and inculcation of a 
nationalist ideology. See Chang (2001, p. 24).
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converts35 – the political visions of what may be the majority of them reveal 
a lingering belief in the values of (a redefined) Confucianism. As Helwig 
Schmidt-Glintzer observed:
China wanted to completely throw away its past, a young generation 
wanted to open a new page in history, and yet, getting free from the 
past was not successful, and this was seen as the core problem of China 
by many.36
When scholars such as Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857) claimed that there was 
no Western knowledge worth to be studied except for military technology 
and knowledge of weaponry, and that, therefore, it would be suff icient 
for China to master this military knowledge in order to be able to defend 
itself against the West, this reveals a maintained conviction in the value of 
Confucianism in its connection to national unity.37 This conviction was also 
visible in the ‘Self Strengthening Movement’ (ziqiang yundong 自強運動) 
of the 1860s – an attempt to make China materially so strong that it would 
be better able to defend itself against the West, as well as in the works of 
Wang Tao 王韜 (1828-1897). Contrary to Wei Yuan, Wang Tao had travelled 
to Europe and had discerned in Europe a peculiar cultural tradition. He 
therefore claimed that it was necessary to study European culture in order 
to become acquainted with the basis of its superior technology. Knowledge 
and the use of Western technology would, in practice, lead to it that Chinese 
(Confucian) culture as ‘essence’ (ti 體) would embrace Western technology 
as ‘function’ (yong 用).38 The f inal outcome of this would be that the dif-
ferent national histories would fuse into an era of universal peace in which 
the world would become one ‘great unity’ (datong 大同). The choice of the 
term datong, a term borrowed from the seventh chapter Liyun 禮運of the 
Han Dynasty Confucian work Liji 禮記, echoes the age-old Confucian claim 
35 Sun Yatsen in this respect claimed that it was due to Christianity that America was more 
prosperous, stronger and had a higher civilization than China had. It would therefore be 
Christianity that could give China back its dignity. See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 69).
36 Schmidt-Glintzer (2009, p. 33). According to Metzger (2012, p. 228), ‘From this normative 
standpoint, modern Chinese history essentially is the story of a troubled progression toward 
increasing discontinuity with the Chinese tradition and increasing convergence with Western 
modernity’.
37 Wei (1852).
38 See Wang (2001, pp. 41-42). For an evaluation of the Fairbankian interpretation of China’s 
modernization process from f irst understanding only the superiority of Western weapons, then 
grasping that of Western institutions, and f inally appreciating Western values: see Metzger 
(2012, p. 238).
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that in this unified world, the right to rule ‘All-under-Heaven’ would remain 
a Confucian prerogative.
A lingering faith in the value of Confucianism as the ‘essence’ of the 
Chinese tradition was most obvious in the writings of the so-called ‘Radi-
cal Confucians’. For the ‘Radical Confucians’, it was ‘State Confucianism’ 
(guoxue 國學) that was to be blamed for the decline of the Chinese empire. 
The ‘State Confucians’ had been in power ever since the Han Dynasty and 
the main aim of their policies had been to legitimize and to uphold political 
power in the hands of the ruling elite. This had resulted in authoritarianism 
and a centralization of imperial power. ‘State Confucianism’ therefore had to 
be replaced by ‘Radical Confucianism’ ( junxue 君學), a moral teaching that 
is critical for all political and social injustice and is aimed at the well-being 
of the Chinese people.39 An analysis of the publications of the ‘Radical 
Confucians’ in the journals Journal of National Essence (‘Guocui xuebao’ 國
粹學報, published between 1905 and 1911) and People’s Tribune (‘Minbao’ 
民報, published between 1905 and 1910) shows that they saw the period of 
China’s history before the unif ication under the f irst empire as the ‘golden 
age’ of Chinese history, characterized by philosophical debate free from the 
direct control of the government – we can, again, refer to the so-called Jixia 
Academy here, and in which knowledge was disseminated among all men of 
letters. Since the unif ication of the empire under the Qin Dynasty and the 
rise of Confucianism to the status of state orthodoxy in the Han Dynasty, 
China had glided into the ‘dark ages’. The ‘Radical Confucians’ claimed that a 
Renaissance of China – in this explicitly referring to European history – did 
not mean that one had to do away with the Confucian tradition, but, on the 
contrary, that such a Renaissance was only possible through returning to 
the ‘essence’ of Confucianism as formulated in the ‘Spring-and-Autumn’ 
period.40 Radical Confucians thus tried to establish a genealogy of the 
Chinese nation that goes back to the Yellow Emperor.41 This illustrates what 
was remarked by Martin Kern: ‘Through remembrance, history turns into 
myth’, whereby ‘it does not become unreal but, on the contrary, and only 
then, reality in the sense of a continual normative and formative force’.42 
In their endeavour to return to the essence of Chinese culture, the ‘Radical 
39 As remarked by Kuehner (2015, p. 25), in ancient usage, the term ‘guoxue’ referred to an 
institution, not to a f ield of learning. In its early twentieth-century usage, the term was reintro-
duced from Japan where it, as kokugaku, was used to denote those nineteenth-century Japanese 
scholars who rejected all foreign intellectual influence, specif ically Chinese Neo-Confucianism.
40 See Hon (2014, p. 31); Zarrow (2007, pp. 23f).
41 See Kuehner (2015, p. 31).
42 Kern ([2008] 2009, p. 226).
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Confucians’ were also profoundly anticlerical – a position that can be 
interpreted as a reaction towards Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy.43
A still very different reaction to the degrading of Confucianism as a result 
of the new religious paradigm can be seen in the f igure of Kang Youwei 
康有為 (1858-1927). He advocated to redef ine Confucianism within the 
new ‘religious’ paradigm, that is as a religion (zongjiao) in its own right. In 
order to transform Confucianism into a ‘national religion’ (guojiao 國教) 
– and the only possible one for that matter, he proposed to ban all religious 
institutions and transform the Confucian temples that had begun to be 
confiscated starting in 1901 into schools for instruction in what he called 
Kongjiao 孔教, the Confucian religion.44 A ‘modernized’ Confucianism 
would thus have to become the Chinese ‘orthodox religion’, in the same way 
as an ‘orthodox’ Christianity was perceived as ‘orthodox religion’ in many 
modern nineteenth century European countries.45 Reshaping Confucianism 
as a national religion may have meant that elements of local cults that had 
traditionally been integrated in ‘State Confucianism’ would now have to 
be avoided, thus completely severing local cults from the realm of off icial 
‘religion’,46 it, on the other hand, would also mean that Confucianism would 
no longer be a dividing factor between the elite and the common people, 
but that Confucius would become a symbol for all and to be honoured 
by all in the nation-state – a guojiao indeed.47 The parliamentarians of 
the early Republic saw the proposal to elevate Confucianism to ‘national 
religion’ as against the freedom of religion and it was voted down in 1913 
and again in 1916.48 With Confucianism dismissed as vehicle to rally the 
collective feelings of all people, Sun Yatsen brought in the Kuomindang 
(KMT, the Nationalist Party) and the concept ‘party state’ (dangguo 黨國) 
43 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 35-36).
44 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 45-47); Ashiwa and Wank (2009, p. 7 and p. 9).
45 This shows that Kang Youwei was not so much driven by ‘intellectual rationality’ as by 
an inspiration to modernize tradition. See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 52). In his zeal for a 
spiritual Confucian renewal and unif ication of the Chinese race and nation along with a social 
reform, Kang Youwei and his disciples were followed by the Guangxu Emperor. See Goossaert 
and Palmer (2011, p. 207).
46 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 55-56).
47 See Kuo (2008, p. 67).
48 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 56). This may partly be explained by the fact that among 
the 274 members elected (indirectly, through colleges of local elites) to the f irst national parlia-
ment between December 1912 and January 1913, sixty were Christians, a proportion that was 
totally out of measure when we consider that Christians accounted for less than 1 percent of 
the population. See Goossaert and Palmer (2001, p. 70). On the concept of ‘modern’ separation 
of state from religion: see Ashiwa and Wank (2009, p. 2).
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– nationalist feelings for the state were identif ied with the KMT that came 
to be regarded as the incarnation of the new state.49 According to Sun Yatsen, 
it was necessary to f irst deconstruct the Chinese ‘cultural state’ in order 
to create the Chinese ‘nation-state’. In his inaugural speech on the f irst 
congress of the KMT in January 1912, he therefore declared that he no longer 
wanted to ‘govern’ the state through the Party (yidang zhiguo 以黨治國), 
but to ‘establish’ it through the Party (yidang jianguo 以黨建國).50 The only 
way for the citizens to respond to the nationalist appeal and to contribute 
to the ‘establishment of the state’ was hence to become member of the 
Party – much in the same way as they, in imperial times, had to become 
part of the Confucian bureaucracy.
Although, in a context in which traditional religions, including Con-
fucianism, had been displaced, the focus on nation-building through 
the KMT may have made Chinese nationalism an overall non-religious 
phenomenon,51 the identif ication of the KMT with the nation-state that 
was to be created through the Party made both the KMT as instrument 
and the modern nation-state as f inal political aim ‘sacred’ institutions.52
Maoist China and Confucianized communist nationalism
The Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and the way the KMT govern-
ment reacted to this event raised support among different social groups 
for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), established in Shanghai in 1921. 
In his article ‘On the people’s democratic dictatorship’, published in June 
1949, a few months before he proclaimed the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China from Tiananmen – the place also Chinese emperors had 
used to announce major political decisions, Mao Zedong 毛澤東 alluded 
to the leading role of the CCP in its historical mission of modernizing the 
Chinese peasants and workers in the following words:
49 See Harrison (2001, pp. 190-193). This move would also prove important for presenting the 
Chinese Communist Party as incarnation of the unif ied (datong) nation-state. See further.
50 See Fitzgerald (1996, p. 185).
51 See Cohen (2005).
52 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 175) remark that Chiang Kai-shek appealed on the citizens 
with such watchwords as ‘orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, precision, 
harmony, and dignity – ideals encapsulated in the four traditional virtues of propriety, rectitude, 
honesty, and sensitivity to shame – drawn from Confucian tradition but given a modern meaning 
within the framework of loyalty to the state’.
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[U]nder the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, 
from an agricultural into an industrial country, and from a new-demo-
cratic into a socialist and communist society, abolish classes and realize 
the Great Harmony [大同].53
This statement can be seen as a development of an earlier statement Kang 
Youwei had made in his History of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo Zhexue 
Shi 中國哲學史):
In the world of the ‘great unity’ (datong 大同), there will be no difference 
between classes and races. There will be no inferior people nor religious 
leaders. Everyone will be equal and ‘All-under-Heaven’ will enjoy equal 
rights.54
While we may expect that Kang Youwei must have exempted Confucianism, 
the doctrine he wanted to have recognized as ‘state religion’ (guojiao), from 
the religions referred to in this statement, for Mao Zedong and the CCP, 
loyal to the Marxist militant atheist interpretation of ‘religion’ as ‘opium for 
the people’, also Confucianism had to be discarded as ‘superstition’. Hence 
the campaign to ‘smash the four olds’ (po sijiu 破四舊).55 However, when 
Mao Zedong stated that: ‘[T]here are some things which need not have any 
national style, such as trains, airplanes and big guns. Politics and art should 
have a national style’,56 this shows that also he was not free from the idea 
that the Chinese political tradition had its particular value and should 
53 Mao (1961, pp. 418-419). See also Schram (2002, pp. 411-412).
54 Kang (2002, p. 716). Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 170) note that also Hong Xiuquan had 
promised to, through the Taiping rebellious movement, create a proto-communist peaceful 
society on earth. Apocalyptic revolution, Christian influence, and communist utopianism, so 
they claim (2011, p. 39) are the three elements that, throughout the next century, never cease 
to interact. For the CCP’s explicit claim of f iliation to the Taiping movement: see Cohen (1997, 
pp. 292-293).
55 The ‘four olds’ are ideas, culture, customs, and habits. Yang (2012, p. 46) def ines ‘militant 
atheism’ as a type of atheism that ‘treats religion as the dangerous opium and narcotic of 
the people, a wrong political ideology serving the interests of the exploiting classes and the 
antirevolutionary elements’, whereby ‘political forces are necessary to control and eliminate 
religion’.
56 Quoted through Schram (2002, p. 437), who interprets this saying of Mao’s as an expression 
of the conviction that ‘a revolutionary transformation guided by Marxist theory […] did not 
mean turning the country into a carbon copy of the Soviet Union’, and of Mao’s conviction that 
‘the assimilation of the past provides not only raw material but also a “method” for elaborating 
a correct line today’.
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continue to exert its influence on contemporary politics.57 Very different 
from the ‘elite orthopraxy’ that had characterized the Confucian society, but 
in the same way as Kang Youwei’s concept of a Confucian guojiao and Sun 
Yatsen’s KMT had contained the possibility to rally all people for a ‘national’ 
cause, also the organization of the Communist state had the potential and 
possibilities to penetrate all layers of society.
In the same way as the Confucian emperors had been conceived to be 
models for ‘All-under-Heaven’ through their moral superiority, the adop-
tion of Marxism-Leninism gave China the possibility to reshape itself as a 
model for other developing and underdeveloped countries in a communist 
‘All-under-Heaven’.58 Zhou Enlai’s 周恩來 (1898-1976) claim that ‘socialist 
patriotism is not a narrow nationalism, but a patriotism aimed to strengthen 
national pride under the guidance of internationalism’,59 is also reminiscent 
of the distinction Liang Qichao 梁啟超 made between ‘small nationalism’ 
(xiao minzu zhuyi 小民族主義) and ‘great nationalism’ (da minzu zhuyi 
大民族主義): while ‘small nationalism’ was, according to Liang Qichao, 
the feeling of the Han for the other ethnic groups within the borders of the 
former Qing empire (guonei國內), ‘great nationalism’ was the sentiment of 
all people towards all people beyond the borders of the former Qing empire 
(guowai 國外).60 This homeland concept was visible in the CCP policies 
that were formulated during the 1930s, when it was attempted to gain the 
support of all Chinese citizens through deemphasizing ethnic difference. 
Such policies were implemented during the famous Long March (Chang 
zheng 長征) of 1934-1936.61
Mao Zedong’s veiled admiration for Confucian political concepts not-
withstanding, the off icial religious policy meant that, in contradistinction 
to the Republican period in which religions were displaced to the grey zone 
of the religious market, the CCP’s militant atheism meant that religion was 
57 For Mao’s indebtedness to Confucian thinking, Guo Moruo’s 郭沫若 (1892-1978) Makesi jin 
wenmiao 馬克思進文廟 (Marx Visits a Confucian Temple), a text written in 1925, is revealing. 
In this text, Guo Moruo, a friend of Mao Zedong, places the following statement in the mouth 
of Confucius in response to Marx’s description of the ideal Communist society: “Yes, truly (…) 
your ideal society and my world of ‘great unity’ are completely the same without us having 
deliberated over it. Let me cite a part of an old text of mine for you!”, after which Confucius 
starts to recite the part of the Liji on datong. (Guo in Liu 1953). See also Dessein (2017).
58 For the rivalry between the PRC and the Soviet Union over leadership in the communist 
world: see Näth (1975, pp. 259-268, p. 284, and p. 307); Chen (2005, p. 43). 
59 Quoted through Chen (2005, p. 41).
60 Liang ([1903] 1983, p. 75). Zarrow (2004, p. 47) suggests that Liang’s ‘deepest inspiration […] 
came from what we can loosely call the Confucian tradition’. Also see Chapter 3.
61 See Gladney (2009, p. 156).
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further degraded to the black zone of the religious sphere, i.e., the zone of 
forbidden religious organizations that work in the underground and arises 
to cater to religious needs that cannot be expressed in the open market.62 
A suppression of religion does not, however, eradicate religious feelings. 
Rather, other forms of religiosity will develop. As most people fear the 
consequences of acting in the black market, they will redirect their religious 
needs in innovative ways, thus negotiating, as it were, a new grey market 
with the authorities. In Maoist China, this possibility was facilitated through 
the integration of secularized medicine, martial arts, and body cultivation 
techniques placed under the new category of qigong’ 氣功 into the new 
state.63 The grey religious market that was thus created would flourish in 
an innovative way during the period of the Great Leap Forward (Da yue jin 
大躍進, 1958-1960).
Although Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Daoism had 
been protected under the principle of religious freedom in the beginning 
years of the PRC and the leaders of these f ive recognized religions were 
even given political acknowledgment – they had to help with the construc-
tion of the new state64 – since 1953 and especially with the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign (1957) and the Great Leap Forward, religious freedom became 
severely restricted and religious festivities, traditional clothing, etc. were 
forbidden because they would have obstructed economic production.65 As 
62 The CCP’s antireligious stance was also inspired by the fact that many redemptive societies 
had sided with the Guomindang during the civil war because of their fear for atheist communism. 
See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 141). These societies were intellectually often linked to the 
‘national essence’ (guocui 國粹) movement. See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 108).
63 The Nationalist project of the martial arts that were claimed to be able to restore the original 
purity of the ‘national essence’ was thus continued in the PRC. Also qigong and traditional 
Chinese medicine that were made ‘scientif ic’ (kexuehua 科學化) in the Nationalist project 
were continued. See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 92, 110, 116-117). Also ordinary superstition, 
which was not to be automatically confused with organized counterrevolutionary activity was 
allowed. See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 149).
64 ‘As long as a part of mankind is technologically backward’, so was stated in a Renmin 
ribao editorial of 1950, ‘any idea about taking coercive action is useless and positively harmful. 
This is the reason why we advocate protecting freedom of religious belief, just as we advocate 
protecting freedom to reject religious belief ’. Quoted through Welch (1972, p. 4). While the CCP 
called for the systematic conf iscation of Han temples and denied political rights to their priests 
and ‘superstitious’ specialists, the temples, monasteries, and mosques of the minorities were 
to be protected, and their leaders could be appointed to political positions. See Goossaert and 
Palmer (2011, p. 144). Zhang Chengzhi 張承志 (b. 1948), a Chinese Muslim novelist and essayist, 
is even credited with having coined the term ‘red guards’ (hong weibing 紅衛兵). See Fisac (2003, 
p. 163).
65 See MacInnis (1972). Also see Chapter 1.
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in the Great Leap Forward movement, rural China had been reorganized in 
communities (Weber’s Gemeinschaften) that resemble traditional kinship 
groups, the disastrous outcome of this economic experience paradoxically 
strengthened the old community loyalties. The main difference with the 
imperial period in this was that the leaders of the new communities in 
the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward were no longer lineage elders, 
but rural CCP cadres. Many people reverted to such old pre-revolutionary 
religious activities as worshipping deities, divination, or fortune-telling, 
and violence between enemy lineages and communities was often accom-
panied by religious rituals that served to express kinship and community 
solidarity.66 Communist policies that had aimed at building a nation-state 
in which loyalty would be to the nation-state through establishing CCP cells 
as substitute for the local temples that had been the traditional places of 
symbolic power where local unities and disunities had been settled, had 
clearly failed.67
It is for the development of religious nationalism in communist China 
important to note that communism shares three important features with 
religions: (1) a certain conviction about life and the world, (2) a set of rituals 
that give expression to this conviction, and (3) a peculiar social organization 
of a moral community of adepts and practitioners. The only characteristic 
that communism does not share with religions is that it does not believe 
in the supernatural. This ‘supernatural’ aspect was, however, substituted 
with the State, the CCP, and Mao Zedong as divine trinity.68 Communism 
further shares characteristics (1) and (2), and to a certain extent also (3) 
with Confucianism.69 It is therefore fairly easy to redirect one’s religious 
feelings from religion (or Confucianism) towards the ‘communist utopia’. 
This became obvious in the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
This period in which religion was seen as one of the ‘four olds’ (si jiu 四
舊) that had to be eradicated, was simultaneously, as labelled by Vincent 
Goossaert and David A. Palmer, the ‘apotheosis’ of political sacralisation.70 
66 See Perry (2001, pp. 288-294). As remarked by Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 225), ‘Family 
practices and values can be considered the sanctuary of traditional religion, especially in times 
of repression and change’.
67 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 55). 
68 See Chapter 1.
69 See Yang (2012, pp. 36-37) who therefore calls communism a ‘pseudo-religion’.
70 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 167). We can also refer here to the famous poster Mao Zhuxi qu 
Anyuan 毛主席去安源 (President Mao goes to Anyuan), f irst published in 1968 and perhaps the 
most important painting of the Cultural Revolution period, on which Mao Zedong is portrayed 
in classical attire. Also see note #55.
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In the same way as religion had, in traditional China, always been inter-
preted as conducive to maintaining the holistic world, also devotion to the 
communist ideal was to serve the sacred nation – and, for that matter, Mao 
as incarnation of the Party and thus of the nation-state.71 As much as the 
Cultural Revolution was the denouncement of tradition and of Confucian-
ism it is generally claimed to be, it is, I would therefore claim, paradoxically 
also fundamentally Confucian in its aspect of, after the chaos caused by 
the Great Leap Forward, projecting the Party and Mao Zedong – the ‘Great 
Saviour of the People’ (renmin de dajiuxing 人民的大救星) – as moral 
examples and only guarantee to overcome the chaos. The CCP directed 
Mao cult that supplied to the religious market, functioned in the same 
way as Confucian rituals had done in the veneration of the emperor and 
‘All-under-Heaven’.72 The Red Book (Mao zhuxi yulu 毛主席語錄) became 
the sacred canon of this ‘political religion’ and statues of the ‘Red Sun’ (hong 
taiyang 紅太陽) of Chinese communism were erected and venerated.73 For 
the hundreds of millions of sincere worshippers engaging in Mao worship, 
the feelings they experienced were almost religious.74
Communist self-cultivation was advocated by Liu Shaoqi in his essay 
On Self-cultivation of the Members of the CCP (Lun gongchandangyuande 
xiuyang 論共產黨員的修養). This essay that, as stated by Vincent Goossaert 
and David A. Palmer is ‘riddled with quotes from Confucius’s Analects and 
the Great Learning and from neo-Confucian philosophers’ explains how 
‘self-cultivation was necessary for keeping one’s faults and ideals before 
one’s consciousness. […] the Communist needed to conduct a class struggle 
within his own mind […] the Party member was to become aware of and 
eradicate every trace of self ishness in his mind; otherwise, it would gradu-
ally corrupt his mind and body, and lead him to lose sight of objective reality 
and of his true self’.75 In the ‘political religiosity’ of the Cultural Revolution 
era, communist study and ritual replaced Neo-Confucian self-cultivation, 
71 See Duara (2008, p. 64). According to Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 189), another explanation 
for the dedication with which the Chinese engaged in the Mao cult is that it was simply too 
dangerous to be suspected of not engaging in the cult. Zealous enthusiasm was often the only 
way to demonstrate sincerity and avoid being struggled against.
72 See Aijmer (1996, p. 227).
73 See Yang (2012, p. 91). See also Zuo (1991).
74 See Yang (2012, p. 139). For the Mao cult: see Myers (1972) and Zuo (1991).
75 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 178). For Liu Shaoqi’s position vis-à-vis Confucianism: see We-
ber (2015, p. 181). For a discussion of religio-political mobilization in relation to self-cultivation: 
see Apter and Saich (1994).
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and the CCP and Mao Zedong as incarnations of the moral norm had to 
bind the people – and thus the nation – together.76
The post-Mao era: Communist new Confucian nationalism
The realities of Maoist China that became increasingly visible after the 
death of the ‘Great Saviour of the People’ on 9 September 1976 had major 
ramif ications for the Party’s legitimation. The patronage and corruption 
that raged in the Party stood in stark contrast with the role of ‘moral exam-
ple’ Mao Zedong had attributed to himself and to the Party. Deng Xiaoping’s 
policies that focused on market principles also undermined the communist 
adagio of the Party as consumerism provided the Chinese citizens with a 
new ideal: ‘becoming rich’ was the new maxim. The identif ication of the 
Party with the Chinese nation-state further meant that decline of the Party’s 
credibility contained a threat for the possibility of the nation-state to rally 
the commitment of the Chinese citizens.
The decline of moral authority of the Party at f irst instance led to a 
spiritual void.77 It is in this void that the post-Mao era has witnessed a 
gradual growth of religious adherence, including a reemergence of qigong.78 
It is therefore important to note that a consumerist modernity as intro-
duced by Deng Xiaoping also has important ramifications for the ‘religious 
market’.79 It is characteristic for consumerist modernity that all social 
relations – including religious and ideological ones – are patterned after 
the ‘consumerist syndrome’.80 Free choice on the commodities’ market 
encroaches on religion in the sense that religion is transformed to be a 
commodity in its own right. This means that (1) the religious customer 
seeks self-realization (no longer support for the state) in religion, and (2) 
religions become flexible in their search for the approval of the religious 
customer.81 Andrew Dawson in this respect speaks of ‘prosumption’, a 
76 See Thornton (2007). Remark that not only Confucianism knows the practice of self-cultiva-
tion, but that Buddhism and Daoism also do. In practice, the Cultural Revolution antagonized 
different sub-groups of Chinese society. However, the class struggle had to, ultimately, ‘make 
the people one’.
77 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 191).
78 For an evaluation of the nature of this reemergence: see Otehode (2009, pp. 250-261).
79 Simmel (2004), stated that consumerism is a worthy replacement for religion, because, like 
religion, it enacts a dream world with material objects.
80 See Bauman (2005, p. 84); Speck (2013, p. 28).
81 See Speck (2013, p. 30). 
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neoliberal process ‘to collapse the acts of production and consumption into 
a singular process through which commodity value is both extracted and 
generated at one and the same time’.82 In contradistinction to traditional 
religious life that focuses on the weakness of human beings as a species, in 
the individualized consumerist religious market, religion focuses on the 
weakness of one individual as against the omnipotent species of human 
beings.83 This new function of religion explains why, on a ‘religious market’ 
that caters to the wishes of the consumerist religious customer who has 
become convinced that there is nothing that cannot be purchased, setbacks 
in life – the encounter with the insuff iciency of human life and the impos-
sibility of state policies and science to overcome these setbacks – may lead to 
religious fundamentalism – a form of religious individuality that allows no 
relativism.84 Religion thus becomes a means with which the effect of state 
policies and of science can be criticized from an individual standpoint.85 
This attitude, it has been claimed, is especially true for those who are more 
vulnerable to the shortages of life – in China these typically are ethnic 
minorities and the workers and farmers who were the f irst advocates of 
the CCP but have seen their economic and social position deteriorating in 
the Deng Xiaoping era – that is, those left behind in the scramble for the 
entry tickets to the consumers’ party.86 With religious aff inity no longer 
directed towards upholding the state, or, as Vincent Goossaert and David 
A. Palmer phrased it, with a ‘“Middle Kingdom” that has lost its Middle’, 
the PRC government has been in search of something to give the Chinese 
‘All-under-Heaven’ a spiritual center again.87
In a politico-cultural context in which religion has traditionally been 
seen as a potential threat for the ruling (Confucian/communist) class, the 
contemporary steep increase of religious adherence and the potential for 
growing religious fundamentalism make a resort to religion as ideological 
alternative for communism impossible. This explains why the government 
is now increasingly promoting age-old Confucianism – a doctrine that is 
82 Dawson (2013, p. 137). See also Zwick, Bonsu, and Darmody (2008). Dawson (2013, pp. 137-138) 
remarks: ‘Such is the case because the notion of the prosumer is paradigmatically late modern 
in that its merger of producer and consumer plays to the contemporary valorization of the 
individual as the central axis around which all else is held to revolve’.
83 See Bauman (2005, p. 183); Speck (2013, pp. 31-31); Gaenssbauer (2015, p. 46); Meng (2012, 
p. 33).
84 See Bauman (2005, p. 182). 
85 See Beck (2010).
86 See Speck (2013, p. 30). 
87 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 3).
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not categorized as ‘religion’ in the so-called ‘Document 19’ of 1982 that 
supplements the 1982 Constitution – as ideological alternative.88 In its 
renewed function as instrument to uphold national unity under CCP rule, 
Confucianism (now called ‘New Confucianism’ (dangdai xin ruxue 當
代新儒學) has thus been reshaped to function as a doctrinal backbone 
to ‘communist New Confucian Nationalism’.89 On the religious market, 
Confucianism thus f inds itself in a dynamic relation with religions that 
are – as was the case in Confucian China – tolerated to the extent that 
they foster national unity.90 It is in this respect also more than noteworthy 
that guoxue has been reintroduced by the CCP government, that is, not as 
a parallel to junxue Confucianism which criticized ‘state Confucianism’, 
but, on the contrary, as a type of learning that is to be advocated in order 
88 This ‘Document 19’ (‘On the Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during 
Our Country’s Socialist Period’) is an exponent of so-called enlightenment atheism: a form of 
atheism that regards religion as ‘an illusory or false consciousness, being both nonscientif ic and 
backward’ and therefore as making propaganda necessary in order ‘to expunge the misleading 
religious ideas’. See Yang (2012, p. 46). The perceived threat for national unity the CCP state feels 
religion is exerting, is also evident from Xi Jinping’s speech delivered at the ‘Working Meeting 
for Religion’ on 23 April 2016. In this speech, he calls upon all religious people to unite in order 
to realize the ‘double one hundred’ and the ‘China Dream’ of the grand revival ( fuxing 復興) 
of the Chinese people, to take their responsibility for the ‘harmonious society’ (shehui hexie 社
會和諧 ), to deeply love their country, and to persevere in the ‘sinicization’ of religion. See ‘Xi 
Jinping zai quanguo zongjiao gongzuohui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua’ 習近平在全國宗教
工作會上發表重要講話 http://www.sara.gov.cn/xwzx/tplb/333676.htm, accessed 12 May 2016. 
Also see note #64.
89 It is, in this respect, important that, as noted by Yang (2012, pp. x-xi), ‘Since the May Fourth 
and New Culture Movements around 1919, Chinese elite intellectuals, influenced by European 
Enlightenment discourses, have become critical of and despising toward religion. The received 
wisdom has been that the Chinese as a whole have never been religious’. Promoting Confucian-
ism may also divert attention away from ‘foreign’ religions and popular cults. See in this respect 
Yang (2012, p. 179); Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 260). Gaenssbauer (2015, p. 54) remarks that 
‘According to He Guanghu, in the PRC Marxism and Communism had been turned into a 
religion of the political community (guojiao 國教 )’, but that ‘in a society marked by materialism 
and corruption there are not many people left nowadays who still believe in Marxism and 
Communism, […]. Chinese people are instead called now to show patriotism (aiguo zhuyi 愛國
主義). He Guanghu describes patriotism in China as a ‘quasi-religion’ (zhun zongjiao 準宗教) 
or ‘pseudo-religion’ (wei zongjiao 偽宗教), since patriotism implies belief in the state and the 
worship of human power’. See He (2012, pp. 220, 230).
90 We can here again refer to the speech Xi Jinping delivered at the ‘Working Meeting for 
Religion’ on 23 April 2016: ‘Xi Jinping zai quanguo zongjiao gongzuohui shang fabiao zhongyao 
jianghua’ http://www.sara.gov.cn/xwzx/tplb/333676.htm, accessed 12 May 2016. Also see Brook 
(2009, p. 22).
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to sustain CCP rule.91 We may, in the same vein, also mention the renewed 
attention for the cult of the Yellow Emperor.92 It is in all this, and very 
similar to the practices in imperial China, remarkable how in the CCP’s use 
of Confucianism, only those elements of this traditional ideology that do not 
infringe on the (communist) nation-state are selected. Selectiveness is also 
evident from the Chinese leadership’s gradual revaluation of the function 
of religion. Chinese communist leadership has meanwhile abandoned the 
slogan that religion is ‘opium for the people’, and has resorted to a policy of 
what it calls ‘mutual accommodation’ – that is, conducive to the creation of 
a ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui 和諧社會).93 This policy, further, also 
allows the CCP to continue its policy of propagating atheism.
The revaluation of Confucianism in mainland China that, actually, 
already started in the 1980s when Li Zehou voiced his admiration for the 
‘pragmatic rationality’ (shiyong lixing 實用理性) of Confucius and his 
influence on Mao’s thought,94 was boosted when, following the economic 
rise of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, a similar economic 
rise also occurred in the PRC. Confucianism was no longer, as had been the 
case in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, condemned as the 
cause of China’s misfortune but, on the contrary, as an important factor 
of economic progress. Consequently, the pragmatist attitude of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century in which the Chinese tradition was 
redefined in European terms, was exchanged for a reinterpretation of the 
European tradition in Chinese terms.95 Wang Bo, professor of philosophy 
at Peking University formulated this attitude as follows in 1999: ‘We are 
91 See Kuehner (2015, pp. 36-38), who refers to Liu Dong’s claim that ‘I have no hesitation 
asserting that if Chinese civilization is to survive, Chinese tradition deserves to be popularized 
and traditional guoxue, especially Ruxue, must reach even greater constituencies’. See Liu 
(2011, p. 46). We may also refer here to the fact that many universities in the PRC have recently 
established a guoxue institute, and that there is a guoxue website: guoxue.com.
92 See Goossaert and Palmer (2011, p. 260). The turn to Confucianism can also be interpreted 
as an attempt to ‘anchor’ CCP rule in more than only economic growth. See Weber (2015, 
pp. 186-187)..
93 Goossaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 2, 316-317, 322, 325-327); Gaenssbauer (2015, pp.25, 33); Mou 
(2009, p. 171); Rošker (2016, p. 216). Rosker (2016, pp. 218-219) remarks that where ‘in the Analects 
(Lun yu), Confucius makes a radical distinction between sameness (in the sense of uniformity, 
tong) and harmony or harmonization (he), and criticizes the former in the following terms: 
‘The nobleman creates harmony, not sameness. Ordinary men, on the contrary, are all the same 
and cannot create harmony’, in the contemporary period ‘harmony’ is rather conceived of as 
‘conformity’.
94 See Metzger (2012, p. 232). Weber (2015, p. 173) dates the academic revival of Confucianism 
back to the 1970s.
95 See in this respect Gaenssbauer (2015, p. 10).
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confronted with the following dilemma: What do we wish? That the object 
of our study would be “Chinese”, or that it would be “philosophical”?96 This 
is reminiscent of He Bingsong who, in the late 1930s and the 1940s, claimed 
that it was not China that had to learn from the West, but the other way 
round. For this, he referred to such eighteenth-century intellectuals as 
Voltaire and Leibniz who were admirers of Chinese culture.97 Zhuo Xinping 
also gives expression to the revaluation of a Chinese uniqueness:
We recognize in the ‘Chinese dream’ the potential for a great development 
and blossoming of Chinese culture. […] but in order to bring this ‘Chinese 
dream’ to realization we must unite the entire Chinese people by means 
of this cultural belief and must mobilize all forces which it is possible to 
mobilize. […] This means that we must, of course, allow to unfold, in the 
course of the economic and social development aspired to, also those 
positive effects contributed by adherents to religions. Any […] manner of 
proceeding which might tend to construct a contradiction between the 
broad majority of adherents to religious beliefs and ourselves is a manner 
of proceeding which we must decidedly oppose […] The ‘Chinese dream’ 
and the building of a ‘beautiful China’ […] both belong to the cultural 
belief of our Chinese nation. At the same time this is the cultural belief 
of every individual person in China. This is our spiritual home.98
A revaluation of Confucian values is not restricted to the philosophical 
and academic milieu. Also in the PRC’s political rhetoric, a reconnection 
to Confucian philosophy is visible. Former Premier Wen Jiabao said the 
following:
From Confucius to Sun Yatsen, the traditional culture of the Chinese 
nation has had valuable elements, many positive aspects concerning 
the nature of human beings, and democracy. In this way, it emphasizes 
love and compassion, sense of community, harmony between different 
viewpoints, and the sharing of the world.99
96 Wang (1999, p. 30).
97 See Wang (2001, p. 157).
98 Zhuo (2013, p. 37). Quoted through Gaenssbauer (2015, pp. 50-51). Note that Zhuo Xinping, in 
another publication, calls for the elevation of Confucianism to the status of ‘religion’, much in 
the same way that Kang Youwei did in the nineteenth century. Personal communication Philip 
Clart.
99 Quoted through Weber (2013).
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This strand of thought is also visible in the ‘cultural nationalism’ of Kang 
Xiaoguang, important New Confucian theoretician and advisor to former 
Premier Zhu Rongji:
In the following 20 to 50 years, Confucianism will f ight a decisive battle 
with Western culture. This will be a battle on life and death, since it 
concerns the future of the Chinese nation. I am f irmly convinced that 
democracy will doom the future of China, while Confucianism or Con-
fucianizing can best serve the interests of the Chinese nation. This is my 
fundamental opinion. […] The hegemony of Confucian culture f irst has 
to be established. One has to realize that it will take continuous efforts 
for Confucianism to beat the West.100
The age-old aura of moral superiority of the junzi 君子 that was once used 
by Mao Zedong is now used by Xi Jinping to boost CCP and his authority.101 
Xi Jinping’s message is that a further modernization of the Chinese nation-
state is only possible under CCP rule and in combination with the Chinese 
cultural tradition. By referring to Confucianism, the CCP is accentuating the 
compatibility between the two and is, in this way, presenting communism 
as the natural continuator of the Confucian Chinese tradition.102 President 
Xi Jinping formulated it thus during his visit to Qufu, the birth place of 
Confucius:
That I come here, to Qufu, to the Institute for Confucian Research, shows 
that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party enhances 
traditional culture. […] The Institute for Confucian Research […] incar-
nates the conviction of the Party and the State. […] Many viewpoints of 
Confucius and of Confucianism were a great contribution to the intel-
lectual richness of humanity, and provide a lot of fundamental concepts 
of which some are common with the thought of other countries, while 
others – such as ‘humanity’ (ren) and ‘do not do to another what you do 
100 Kang (2006, pp. 113-114). Quoted through Weber (2013).
101 Kallio (2015, p. 76) quotes Michael Schuman (2014) in this respect: ‘Xi also apparently believes 
that Confucius can bolster his own standing in the country. Confucius’ ideal government was 
topped by a “sage-king” […] By combining one-man rule with the morality of Chinese antiquity, 
(Xi) appears to be painting himself up as some newfangled communist/Confucian sage-king – an 
all-commanding f igure who will usher in a new epoch of prestige and prosperity’.
102 See Zlotea (2015, p. 162). In Chapter 5 of this volume, Robert D. Weatherley remarks that ‘[t]
he use of historical memory to stimulate popular nationalist sentiment is second nature to the 
Chinese Communist Party’.
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not wish others would do to you’ ( ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren 己所不欲, 勿
施於人) – are unique. We may not cut off history. We have to summarize 
it and to adopt the valuable heritage of Confucius to Sun Zhongshan. 
[…] Comrade Mao Zedong has used a lot of quotations of Confucius and 
Confucian ideas in his speeches. […] In my speeches, I also use a lot of 
words of Confucius. […] Now we see the value of Confucian thinking 
much more clearly. […] If we want to bring China’s case to a good end, 
then it is necessary that we are in accordance with the method of China’s 
national situation.103
Jyrki Kallio therefore summarized the recent development as follows:
If Confucius is the new f igurehead for China, then President Xi Jinping 
is the f igurehead for the project to revive traditional schools of thought 
in China. The beginnings of the Party’s project were noticeable as far 
back as the 1980s, and it was during Hu Jintao’s era (2002-2012) that the 
‘harmonious society’ became the catchphrase for the Party’s goals. […] Xi 
Jinping has since widened the scope and has been talking about China’s 
desire to build a ‘harmonious world’.104
Or, how with the revaluation of Confucianism for a national agenda, also 
the age-old ‘All-under-Heaven’ ideal has returned to the fore.
Conclusion
The development of the practical use of Confucianism in China since the 
Han Dynasty perfectly illustrates the claim by Anthony Kemp that: ‘(a) sense 
of time is fundamental to human thought to the extent that the past must 
be invoked in order to establish any present ideology, even one that involves 
a discounting of the past. All ideologies are fundamentally descriptions not 
of a present state, but of a past history’.105
This observation suggests that, in twentieth-century China, no radical 
rupture occurred when the culturalist concept made place for a ‘national’ 
103 Xi Jinping zhuxi dao Qufu Kongzi ruxue yanjiuyuan canguan bing fabiao yanjiang’ 習近
平主席到曲阜 孔子儒學研究院參觀並演講 http://www.hytxe.com/info/361.html, accessed 
16 May 2014.
104 Kallio (2015, p. 76).
105 Kemp (1992, p. 106). Emphasis added.
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identity. Rather on the contrary. The very fact that Chinese nationalism 
and communism grew from a humiliated culturalism has continued to 
shape the way the country perceives itself and presents itself to the world. 
As def ined by Prasenjit Duara:
The shape and content of national identities in the modern era are a 
product of negotiation between remembered historical narratives 
of community and the institutionalized discourses of the modern 
nation-state-system.106
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8 Yiguandao under the Shadow of 
Nationalism
Traitors, Conspirators, Traditionalists, or Loyalists?
Ching-chih Lin
Abstract
In the name of nationalism, Yiguandao has been portrayed as double-faced 
by different political authorities since the 1930s: traitors, conspirators, 
loyalists, and traditionalists. To strengthen its legitimacy, Yiguandao has 
emphasized Confucian teaching and proclaimed its orthodox status as a 
successor to Chinese cultural heritage since the 1970s. However, Yiguan-
dao faces another predicament between its Chinese national identity and 
rising Taiwanese nationalism, particularly after the 2000s. The modern 
fate and face of Yiguandao are closely entangled in the political strug-
gles of nationalism. Revolving nationalism can be a double-edged sword 
because it can be reconstructed or manipulated by the state, political 
parties, or even religions to meet their own interests over time.
Keywords: Yiguandao, Chinese nationalism, Taiwanese nationalism, 
traitor, sectarianism
Introduction: Labeling religious sectarianism in the name of 
nationalism
In the name of nationalism, Yiguandao 一貫道 (I-Kuan Tao, the Unity 
Sect)1 has been politically portrayed as having various contradictory faces 
by different political authorities and even the Yiguandao itself, since Zhang 
Tianran 張天然 (1889-1947) succeeded the patriarch in the 1930s and made 
the religious sect one of the most influential religions in twentieth-century 
China. Unlike the modern Daoism considered as a part of national identity 
1 I-Kuan Tao is the English romanization and translation of ‘一貫道’ by the religious organiza-
tion itself. Literally it means ‘Way of Penetrating Unity’, a quote from Analect, in which Confucius 
dialogues with his students, ‘My Way is penetrated by a universal unity’ (wu dao yi yi guan zhi
吾道一以貫之).
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in Hsieh Shu-wei’s chapter in this book, Yiguandao followers were deemed 
traitors of the nation or the people, in line with the sentiment of the anti-
Japanese campaign after World War II, because of their connection with 
Japanese rule and the leadership of Wang Jingwei’s government from 1940-
1945. Moreover, members of Yiguandao were accused of being conspirators 
and Kuomintang (KMT) spies or American imperialist accomplices soon 
after the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. Ironically, 
the KMT in Taiwan also viewed Yiguandao members as conspirators and 
Communist spies, and hence suppressed the religion’s organization and 
spread for more than three decades.
Yiguandao followers turned into loyalists three decades later. After 
the KMT government in Taiwan recognized Yiguandao’s legal status and 
rehabilitated its reputation in the late 1980s, its masses of adherents became 
sought-after voters for different political parties to win over in the process 
of democratization. To strengthen its legitimacy, Yiguandao emphasized 
Confucian teaching and proclaimed its orthodox status by succeeding in 
the tradition of promoting Chinese cultural heritage, working in concert 
with the KMT’s traditionalist ideology of politicized Confucianism – a tool 
of legitimacy used against the Cultural Revolution of the Communist Party.
Since the 1980s, Yiguandao has successfully propelled Confucian teaching 
forward and has helped preserve Chinese tradition by promoting the children’s 
movement of reciting Chinese classics and poets in Taiwan. This movement 
resonated also with the recent nationalist trend of restoring Chinese tradi-
tion in general education in mainland China. From the 1990s, Yiguandao 
members became traditionalists preserving cultural heritage in mainland 
China. Some Taiwanese Yiguandao educators were discreetly invited to return 
to the mainland and help promote Chinese tradition, in order to slow down 
the rapid growth of Christian churches and sectarianism in rural areas.
However, in Taiwan today, Yiguandao has a new crisis of nationalist 
legitimacy. It has had to face the predicament of its Chinese national identity 
encountering the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, particularly since Chen 
Shuibian’s presidency in the 2000s.
Yiguandao’s modern fate and face are thus closely entangled with politi-
cal struggles under the shadow of nationalism. Dynamic nationalism can 
be a double-edged sword, as it can be reconstructed or manipulated by 
the state, political parties, or even religions themselves to meet their own 
needs over time. In the following pages, I unveil how in different periods 
Yiguandao members were portrayed as traitors, conspirators, loyalists, and 
traditionalists in the name of nationalism by different political authorities 
and by Yiguandao itself.
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As John Lagerwey has pointed out, China has been a ‘religious state’, 
and the religious dimension of the Chinese state and society were and are 
inseparable from each other, past and present.2 Not only has the state tried 
to control or intervene in religious affairs, but religions have also utilized 
political symbols and resources as social, political, economic, and cultural 
capital. Nationalism became a new political symbol in the modern period, 
used by both the state and religious organizations. This essay endeavors 
to explain why Yiguandao has a multifaceted image, due to nationalist 
manipulation, whether by the state, political parties, or the religion itself. To 
borrow Prasenjit Duara’s phrase,3 the author here tries to rescue Yiguandao 
from nationalist narratives and political manipulation. Like the history 
of the Boxers in 1900, historians can reconstruct the past in at least three 
dimensions – as event, experience, and myth.4
Nationalism has never been f ixed; instead, it has been reimagined, 
reinvented or reconstructed at all times.5 Nationalism was a symbol or 
tool used by different state governments or political parties to manipulate 
the relationship between state and religion in China and Taiwan in the 
twentieth century and this continues even today.6 This chapter deals with 
both state-led nationalism and popular nationalism,7 and various types 
of cultural nationalism launched by either the state, political parties, or 
Yiguandao itself are explored in the following pages. Considering the party-
state nature of both KMT’s Republic of China and the People’s Republic of 
China led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),8 this chapter treats 
the party-centered nationalist discourse and strategies as part of state 
nationalism. The history of Yiguandao needs to be restored in the context 
of competing nationalist narratives in modern and contemporary China. 
Among those multifaceted images bearing the name of nationalism, we 
need to clarify whether they are autonyms, pseudo-autonyms, labels, or 
stereotypes, using the analytical categories inspired by B.J. ter Haar.9 In 
the following sections, this essay tries to answer these questions: How were 
2 Lagerwey (2010, p. 1).
3 Duara (1995).
4 Cohen (1997).
5 Anderson (1991); Hobsbawn (1992); Smith (1993).
6 Weller (1994); Madsen (2007); Kuo (2008); Yang Fenggang (2012); Kuo (2014).
7 Charles Tilly (1994, p. 133) explores the state-led nationalism in Europe, and Zhao Shuisheng 
(1998) discusses China’s case demonstrating how PRC government launched patriotic education 
in post-Tiananmen China. 
8 Guo Yingjie (2004, pp. 24-48) discusses the intermingled relationship between state, nation, 
and ruling party, namely CCP, in terms of nationalism.
9 Ter Haar (1992).
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these contradictory labels or stereotypes made? By whom and for what 
purposes were they constructed?
Ambivalent faces of Yiguandao
Under the shadow of nationalism, Yiguandao has been portrayed with 
ambivalent, contradictory faces by various political entities, from the state 
to ruling parties, and Yiguandao itself in different periods and for dissimilar 
purposes. Each label has had varying consequences, from the suspension 
or revival of religious activities, to the sacrif ice of lives.
Traitor
Some leaders of Yiguandao were viewed as traitors during and after the 
Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945). Yiguandao rapidly expanded during this 
period, particularly in the areas occupied by the Japanese army or the 
puppet government led by Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883-1944). The religion’s 
boom under Japanese occupation may have had different causes, such 
as its charitable activities and the promise of religious salvation offered 
by Yiguandao believers, yet this boom also earned the group the label of 
traitor (hanjian 漢奸) and political suppression afterwards. Some religious 
leaders of Yiguandao were individually labeled traitors, especially those 
high-ranked off icials in Wang Jingwei’s government, such as Li Lijiu 李麗
久, Sun Xiangfu 孫祥夫, Chu Minyi 褚民誼, Zhou Fohai 周佛海 and Zhou 
Xuechang 周學昌.10 The modern founder of Yiguandao, Zhang Tianran, 
was once appointed a Councilor in Wang Jingwei’s administration, in order 
to facilitate passing through military checkpoints to preach in different 
areas. This connection with Japan and the puppet administration resulted 
in the traitor label.
This traitor label led to an official dismissal order from the Social Depart-
ment on 31 January 1946, with the court accusing Yiguandao of treason.11 
The headquarters and branches in Nanjing, then the national capital, were 
seized by the government. Yiguandao ceased public activities and had to 
use its social and political connections to regain its property and reputation. 
Eventually the court could not f ind significant evidence to accuse the group 
of treason, and Yiguandao won the lawsuit and regained its property and 
10 Lu (1998, pp. 169-173); Lu (2002, pp. 272-278); Lin Wanchuan (2010, p. 137).
11 Lu (2002, p. 377).
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reputation.12 On 1 August 1947, the major leaders of Yiguandao off icially 
established a new charitable organization, the Association of Chinese Mo-
rality and Charity (Zhonghua Daode Cishan Hui 中華道德慈善會),13 in 
order to avoid the negative traitor label.
The trials against traitors were abundant and controversial after the end 
of World War II. Scholarly research has proved that a great number of the 
accused in traitor trials were actually innocent.14 The struggle between 
the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party caused mutual 
accusations of treason during this period. Nationalism was manipulated by 
both political parties to instigate nationalist sentiment against the Japanese 
by labeling the other side as collaborators and traitors.15 Yiguandao’s rapid 
and nationwide boom had threatened the political authorities. National-
ism thus became a convenient label and tool to weaken the legality and 
legitimacy of Yiguandao. Compared to conventional accusations against 
sectarian groups in the late Imperial dynasties, such as rebellion, swindling 
of money, rape of young girls and married wives, nationalism was a new 
charge during the twentieth century.
Conspirators
Both KMT and CCP governments still applied conventional labels to 
sectarian groups in the twentieth century. Both political parties accused 
Yiguandao of conspiracy and being enemies of the state, although using 
different terminologies. After the political separation of 1949, the KMT in 
Taiwan labeled some Yiguandao leaders from mainland China as Taiwan 
CCP spies and conspirators ( feidie 匪諜) who were scheming to overthrow 
the government and jeopardize the survival of the state – the Republic of 
China which KMT claimed the authentic orthodox nation representing 
‘the only Chinese nation’. Meanwhile, the CCP government, claiming the 
only orthodoxy as well, also suspected the leaders of Yiguandao of being 
KMT spies and conspirators (guote 國特 or guomindang tewu 國民黨
特務) who were spreading rumors of the end of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and scheming to organize guerrilla warfare supported by 
the KMT or American imperialist accomplices. The latter charge involved 
the manipulation of nationalism also. Rumors in North China in the early 
12 The Second Historical Archives of China (1999).
13 Lu (2002, pp. 378-379).
14 Lo (1994); Lo (1995); Chang (2001); Wakeman (2003); Brook (2005); Pan (2010); Lo (2013).
15 Liu Ping (2013, pp. 266-267).
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1950s were that Yiguandao followers, as KMT conspirators or American 
imperialist accomplices, plotted to cut off women’s breasts and steal boys’ 
testicles. The other version of the rumor said that the KMT accused CCP 
cadres of cutting off men’s testicles and women’s breasts and removing 
wombs to make new weapons against America’s atom bombs.16 All these 
rumors refer to the consequence of having no offspring, which would result 
in the death of the Chinese nation. Both the KMT government in Taiwan 
and the CCP government in mainland China launched campaigns against 
the Yiguandao after 1949.
Both KMT and CCP rulers claimed the orthodoxy (zhengtong 正統) of 
the Chinese nation and therefore considered spies and conspirators of the 
other to be major enemies. The Yiguandao became the scapegoat in the 
struggle between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is a different level 
of nationalism: the competition between two ruling governments claiming 
the orthodoxy of China as a nation. Both governments launched campaigns 
against the Yiguandao as being an ‘evil cult’ (xiejiao 邪教) although using 
different terminologies.
The CCP government launched a regional campaign against the Yi-
guandao in the areas occupied by the CCP’s army before 1949, and soon 
accelerated the nationwide eradication of Yiguandao personnel and organi-
zations after the establishment of the PRC. The alleged crimes of Yiguandao 
members were collaboration with the Japanese, conspiracy with the KMT 
and American imperialist accomplices, counter-revolutionary behavior, the 
status of gangsters and landlords, and ‘feudal superstition.’17 The accusation 
of feudal superstition was the contemporary ‘evil cult’ under the rule of the 
CCP along with animism. Central and local governments executed brutal 
suppression between 1950 and 1953 and fundamentally eradicated most of 
the organizations of Yiguandao.18
The KMT government considered Yiguandao members potential con-
spirators even before the Anti-Japanese War. Zhang Tianran was arrested 
by secret police in the spring of 1936 for his suspected conspiracy and col-
laboration with the Japanese and was f inally released without conviction 
in January 1937.19 The KMT government arrested some Yiguandao leaders 
in the course of investigating CCP spies in the early 1950s, and then used 
16 Lu (1998, pp. 192-195).
17 ‘Editorial: Firmly Prohibiting I-Kuan Tao’, People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao 人民日報), 20 De-
cember 1950.
18 Lu (1998, p. 200); Yang Liuchang (2011, pp. 37-40).
19 Lin Jung-tse (2010, p. 513); Lu (2002, p. 255).
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the Regulation of Prohibiting Unhealthy Popular Customs (Chajin Minjian 
Buliang Xisu 查禁民間不良習俗) to categorize Yiguandao as evil cult in 
1951.20 The Ministry of the Interior reiterated the prohibition in 1958. After 
that, newspapers, magazines, and radio stations began to cooperate with 
KMT propaganda and reported the alleged crimes of Yiguandao. Buddhist 
associations were also mobilized by the Taiwan Garrison Command (Tai-
wan Jingbei Zongbu 台灣警備總部) to attack Yiguandao.21 Some leaders 
and followers of Yiguandao were arrested and tortured in prisons. In 1963, 
the Chief of Office of Police Affairs, Zhang Guoqiang (張國彊), strengthened 
the suppression, although no clear evidence could be found to link it to 
conspiracy.22 As a result, two top leaders of Yiguandao, Chen Wenxiang (陳
文祥) and Zhang Peicheng (張培成) had to publicly announce the dismissal 
of Yiguandao in nationwide newspapers on 13 March 1963.23 Thereafter, Yi-
guandao activities became clandestine, and some branches joined Buddhist 
or Daoist associations, in order to maintain their legitimacy and legality.24 
The Provincial Association of Daoism in Taiwan welcomed Yiguandao 
believers to join its membership, according to a newspaper published by the 
KMT. The top leader Zhang Peicheng joined Daoism and eventually became 
the deputy chairman.25 Two leaders of the Andong Branch of Yiguandao, 
Gao Binkai (高斌凱), and Liu Renhan (柳人漢), learned Zen meditation 
in Buddhist temples.26 Some branches emphasized Confucian teaching 
in order to fashion the orthodoxy of Confucianism which was off icially 
sponsored by the KMT government in Taiwan, and which will be discussed 
in detail in the following sections. After the government’s crackdown in the 
1960s, most Yiguandao leaders and followers transformed into clandestine 
organizations and activities and promoted charities and moral teaching 
to demonstrate their loyalty to the ‘Liberal China’, the KMT government 
in Taiwan. Most of the books they published during this period had loyal 
phrases on the covers, such as ‘restoring traditional culture’, being ‘patriotic 
to the nation’, and ‘loyal to the state leader’.
20 Lin Pen-hsuan (1990, p. 17); Song (1983, p. 9).
21 Ho (1996, pp. 75-76).
22 Ho (1996, pp. 136-137).
23 Lin Wanchuan (2010, p. 131); Yang Liuchang (2011, pp. 45-50).
24 Song (1983, p. 10).
25 Lee Li-liang (2012, pp. 307-308); Lee Fong-mao (2013).
26 Xuan Yi (2003, p. 253-255).
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Loyalist and traditionalist in Taiwan
Leaders and followers of Yiguandao emphasize loyalty (zhong 忠) as one 
of the most important virtues, because they highlight Confucian teaching 
as the core element in traditional Chinese culture. Yiguandao members 
thus view themselves as the successors to Chinese orthodox culture.27 The 
roles of loyalists and traditionalists are two sides of the same coin. Loyalty 
to the state or ruler has been the most signif icant ethic among all social 
relations in Confucianism. Yiguandao emphasizes Confucian teaching, 
along with other teachings from Daoism and Buddhism. In Provisional 
Etiquette (Zhanding Fogui 暫訂佛規) published in 1939, Zhang Tianran 
emphasized that all Yiguandao followers should follow the Eight Virtues of 
Confucianism, among which loyalty is the foremost.28 During the political 
crackdown, Yiguandao followers did not choose to resist. Zhang Tianran 
constantly stressed that Yiguandao followers, including himself, should 
not be involved in politics.29 Instead, Yiguandao emphasized Confucian 
teaching even harder, in order to favor the ‘Movement of Renaissance of 
Traditional Chinese Culture’ (Zhonghua Wenhua Fuxing Yundong 中華
文化復興運動) which was initiated by the KMT government during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Due to the destruction and eradication of 
traditional Chinese culture during the CCP-led Cultural Revolution, the 
KMT stressed its respect for traditional culture and highlighted Confu-
cianism in particular, since Confucius had been seriously attacked by the 
Red Guards and CCP elites. Confucianism became the critical symbol of 
the Chinese nation. Regarding the competition of orthodoxy between the 
KMT and CCP governments, the attitude toward Confucianism became 
the critical value and criterion. Since Yiguandao had taught its follow-
ers the importance of Confucianism for decades, it found a niche in the 
KMT’s rule to rebuild the religion’s legitimacy. Yiguandao thus became 
one of the most inf luential movements promoting Confucian teaching 
outside the off icial educational system, including the movement of reciting 
Confucian texts and classical poems.30 The state-led nationalism and its 
popular counterpart converged at this point and mutually strengthened 
the legitimacy of each other. Song Guangyu 宋光宇 identif ies Yiguandao 
27 Liu and Liu (1995, p. 233; 266).
28 Zhang (1939, p. 6b).
29 Zhang (1939, p. 1a).
30 Ting (2009, pp. 307-365).
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as ‘non-off icial Promotion Committee of the “Movement of Renaissance 
of Traditional Chinese Culture”’.31 In the 1990s and afterwards, Yiguandao 
members presided many times at the off icial Memorial Ceremony for 
Confucius in different Confucian Temples in Taiwan.
Yiguandao stressed orthodoxy by reconstructing the Confucian geneal-
ogy from ancient emperors and sages through the KMT’s founder Sun Yatsen 
and contemporary rulers, Jiang Jieshi and Jiang Jingguo, and then connected 
Yiguandao with orthodoxy. Before and after the crackdown, Yiguandao 
members tried to communicate with KMT rulers and high-ranked elites 
via intermediate personnel to the effect that Yiguandao would be very 
loyal to the government if legal status were granted. Within the preaching 
and spirit-writing rituals, loyalty and f ilial piety were often highlighted as 
the most important virtues.32 Yiguandao promoted traditional culture by 
organizing children reading Confucian classics and the politeness move-
ment.33 Moreover, Yiguandao groups also organized various charities, from 
refuges for disasters, orphanages, preschools, social assistance for the poor 
and the elders, to health care and hospitals, and thus earned awards and 
honors from the government even before they were legalized.34 All these 
efforts to strengthen the civilized dimensions perfectly f it the modern 
category of ‘institutionalized religion’ demonstrated by authors of Mak-
ing Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China.35 
Yiguandao endeavored to present itself as a civilized modern religion to 
fulf ill the expectations toward all religions of the modern state. In addition, 
Yiguandao stressed moral teaching as the foundation for social stability and 
organized numerous workshops and camps for students and teenagers.36 
The former Interior Minister, Wu Boxion 吳伯雄, once remarked admiringly 
that wherever there is one more Yiguandao follower, the society would 
need one less police off icer.37 The roles of loyalist and traditionalist were 
recognized positively by the state after the mid-1980s. Yiguandao’s emphasis 
on popular nationalism won the tolerance of the state and created the 
partnership between the religious association and KMT.
In the process of democratization in Taiwan in the mid-1980s, KMT 
elites found a new way to ask Yiguandao followers to demonstrate their 
31 Song (1983, p. 219).
32 Song (1983, p. 41).
33 Liu and Liu (1995, pp. 366-368).
34 Song (1983, pp. 137-208); Liu and Liu (1995, pp. 337-452); Lin Wanchuan (2002, pp. 228-266).
35 Ashiwa and Wank (2009).
36 Liu and Liu (1995, pp. 366-452).
37 Pingjiang Magazine Editor (2012).
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loyalty: by collecting votes to elect KMT’s candidates. To earn its legal 
status, Yiguandao cooperated with the KMT in various elections to help 
the candidates of the ruling party defeat the opposition party,38 the rising 
camp in favor of Taiwanese nationalism. By cooperating with the rulers, 
Yiguandao successfully removed their demonizing label and eventually 
earned legal status in 1987 when the Ministry of the Interior accepted the 
application for a national association of Yiguandao. The Republic of China 
Yiguandao Association was off icially established and registered in 1988.
Both the KMT government and Yiguandao itself stressed the role of 
loyalty to the state and the ruling party from different perspectives and 
for distinct purposes. The party-state rulers wanted votes to win elections, 
while Yiguandao members desired legalization. However, as democratiza-
tion proceeded, Yiguandao members had to face the predicament of how 
to interact with the rising opposition political party. Unfortunately, the 
predicament deteriorated as the opposition party tended to be more and 
more ‘pro-Independence’ in the 1990s and 2000s, the period of the expansion 
of Taiwanese nationalism. As Robert D. Weatherley points out in this book, 
nationalism is a double-edged sword. Yiguandao’s emphasis on Chinese 
nationalism might have helped the religion earn legitimacy and legality in 
the 1980s, but it also undermined the religion’s legitimacy and social support 
when Taiwanese cultural nationalism gradually inflated in the 1990s and 
2000s.39 In fact, the Taiwan Affairs Off ice of the State Council (Guowuyuan 
Taiwan Shiwu Bangongshi 國務院台灣事務辦公室), had already noticed 
the value of Yiguandao in the competition between Chinese and Taiwanese 
nationalist narratives,40 something which will be discussed further in the 
next section.
Another traditionalist’s predicament concerns Yiguandao’s global spread. 
The fact that the religion highlights traditional Chinese culture as its core 
element has hindered its reception by potential non-Chinese followers, 
although Yiguandao’s highlighting of Chinese nationalism has been helpful 
for the religion’s transmission among overseas Chinese communities.41 
In some Southeast Asian countries, several branches have become suc-
cessfully indigenized in non-Chinese cultural communities. Local ritual 
masters use local languages and concepts to preach and practice the rituals. 
Globalized transmission is the ultimate goal that Yiguandao has pursued 
38 Song (1983, pp. 41-42); Song (1996, p. 245); Yang Liuchang (2011, pp. 58-63).
39 For details of the growth of cultural nationalism in Taiwan, please see: Hsiau (2012).
40 Yang Liuchang (2011, pp. 139-141).
41 Song (1983, appendix pp. 9-11). 
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for decades, but it requires more global adaptation to reduce the religion’s 
China-centered doctrine, which in some ways contradicts its emphasis on 
Chinese nationalism.
Loyalist and traditionalist in mainland China
There has been no legal status for Yiguandao as loyalist or traditionalist 
under the PRC’s rule. Yiguandao has been categorized an evil cult since the 
very beginning of the PRC. In order to be considered good citizens, followers 
of Yiguandao had to relinquish their membership and publicly denounce the 
religion and its leaders and followers. Traditional culture was disregarded 
and massively destroyed before the end of the Cultural Revolution. By then, 
there was no social or cultural space in which Yiguandao could survive. 
However, the situation changed in the mid-1980s.
The call for restoring traditional culture gave space for the reading of 
classics and the restoration of Confucius’ status. Taiwan’s experiences in 
promoting the movement of reciting classics and poems were then de-
manded in mainland China also. The PRC needed traditional culture to 
restore national glory and strengthen its national identity. The ‘National 
Studies Fever’ (guoxuere 國學熱) began in 1993 in the universities, gradually 
spreading to the public and becoming popular in the 2000s.42 Scholars, 
educators, and parents were devoted to the trend, while the state invested 
national resources to construct infrastructure and to promote the move-
ment. The establishment of Confucius Institutes abroad represents the 
crystallization of the National Studies Fever. There are now 500 branches 
offering 1000 courses in 134 countries, educating in the Chinese language 
and propelling Chinese culture into the world.43 This can be considered 
a revitalization movement that the state and society use to try to restore 
the missing traditional culture,44 though Yiguandao also tries to syncre-
tize Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, and Islam with Chinese culture, 
mainly Confucianism.45 Yiguandao has thus participated in the trend. Some 
branches of Yiguandao sent followers back to China to set up preschools and 
extracurricular schools with specialization in reading Chinese classics and 
poems, plus highlighting moral teaching, which differentiates them from 
42 Dong (2014, p. 33).
43 See off icial website of Confucius Institute: http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/
node_10961.htm. Last accessed on 22 March 2016.
44 Chiu (1989); Li Yih-Yuan (1999, pp. 41-74); Ting (2004, pp. 123-124).
45 Ting (2009, p. 313-366).
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their regular competitors. In the 21st century, Yiguandao has been afforded 
a very promising opportunity to return to mainland China as part of the 
National Studies Fever. In fact, Yiguandao’s return was tacitly connived at 
by the PRC for multiple purposes: to promote the grassroots organizations 
of National Studies Fever, to win over the Taiwanese and overseas Chinese, 
and to stop the rapid growth of Christian churches and sects in rural areas.
Out of concern for Chinese nationalism, the PRC government has worried 
about the boom of Christian churches as discussed in this book by Tsai 
Yen-zen and Kuo Cheng-tian as regards to the relationship between state 
and church in China. One of the main under-the-table concerns is the 
foreign connection behind Christian churches and missionaries who can 
propel democratization and challenge the legitimacy of the PRC. To harness 
the rapid expansion of Christianity, the PRC government would rather 
give space to native religious organizations, even sectarianism. In fact, the 
backroom communication between the PRC and Yiguandao representatives 
started in the 1990s, and the public interactions began in the mid-2000s. In 
the f irst stage, the PRC government sent scholars with special backgrounds, 
such as retired police off icers or off icials of the Taiwan Affairs Off ice or 
the United Front Work Department to contact Yiguandao in Taiwan and 
abroad.46 Yang Liuchang (楊流昌), an off icial of the Taiwan Affairs Of-
f ice, earned a PhD in Beijing investigating the history of Yiguandao and 
its development in Taiwan and published his dissertation in Hong Kong. 
This book suggests that the PRC government is seeking a way to allow 
Yiguandao to return to mainland China as it concentrates on the process 
of legalization and negotiations between the KMT and the religion. The 
PRC government is facing a similar situation that its KMT counterpart 
experienced three decades ago: after criticizing and suppressing Yiguandao 
for decades, how does it now legalize the religion and reinterpret that past 
criticism and suppression? One potential discourse explains that Yiguandao 
in Taiwan has fundamentally transformed its conspiratorial tendencies into 
a patriotic and philanthropic religious association. The PRC government 
needs a reasonable discourse to legitimate the return of Yiguandao.
Nationalism can be invoked to legitimate the return of Yiguandao to 
compete with the rapid expansion of Christianity. In the Annual Report on 
China’s Religions of 2009, published by the state think-tank Institute of World 
Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Science, the authors clearly suggest 
mobilizing formerly prohibited sectarian religions, such as Yiguandao or 
Dejiao (德教), to form a team to spread Chinese culture globally, appeal to 
46 Lin Wanchuan (2010, pp. 78-81).
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overseas Chinese, enhance the nation’s ‘cultural soft power’ and maintain 
the ‘security of national culture’.47 Time will heal the wound. From feudal 
superstition and counter-revolutionaries to protectors and missionaries 
of national culture, followers of Yiguandao are now expected to be loyal 
to the PRC by playing the traditionalist role against Christianity. On the 
list of evil cults announced in 2000 and 2005, Yiguandao was no longer 
categorized as an evil cult. Some branches were tacitly connived with to 
return to mainland China, as long as they did not cross over the ‘red line’ 
and preach religion in public. In the past, most activities of Yiguandao 
in mainland China were under surveillance; some religious leaders were 
even arrested or exiled.48 Now Yiguandao shifts its status in China from 
‘red zone’ to ‘gray zone’, to borrow Yang Fenggang’s concept.49 It took more 
than f ive decades to overturn the relationship between Yiguandao and the 
PRC government.
Mutual understanding began in the early 1990s when Yiguandao as-
sociations made donations to assist victims of several natural disasters. 
Yiguandao leaders entrusted messages to scholars to communicate with 
the think-tank Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social 
Science in 1996, and also invited the Institute’s faculty members to visit 
branches of Yiguandao and attend academic forums organized by the reli-
gion in Taiwan from 1997 onwards.50 Yiguandao leaders were also invited 
to visit mainland China by various bureaucratic administrations from 2006 
onwards. The United Front Work Department even invited several top 
leaders of Yiguandao branches to visit several historical sites of the religion 
and the hometowns of the religion’s modern founders, Zhang Tianran and 
Sun Huiming (孫慧明). Former KMT Chair ,Wu Boxion, helped pass the 
Yiguandao organization’s message to former CCP Chair and PRC President 
Hu Jintao (胡錦濤)with the suggestion of legalizing Yiguandao in mainland 
China on 26 May 2008.51
Being loyal to the PRC might earn legal space for Yiguandao in main-
land China, but might also backlash in Taiwan. When the President of 
the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, Chen Yunlin (陳
雲林), led delegates to attend the f irst meeting with the Straits Exchange 
Foundation in Taiwan in December 2008, and encountered protests led by 
47 Jin and Qiu (2009, p. 16; p. 228).
48 Lin Wanchuan (2010, pp. 80-81).
49 Yang Fenggang (2012).
50 Li Yu-zhu (2011, p. 229).
51 Li Yu-zhu (2011, p. 230).
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the pro-Independence camp, Yiguandao leaders mobilized hundreds of 
supporters to welcome and escort the PRC delegates.52 According to one of 
the organizers, they wanted to demonstrate the voice of Chinese national 
identity and show friendly intentions towards the PRC government.53 Later, 
in early 2009, the messenger from PRC contacted Yiguandao and inquired 
why they had organized the mobilization. The friendly intentions received 
a positive response. Top off icials of the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs (SARA), Ye Xiaowen (葉小文) and Jiang Jianyong (蔣堅永), also met 
Yiguandao leaders in Taiwan in 2009.54 Several top off icials, along with 
scholars, visited Yiguandao’s branches in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, and Hong Kong in March 2009; then other delegate groups 
visited branches of Yiguandao in Taiwan in May and June 2009. In August 
2009, delegates of scholars and officials from the PRC attended an academic 
conference and visited the most signif icant branches all over Taiwan. By 
showing classes of National Studies, children reciting Chinese classics and 
poems, and charities for social minorities and disaster victims, Yiguandao 
endeavored to persuade PRC off icials that Yiguandao means no harm to 
the rule of PRC. Using the roles of loyalist and traditionalist again became 
the strategy for the religion to cooperate with the state, but this time the 
nation was the PRC.
Chinese nationalism is a double-edged sword for Yiguandao followers. 
On the one hand, it has helped Yiguandao earn trust from the PRC leaders. 
On the other hand, Yiguandao may risk losing social support in Taiwan as 
the Indigenization Movement launched by President Li Denghui 李登輝 
(Lee Teng-hui) in the 1990s, and followed by President Chen Shuibian (陳
水扁) in the 2000s, has educated a new generation of students with more 
Taiwanese national identity than their Chinese counterparts. Yiguandao 
voters no longer favor the KMT in elections. To attract the young generation 
to join Yiguandao, the religion needs to adjust the policy of highlighting 
Chinese nationalism and orthodoxy, which worked successfully in Taiwan 
in the 1980s and works well in mainland China in the 2010s, but could fail 
in Taiwan the future. If Yiguandao favors Chinese nationalism in order to 
obtain legalization in mainland China, it might offend Taiwanese national-
ism and lose social support. As a result, the religion’s adherents might be 
considered traitors once again.
52 Li Yu-zhu (2011, p. 231).
53 Personal communication with the top leader. To protect the person’s privacy, identity is 
anonymous here.
54 Li Yu-zhu (2011, p. 231).
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Concluding remarks
Under the shadow of nationalism, the images of Yiguandao have been 
manipulated by different parties, including the religion itself. The state 
and political parties have used nationalist narratives to control religious 
sectarianism; meanwhile, religions have their own autonomy and know 
how to utilize nationalist narratives to create social and political space 
and earn more resources. However, nationalism as a double-edged sword 
is essentially f luid and may change over time. Religion, nonetheless, is 
supposed to pursue ultimate, eternal concerns. When a religion tries to use 
nationalism as an expedient means of obtaining something, it can easily 
lose that thing or eventually even lose itself.
The image of religious sectarianism can be manipulated by governments 
or political leaders according to their needs, and nationalism has served as 
a useful and convenient mobilizing tool. Under the shadow of nationalism, 
Yiguandao has been portrayed with ambivalent and conflicting faces since 
its modern rising in the 1930s.
Religion cannot be free from politics, past and present; but that does not 
mean it has to serve politics or nationalist identity. Religions have their own 
autonomy, goals and signif icance.
Yiguandao has used nationalist narratives and labels to legitimate its or-
thodoxy and legality and to appeal to overseas Chinese in the past decades. 
However, it could also have undermined its social basis as the indigenization 
of political-cultural national identity has gradually increased in Taiwan in 
the past two decades. The ‘China-centered’ discourses and terminology in 
the teachings and rituals of Yiguandao might also be a barrier to its teaching 
to non-Chinese people and to spreading its religion across the globe.
Nationalism is a double-edged sword for religion. As nationalism can 
be reconstructed and manipulated for different communities for various 
purposes over time, the changing dynamics of nationalist discourses and 
labels can jeopardize the social and cultural basis of religion, which is usu-
ally expected to be ‘eternal through time’. If Yiguandao desires to become 
a world religion in the future, it needs to create advanced theologies and 
religious concerns that transcend China-centered nationalism.
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This chapter explores the Daoist encounter with modernity in twentieth-
century China. It focuses on nationalism and Daoist resilience, reinvigora-
tion, and revival. Since both nationalism and Daoism are transformations 
of premodern traditions and identities, the emergence of the modern 
category of ‘Daoism’ is a product of the encounter with the West. Daoism 
was nationalized in early twentieth century and Daoism was made a part 
of national identity. The efforts to renew and reform Daoism became 
deeply engaged with nationalism, science, the religious reform move-
ments, as well as other movements of modernity. According to these 
Daoist leaders, promoting Daoism has a positive impact on modern China, 
including building a sense of community, forging cultural self-identity, 
and strengthening the nation.
Keywords: Daoism, Chinese religion, nationalism, modernity, patriotism
Introduction: Religion and superstition
The Chinese intellectual elite regarded religion with skepticism in the 
early twentieth century, partially due to the reason-based approach 
taken by traditional Confucian scholars toward the issues of ghosts and 
gods. Historically, religion played only a supporting role in the moral 
education of the populace and in the continued survival of the state. With 
the dawn of scientif ic-rational thinking embraced by the May Fourth 
movement, religion and science were considered opposing concepts. 
These historical factors, in conjunction with the emergence of the Non-
Christian Movement and Non-Religious Alliance in the 1920s, have meant 
that modern intellectuals and the modern state have not made religion a 
major priority. The religious policy of the modern Chinese state has gone 
further to re-delineate the realm of religion, drawing a border between 
legal religion and superstition. This policy is aimed at achieving the goal 
of modernizing the state, so that China can become a secular modern 
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country.1 As China’s national religion, Daoism must be made compatible 
with the process of modernization. In this context, Daoism underwent 
a reshaping to make it a suitable national religion for a modern state. 
This reshaping process is closely tied with the concept of what makes a 
religion.
The modern Chinese word for ‘religion’ (zongjiao 宗教, literally ‘sect 
teaching’) represents a concept that is relatively new to China. The ac-
ceptance of the concept of religion, and the assessment of its meaning and 
value, are closely intertwined with modern cultural thought and political 
movements. In other words, religion was an important part of the discussion 
in intellectual circles regarding how traditional China could be shaped into 
a modern country. Prior to the twentieth century, China had no concept 
of religion. The new word zongjiao was borrowed from Japanese shūkyō, 
which was coined as a translation for the Western concept of religion. After 
Japan signed trade and maritime treaties with the North German Federa-
tion in 1869, the word shūkyō began appearing in translation of the word 
religion. Fumio Murata, in his Record of Things Seen and Heard in the West 
(‘Seiyo bunken roku’), discussed the various sects of Western belief under 
the heading Shūkyō. Yukichi Fukuzawa experimented with several other 
translations of the word religion, but after Mori Arinori published the essay 
‘Shūkyō’ in the journal Miroku zasshi in 1874, shūkyō became the word of 
choice for the concept of religion.2
In China, though the combination of the characters zong and jiao has 
been in use from documents ranging from Southern-dynasty documents 
to Song-Dynasty Buddhist writings and local annals in the Ming and Qing 
Dynasties, the combination usually referred to the teachings or tenets of 
a certain sect or school of thought, instead of its modern definition that 
can encompass all belief systems. The word zongjiao did not appear in the 
cultural discourse of China’s intellectual circles until the late nineteenth 
century. The first use of the word in its modern definition in Chinese writing 
was in Huang Zunxian’s Chronicle of Japan (‘Riben guo zhi’, 日本國志), 
published in 1895. Liang Qichao also began to use the word zongjiao after 
he fled to Japan in the wake of the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform in 
1898. From then on, the concept of religion became increasingly part of 
China’s intellectual discourse. In his Discourse on the Boundary of Rights 
1 Ashiwa and Wank, eds. (2009); Chau (2006); Duara (1991, pp. 67-83); DuBois (2005); Goossaert 
(2006, pp. 307-336); Palmer and Goosaert (2011); Poon (潘淑華), (2010); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang 
(2008).
2 Chen (1999); Smith (1998, pp. 269-284); Gaenssbauer (2015, pp. 10-13).
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Between the Collective and the Self (Qunji quanjie lun 群己權界論), Yan Fu 
嚴復 used the word zongjiao to correspond to the English word religion. This 
correspondence became widely accepted and formalized in the twentieth 
century, and the traditional definition of ‘teaching tenet’ gradually gave way 
to the modern definition of ‘religion’. The establishment of the word also 
gave rise to modern scholarly discussion of the topic of religion.3
The borrowing of the Japanese word shūkyō in order to translate the 
word religion heralded the emergence of religion studies in its modern 
form: the study of religion in a rational, objective, and interdisciplinary 
manner. This represented a major change in the approach to religion for 
Chinese scholars. However, there is no concept equivalent to the Western 
conception of ‘religion’ in Chinese cultural and academic contexts. The 
word is only a symbol to represent the Western concept of religion, and can 
only be understood from a Western perspective using Western definitions. 
When we analyze Daoism through the lens of ‘religion’ we inevitably view 
the various aspects of Daoism from a Western context and using Western 
approaches. This leads to an analysis of Daoism through its classics, its 
tenets, and its organization. Certainly, this research approach has proven 
fruitful for modern Daoism studies around the world, opening up avenues 
of research that had not been explored. However, on some level, this ap-
proach also molds or interprets Daoism as a ‘religion’ as def ined through 
the Western lens, overlooking some core aspects of Daoism. This has led 
to an imbalance in Daoism studies that has in turn weakened or damaged 
the value of Daoism as a subject of research.
The concept of religion stands in opposition to the concept of superstition 
(mixin 迷信). The word mixin does occur in Chinese contexts, but in its 
modern meaning it must once again be traced back to a borrowing from 
the Japanese meishin. In the mid-1880s, meishin was used in Japanese in 
opposition to science. In A Japanese and English Dictionary (1886), meishin 
was given as the Japanese word corresponding to the English superstition. 
Chinese media sources began using the word mixin in 1897, mostly connect-
ing it with zongjiao in opposition to ‘science’ (kexue 科學) in a continuation 
of the Japanese usage of the word. An English-Chinese Standard Dictionary 
(1908) was the f irst English-Chinese dictionary to explicitly give mixin as 
the equivalent of superstition. Starting at the end of the Qing Dynasty, the 
opposition between ‘superstition’ and ‘science’ fueled many debates. The 
May Fourth movement espoused the Enlightenment ideals of science and 
reason, opposing traditional beliefs including the Confucian teachings 
3 Chen (1999); Campany (2003, pp. 215-253).
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of putting family f irst, worshipping ancestors, and emphasizing sexual 
purity. Religion and feudal traditions were considered ‘superstitions’. It 
was not until Liang Qichao 梁啟超 conducted an in-depth exploration 
of religion, superstition, and belief in the journal Xinmin Congbao 新民
叢報, and similar debates took place on the pages of the Xin Qingnian 新
青年 and Lingxue Congzhi 靈學叢誌, that religion was decoupled from 
superstition. In the 1920s and after, both the Nationalist and Communist 
regimes launched major campaigns against religion and superstition under 
various names: ‘destroying temples to build schools’, ‘improving customs’, 
and the f inal culmination in the Cultural Revolution. All of these efforts 
show the profound influence of the concept of superstition.4
Under the Western conception of religion, Daoism was reshaped based 
on its tenets and its classics. Daoism was considered one of the major world 
religions in China, comparable to Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, 
and Buddhism. In the early twentieth century, the Nationalist government 
off icially recognized Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism, and 
Daoism as the ‘f ive major religions’, subject to government regulations 
but also government protection as long as they conformed to government-
imposed standards for being a ‘religion’. However, the classif ication of 
Daoism as a world religion necessarily emphasizes certain aspects that are 
more compatible with the Western framework of religion, while overlook-
ing or marginalizing other essential aspects. This process, known as the 
religionization of Daoism, has been underway for a century, and it is now 
time to look back and reflect on how religionization has shaped Daoism.
At the end of the Qing Dynasty, ‘Daoism’ was a wide-ranging f ield that 
included the systemic organizations of temples, local Daoist altars and 
Daoist clerics living secular lives, the tradition of self-guided practition-
ers, and various other outlets that provided Daoist-related services. All of 
the elements listed above have some level of connection with folk beliefs, 
particularly the secular-living clerics. Daoism and folk beliefs formed a 
complex and intricate web of faith.5
Inf luenced by the religion-related policies of Western nation-states, 
modern China adopted the secularization model and redefined the realm 
of religion, establishing a dichotomy between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ religion.6 
Under this state-led process undertaken by the intellectual elite, Daoism 
was reshaped: the elements that were deemed appropriate by the state 
4 Katz (2013, pp. 605-682); Nedostup (2010).
5 Goosaert (2012, pp. 200-228); Goosaert (2010, pp. 39-80). 
6 Szonyi (2013, pp. 339-358).
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became the core of modern Daoism, while the elements that were excluded 
faded into the periphery, deprecated and sometimes even suppressed and 
destroyed. The dichotomy of ‘religion’ and ‘superstition’ was the framework 
on which the twentieth-century state and intelligentsia based their efforts 
to reshape Daoism.
National policy separated religion and the state, making religion an 
object of state governance. Under this system, the state provides legal status 
to certain Daoist institutions, allowing them to establish organizations of 
clerics, temples, and Daoist academies. This model is an obvious imitation 
of the Western approach to religion (mainly Christianity), an approach that 
has reshaped modern Daoism.
First, this approach emphasizes tenets and theology. However, the focus 
of Daoism has never been on its teachings. Historically, Daoism encountered 
many challenges in terms of what it teaches, some from Buddhism and some 
from Confucianism; Daoism has seldom gained the upper hand in these 
debates. The modern state’s effort to def ine Daoism in the way Western 
religions are defined have led to a focus on classics, tenets, and organization, 
yet such an approach is limiting because it overlooks the practice of Daoism 
and how it manifests in daily life and in the various levels of society, which 
is where the core of Daoism lies.7
I believe that the most important aspects of the practice of Daoism 
include individual cultivation and study, rituals, talismans, and the 
performance of spells. However, individual cultivation and study is the 
only aspect that remains in the realm of modern Daoism. The remaining 
elements have become watered down, or rationalized as part of the ‘national 
culture’ or ‘cultural heritage’. At the same time, Daoism has been closely 
connected with folk beliefs since the Song and Yuan dynasties, as part of 
the same network of faith. This has been a key link between Daoism and 
daily life. But after the founding of the Republic, the link has been gradually 
severed and Daoism isolated from the wider context of the general popula-
tion’s beliefs. This reshaping and re-delineation of Daoism has occurred 
because of the modern state’s view of Daoism through the lens of religion. 
As China’s national religion, Daoism must adhere to the state’s standard for 
a ‘legal’ (hefa 合法) religion. The state has therefore overlooked or belittled 
the practice of Daoism, believing that these elements are unworthy of a 
major world religion. At worst, these elements have been railed against as 
superstition; at best, they are separated from their cultural context with 
attempts to explain them using ‘science-like’ or ‘semi-scientific’ approaches, 
7 Goosaert (2010, pp. 39-80); Goosaert (2011, pp. 172-190); Tam (2011, pp. 30-49).
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rationalizing these practices through the academic disciplines of medicine, 
psychology, or anthropology.8
This chapter will explore the religionization of Daoism under the 
context of secularization theory. The works of Robert Weller, Vincent 
Goossaert, David Palmer, Paul Katz, and Liu Xun will form the basis of 
these explorations.9 From the works of these scholars, we can see the 
hidden influence of Christianity as the modern intellectuals and the state 
have reshaped Daoism. The influence is felt on different levels including 
politics, education, religious publishing, organization, and the gaining 
of adherents. This Christian-influenced model has given rise to the new 
form of modern Daoism. Here, we must understand how the concept of 
religion has changed and the background for these changes, then explore 
more deeply the historical background of modern Daoism and how the 
Western conception of religion has reshaped Daoism. Against this historical 
context, I will analyze the structure and content of the Daoist Textbook 
of Patriotism to understand how contemporary China sees and def ines 
Daoism, and observe the relationship between the state and Daoism from 
the government’s perspective. Finally, the model for constructing a national 
Daoism will be discussed, as well as how this model has influenced our 
understanding of Daoism.
The historical background of modern Daoism
In the twentieth century, China experienced a series of political upheavals 
and social movements including the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the estab-
lishment of the Republic, and the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949. All of these events shaped and influenced the development 
and practice of Daoism in China. National policy and discourse played a 
major role in determining the form and content of Daoism. The rise and 
eventual suppression of Daoist temples, and their revival in recent years, 
is emblematic of how the relationship between the state and Daoism has 
changed over time.
After the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, China underwent a profound 
change in intellectual thought as well as an accompanying change in 
religious policy. Between 1898 and the Communists’ rise to power in 1949, 
intellectuals began discussing the ideals of religion and superstition in 
8 Lu (2012, pp. 228-250); Palmer (2011, pp. 87-106).
9 Szonyi (2013, pp. 339-358); Katz (2014); Palmer, Shive, and Wickeri (2011).
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their works, and the state bureaucracy underwent a thorough reform of 
its religious features. State-led worship was abolished, and government-
supported local temples and ceremonies lost their off icial status. Initiatives 
to break superstitions and replace temples with schools were launched 
across China.10 However, religion-based ‘redemptive societies’, such as the 
Unity Sect (Yiguandao 一貫道, also see Chapter 8) and the Red Swastika 
Society (Shijie hongwan zihui 世界紅卍字會), remained legal and highly 
influential. Many prominent members of the Nationalist Party, business 
tycoons, and industrialists were devoutly religious. They practiced ‘internal 
alchemy’ (neidan 內丹) in pursuit of a long life, becoming at-home clerics. 
Many studied under prominent Daoist masters. Traditional religious groups 
emulated Christian churches in their mass communication efforts, leading 
to a rise in the number of religious publishing houses, record companies, 
and radio stations.11 During this period, the movement to found schools 
using temple resources, the transformation of religious knowledge, and the 
religious life of the urban elite all shaped the substance of modern Daoism.
In the f irst half of the twentieth century, Daoism gradually became part 
of the global culture as it underwent modernization and came into contact 
with modernity. This transformation can be seen in three aspects:
First, local folk beliefs underwent a transformation. The biggest influ-
ence on this transformation was the ‘found schools using temple resources 
movement’ (miaochan banxue 廟產辦學), which was accompanied by 
efforts to abolish superstitions and improve customs, as well as the New 
Life Movement. These state-driven reform efforts reached their peak when 
the Standards for Preserving and Abolishing Temples was promulgated in 
November 1928.12 The reforms broke apart the folk-belief networks centered 
on local temples, severely affecting the livelihood of secular-living local 
clerics. The gradual disintegration of the intricate network of local altars, 
temples, and adherents completely changed the face of local Daoism, a 
transformation that represents national religious policy and the changing 
relationship between local society and Daoism.13 From a historical perspec-
tive, the movement to replace temples with schools is conceptually different 
from traditional efforts against ‘debauched worship’. Later, the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution would further the destruction of this 
faith network.
10 Duara (1991, pp. 67-83); Goosaert (2006, pp. 307-336); Lo (2010).
11 Katz (2014).
12 Nedostup (2010); Goosaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 123-138); Duara (1995).
13 Goosaert (2013, pp. 569-604).
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Second, Daoist organizations and activities, centered on the ‘spirit-
writing’ ( fuji 扶乩or fuluan 扶鸞) ceremonies, took place mostly in Daoist 
altars and halls. Some altars were part of ‘spirit-division’ ( fenling 分靈) 
networks, in which multiple altars or temples worshipped the divided 
spirit of the same god. Clerics were the members of these organizations, 
but adherents and lay worshippers often played an even more important 
role. The gods worshipped by these groups mainly included Lu Dongbin 
呂洞賓, Guangong 關公, and Jigong 濟公. Adherents communicated with 
these gods through spirit-writing ceremonies. Activities such as reading the 
classics, cultivating good health, inner alchemy, curing sickness, banishing 
evil, and charity works were important to many adherents.14 Many spirit-
writing halls produced religious texts through spirit-writing, and these texts 
became an important way in which Daoism was spread.15 These Daoist 
organizations were very common in the Jiangnan region, which included 
major cities such as Shanghai and Hangzhou. Some of the organizations 
were connected to salvation groups. Most traditional scholar-gentlemen 
were involved in the religious practices of spirit-writing and charity work 
by salvation groups. Meanwhile, in the face of the war and upheaval of the 
period, Daoist institutions, salvation groups, and spirit-writing halls all 
operated with the ideal of helping the world, becoming places of refuge 
for ordinary people. These organizations played an important role in the 
religionization of Daoism in the early twentieth century, with their charity 
work, publishing of religious texts, and spreading of their teachings. After 
1949, however, this type of Daoist organization gradually disappeared as 
the state adopted ever-broader def initions of ‘feudal superstition’. The loss 
of these organizations greatly weakened the spread of Daoism.
Third, the faith and practice of the urban elite, and the way Daoism 
manifested in their lives, reshaped the face of Daoism. The changes in 
modern Chinese society were most profound and signif icant in the cities. 
A key to understanding Daoism in modern and contemporary China is 
the changing role that Daoist clerics played in urban life, particularly the 
interaction between Daoist temples, urban adherents, and professional cler-
ics. In the colorful religious life of China’s modern and contemporary cities, 
clerics and the intellectual elite are influenced by both national and local 
14 Goosaert (2007, pp. 308-319); Goosaert (2004, pp. 699-771, esp. pp.741- 748); See also Esposito 
(2000, pp. 623-658, esp. pp. 645-650); Esposito (2001, pp. l91-231); Yuria 森由利亞 (2002, pp. 165-
184); Ichiko 志賀市子 (2002, pp. 185 -209). 
15 Goosaert (2004, pp. 706-707, 735-740, 744-751); Monica Esposito (2004, pp. 630, 638, 643); 
Goosaert and Palmer (2011, pp. 91-122).
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forces.16 The shaping of Daoism in modern Chinese cities is closely linked 
to the shaping of the religion itself; it is a form of Daoism that preserves 
traditional cultural elements while adapting to unprecedented challenges 
and even developing new innovations.17 Shanghai in the Republican period 
was home to a flourishing religious publishing industry, as well as many 
prominent religious f igures.18 Other smaller cities had Daoist organizations, 
and the practice of neidan and qigong was popular.
Chen Yingning 陳攖寧 (1880-1969) is a good example of the Daoist life-
style of China’s urban elite, and how the urban elite in turn shaped modern 
Daoism by devoting themselves to Daoist practice, publishing Daoist maga-
zines, and participating in new ways to practice Daoism. Chen’s lifestyle 
shows that Daoist groups and masters were extremely active in modern 
Chinese cities. His example shows that the interaction between Daoism 
and modern ideas extended beyond simple secularization; in particular, 
the Shanghai elite were innovative in their practice of Daoism. The Chen 
example demonstrates that the religious and secular were not a dichotomy. 
For the urban elite of which Chen was a member, religion was a cultural 
realm that was closely tied to daily life. He accepted and participated in 
the Christian concept of kindness, the charitable works of Daoist groups, 
at-home practice of Daoism, spirit-writing activities, and all kinds of Daoist 
organizations. Chen participated mostly in volunteer groups, which were 
important in modern China as a personalized form of religious activity. 
This type of religious practice was a result of personal decisions and choices 
to cultivate a person’s own interior life and health. Chen also noticed that 
women were consciously creating a female form of Daoist practice.19
Chen promoted his ideas of ‘learning of the gods’ (xianxue 仙學) through 
the Yihuatang publishing house, founded by Zhang Zhuming (1904-2004). In 
1933, Zhang founded the semi-monthly Yangshan banyuekan in Shanghai 
and invited Chen to be one of the chief writers for the publication. Chen 
used this platform to advocate for learning of the gods and connect with 
Daoism enthusiasts; the publication became a major hub for Daoists across 
China. In 1939, Zhang founded the monthly Xiandao Yuebao, again with 
Chen as chief writer.
16 See Papers in ‘The Modern History of Urban Daoism’ International Conference, Southern 
Taiwan University, 13-14 November 2010; Susan Naquin (2000). 
17 Goosaert (2007); Liu (2009).
18 Kiely (2011, pp. 4-22); Jessup (2010); Scott (2014).
19 Liu (2009).
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Through these platforms, Chen constructed and ref ined his ideas of 
learning of the gods. He set himself in opposition to the basic ideal of ‘quiet 
inaction’ (qingjing wuwei 清靜無為) in Daoism, framing learning of the gods 
as an active, empirical science that could be verif ied. He believed that the 
Chinese nation was facing a crucial test for its survival, and that Daoism 
should take a healthy, confident, and worldly approach in resistance to the 
intrusion of foreign countries. Therefore, Chen billed learning of the gods as 
a form of bodily cultivation that was scientif ically valid, and said of Daoism: 
‘from the smaller perspective it can strengthen your body; from the greater 
perspective it can strengthen our race’. He tied Daoism with the strength 
of the nation, believing that Daoism was the way to make China and the 
Chinese people stronger and better able to f ight off foreign invaders. He 
also called on his fellow believers to collect and organize texts on neidan, 
establishing the Association for Printing Classics on the Way of Alchemy 
(Dandao Kejing Hui 丹道刻經會) to publish and circulate classics and newly 
collected texts on inner alchemy. His intent was to strengthen the Chinese 
people physically, fundamentally changing the Chinese nation through the 
physical cultivation of Daoism. In effect, Chen’s efforts provided a way for 
people to reacquaint themselves with Daoism and experience the richness 
of Daoism practice.
Chen wrote the Declaration of the Chinese Daoist Association (Zhonghua 
Daojiao Hui Xuanyan 中華道教會宣言) in 1936, providing an in-depth 
analysis of the nationalistic advantage of Daoism:
Other religions often despise the world, hoping for greater blessings in 
the afterlife. This makes for a pessimistic atmosphere for our nation and 
our affairs. The ideas of Daoism focus on this life only, and place physical 
health as the f irst priority, making for a better real life. Other religions 
speak of peace, yet once the weak nations share the religion of the strong 
nations, the strong nations invade and cause trouble. Daoism is based 
on our nation. If the nation is willing to work hard, then heaven will be 
in front of our eyes. Ah! What else but Daoism can take on the mission 
of bringing together all schools of thought, of f illing the def iciencies of 
Confucianism, of taking on the best of Chinese learning, and of ensuring 
the correctness of new ideas? If we have the Dao (way), then we must 
not lack in teaching it; if we do not teach it, then how can we spread the 
Dao? If we teach it, then we must not lack in an organization; if we do 
not have an organization, then how can we ensure that the Dao remains 
correct and consistent? We are all children of the Yellow Emperor, born 
on the land of China with its wonderful rivers and mountains. We think 
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back on our forbearers and martyrs, and we see the heretics f ighting 
for our land and the decline of our national religion. Therefore we have 
gathered our comrades to form this association. On the basis of current 
law, we have formulated our rules and presented them to the party and 
government seeking permission to found this association. The great way 
may join together with the eight virtues; Daoism and Confucianism may 
collaborate, focusing equally on changes and constants, and letting the 
usual and unique work together. If that can be, China will be able to 
coordinate toward its purpose. The heavens and man will be in harmony, 
danger will turn to safety, and the ominous will become auspicious. The 
spirit of our nation relies on this.20
Here, Chen treats Daoism as the national religion, part of the heritage of the 
children of the Yellow Emperor. It is the only legal faith, while other belief 
systems are heresies. He criticizes Buddhism for its disdain of the world 
and its passive yearning for reward in the next life, while also criticizing 
Christianity for being the religion of foreign invaders who have no place to 
speak of peace. Daoism’s focus on the cultivation of health and the pursuit of 
bodily strength is proactive and worldly; Daoism is also the embodiment of 
the national spirit, allows China to solve the problems posed by Confucian-
ism by bringing together the various schools of Chinese philosophy, and 
is able to change with the times. Chen said: ‘When we speak of Daoism 
today, we must trace it back to the Yellow Emperor and Laozi, while taking 
into account all of the different schools of thought in China’s history. Then 
we can see that Daoism is the spiritual refuge of the Chinese nation’. He 
also said: ‘When one believes in Daoism, one can save one’s self; when one 
spreads the word of Daoism, one can save the nation’.21 Used in service of 
one’s self, Daoism can strengthen the body so that it does not decay; used in 
service of others, Daoism can bring the rule of the saintly kings. Based on 
this nationalistic consciousness, Chen wanted the party and government to 
approve the formation of the Chinese Daoist Association in order to spread 
the Dao of the nation.
Chen Yingning 陳攖寧 is an emblematic example of how the intellectuals 
of his time thought of the relationship Daoism and the Chinese nation, 
offering a view of the nationalistic attitudes of Daoist supporters. Chen’s 
conception of Daoism as an essentially worldly school of thought, as well as 
his nationalistic fervor, meant that his ideas were supported by the state. 
20 Wu 武國忠 (2006, p. 1627). 
21 Chen Y陳攖寧 (1934, p. 1). 
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When the Chinese Daoist Association was founded in 1957, Chen was elected 
vice president and general secretary; he was then elected as president of 
the association in 1961. He was also a member of the National Committee of 
the Second and Third Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
A textual analysis of the Daoist Textbook of Patriotism
In November 1956, Daoist representatives in China began preparing to form 
a Daoist association in Beijing, publishing the Formation Declaration of the 
Chinese Daoist Association (Zhongguo daojiaohui faqishu 中國道教會發起
書), which expressed their patriotic sentiment toward the new China. In 
April 1957, the Chinese Daoist Association was off icially founded in Beijing. 
The Charter of the Chinese Daoist Association (Zhongguo daojiao xiehui 
zhangcheng 中國道教會章程) highlighted the need to ‘bring together 
Daoists across the nation in solidarity, continue and develop the superior 
traditions of Daoism, love and protect the fatherland under the leadership 
of the People’s Government, actively participate in the nation’s socialist 
construction work and movement to protect world peace, and assist the 
government in implementing religious freedom policies’. In March 1992, 
the Chinese Daoist Association amended the charter and emphasized that 
it would ‘bring together Daoists across the nation under the leadership of 
the People’s Government, love the nation and the religion, and adhere to 
the nation’s constitution, laws, regulations, and constitution’. Therefore, 
the charter of the Chinese Daoist Association has always made patriotism 
one of its highest priorities.22
On the basis of the historical analysis above, we can now turn our at-
tention to the structure and content of the Daoist Textbook of Patriotism 
(Daojiao Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaocheng 道教愛國主義教程, ‘Textbook’ afterwards). 
This text was produced by the Chinese Daoist Association, reviewed by 
Daoist scholars in research institutions, re-reviewed by researchers at the 
State Administration for Religious Affairs, and published by China Religious 
Culture Publisher in 2011. Instruction based on the Textbook is required for 
students in Daoist schools, and the leaders of Daoist organizations must 
also teach the Textbook to their believers.23 The Textbook represents the 
off icial viewpoints of the state, the government, and academia, as well as 
how the state seeks to educate its populace on Daoism. The Textbook thus 
22 Lai (2003, pp. 107-121); Laliberté (2011, pp. 191-208).
23 Yang (2012, pp. 47-81).
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offers us a window into the off icial view on Daoism and how the modern 
state sees the connection between Daoism and patriotism. Studying the 
Textbook allows us to explore how Daoism has been linked with patriotic 
thought to form a system of values.
The Daoist Textbook of Patriotism gives this def inition for patriotism: 
‘Patriotism refers to the thoughts and emotions that drive people to stay 
loyal to, love, and give to their fatherland, as well as the moral norms that 
arise from these thoughts and emotions. It is a political principle and moral 
standard for how one treats the people of one’s fatherland’.24 Under the 
moral rubric of patriotism, the Textbook constructs an off icial political 
theology of Daoism and a viewpoint on Daoism and the nation.
The understanding and definition of Daoism in the Textbook maintains 
the Western, Christian understanding of religion. Key elements include 
teachings, classics, organizations, rules, rituals, and sites. In such a frame-
work, the Textbook def ines the theological teachings of Daoism as being 
contained in its founding classic, the Daodejing 道德經. It claims that 
the over 1,000 Daoist classics collected in the Daoist Canon (Daozang 道
藏) are derived or developed from the basic ideals of the Daodejing. In 
truth, in the ‘three caverns and four supplements’ (sandong sifu 三洞四
輔) structure of Daoist classics, the Daodejing is placed on a fundamental 
but peripheral position. Analyses from within Daoism, such as The Origin 
of Daoism (Daojiao Suoqi 道教所起) hold that the classics stem from the 
divinely inspired Perfect Writing (zhenwen 真文).25
Therefore, the designation of the Daodejing as Daoism’s foundational 
text corresponds with both the off icial view over the centuries as well as 
the Western Christian-influenced viewpoint in the modern context. The 
Daodejing symbolizes the most primal, unaltered, and pure ideas of Daoism, 
and all other classics derive from this original text. That is why the Textbook 
holds that the teachings of Daoism are all contained in the foundational text 
of the Daodejing. This perspective also matches the Protestant Christian 
understanding of religious teachings. The Protestants of the seventeenth 
century reacted against the liberal humanism of the Renaissance, claiming 
to be in pursuit of truth. The Protestants debated the ‘pure essence’ of 
Christianity under the standard of ‘orthodoxy’, rejecting all hybridized, 
integrated, and untrue religious phenomena.26
24 Chinese Daoist Association, p. 3.
25 Raz (2015, pp. 83-111); Raz (2012, pp. 1-37).
26 Pelikan(1984, pp. 332-338).
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Next, the Textbook is essentially theistic. It includes the following: ‘To 
love Daoism is to exalt the gods of Daoism, respect the gods of Daoism, 
and worship the gods of Daoism’. Even so, the Textbook does not expound 
further on the Daoist gods, only mentioning the seven-level hierarchy of 
Daoist divinities in Tao Hongjing’s 陶弘景 Dongxuan Lingbao Zhenling 
Weiye Tu 洞玄靈寶真靈位業圖. In its theological discourse, the Textbook 
returns to ‘morals’ as its core.27 From the perspective of a secular state, the 
cosmology and divine hierarchy of Daoism are not matters that deserve 
pressing attention.
Third, Daoism has an organization and leaders. Its organization starts 
with individual temples and includes local, provincial/municipal, and 
national groups. This structure matches that of the contemporary Daoist 
Association, and also forms the organizational network that the state uses 
to administer Daoism. Old religious power structures centered on major 
mountain-monasteries such as Longhu Mountain, Gezao Mountain, and 
Wudang Mountain are essentially excluded from this power structure, as 
are the networks between local altars and temples, as well as local centers 
for spreading Daoism such as spirit-writing halls. Under the modern Daoist 
organizational structure, these three types of Daoist institution must be 
incorporated into the organizational network of the modern Daoist Associa-
tion before they can be considered ‘orthodox’ and ‘legal’.
Fourth, the Textbook def ines Daoism as a religion with rules. The rules 
are embodied by the ‘commandments and taboos’ (qinggui jielu 清規戒
律), which f it with modern views on religious ethics. However, Daoism 
actually places more importance on the ‘granting of runes’ (shoulu 受籙) 
and associated rituals than on the ‘commandments and taboos’. ‘Grant-
ing of runes’ is very closely connected to one’s place in the hierarchy and 
self-identity in Daoism. Taboos are one element of the ‘granting-of-runes’ 
system, which must be considered as a whole. However, the study of religious 
ethics and world religions have often overlooked the importance of the 
‘granting-of-runes’ system and focused solely on the normative effects of 
the ‘commandments and taboos’.
Fifth, the Textbook states that ‘[t]o pursue purity and cleanliness, and 
help the living and put the dead to rest, Daoism has over the past two 
thousand years accumulated a great amount of methods and techniques 
to perform rituals and make for a long life’.28 The Textbook def ines the 
teachings for purif ication and internal alchemy across the vast collection 
27 Chinese Daoist Association (2011, p. 101).
28 Chinese Daoist Association (2011, pp. 15-16).
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of Daoist classics as ‘rituals’ and ‘methods for a longer life’. The former is a 
tool for the serving adherent, i.e. the social service dimension of religion; 
the latter is a method of self-control on the mental and physical levels, i.e. 
religious morals and practice.
Sixth, the Textbook points out that ‘the temples of Daoism are places for 
Daoists to learn and practice the religion, as well as places for Daoist clerics 
to stay in contact with lay adherents. Daoists conduct religious activities 
and collect contributions from adherents in temples, allowing Daoism to 
be passed down through the generations’.29 Here, temples are considered to 
fulf ill the same function as churches, as a place to conduct religious activi-
ties and for adherents to gather. However, this view overlooks the complex 
relationship between temples and folk-belief networks. Since the Song and 
Yuan dynasties, Daoist temples have been connected on many levels with 
the state-worship system, as well as with other temples devoted to folk 
beliefs.30 Daoist temples were part of a hierarchy together with mountain 
temples, temples for Confucius and Guan Yu 關羽, city-god temples, and 
land-god temples. This hierarchy was the dominating force in the beliefs of 
the Chinese people, but gradually disintegrated in the twentieth century. In 
modern times, Daoist temples are isolated religious spaces that sometimes 
become tourist traps, maintaining their existence only through visitor 
ticket sales.
The six dimensions of Daoism in the Textbook, as described above, are all 
the product of an understanding of Daoism based on Christian models and 
ideas. This is the result of the re-delineation of Daoism using the framework 
of ‘religion’ in the wave of modernization and secularization of modern 
times. This viewpoint is also how the state defines and understands Daoism. 
Yet in this model, the traditional secular-living clerics, priests of folk beliefs, 
spirit-writing halls and altars, and self-guided practitioners and scholars all 
struggle to f ind a place. They seem to be left out of this framework.
The Daoist Textbook of Patriotism is divided into nine chapters, each on 
a different topic. The f irst chapter is titled ‘Fighting for the Equality of the 
Heavenly Way and the Independence of the Nation’. This chapter discusses 
the Daoist ideal of peace and how it coincides with the goals of a socialist 
country. With this ideal in mind, the Textbook uses the examples of various 
historical f igures to explain how Daoists sacrif iced themselves for their 
country and society, protecting the independence of the nation.
29 Chinese Daoist Association (2011, pp. 15-16).
30 Meulenbeld (2015).
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The second chapter, ‘The Flesh and Blood of the Chinese People’, estab-
lishes the Yellow Emperor and Laozi as the sources of Daoism, and as the 
ancestors of the Chinese nation. To connect the Yellow Emperor 黃帝 to 
Laozi 老子 is to link the sources of Daoism and the Chinese nation. Within 
a religion, this kind of tracing back to a ‘pure’ source is often based on a 
process of delineation and differentiation, making clear the difference 
between that which is primal, pure, legal, central, and authoritative, and 
that which is late-coming, counterfeit, additional, superstitious, hybridized, 
and ritualized. The goal is to establish a pure legitimacy in heritage, history, 
or politics. Such a differentiation and determination can also be discussed 
within the framework of Daoism and the Chinese nation.31
The third chapter is ‘The Shared Spiritual Force and Behavioral Rules 
for the Chinese Nation’. This chapter uses the examples of Guan Yu and 
other Daoist divinities such as Lu Mi, Xin Ya, and Li Qing to explain that 
these divinities, who were only made gods after dying as mortals, were 
all loyal to the country, responsible protectors of the people, diligent in 
their duties, devoted to their morals, and great contributors to the Chinese 
nation before they died. The chapter then goes on to discuss that the ideal 
for interpersonal relationships in Daoism is harmony and concordance 
(hehe 和合). The Textbook uses classics such as the Lingbao Wuliangduren 
Shangpin Miaojing 靈寶無量度人上品妙經, the Taipingjing 太平經, and 
the Daodejing 道德經 to discuss Daoism’s pursuit of interpersonal and 
societal harmony. Finally, the chapter connects the rules and taboos of 
Daoism with the rules of Chinese ethics, holding that Daoism’s rules regard-
ing morals and ethics are consistent with those of Chinese traditions. The 
Textbook extols these ethical views as having contributed greatly to the 
order and stability of Chinese society.
The fourth chapter is ‘An Important Part of China’s Philosophical Treas-
ures’. In this chapter, the Textbook def ines the Daoist school of thought in 
the Eastern Zhou Dynasty, as embodied by the Daodejing, as the source 
and core of Daoist philosophy. Ideas contained in the Daodejing, such as 
‘morals’ (daode 道德), ‘pure quiet’ (qingjing 清淨), and ‘inaction’ (wuwei 
無為) are also explored. The tracing of words and ideas in this chapter 
establishes a linear understanding of the development of Daoism, from 
purity to complexity. The chapter carries a subtextual viewpoint that 
Daoism developed from a primal, pure spiritualism to a more religious, 
ceremonial form through additions, misunderstandings, and hybridization 
throughout the ages. The pursuit of a return to the supposedly pure past 
31 Sharf (2002, pp. 13-15); Campany (2003, pp. 215-253).
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is common across all religions in the modern world. This phenomenon 
shows the complex and multifaceted relationship between religious studies 
and religious movements.32 The Textbook divides the history of the Daoist 
School and Daoism into four stages which also represent a shift from the 
philosophical and spiritual toward the religious, ceremonial, and mystical. 
To avoid this association with superstition, the Textbook takes care to always 
link the teachings and theology of Daoism back to the philosophical concept 
of ‘morals’. This is a perspective worth examining.33
The f ifth chapter, ‘A Wondrous Flower in the Glory of Chinese Culture’, 
and the sixth, ‘The Contributions of Daoism to Chinese Culture’, discuss 
Daoist literature, music, art, and architecture. Why would a text such as 
this, whose purpose is to instill a proper sense of patriotism in learners, 
incorporate literature and art in its Textbook? Why devote so much time to 
these historical works of art, and what do these artworks have to do with 
patriotism? These two chapters are written with two main goals. First, 
the rich religious essence of Daoism, including practices such as rituals, 
meditation, runes, and spells, are transformed and reduced to ‘art’ in these 
chapters. Not only does this allow the text to avoid the tricky boundary 
between religion and superstition, it also uproots religious practice from 
the realm of the sacred to the secular realm of literature and art. Second, 
using the same logic that made Daoism China’s national religion, Daoism’s 
associated literature, music, art, and architecture are incorporated into the 
spiritual heritage of the Chinese people. The richness of Daoist religious 
practice is thus turned into a cultural resource shared by the entire Chinese 
nation. To discuss these works of art and literature is to prove that Daoism 
directly contributed to Chinese culture, and acts as evidence that Daoists 
love the nation and the country. This is a process of secularization: turning 
‘superstitions’ into ‘cultural heritage’ or ‘intangible heritage’, so that they 
become cultural relics of the secular world.
The seventh chapter is ‘For the Health and Survival of the Chinese People’ 
and the eighth is ‘Building an Environment Where Man Is in Harmony with 
Nature’. These two chapters begin with an introductory history of medicine 
in China, then describe the contributions that Daoism made to Chinese 
medicine. Next, the text discusses Daoism’s contributions to China’s health 
culture. The eighth chapter describes Daoism’s ideas on environmental 
protection and how Daoism contributed to science. These two chapters 
emphasize the state’s shaping of Daoism as a religion. As China’s national 
32 Tambiah (1984, p. 7).
33 Bokenkamp (2001, pp. 191-99); (2004, pp. 317-139); Overmyer (1990, pp. 197-222).
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religion, Daoism must meet the standards of a ‘legal’ religion in the state’s 
eyes. This means that when it comes to the physical practice of Daoism, 
including external alchemy, internal alchemy, guidance, and consumption 
of potions, the text overlooks and reduces the religious sensibility and 
ultimate aim of salvation of these practices. The ‘superstitious’ aspect of 
these practices are removed, replaced with a ‘rational science’ wrapping. 
The practices are plucked from their religious concepts and explained as 
‘semi-science’ or ‘science-adjacent’. They are placed into the history of 
science, so that they can be rationalized and legitimatized in a medical, 
psychological, or anthropological context.
The ninth chapter is ‘Daoism and Socialism Must Continuously Adapt 
to Each Other’. This chapter focuses on the service aspect of Daoism. The 
practices and rituals of Daoism must always have the ultimate aim of serv-
ing the people. This chapter enlarges and glorif ies the ideal of helping the 
world and other people in Daoist texts, placing the ideal in the framework of 
contemporary socialism. The chapter emphasizes the need to discover the 
parts of Daoist culture that are useful to modern society, and to promote and 
spread these elements. It also demands a ‘correction’ of traditional rituals 
and spells, and a ‘modernization’ of traditional Daoist organizations. These 
calls for reform are an echo of Daoism’s modernization process.
The image of Daoism established by the state is the product of Daoist-
related discourse since China began modernizing. It is impossible to sepa-
rate the social, political, and religious ideologies contained therein. From 
the perspective of social and cultural history, we can better understand 
the power plays behind the construction of Daoism. The Daoist Textbook 
of Patriotism is a self-shaping of a national Daoism, with the debate on 
legitimatization and the goals of such a construction embedded within. 
Analyzing the Textbook allows us to observe how myths are considered 
and used.34
Based on the state’s off icial position and the rubric of patriotism, the 
Textbook provides an overview of Daoism with a unique perspective and 
method. The Textbook is not a promulgation of Daoism’s teachings from the 
point of view of the religion itself, nor is it critical of Daoism on any ideologi-
cal basis. Rather, its perspective is one that is rooted in the nation and its 
culture. When Daoism is constructed using this perspective, it becomes a 
national form of ‘Daoism’.35
34 McRae (1986, pp. 8-10); Faure (1991, p. 28); Schlutter (1998, p. 19); McRae (2003, pp. 1-21).
35 Potter (2003, pp. 11-31).
daoiSm aNd NatioNaliSm iN modeRN aNd CoNtemPoRaRY ChiNa 271
Of course, the Textbook is only one prescriptive text. Prescriptive texts 
usually present a religion, ethical system, or system of rules as the writer 
wishes them to be, rather than as they are. In contrast, descriptive materials 
can reveal how people understand and use prescriptive texts. To treat a 
prescriptive text as if it were descriptive would undoubtedly be a significant 
blind spot, treating religious documents specifying rules and command-
ments as textual embodiments of actual religious practice. As many scholars 
have pointed out, religious practice in real life is often the opposite of what 
is presented in prescriptive texts. Jonathan Z. Smith has pointed out the gulf 
between systemic religious discourse and the social practice of religion.36 
In other words, while the Textbook does reflect historical fact on some level 
as a prescriptive text, the text ultimately represents the state’s viewpoint. 
Exactly how closely this ‘Daoism’ as def ined by the state and the intel-
lectual elite corresponds to the real world is worth thinking about. We 
have reflected on modern Daoism on the level of a national symbol and 
of a metaphor. The state-constructed Daoism is an entity imagined in the 
process of modernization. Due to the modern concept of religion, Daoism is 
often seen, consciously or unconsciously, as a metaphorical self-contained 
whole, or as an organism with teleological characteristics. On one hand, 
such a view would see religion as a subject and overlook its more abstract 
and complicated aspects; on the other, this view would see Daoism as a 
f ixed and unchanging system, overlooking its historical framework and 
social context. When the state makes a religion a subject and treats it as an 
objectively existent entity, the important role played by adherents will be 
ignored. This viewpoint stems from the Western conception of religion as 
a self-contained whole. When religion is considered an entity, it becomes a 
vessel, an exclusive and rigid phenomenon. In this view, people only belong 
to a religion – the agency, inclusivity, and changing nature of the adherents 
are entirely ignored. We must treat Daoism as a loose set of resources and 
observe how adherents use, transform, and ignore these resources in 
response to different situations.37
We can rely on prescriptive texts like the Textbook to understand and 
analyze the state’s position; in the future, we can explore more limited per-
sonal writings and oral material, then bring in religious discourse to clarify 
the engagement and mutual creation that takes place between individuals 
and religious discourse. In doing so, we can present a more diverse view 
of the dynamism of contemporary Daoism. We can begin by exploring 
36 Smith (1982).
37 Campany (2003, pp. 215-253).
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the personal interactions between Daoists, then bring in the discourse of 
Daoist groups in order to clarify the engagement and mutual creation that 
takes place between individuals and religious discourse. In doing so, we 
can present a more diverse and f inely graduated view of the dynamism of 
contemporary Daoism.38 We can treat the daily lives of adherents as the 
central topic of Daoism, then explore adherents’ lives and inner activities 
and how they connect and interact with Daoist discourses. This is also a way 
to explore through adherents the link between state discourse on Daoism 
and the interior thoughts of individuals.39 In short, our work cannot be 
limited to the philosophical and prescriptive levels. We must also include 
in our study how groups on different levels of the hierarchy, as well as 
individuals, interact with each other and practice Daoism. Only when we 
view Daoism through these interactions and mutually creative activities 
can we better understand the construction of modern Daoist culture and 
religious imagery, so that our depiction of Daoism is more nuanced and a 
better representation of the dynamic phenomenon in Daoist states and 
societies.
Conclusion
Daoism underwent a shift over the past century from traditional to modern. 
The concept of religion, previously non-existent, was imported into China 
and subsequently applied to Daoism, shaping the modern form of the faith. 
Using the concept of religion as a starting point, this chapter explored 
how the state established and shaped Daoism, and observed modern and 
contemporary Daoism from the state’s perspective to elaborate how the 
template of a ‘religion’ influenced the contemporary view of Daoism. A new 
model for contemporary Chinese Daoism was molded by modernization and 
state regulation; this new model is not only manifest in many Daoist writ-
ings, but is also an inescapable part of popular ideas and conceptions. This 
chapter rethinks the essence and value of Daoism based on the reflective 
framework outlined above, exploring the essence and content of China’s 
national religion.
This chapter examines the shaping of Daoism in China over the past 
century, as the landscape of temples changed and religious activities gained 
in popularity among the elite. The complex relationship between the state 
38 Herrou (2010, pp. 355-400); Herrou (2012, pp. 82-107).
39 Orsi (1997, p. 7).
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and modern Daoism is recontextualized by reflecting on the dichotomy of 
religion and superstition.
Daoism continues to play an important role in China, but modern Daoism 
was indubitably the product of the influence of Western religions. This 
‘religionization’ process was a phenomenon that took place under the influ-
ence of Christianity and the Western idea of religion. The traditional form of 
Daoism was, in modern times, ‘replaced’ by the new modern form of Daoism. 
Therefore, the history of Daoism is fragmented and non-continuous, as the 
new cultural form replaced the old, creating a rift in the middle. However, 
the break is not total; the new form appeared in part to solve the diff iculties 
and problems inherited from the past, and to seek a new form of legitimiza-
tion and authority.40
In fact, Daoism underwent multiple major shifts in its tenets and its 
form of worship in its history, but all of those forms were incorporated 
under the umbrella of ‘Daoism’. This caused scholars to think of Daoism 
as a tradition passed down through the generations. Meanwhile, Daoism 
devoted much effort to constructing such a history for itself, in an attempt 
to establish its legitimacy and authority and to situate itself as the ‘legal’ 
Daoism passed down through history. Historically, Daoism was always a 
loose category of multiple lineages.41 It is a cluster term incorporating many 
complex traditions, which multiplied and changed with time,42 f itting in 
with local traditions and creating new ones as new ideas emerged. Daoism 
also maintained an interactive relationship with the state.
The establishment of legitimacy is a historical process that is continually 
redef ined.43 Daoism is not a comprehensive and closed system that can 
be controlled and understood by the state; from the perspective of the 
faithful, every person has a different understanding and interpretation of 
the relationship. However, as def ined by the state, Daoism must be limited 
in its scope; it must be ‘legal’ and comply with laws. The less clearly defined 
Daoist traditions are marginalized. The clerics and priests living secular 
lives may have the richest knowledge of Daoist rituals and spells to ward off 
evil, but their knowledge is considered part of ‘local customs’ or intangible 
cultural traditions. The spirit-writing tradition, so important in the spread 
of Daoism, also struggles to f ind its proper position in this framework.
40 Davis (2001, p. 221).
41 Raz (2012, pp. 1-37); Burke (1992); Needham (1975, pp. 349-369); Brown (1996, pp. 14-15).
42 Lipner (2005, p. 31).
43 Ehrman (2003).
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Although modern Daoism is undergoing a revival in many places, the 
renaissance conceals a crisis. As Daoism gradually loses its rich and di-
verse elements in the process of modernization, how can it reconnect and 
revitalize itself through th connection with local cultures within the state 
framework? How can it rebuild its link with folk beliefs while pursuing 
innovative developments in modern urban civilization, so that it is no longer 
just a ‘state religion’ protected by the state or a part of the ‘cultural heritage’ 
for tourists to experience? The answers will decide whether Daoism can 
compete with Buddhism and Christianity in China, as well as whether 
Daoists can develop their religion into a universal religion that is part of 
the spiritual heritage of humanity in general.
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Among Mystics and Martyrs of Tibet
Antonio Terrone
Abstract
This chapter looks at two strategies employed by Tibetans to preserve 
their values, culture, and religion thus advancing nationalistic concerns. 
The ‘Buddhist encampments’ of the Nyingma School are a form of ‘soft 
nationalism’ adapting traditional religious culture to a modern Bud-
dhism. The wave of self-immolations spearheaded in 2009 by monks 
from the Gelukpa school of Buddhism, exemplif ies, instead, what I call 
‘hard nationalism’. As a violent form of nationalism, self-immolators call 
for radical political change in Chinese-controlled areas of eastern Tibet, 
autonomy, and the return of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Nationalism, 
is thus seen not as a monolithic phenomenon but as a movement taking 
different shapes even within the same community and among individuals 
sharing the same values.
Keywords: Nationalism, fundamentalism, Tibetan Buddhism, Buddhist 
encampments (chögar), self-immolations
Introduction
Three decades ago Chinese scholars, just like most scholars in international 
relations, understood religion more as a private human activity than one 
relevant to domestic and global politics. Nowadays, however, religion has 
become centrally important when it comes to democratic initiatives, peace-
building programs, economic growth, international relations, and terror-
ism prevention.1 According to recent statistics, despite different public 
perceptions about the relevance of religion in society and politics, religion 
continues to be prominent in human life, and as a consequence, subject to 
more restrictions across the world.2 Religious groups and organizations 
have flourished and become creative, adaptive, and increasingly engaged 
1 Toft et al. (2011).
2 Pew (2014; 2015a; 2015b).
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both socially and politically. In Asia, large-scale surveys demonstrate 
that religions are highly diverse in numerous countries, thus showing 
that the map of the global religious landscape does not grow consistently 
everywhere.3
In the case of China, while it scores in the top six Asian countries in 
terms of religious diversity next to Vietnam, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
and South Korea, in 2013 it also had the highest number of government-
imposed restrictions on religious practice in the world.4 China amended its 
Constitution in 1982 to include laws on the protection of religious freedom 
and ‘normal’ religious activities, and is committed to atheist governance 
and a separation between religion and politics. Ironically, however, Chinese 
government off icials have declared themselves in charge of selecting and 
electing spiritual leaders in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition including the 
Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama, the two highest ecclesiastic hierarchs 
in Tibet.5 Religion is also centrally important in the territorial and cultural 
claims of national minorities in China, and f igures centrally in what we 
may consider ethno-religious nationalism. Since the foundation of the PRC, 
Xinjiang and Tibetan-inhabited provinces in China have witnessed several 
cycles of ethnic protests. Since 2008, violent urban riots erupted in Lhasa 
and across various Tibetan regions of western China resulting in numerous 
casualties among both Tibetans and Han Chinese. To date, 147 Tibetans have 
self-immolated in eastern Tibet, calling for self-determination, the return 
of their leader the Dalai Lama, the preservation of the Tibetan language, 
and freedom of religion.
This essay discusses two major religious phenomena in Tibetan society 
that have emerged as new responses to Chinese religious and ethnic policies 
in the past three decades. My essential concern is that although these two 
are different from each other, they are both expressions of the nationalist 
concerns and agenda of a substantial portion of Tibetans in contemporary 
China struggling to safeguard their cultural identity. The f irst phenomenon 
that I discuss in this essay is the rise and development of an unprecedented 
form of religious congregation called chögar in Tibetan and that in English 
can be glossed as ‘Buddhist encampment’. The modern form of these reli-
gious congregations began during the 1980s’ revival of Buddhism in Tibet 
in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘reforms and opening’ (gaige kaifang 改革
開放). The identity of these establishments as hybrid institutions lay at the 
3 Pew (2014).
4 Pew (2014; 2015a).
5 Sara (2007; 2016).
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intersection between formal Buddhist monasteries and informal meditation 
hermitages. Their founders employed historical and religious means to fos-
ter faith and reeducate devotees in the fundamentals of Tibetan Buddhism, 
in so doing rejuvenating a sense of nationalist identity in their following 
through invoking Tibet’s past glories. The second phenomenon I look at is 
the striking wave of self-immolations in eastern areas of Tibet in the PRC. 
These began in 2009 with protesters initially coming predominantly from 
the monastic ranks but later from the Tibetan laity as well. The numbers 
of lay self-immolators now outnumber that of Buddhist monastics. This 
phenomenon too, like that of the chögars, is rooted in reappropriating 
Tibetans’ control of their society, their language, and their cultural and 
religious values.
This essay argues that not only has ethno-religious nationalism not 
declined among Tibetans against most secularist theories’ odds (especially 
Marxist-Leninism), but rather the two phenomena I analyze here show 
that ethno-religious nationalism still matters for a minority struggling for 
relevance in an increasingly contentious and globalized world. I suggest 
that these phenomena can be analyzed and understood as expressions of 
soft nationalism (in the case of Buddhist encampments) and hard national-
ism (in the case of self-immolation), both of which have emerged in Tibet 
in response to long decades of complex political, economic, and social 
transformations that have affected Tibetan communities in the PRC.
When it comes to expressions of nationalism, different Tibetan Buddhist 
congregations have employed diverse strategies and agendas. In particular, 
we can distinguish between types of strategies utilized within Nyingma and 
Gelukpa religious institutions; although both communities share common 
goals, they also have specif ic individual interests. Whereas the large-scale 
efflorescence of Buddhist encampments is exclusively a Nyingma phenom-
enon, self-immolations have occurred with greater frequency in Gelukpa 
monastic centers. Considering the long history of Tibetans’ controversial 
relationship with the Chinese state, this essay concludes by arguing that 
ethno-religious nationalism is not only an unremitting force within the 
Tibetan community in China, but is ongoing and will likely deepen in the 
foreseeable future.
Nationalisms and religions
In the past three decades, scholarship in the f ield of political science and 
religious studies has ref ined our understanding of the elusive nature of 
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nationalism. From characterizing it as a sentimental state of mind to an 
imagined community, many have attempted to pin down the essence of 
nationalism. Beginning in the 1990s, nationalism was understood as a politi-
cal doctrine and an ideal essentially of two types: an ethnic nationalism, 
also referred to as ‘genealogical’ nationalism, which predominantly locates 
itself in the inherited legacy of a people’s culture as the cement of a given 
community; and a civic nationalism, or ‘territorial’ nationalism, which 
transcends ethnicity as a marker of community to incorporate all those 
willing to submit to the sociopolitical creed of a given nation.6 For some, 
civic nationalism is the one generated by some sort of ‘rational attachment’ 
and is more socially realistic whereas for territorial nationalism, ethnicity 
is not the sine qua non of identity claims, but just one of several factors 
conducive to community formation. Ethnicity, instead, when advocated 
on nationalistic terms, enacts a spirit of genealogical belonging that takes 
over other potential identity factors, thus tending to border on racism 
and authoritarian rule.7 So strong is the sense of a nation and national 
identity in people that even without a state as a political entity, a national 
community can succeed in maintaining faith and loyalty to its values, 
beliefs, traditions, language, and culture. This is what warrants a nation’s 
work to protect and disseminate its traditional value system and culture 
(including language and religion) as well as to value its people’s sacrif ice 
on behalf of the nation.8 According to Robert Pape, suicide terrorism has 
roots in nationalism, which he def ines as ‘the belief among members of a 
community that they share a distinct set of ethnic, linguistic, and historical 
characteristics and are entitled to govern their national homeland without 
interference from foreigners’.9
As Michael Ignatieff comments, resistance to historical truth or protec-
tion of historical myths is fundamental to a people’s group identity.10 To 
guarantee individuality, a nation tends to build and manipulate its historical 
memory based on its need to represent itself as unique and distinctive, and 
to those ends nations emphasize myths of origins, myths of their liberation 
from oppression, and accounts of their group formation.11 This nurtured 
belief in one unique origin, the myth of its formation, and the liberation 
from various calamities not only contributes to their group identity but also 
6 Ignatieff (1995, pp. 5-7); Smith (1993, p. 15).
7 Ignatieff (1995, pp. 7-8).
8 Ignatieff (1995, p. 10); Smith (1993, pp. 162-163).
9 Pape (2005/2006, p.7 9).
10 Ignatieff (1997, p. 185).
11 Smith (1981, p. 65).
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sustains other factors essential to a community including language, cul-
ture, and religion.12 Memory is essential to a people’s nationalistic claims. 
Umberto Eco (1932-2016), for instance, believed that collective memory 
represents collective identity. Memory is used differently by people with 
different political agendas. Reactionary groups tend to preserve memories 
based on what they consider useful and meaningful to their cause. Revolu-
tionary groups, instead, tend to erase memories in the interest of forgetting 
everything that existed before their rise in order to start from scratch.13
Despite being at odds with other forms of political ideology (secular-
ism, democracy, Communism, pluralism), religion is a cohesive force in 
nationalistic claims especially when it comes to national minorities. The 
common practice of liturgies and the sentiment of brotherhood and sister-
hood that emerges through religion have the power to generate cohesion 
among people.14 Sacred imagery, or holy icons as Hobsbawm calls them, 
exemplify the emblematic role that religious feelings and shared beliefs 
have on communities that claim national identity. Hobsbawm’s research on 
holy icons, which corroborates this essay’s argument, suggests that the most 
successful forms of religious symbols that sustain an idea of a ‘state’ at a 
proto-nationalistic phase of a people’s history are those germane to a ‘divine 
or divinely imbued king or emperor whose realm happens to coincide with 
a future nation’. Theocracies, for instance, like the system of government in 
Tibet (‘ganden podrang’) ruled by the lineage of the Dalai Lamas until the 
1950s are a case in point as the Tibetan rulers were themselves understood 
to be emanations of buddhas and bodhisattvas. According to Hobsbawm, 
there is hardly anything more crucial and successful in a people’s claim to 
statehood in a proto-nationalistic phase than ‘the consciousness of belong-
ing or having belonged to a lasting political entity’, or being a ‘historical 
nation’.15 Like Ernest Gellner, he agrees that proto-nationalism alone (a 
term used by Georges Dreyfus to characterize the Tibetans’ sense of national 
identity during the Imperial period, seventh to ninth centuries) is a desirable 
ideological determinant for further developing mature nationalistic claims, 
but insuff icient in itself to concretize a people’s state-forming aspirations.16 
Both phenomena discussed in this essay exemplify attempts to foster and 
concretize national identity and unity. However, one of them, the rise 
12 Kedourie (p. 73); Smith (1993, pp. 65-66).
13 ‘Eco Sulla Memoria’ in Ferrario (2015).
14 Hobsbawm (1992, p. 68).
15 Hobsbawm (1992, pp. 72-73).
16 Hobsbawm (1992, p. 78); Gellner (1983, pp. 112-114).
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of Buddhist encampments, focuses on constructive building blocks of a 
people’s cultural legitimacy such as cultivating moral values, education, 
and the safeguarding of culture, religion, and language. The other, Buddhist 
monastics and laypeople’s self-immolations attempt to realize the modern 
idea of political legitimacy and self-determination by engaging in political 
protest and violent self-sacrif ice through auto-cremation, calling on the 
return of the Tibetan leader (the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso), 
Tibetan independence, and national unity.
While on the one hand, Tibetan religious leaders realize that self-
preservation is necessary and essential, they also understand that staunch 
conservatism and traditionalism can be counter-productive strategies in 
authoritative regimes like the Chinese Communist government, if not 
self-destructive. In my experience, based on observation in the f ield and 
empirical analysis, I believe that a moderate radicalization phenomenon has 
emerged in Tibet due to the perceived disregard of Chinese policy makers 
for Tibetans’ sociopolitical and cultural discontent. Far from being satisf ied 
with recent Chinese economic, educational, demographic, employment, 
and social change brought in by the government in the past three decades 
since the launch of the ‘reform and opening’ campaign, Tibetans persist in 
perceiving their religion, mostly Buddhism, as one of the most important 
bastions of defense against the tensions and the chaos of the time. Some 
scholars have commented on how the societal turbulence, perceived injus-
tice, and suffering can easily stimulate new ideas and creative responses.17 
I see both the rise of mass Buddhist encampments and self-immolations 
as examples of such creative responses, emerging in or after moments of 
crisis. The impact of globalization is far-reached and has had wide-spread 
repercussions. In the case of Tibetans in China these include but are not 
limited to the opportunity to disseminate faith and religious ideas (mostly 
Tibetan Buddhism), more opportunities for traveling and meeting other 
people and ethnic groups, the rethinking of traditional systems and the 
embrace of modernization, increased use of the Internet, and growth of 
interconnectedness. While traditionally Tibet Buddhism virtually governed 
every aspect of life including education, culture, and even politics, under 
the Chinese Communist regime, Tibetans had to accept and adapt to a new 
worldview, new policies, and pervading interference in their society and 
culture. Therefore, while on the one hand Tibet’s integration into a secular 
state caused enormous changes, on the other hand this very same event 
also stimulated new interests and challenges with the appropriation among 
17 Kuriakose (2011, p. 156); Bogardus (1960, p. 8).
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Tibetans of new understandings of religious renewal, new formulations of 
the relationship between religion and society, and new uses of the body as 
an instrument for political and religious activism.
Buddhist encampments
Although Tibetan society has faced numerous challenges and changes in its 
modern history, most Tibetans both inside and outside of Tibet continue to 
look at their national history through religious symbols and holy icons. In 
the early 1980s, responding to the opening encouraged by Deng Xiaoping’s 
and Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦’s liberalization policies, most monasteries in Tibet 
reopened their gates, rebuilt their premises, and revived their theological 
curricula. In the f irst decade up to the late 1980s, these policies of religious 
tolerance and mild encouragement to reopen religious centers under the 
auspices of major economic reforms instigated large-scale responses by 
Tibetans, who eagerly rebuilt their Buddhist institutions. Though many 
monasteries reopened and started their activities with relative freedom, 
particularly Gelukpa monasteries known for their historical ties to both 
the Dalai Lama and the political authority of the country were penalized 
by coercive state policies whose ultimate goal was to dilute their relevance 
in Tibetan social life.
However, monasteries were not the only form of institutional religion 
to respond to the new socioeconomic and political atmosphere. A small 
number of Buddhist masters in the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism 
established new religious centers in eastern Tibet that became known 
as chögar, ‘Buddhist encampments’. These were not monasteries in the 
traditional sense of the word; they were loosely organized, democratic, 
multiethnic, and more liberal with regard to gender inclusivity. Both monks 
and nuns could join, as well as lay people including Han Chinese, each 
with their own living quarters. Importantly they refrained from openly 
demonstrating loyalty to the Dalai Lama, thus avoiding the charged issue 
of Tibet’s political leadership. They also employed traditional forms of Bud-
dhist doctrinal transmission, with a focus on providing a comprehensive 
and solid monastic education emphasizing philosophy, commentarial 
traditions, and debate. Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok (1933-2004) founded the 
f irst modern Tibetan Buddhist encampment in 1980 called Larung Gar, now 
the largest Buddhist institution in the world, located in Sichuan Province, 
PRC. At the root of his institution-building effort was his conviction of 
the need to solidify the validity of the Vinaya code of monastic discipline 
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for both monks and nuns, which had been damaged during previous 
decades of social hardship and religious suppression. At the same time 
he also progressively adopted a more modern educational approach, thus 
in a way adapting his vision to the secular interests of the PRC, for whom 
religious freedom is contingent on religious organizations’ commitment to 
the interests of the state, such as safeguarding a ‘harmonious society’ (hexie 
shehui 和諧社會), upholding the authority of the Chinese Communist Party, 
and incorporating elements of a modern scientif ic education. Larung Gar 
and the other modern Buddhist encampments that followed its model are 
known for supporting an egalitarian system of monastic life, education, 
and service opportunities, minimal leadership and hierarchical structures, 
as well as an interest in social engagement and religious education for the 
laity. Since their onset, most of the Buddhist encampments operated on a 
leadership based on types of executive committees constituted by educated 
monastics headed by the spiritual guidance of the original founders of the 
institutions. Larung Gar, for instance, had an executive committee of up 
to seven ‘reincarnate lamas’ (‘tülkus’) and ‘seminary teachers’ (‘khenpos’) 
who responded directly to Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok. After his passing, the 
place continues to run this way and its leaders are at the same time Bud-
dhist masters and scholars with an increasingly international reputation 
gained by regular tours around China and the world to give speeches about 
Buddhism, modernity, and science.
Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s Larung Gar mountain hermitage was later for-
mally established and registered as Larung Five Sciences Buddhist Academy 
(Larong wuxing foxueyuan 喇榮五形佛學院) in 1987 under the auspices 
and active mentorship of the Tenth Panchen Lama Chökyi Gyeltsen (1938-
1989). It rapidly became a large, ecumenical, and internationally oriented 
institute that promoted an innovative Tibetan Buddhist education for a 
younger generation of monks and nuns. This education consisted of offering 
degrees as ‘seminary teacher’ (‘khenpo’), open to both monks and nuns, upon 
completion of one of two fundamental classical curricula: a scholarly one 
focused on exoteric as well as esoteric learning, including Madhyamaka 
philosophy, canonical Mahāyāna literature, and so forth, and a meditation 
track aimed at the deepening of the study and practices of contemplation 
systems, including the pinnacle contemplative techniques of the Nyingma 
and Kagyu Schools of Tibetan Buddhism, the Great Perfection (‘dzokchen’) 
and Great Seal (‘chakchen’) systems.
Larung Gar quickly rose to prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s not 
only for the traditional scholastic and contemplative Buddhist education 
it offered, but for the modern approach to learning that Khenpo Jikmé 
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Püntsok and his closest assistants spearheaded, including the incorpora-
tion of computer science and history in the context of a multicultural and 
multilinguistic environment influenced by large numbers of Han Chinese 
devotees. When I visited Larung Gar for the f irst time in August 2001, in the 
very f irst few hours after my arrival, I was introduced to Khenpo Sodargyé, 
at that time already a leading authority at the encampment whom I found in 
a newly arranged computer room containing at least half a dozen desktop 
computers that he announced would be used to train young monastics in 
typesetting and other skills.
Another emphasis in the newly modernized form of Buddhism at religious 
encampments beyond education was a heightened involvement in social 
welfare concerns outside monastic life, including environmentalism, animal 
protection, vegetarianism, philanthropy, vocational training, healthcare, 
and disaster relief. These centers became immediately popular and, due to 
the relative paucity of good monastic education, they attracted monastics 
as well as lay devotees by the thousands both from Tibetan regions and, 
interestingly, from mainland China and other Chinese societies. Therefore, 
these centers have been able to maintain a strong adherence to traditional 
Buddhist ethics and Tibetan cultural values, while also adapting to the 
changing needs of the contemporary world.
However, I would argue that Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s success benefited 
greatly from the visions and wisdom of other prominent f igures of his 
time. In designing his Larung Five Sciences Buddhist Academy, he received 
the endorsement from two of the highest hierarchs in the Tibetan religio-
political world. One was the Tenth Panchen Lama, Chökyi Gyeltsen (1938-
1989), whom he met in 1980 and who fully supported and contributed to 
the founding of his Buddhist Academy. Another was the Fourteenth Dalai 
Lama Tenzin Gyatso, whom he met during a visit in India in 1992. Khenpo 
Jikmé Püntsok was believed to be a reincarnation of an earlier well-known 
Buddhist master, Tertön Sogyal Lerab Lingpa (1856-1926), himself a vision-
ary who established a strong connection with the Thirteenth Dalai Lama 
Tupten Gyatso (1876-1933). Conceptually, the Larung Five Sciences Buddhist 
Academy evokes the modern ‘Buddhist colleges’ or academies ( foxueyuan 
佛學院) popularized by the Chinese master Taixu (1890-1947) in the early 
twentieth century and reconceptualized in the post-Cultural Revolution 
wave of Buddhist revival in China. Just like Taixu, Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok, 
and especially his successors adapted the Buddhist teachings, envisioning a 
new and modern platform to educate monastics and propagate the doctrine 
among Tibetans, Chinese, and internationally. In so doing they opened 
the doors to discussions of Buddhism and science and encouraged a more 
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active social engagement among devotees. I would argue that by adopting 
this model, Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok effectively transnationalized Buddhism, 
thus attracting not only Tibetans, but thousands of Chinese devotees as 
well. In this he became a model for other Tibetan religious encampments 
across eastern Tibet.
We can understand the rise of Tibetan religious encampments as an 
instantiation of modern Buddhism in that they are ecumenical; environ-
mentally, philanthropically, and socially engaged; and geared as much 
toward laity as monastics. At the same time, Buddhist encampment lead-
ers such as Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok, Drupwang Lungtok Gyeltsen, Orgyen 
Kusum Lingpa, and Namtrül Jikmé Püntsok drew their charisma from 
traditional Tibetan conceptions of their national history. In particular, 
through their identities as Nyingma visionaries, or Treasure revealers (‘ter-
tön’), they evoked Tibet’s ancient past during its era of imperial glory and 
Buddhist virtue from the seventh to ninth centuries. Their emphases on the 
golden age of Imperial Tibet gained particular resonance with some Tibetan 
Buddhists in the aftermath of the assimilation of Tibet into China and 
concomitant harsh socioeconomic policies started in the 1960s followed by 
the devastating events of the Cultural Revolution. The connection between 
the historic height of Tibet’s imperial power and Buddhist encampment 
leaders lies in the religious roots of their identity as Treasure revealers, 
or those who retrieve sacred scriptures and artifacts through a process of 
visionary revelation.
At the heart of the Treasure tradition are the epic narratives of the obscure 
and probably mythic eighth-century Indian Tantric master Padmasamb-
hava, whom Nyingma supporters as well as many other Tibetans worship as 
a ‘second Buddha’ and a major contributor to the establishment of Buddhism 
in Tibet.18 By virtue of their connection to his prophetic and thaumaturgic 
skills, present-day Treasure revealers can receive Padmasambhava’s Bud-
dhist teachings, supernatural powers, charismatic gifts, and sacred relics 
through their mystic powers. These serve to reconnect Tibetans with a 
strongly autochthonous vision of their past and thereby reaff irming their 
sense of Tibetan identity. Through the process of discovering these sacred 
missives in the Tibetan landscape, Treasure revealers have resacralized 
Tibet’s Buddhist legacy and reinvigorated Tibetans’ memory of ancient 
sacred sites that have been and continue to be pilgrimage destinations 
relevant as localities of national memory as well as foci of religious identity 
18 Kapstein (2006, pp. 68-72); Dalton (2011, pp. 66-70).
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for thousands of devotees.19 This emphasis within the Treasure tradition 
on sacred places supports a particularly strong ritual construction of a 
symbolic boundary according to which individuals (the personal self) 
reconnect with the cosmic unity or divine genesis (the other) essential to 
their sense of community.20
The narratives of Padmasambhava are also interesting for another 
reason pertaining to nationalism in Tibet. In traditional Tibetan sources, 
mostly Nyingma, but several of them recognized on a national level as well, 
Padmasambhava contained and tamed the negative unruly and chaotic 
energies of local Tibetan chthonic spirits that resisted the introduction of 
an alien religion (Buddhism) on Tibetan soil. A vast number of Tibetans, 
therefore, imagine the role of pious early historical Tibetan kings and 
especially Padmasambhava as founders of a Buddhicized and civilized 
Tibet, associating this with proto-nationalism, institutionalized religion 
and Tibetan unity. The ‘compassionate forces’ of Buddhism religiously 
subjugated and consecrated the land of Tibet through the potent means of 
Tantric rituals and thus transformed the restive gods, demons, and spirits 
of the Tibetan land into pacif ied protective lords of the Buddhist doctrine. 
This popular mythic narrative of Tibetan national history is central to the 
way in which centuries of Tibetans have thought of Tibet, presenting it as 
a land that since the embrace of Buddhism during the seventh to ninth 
centuries turned its harsh nature and rough people into a sophisticated 
and spiritual nation, with a distinctive language, culture, and religion.
By virtue of the reenactment of divine revelation, the reopening and 
recreation of sacred sites and pilgrimage routes, and the activation of vision-
ary charisma, all potent ‘holy icons’ of Tibetan identity, Tibetan Buddhist 
visionaries helped Tibetans reconnect with the idea of belonging to a land 
def ined in terms of shared memories.21 These ideas, traditions, and nar-
ratives contribute to a Tibetan sacred geography through idealized and 
mythicized landscapes populated by powerful entities and human beings 
whose genesis is connected to highly realized bodhisattvas, pious kings, 
and compassionate Buddhist masters.
It is appropriate to point out here the role of pacif ication and viola-
tion intrinsic to the missionary task attributed to Padmasambhava. The 
histories of early Tantric Buddhism in Tibet portray the soteriological 
power that Buddhism emanates both as a compassionate benevolence 
19 Germano (1998, pp. 81-84).
20 Van der Veer (1994, p. 11).
21 Dreyfus (2005, p. 10).
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and a violent and wrathful attitude toward human life and nature. The 
myth of Padmasambhava’s use of pacifying as well as violent means to 
enforce a new faith system on Tibetans is one instance of the prevalence of 
violence in religion, but also and even more interestingly of the influence 
that religion often imposes on the sociopolitical and cultural identity of a 
people. Jacob Dalton confirms from his analysis of numerous early Tibetan 
Buddhist manuscripts dating from the eighth to the twelfth centuries that 
certain types of ritual technologies in Tibet at this time involved the use of 
compassionate violence to tame chthonic spirits to achieve spiritual goals. 
The classic trope of the heroic bodhisattva who engages in compassionate 
killing or even self-sacrif ice/suicide for a higher cause with the altruistic 
intent of reducing suffering among all beings is well-known not only in 
Tibetan literature but also in earlier Mahāyāna sūtric scriptures.22 This 
ideal, although already doctrinally explicit, was further intensif ied and 
complicated in the specif ic Tibetan ritual and literary context by Tantric 
literature and practice with the emergence of narratives that addressed not 
only violence in the form of the subjugation of restive sprits impeding the 
conversion of Tibetan to the new faith (Buddhism), but also a controversial 
discussion of killing, often linguistically disguised as righteous and morally 
upright rituals of ‘liberation’ (‘drölwa’).
The use of legitimate and state-sanctioned violence in the context of Bud-
dhism in Tibet evokes Weberian motifs of state monopoly on the use of force 
and violence as legitimate means of government and in maintaining law and 
order in a country.23 The Tibetan motif of subjugating and taming the restive 
chthonic forces opposing the construction of the f irst monastery in Samyé 
and the ordination of the first Tibetans as Buddhist monks as planned by the 
then king Tri Songdetsen (755-ca 804) evokes similar cosmic wars featuring 
good versus evil epics in numerous religious traditions from Judeo-Christian 
to Asian. The very same technologies were also transposed into the realm 
of Tibetan border defense from potential or real aggressors, thus adding 
a stronger political and historic relevance to these doctrines. Therefore, I 
argue that since the very beginning of the genesis of Buddhism in Tibet, 
not only were politics and governance intimately tied with religion, but this 
latter was itself in some instances tightly interconnected with violence. This 
history can help the relationship between religion and nationalism in Tibet 
today as demonstrated in the examples featured in this essay.
22 Dalton (2011, pp. 10-12).
23 Weber (2004, pp. 32-34).
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Buddhist encampments as Tibetan soft nationalism
The vast popularity of the Buddhist encampments, enhanced by the re-
ligious literature they disseminate featuring mytho-histories of Tibet, is 
a main reason why the Nyingma visionaries who are their founders have 
garnered a wider following among Tibetans as well as Han Chinese devotees 
than other Tibetan Buddhist masters. By ‘religious literature’ I refer to their 
prolif ic production of revealed Buddhist scriptures known as Treasures 
(‘terma’). The Treasure tradition is a system of scriptural and artifact revela-
tions developed in the tenth and eleventh centuries by ritual specialists 
within the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, although it is important 
to point out that such a system of scriptural transmission exists with equal 
relevance in the Bön tradition as well. Many of these scriptures reproduce 
narratives of the mythic history of the Tibetan race, the introduction of 
Buddhism in Tibet, and the divine nature of the Tibetan imperial lineage. 
This is the case, for instance, of the Manikabum (Maṇi bka’ ’bum), a text that 
was revealed between the twelfth and the thirteenth century.24 Several 
elements of the terma tradition are narrated in this scripture that factor 
into the formation of a nationalist consciousness in Tibet. These include, 
the narrative of the origins of how Buddhism entered Tibet, the deeds of 
the eighth-century Indian Buddhist master Padmasambhava, especially 
his subjugation of the land and the conversion of Tibetans to Buddhism, 
and the rise of pious Buddhist kings incarnating the divine virtues of the 
Bodhisattva Avalokisteśvara.25
While these narratives justify the retrieval of ancient artifacts and scrip-
tures specif ically intended to address and fulf ill the spiritual needs of the 
contemporary times, interestingly, they also incarnate a moderate form of 
nationalism or soft nationalism. The Buddhist visionaries who founded the 
encampments employed myths and histories related to Tibet’s mythicized 
and idealized past to legitimize a revival of Nyingma doctrinal and liturgical 
practices, an emphasis on monastic discipline, and a return to Buddhist 
moral values from which Tibetans went astray especially due to decades 
of hardships. By virtue of a nostalgic idealized golden past when Buddhism 
was established and growing, when Buddhist communities dominated the 
Tibetan cultural and political world where the society was autonomous 
and in charge of its cultural, spiritual, and political life, the founders of the 
Buddhist encampments did not aim to recreate the past through reshaping 
24 Martin (1997, p. 30); Kapstein (1992, p. 80).
25 Dreyfus (1994, pp. 207-209).
292 aNtoNio teRRoNe 
an ancient political and social order. Rather, they used the past in order 
to orient themselves toward the future, selecting various elements from 
traditional values and modern opportunities for self-preservation and for 
the reactivation of a Buddhist order. The Buddhist encampments accom-
modate some of the requirements promulgated by the Chinese state in 
terms of administration, performance of religious activities, and a more 
up-to-date education.26 At the same time, however, the leaders, especially 
in the case of Larung Gar, continue to hold on to a strong nationalist agenda 
of safeguarding traditional culture, monastic codes of discipline, strict 
scholastic learning, and Buddhist ethics together with an unremitting com-
mitment to develop the study and dissemination of the Tibetan language.
Although it is admittedly diff icult at this stage to quantify the impact 
and influence these sacred Treasure texts and the narratives they produce 
have on their audience in contemporary Tibet, it is quite safe to infer that 
it is substantial. This is especially true considering the vast popularity of 
these institutions among Tibetan monastics and laity in the past 40 years 
and the continuous turbulent relationship they entertain with the Chinese 
government. Additionally, as briefly mentioned above, Buddhist encamp-
ments, unlike most Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, promote an ecumenical 
attitude toward education thus attracting and welcoming monastics not 
just from Nyingma congregations, but from monasteries and nunneries 
adhering to other Tibetan Buddhist denominations as well. The role of non-
canonical literature with strong indigenous content on fostering sentiments 
of fundamentalist nationalism has been attested in many traditions.27 The 
example of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka is a case in point. Donald 
Swearer’s study of the Mahāvaṁsa, the ancient Sinhalese non-canonical 
Buddhist scripture, shows how its narrative attributes the development of 
Buddhism on the island to the Buddha himself, grounding the plot on Sri 
Lankan soil with Sinhalese actors. Therefore, it connects the development of 
Buddhism there to the Sinhalese subjugation of Tamil people considered the 
enemies and usurpers of Sri Lankan territory and contributed signif icantly 
to the rise of fundamentalist Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism.28
Based on my ethnographic research in Tibet during frequent f ieldwork 
trips and long-term sojourns between 1998 and 2011, I can confirm the vast 
popularity of religious encampment leaders, particularly Khenpo Jikmé 
Püntsok, Drupwang Lungtok Gyeltsen, Orgyen Kusum Lingpa, Namtrül Jikmé 
26 Ashiwa and Wank (2009, pp. 14-15)
27 Fine (2015); Marty (1991).
28 Swearer (1994, pp. 647-651).
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Püntsok and Tāré Lhamo. Virtually in every town or village in eastern regions 
of Tibet, in people’s houses or on stands at the local market, it was possible 
to find photos and photo collages of them, pamphlets with short biographies 
and photos of their revealed items, VCDs, VCRs, and music cassettes of their 
teachings, documentaries, and even recorded discoveries of their terma/
treasure items. Collections of devotional folksongs and poems were composed 
for them, portrait pictures of the most famous Buddhist visionaries such as 
Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok and Drupwang Lungtog Gyeltsen could be easily 
found on the souvenir stands on the Bharkhor circular road around the 
Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, and pilgrimage to their Buddhist encampments 
was very common among many Tibetans even from as far away as Lhasa.29
An example of this focus on traditional values is Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s 
well-known attention to the Buddhist doctrine of virtuous and meritorious 
behavior. During his lifetime, he reiterated the relevance of strict monastic 
discipline, good conduct, moral rectitude, and outstanding ethics during 
large-scale public and private speeches in the main ‘college hall’ (‘shedra’) at 
his Buddhist academy. A selection of his speeches was published under the 
title The Radiant Lamp that Discriminates Between the Two Systems,30 which 
collects some of Khenpo Jigmé Püntsok’s most representative thoughts 
on these topics. There we can detect an interest in rejuvenating a form of 
Buddhism that accentuates morality and ethics and critiques deceit and 
falsehood among Buddhist professionals with the intent of providing guid-
ance in a period of the decay of ethical values and fast-paced modernization. 
A similar text is the Heartfelt Advice to Tibetans for the Twenty-first Century 
that also includes Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s attention to the importance of 
ethical behavior, harmony, and the preservation of Tibetan culture in the 
face of a rapidly changing world.31 The short and privately published booklet 
was widely distributed among his devotees and copies could be found in 
several households across eastern Tibet. A local nun gave me a copy of the 
booklet when I was living in a remote mountain hermitage near Sharda in 
Nangchen County in Qinghai in 1998. She had recently returned from Serta 
Larung Gar for a break from her studies and meditation training there. She 
was adamant about the importance of the Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s words 
and strongly advised me to read it if I wanted to understand his work.
Just like the Tenth Panchen Lama Chökyi Gyeltsen’s aim in the 1980s, 
Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s priority in helping Tibetan religious traditions 
29 Terrone (2010).
30 Tenzin (2005).
31 Jikmé Püntsok (1996).
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to resurge was education, which became one of the main features of his 
mission. Seeing the young generation of Tibetans as the future leadership 
of the religious and secular worlds,32 he reiterated the relevance of correct 
study. Within this background, he addressed committed Buddhists, stress-
ing several key points including the need that they entrust themselves fully 
in the three jewels, the importance of pure intentions, sincere and honest 
behavior, correct speech, dismissing evil actions and sins, and ultimately 
living in accordance with the ten virtues. He does this by invoking authori-
ties of the past such as the nineteenth-century Tibetan Buddhist polymath 
Ju Mipham, whose commentary to Nagarjuna’s ‘Drop of Nourishment for 
the People’ (Skt. nitasastra-jantuposanabindu), a short collection of didactic 
metaphors, he employs to strengthen his ideological legitimacy.33
Additionally, Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok skillfully interspersed his authority 
grounded in the formal knowledge of the scriptural tradition with classic 
Treasure revelation-inspired prophetic rhetoric. He announced numerous 
times that only by committing to the teachings on ten virtues can one see 
through the pitch-dark night of the current degenerate times. He considered 
the practice of virtues as a fundamental aspect of self-control.34 Addressing 
then more specif ically the monastic sangha, The Radiant Lamp advises 
that it is important for monks to completely renounce possessions, one’s 
household, and the accumulation of wealth. Invoking the pratimokṣa vows 
of individual liberation for monastics, he often embraced a paternalistic 
attitude admonishing against the dangers of impure conduct/having sex, 
theft, killing, and lying as the major four actions to avoid.35 Beyond this, 
however, Khenpo Jigmé Püntsok’s nationalist message can be found also 
in his calling for a more thorough study and use of the Tibetan language, 
and the active preservation of Tibetan knowledge, customs, and costume.36
The new Buddhist centers like Larung Gar and other mass Buddhist 
encampments command increasing respect among devotees in China and 
reached out to supporters in Euro-American societies as well. They function 
as catalysts of ‘Tibetanness’ for Tibetans, while also acting as centers of 
modern Buddhism for many Chinese. Their focus on education, training, 
and maintaining Buddhist virtue is emblematic of the fundamentalist 
intent of the leaders behind these institutions. Many Tibetans could not 
32 Tenzin (2005, pp. 15-16).
33 Tenzin (2005, p. 12).
34 Tenzin (2005, pp. 21-35).
35 Tenzin (2005, p. 48).
36 Jikmé Püntsok (1996, pp. 11, 99).
NatioNaliSm mat teRS 295
appreciate the increasing loss of traditional Tibetans religious culture and 
the changed nature of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet, where curricula have 
been weakened and authority diluted. The establishment of religious educa-
tional institutions such as the Buddhist-encampments-turned-colleges is a 
clear sign of fundamentalist trends that emerged in the 1980s and continued 
until the early 2000s.37
While the conservative and Tibetan nationalist orientation of the Bud-
dhist encampments is highly problematic for the Chinese authorities (hence 
the years of crackdown and relaxation over the past three decades), the 
positioning of many leaders of Buddhist encampments within the Chinese 
state’s discursive institutions of religion, modernity, and science offer at 
the same time the opportunity for some accommodation. Their hybrid 
nature and modern orientation with a culturally conservative Tibetan 
flavor, therefore, can be mutually beneficial to Tibetans and the Chinese 
state. They were born and grew up around Buddhist teachers who by virtue 
of their visionary-based charisma were able to attract thousands of fol-
lowers in just over a decade. For many Tibetans, they promoted a strong 
nationalist ideology which emphasizes their connection to the glorious 
part of the Tibetan empire, the reinforcement of a type of Buddhism with 
strong Tibetan characteristics, and the promise of salvation as prophesied 
by Padmasambhava, emanated in the prophecies and visions that they claim 
to receive as part of their spiritual connection to their ancestral teacher, 
Padmasambhava. Their vision, however, did not stop there as Khenpo Jikmé 
Püntsok inspired this new approach by combining charismatic leadership 
and a modern approach to teaching Buddhism (always with some traditional 
elements), thus adapting to the new sociopolitical circumstances.
What he and many other leaders of Buddhist encampments promote is 
a sort of ‘soft nationalism’ that is not so much aimed at claiming political 
self-determination but rather at protecting the cultural, linguistic, and 
religious legacy of Tibet while also accepting some level of adaptation to the 
changing world. The Buddhist centers they have founded are rarely engaged 
in assertive forms of ‘hard’ nationalism aimed at political confrontation 
and self-determination. They are aimed at revamping religious education, 
remapping the Buddhist landscape with sacred places and powerful spaces 
of worship, promoting ecumenism as a path to a united front against the 
dangers of globalization and Chinese dilution of Tibetan traditional culture 
and values. Unlike the once-powerful and politically influential mega mon-
asteries of the Gelukpa school, these new mass semi-monastic centers do not 
37 Marty (pp. 32-33).
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promote the worship of the Dalai Lama nor try to f ight for his return, and 
do not engage in confrontations with local authorities for more freedom in 
the practice of religion. They focus on combining modern education and a 
strong ecumenical outreach, instilling the relevance of social engagement 
in the formation of Buddhist monastics, while at the same time not resisting 
but adapting to and experimenting with the new ideas promoted by the 
Chinese government through the State Administration for Religious Affairs 
including the work that religious organizations should endorse such as 
peaceful and harmonious coexistence, charity, relief work, and promotion 
of environmental protection.
The persistence of nationalism in eastern Tibet is a consequence of vari-
ous interdependent factors including the historical demise of the theocratic 
polity led by the Dalai Lama and other high hierarchs in the Buddhist world, 
the collapse of the mass monastic system predominantly led by the Gelukpa 
school and which was virtually in control of the production of knowledge, 
education, and culture, as well as the impact of the vast sociopolitical, 
economic, and cultural influence which resulted from Tibetans’ conflicted 
interaction with the modern Chinese world. By virtue of its claimed link 
to the Tibetan Empire, the role of Padmasambhava in the introduction of 
Buddhism in Tibet, and the activities of the early Tibetan Buddhist com-
munities, the scriptures of the Nyingma school root Tibetan identity in 
that early phase of Buddhism on Tibetan soil, therefore gaining heightened 
significance as an antidote to the threat of modern circumstances. The Bud-
dhist encampment leaders with their focus on meditation, scholastic study, 
multi-year curricula, and social engagement represent the complexities of 
what I see as a fundamentalist movement within the Tibetan society. It is 
especially Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok’s modern attention to the relevance of 
traditional canonical and non-canonical scriptures, the safeguarding of 
Vinaya, the monastic code of discipline, his emphasis on morality, ethics, 
and virtuous actions based on various Buddhist doctrines such as the ‘ten 
virtues’ as a guiding principle for both monastics and the laity, as well as 
his active participation in prophetic and visionary movements across Tibet 
through the treasure revelation tradition in the service of the twenty-f irst 
century that encapsulates this new Tibetan national identity.
Self-immolations as hard nationalism
Beyond the role of the Buddhist encampments in revamping Tibetan na-
tionalism, recently Tibetans are also employing more assertive and harder 
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expressions of nationhood and political awareness that resonate with types 
of nationalism found in Europe since the nineteenth century. This latest 
phase of Tibetan nationalism is being expressed among the young and 
disenfranchised through a form typical of ethno-nationalist conflicts, that 
of martyrdom. This is manifest, nowadays, in the wave of self-immolations 
that occurred particularly in eastern Tibet between 2009 and 2015, and 
continue to claim victims in the present. As of March 2017, 147 Tibetans have 
voluntarily set their bodies ablaze as a form of protest against the Chinese 
government.38 While many were Buddhist monastics or ex-monastics, 
both monks and nuns especially in the f irst two years, the vast majority of 
self-immolators have been lay people. Approximately one-third of the total 
self-immolated protesters left behind either written or recorded messages 
before their ultimate act.39 Based on these records, it seems that religion 
per se is not the main reason for their violent act. Only in the f irst years 
were monastics, almost uniquely from Gelukpa monasteries, the majority 
of self-immolators. Starting in 2011, more and more lay people joined the 
lethal protests and by 2013 they outnumbered monastics in areas such as 
Amdo (Qinghai and Sichuan Province) with a majority of ethnic Tibetans, 
which scholars believe are typically more prone to unrest and resistance.40 
In these areas ethnic Tibetans have displayed increasing frustration at 
several circumstances perceived as unjust and unfair including a sense 
of desperation for lack of employment, more state-imposed control and 
interference with religious activities, unbalanced education, and exclusion 
from political, and economic opportunities.41 Lack of freedom of religious 
practice seems to be a major concern for the self-immolators, especially 
among monastics, but it is only one of several other motivations. Other 
desiderata include self-determination, the return of the Dalai Lama, the 
release of the Eleventh Panchen Lama originally recognized by the Four-
teenth Dalai Lama named Gendün Chökyi Nyima (b. 1989), more equality 
and justice in education and employment opportunities, and the promotion 
of Tibetan language and cultural education. For many Tibetans, these issues 
together with requests for more authentic religious freedom are all core 
ingredients of their perception of Tibetan national and cultural identity.42
38 ICT (2016)
39 Woeser (2014); Wang (2012).
40 Toft et al. (2011).
41 Fischer (2009); Enze and Paik (2014, pp. 70-85).
42 ’Jam bzod (2014, pp. 144-145); Woeser (2013, pp. 23-28).
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The spate of self-immolations began in Ngaba in February 2009 just a 
few months after local security forces brutally put an end to the violent 
uprising in 2008. Monasteries there as well as in other parts of eastern 
Tibet including Rebkong, for instance, were put under strict monitoring, 
religious practices were tightly controlled as were rituals and education, 
and patriotic reeducation intensif ied. A network of CCTV surveillance 
video-cameras monitored monastics’ as well lay peoples’ movements in 
strategic places across the urban area. Additionally massive deployments 
of military and paramilitary personnel fostered an atmosphere of intimida-
tion and fear.43 Under these conditions, many monks radicalized out of 
frustration. To date the self-immolators’ demands have not been adequately 
met. The Chinese government’s refusal to recognize Tibetans’ yearning for 
increased self-determination and their unwillingness to offer any solutions 
or dialogue, but only harsh suppression, is further fueling the rise of Tibetan 
self-immolations. Self-immolation is the new Tibetan form of communica-
tion to convey their despair, taking Tibetans’ nationalist response to the 
Chinese government’s hard line to a higher level.44 Reports indicate that 
prior to their dramatic self-sacrif ice; many self-immolators show signs of 
anger, frustration, and confrontation with local authorities and military 
personnel in their local areas, often just days before committing themselves 
to f ire.45
Although the PRC and its media sources have extensively accused Tibetan 
self-immolators of being not only terrorists engaging in separatist activities, 
but also religious zealots backed by the Dalai Lama, self-immolation can 
hardly be considered a form of terrorism.46 While self-immolation is a 
violent expression of anger, resentment, and hopelessness, auto-cremation 
speaks more to the non-hostile commitment to political activism than 
any form of terrorism, including suicide bombing, with which it shares 
some features. The two forms of political violence, self-immolation and 
terrorism, share several characteristics including a central communica-
tive component, political radicalism, a fundamentalist agenda, and being 
an extreme last resort which includes the death of the activist in tune 
with ancient Mahāyāna scriptures. However, the non-hostile nature of 
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not be confused with criminals who unleash indiscriminate harm to others 
for political goals.47
Within the Tibetan community in exile in India, self-immolators are 
being celebrated and immortalized as martyrs and national heroes, as 
exemplif ied by their identif ication as pawó, a word that in Tibetan refers 
to both ‘hero’ and ‘martyr’.48 It is to these martyrs that the Tibetan com-
munity in exile, based in Dharamsala, India, has erected a monument to 
commemorate their gestures as acts of selfless patriotism (‘gyelché’). The 
self-immolators are not only patriots, but also specif ically Tibetan which 
on the stele (‘doring’) are referred to not by the ubiquitous term bö/bod for 
Tibet, but chölsum bö or ‘Tibet of the three provinces’, a traditional political 
term used in reference to the political unity of the Tibetan regions of the U 
Tsang, Kham, and Amdo provinces. As much as self-immolation is political, 
however, it is also religious, given that from a Buddhist perspective the 
martyr’s intent to sacrif ice her body to communicate the anguish of her 
people is an act of generosity; it is an imitation of the extreme gesture of the 
Buddha to sacrif ice his life for the wellbeing of another living creature.49 
This has an important place in the phenomenon of self-immolations in 
Tibet and in Asia in general. The act, however, is then also appropriated 
by the nation it represents and controlled, manipulated, and sacralized to 
become the emblem of the heroic struggle of the Tibetan nation. Here the 
politics of martyrdom in both its altruistic sacrif icial sense stemming from 
the Buddhist legacy as well as extreme political activism merge with the 
interdependent concepts of ‘memory’, ‘identity’, and ‘heroism’, reinforcing 
a radicalized sense of Tibetan national unity.50 Tibetans, like all societies, 
are psychologically invested in their heroes and especially the monastic 
sangha, as these not only represent Tibet, its struggle for freedom, and the 
knowledge of more than a thousand years of Buddhist history, but they also 
function as the pure truth of a nation’s past.51 Whereas martyrdom suggests 
union with one’s spiritual achievements, heroism invokes union with one’s 
homeland, a mystical union with the spirit of a nation. The militant and 
violent nature of self-immolations cannot be understated as they represent 
a hard-line assertion of values and a confrontation with perceived threats 
to individual, communal, and national rights and values. A vast number 
47 Biggs (2012); Schmid (2011, pp. 39-157).
48 Shakya (2012, pp. 20-21).
49 Cabezón (2013, pp. 1-2).
50 Fields (2004, p. 85).
51 Ignatieff (p.184).
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of self-immolators show signs of radicalization exacerbated by decades of 
policies that have diluted religious culture, impoverished the relevance of 
Tibetan languages, and weakened the Tibetan sociopolitical identity by 
precluding Tibetans from having self-chosen leaders. Some self-immolators 
wrote about acting to ‘lead others to Buddhahood’ and modeling their 
actions on ‘the Buddha who gave his body to a hungry tigress’, while others 
addressed the needs to offer their burning bodies as ‘lamps that dispel 
the darkness of the land of snows’.52 While the lyricism contained in such 
testimonies draws on religious fervor as well as scriptural and doctrinal 
sources typical of the Mahāyāna tradition, it nevertheless contributes to 
an estheticization of violent sacrif ice as a modern form of identity. They are 
reminiscent of certain postmodern interpretations of the consumption of 
images, signs, and actions representative of contemporary Western societies, 
where so much becomes a spectacle.53 And therefore everything overlaps 
including politics, religion, culture, as well as violence and the power of 
media technologies. Considering the visual media through which the vast 
majority of the world population is exposed to the images of Tibetans dying 
ablaze for their nationalist struggle, it is hardly possible to ignore the shock-
ing elements of these stylized performances so critical in this esthetics of 
death especially in popular culture.54 The graphic signs of auto-cremations 
have now likely entered the houses of millions of people around the world 
and its audiences have consumed these images as signs and symbols now 
referring to the specif ic struggle for justice and equality in Tibet.
This kind of fundamentalism that emerged in Tibet in the past few years 
is not unique among Asian societies. Similar episodes of Buddhist leadership 
and monastic engagements in nationalist activities have been documented 
in many modern South Asian countries including Sri Lanka, Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Myanmar. Although these cases are all characterized by 
their own historical circumstances and thus are not directly comparable, 
this confluence of Buddhist insurgencies around the Asian world shows 
that despite their stereotype as nonviolent, compassionate, and altruistic, 
there is strong potential for Buddhist supporters to rise and join forces to 
f ight against what they perceive as a dangerous threat to national interests 
and their sense of identity as a people.
Central to the cohesion of a nation is its ‘rich legacies of memories’, 
since ‘the nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of 
52 Lhamokyab (2013, p. 117); International Campaign for Tibet (2012).
53 Baudrillard (1993, p. 16).
54 Bruder (2004).
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endeavors, sacrif ice and devotion’.55 The glory of a heroic past is therefore 
the capital upon which a nation builds its imagined community, to use 
the well-known term coined by Benedict Anderson. A nation’s imagined 
political community is heightened by the solidarity expressed toward those 
who died for that very same idea of nationhood.56 Ernest Renan would have 
agreed with this point as he believed that a nation is ‘a large scale solidarity, 
constituted by the feeling of the sacrif ices one has made in the past and 
those one is prepared to make in the future’.57 For him shared suffering is 
more important than shared joy, and grief is more valuable than triumph. 
Nothing could be truer in the case of self-immolators in Tibet, for in the 
micro-politics of self-immolations, sacrif ice, suffering, and grief are at the 
heart of building national identity. Supreme sacrif ice therefore justif ies 
the transcendent character of the nation and the Buddhist altruistic act 
of a bodhisattva. It is above all the ‘off icial memory’ of these experiences 
as passed down to posterity that will contribute to the reinforcement of 
a national spirit. Therefore, the f igure of the martyr is particularly useful 
in the construction of national memory, especially in moments of crisis. 
It creates a sacred aura around an already victimized and much idealized 
imagined nation. Individual victims become national heroes by taking upon 
themselves the task of denouncing perceived human-rights violations and 
memorializing their sacrif ice through enacting heroic death.
Conclusion
With the Communist Party’s self-fashioning as a multireligious and multi-
ethnic China – albeit strictly controlled and regulated – several religious 
traditions sprang back to life. The Marxist narrative of the decline of religion 
in China not only did not work, but by tolerating religion PRC policy has 
allowed it to flourish and crystallize.58 In the case of Tibetans, for whom 
religious life constitutes a fundamental part of national and cultural 
identity, not only has Buddhism reemerged strongly, but it supports even 
stronger Tibetan nationalistic claims. In its modern emphasis, religion, 
next to language and ethnicity, can be used to transform the community 
into a nation.
55 Renan quoted in Fields (2004, p. 85).
56 Anderson (2006, pp. 6-7). 
57 Fields (2004, p. 85).
58 Van der Veer (2013, p. 657).
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The two cases presented here demonstrate two ways in which Tibetans 
are promoting and consolidating their national identity. The power of 
history and myth at the core of the success of large religious institutes, 
like the Buddhist encampments, and the promotion of martyrdom and 
heroic sacrif ice to protest for self-determination are two aspects of modern 
Tibetan collective identity that are unlikely to dissipate any time soon. 
Buddhist encampments like Larung Gar capitalize on religion, modern 
education, language, and social engagement as a source of anti-secular 
nationalist revival. This phenomenon seems to encourage some openness 
for discussion with authorities and accommodation of China policies and 
state institutions. The same cannot be said of the self-immolators, who 
do not give the impression of being interested in compromises. As the 
government in China tends to turn a blind eye to the issues for which 
they advocate, the international media seems the only one to be actually 
acknowledging their message. This can be evinced by the essential role 
that digital technology, especially the Internet, emailing, text messaging, 
and social media has in the phenomenon of self-immolations. Communica-
tion to the outside world is essential. The martyrdom and heroism of the 
self-immolators are equally balanced in their sacrif icial activities: the 
former stemming from personal dedication and religious identif ication 
(the desire to imitate the supreme generosity of the Buddha); the latter 
valorized by the myths of personal transformation by virtue of violent 
processes and typically identif ied and bestowed by community valoriza-
tion and evaluation. In the economy of sacrif ice, Tibetans who commit 
themselves to the blazing f lames of altruism and patriotic heroism enjoy 
great admiration and are rewarded with honor and status in the memory 
of the community.
This essay suggests that Tibetans continue to cultivate and give voice to 
Tibetan national sentiments through diverse strategies. Buddhist encamp-
ments are a platform for local communities to focus on education, language, 
ethics, and religious values as priorities in safeguarding Tibetan culture, 
thus promoting a form of ‘soft nationalism’. The attention on Buddhist 
education, culture, and modernization of most of the Tibetan Buddhist 
encampments and institutes resonates with China’s post-socialist mod-
ernization project and its promotion not only of economic development, 
but also of poverty reduction, openness, and stability. What the Buddhist 
encampments also feed into is China’s move toward a multicultural, cosmo-
politan, and controlled religious pluralism, contributing to its new image 
via the ‘soft-power’ strategy of promoting certain modern forms of religion, 
including Tibetan Buddhism.
NatioNaliSm mat teRS 303
On the other hand, self-immolators use the hard currency of self-sacrifice 
and self-chosen martyrdom through violent death to call on Tibetans to 
unite and simultaneously influence the national and international com-
munities’ perceptions of Tibet in the hope of hastening a response. Unlike 
the mass Buddhist encampments, the phenomenon of self-immolation with 
its religion-infused political intent speak of a more assertive nationalism, 
one of resistance to integration, political violence, and martyrdom. The 
crisis of Tibetan self-immolation indicates a widespread and growing sense 
of malaise and impotence in the face of aggressive market-based homogeni-
zation throughout China. It condemns the loss of cultural values and local 
traditions in the rush for global economic competition. The predominant 
and overarching role played by Gelukpa monks in Ngawa and other towns 
such as Rebkong in the self-immolation crisis suggests their frustration for 
not being able to freely worship the Dalai Lama as a centrally important 
religious f igure in their tradition, which is not shared in the same way by 
other Buddhist schools in Tibet, especially the Nyingma. We can under-
stand these differences as examples of how nationalism in a postindustrial 
globalized world and the rise of politicized religion in the international 
political economy are not uniform and monolithic phenomena, but are 
shaped and represented differently by different people and diverse agencies 
even within the same community that shares the same values. However, 
I believe that both soft and hard nationalisms in the form of religious en-
campments and self-immolation, respectively, operate at the microlevel of 
a developing society lacking the ability to trigger an effective nationalist 
rebellion to achieve its goals. In the larger picture, this study understands 
nationalistic developments among Tibetans in China not as emblematic 
of a f law in Buddhism, but as a characteristic sign of the interconnection 
between religion and nationalism.
Central Tibetan authoritative leadership is lacking in Tibet since the 
departure of the Dalai Lama for India in 1959 and the passing of the Tenth 
Panchen Lama in 1989. Since then, the religious enthusiasm that a number 
of influential religious f igures, such as the highly charismatic Nyingma 
Buddhist teachers and visionaries of the encampments, have been able 
to rekindle among large sections of the population in eastern Tibet and 
mainland China has been largely unrivaled by other Buddhist monastic 
communities. Therefore, I characterize this movement as soft national-
ism, whose actors have established new institutions with the intent to 
combine traditional values and symbols with modern systems of thought. 
By contrast, however, there is also pervasive resentment and frustration 
among many other Tibetans in the very same regions who react to China’s 
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repressive policies on religion, language, and territory with anger and a 
harder nationalist, if not fundamentalist, attitude. Radicalized by years 
of harsh control and perceived sociopolitical ostracism, Tibetans opting 
for self-immolation represent this alternative strategy of political protest 
and violence with the desperate intent to unite Tibetans in the struggle for 
self-determination, the call to return the Dalai Lama to Tibet, and to draw 
attention to their plea from various audiences, including the international 
media. Considering their lackluster results, self-immolations may gradually 
decline in frequency, but political protests of some sort will be unlikely to 
stop. Nevertheless, both soft and hard nationalist groups have shown them-
selves to be innovative and resourceful. They have proven that nationalism 
matters in Tibet on a global religious level as well as a local activist level.
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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sets up rules that restrict religious 
group’s activities. Since Xi Jinping became the president of the People’s 
Republic of China in 2012, suppression of the Chinese Protestant churches 
has intensif ied. In this chapter, I approach this church-state tension 
by examining key off icial documents about CCP’s religious policy and 
regulations as the context in which the tension arises. I also analyze 
important manifestos, petitions or theses recently produced by unregis-
tered Protestant communities or individuals as responses to the state’s 
oppression. I argue that both CCP and the unregistered Protestants 
subscribe to a notion of religious nationalism but emphasize this notion 
differently and that this difference is a key factor underlying their present 
antagonistic relationship.
Keywords: Chinese Christianity, CCP, TSPM, house church, apologetics
Introduction
Benef iting from China’s Reform-and-Open policy implemented in 1978, 
Chinese Christians have in general enjoyed more religious freedom in the 
post-Mao era than before. This relative freedom, however, is fragile and 
precarious. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), based upon its atheist 
ideology, sets up rules and regulations that restrict the religious group’s 
activities. Violators or non-conformists are easily arrested and sentenced 
to imprisonment.1 Since Xi Jinping became the president of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 2012, suppression of the Protestant churches 
has intensif ied. This is especially marked by two kinds of repressive meas-
ure: the removal of the cross from the chapel roof or demolition of the 
church building and the arrest of human-rights lawyers, many of whom 
1 Bays (2003); Dunch (2001, 2008); Kindopp (2004).
310 YeN-zeN tSai 
are Protestants.2 During the national conference on managing religion 
held from 22 to 23 April 2016, Xi reaff irmed the correctness of the CCP’s 
theory about religion and its restrictive policy, insisting upon embracing 
a ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.3 Against observers who are 
optimistic about the irreversible progress of the opening up of religious 
policy in China, this sharp turn should alert us to the inveterate conflict 
between church and the Communist party-state.4
Interactions between Chinese Protestants and CCP are complicated, and 
there are ways by which we can investigate them. In this chapter, I propose 
to approach the tension issue by examining two groups of literature. The 
f irst one is related to key off icial documents that stipulate CCP’s religious 
policy and rules and regulations. They tell the government’s basic position 
toward religious belief and religious activities. On one level, they reveal 
how CCP defines religion and where its core interest lies. On another level, 
they make clear the standard on the basis of which the government deals 
with the religious groups. The second one contains manifestos, petitions 
or theses produced by Chinese Protestant communities or individuals as 
responses to the party-state’s afflictions upon their faith. These apologetic 
writings are highly relevant and useful to our understanding of the subject 
because, as a ‘genre of testimony’, they show the ‘fundamentals of religious 
belief’ of a church community. They are salient markers that indicate this 
community’s boundary and ‘act as a membrane for the exchange of ideas’.5 
By juxtaposing these two sets of writings, one should be able to detect 
key elements surrounding the tension, to contrast their differences and 
similarities, and to explain the antagonism between them.
My chapter consists of three major parts. I start with introducing CCP’s 
religious policy and revealing its gist found in key off icial documents as 
the context in which the Chinese church-state tension arises. In the second 
section, I analyze some of the important Chinese apologetic writings gener-
ated in the recent decades, making clear where and why they oppose the 
off icial policy. In the last section, I discuss, on the basis of my f indings, the 
fundamental stances of CCP and Chinese Protestants, and argue that both 
of them subscribe to a notion of religious nationalism. I further point out 
2 BBC (2016); Economist (2014); Los Angeles Times (2014); McKenzie (2014); Melchior (2016); 
UCA News (2016); Van Sant (2016).
3 Xi’s speech can be read at http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/0423/c1001-28299513.
htm, last accessed 17 June 2016.
4 Kindopp (2004); Lambert (2009); F. Yang (2012); Wielander (2009).
5 Bernabeo (1987, pp. 349-352).
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that their emphasis upon this notion diverges and that this divergence is a 
key factor underlying their antagonistic relationship.
CCP’s religious policy
On the national level, there are three important documents that spell out 
CCP’s def inition of religion and prescribe how a religious group should act 
accordingly. ‘The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question 
during Our Country’s Socialist Period’, f irst presented during the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978 and publicized in 1982, and 
commonly named Document 19, sets the basic tone of CCP’s religious policy 
that has exerted a great influence in the following decades.6 Brought about 
immediately after the Cultural Revolution, the document repudiates the 
leftist extremism against religion in the previous years. Instead, it asserts 
the importance of coping with religion pragmatically with scientif ic theo-
ries. Based upon Marxist materialism, it regards religious manifestations, 
including religious beliefs, feelings, rites, and organizations, as social and 
historical products. They are destined to vanish, it aff irms, once human 
development advances into socialism and communism. Before this hap-
pens, one has to deal with religion meticulously as it possesses protracted 
nature, complexity, and mass nature, three characteristics that may cause 
contradictions among the people.
According to Document 19, CCP’s basic policy ‘toward religious question 
is that of respect for and protection of the freedom of religious belief’.7 This 
seemingly positive attitude, however, is circumscribed by many subordinate 
clauses. Document 19 confirms people’s freedom to religious belief, but, at 
the same time, it advocates people’s right to reject religion and propagate 
atheism and anti-superstition. Further, it thus stipulates:
Religion will not be permitted to meddle in administrative or juridical af-
fairs of state, nor to intervene in the schools or public education. It will be 
absolutely forbidden to force anyone, particularly people under eighteen 
years of age, to become a member of a church, to become a Buddhist monk 
6 MacInnis (1989, p. 7). For more detailed historical background about Document 19, see 
Dunch (2008, pp. 160-165). The Chinese original of this document can be obtained at www.kxwsl.
com/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=755, last accessed 20 February 2016. For its English translation, 
MacInnis (1989, pp. 7-26).
7 MacInnis (1989, p. 14).
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or nun, or to go to temples or monasteries to study Buddhist scripture. 
Religion will not be permitted to recover in any way those special feudal 
privileges which have been abolished or to return to an exploitative and 
oppressive religious system. Nor will religion be permitted to make use 
in any way of religious pretexts to oppose the Party’s leadership or the 
Socialist system, or to destroy national or ethnic unity.8
What the document aims at is to instruct the religious believers, both clergy 
and laity alike, to be patriotic, observe the law, support socialism, and 
uphold national and ethnic unity, the strengthening of which contributes 
to the establishment of the united front. To achieve this purpose, it requires 
that religious groups follow CCP’s leadership; objection to this demand is 
deemed being disloyal to the party-state.
With respect to religious activities, Document 19 states that religious 
groups should act only at a site, either a temple, a chapel, or a mosque, 
licensed by the government. Activities conducted outside the designated 
area are in principle not allowed. All religious groups, based upon their 
respective religious tradition, should be associated with or incorporated 
into one of the eight national religious organizations that represent the f ive 
state-approved religions:9 the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Chinese 
Daoist Association, the Chinese Islamic Association, the Chinese Catholic 
Patriotic Association, the Chinese Catholic Religious Affairs Committee, 
the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Chinese Protestant Three-self 
Patriotic Movement, and the China Christian Council. The party-state in 
this way consolidates different religious groups into authorized associations 
so that they, within the limit of constitution and law, can perform a positive 
function for the country.
It is signif icant to note that Document 19 def ines religion in distinc-
tion from three areas that may cause confusion or overlapping. It f irst 
distinguishes religion from culture and custom, arguing that for the CCP 
members, to join the former is forbidden whereas to follow the latter as a 
traditional, social practice is conducive to ethnic unity. The document also 
differentiates between ‘normal religion’ (zhengchang zonjiao 正常宗教) 
8 MacInnis (1989, p. 15).
9 It is true that some provincial governments might, in consideration of their respective needs 
or situations, admit religions not within these f ive to be off icially acceptable. For example, 
Russian Orthodoxy can be practiced in Heilongjiang and folk religion is permitted in Fujian. But 
it should be noted that they are not authorized on the national level and that to be practically 
admissible does not always mean they are legally guaranteed. See SARA (2000b, p. 41); Hsun 
Chang (chapter 13 of this volume).
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and ‘abnormal religion’ (buzhengchang zonjiao 不正常宗教). By ‘abnormal 
religion’, it refers to criminal and anti-revolutionary groups and their activi-
ties in the guise of ‘religion’. Included in this category are sects branching 
off from popular religions and sorcerers and witches who capitalize on 
people’s ignorance for material gains. The document further stipulates that 
even for the f ive authorized religions, conducting activities on the principle 
of self-government, self-support, and self-propagation only is permitted. 
To cut foreign connections, either f inancial or organizational, and resist 
inf iltration of hostile power from abroad makes clear an area where the 
domestic religions should stand; it simultaneously reveals how CCP defines 
religion out of political consideration.
The State Department of PRC issued the ‘Announcement Regarding Some 
Questions on Further Improving Work on Religion’, alternatively called 
Document 6, in February 1991.10 The document was formulated in the 
aftermath of and as a response to the June Fourth Incident in 1989 that had 
generated tremendous upheavals throughout China. Social stability was at 
the top of the PRC government’s agenda. As far as its attitude toward religion 
is concerned, the government set as its primary goal to persistently imple-
ment the policy of religious freedom, on the one hand, and, on the other, to 
more harshly control illegal religious activities.11 On the surface, Document 
6 adds nothing but reiterates the main gist of Document 19. However, the 
tone it raises and the content it frames underline its importance in shap-
ing the operation of the off icial religious administration. In view of some 
confusions, such as competing for leadership in the temple, mosque, and 
church and establishing unauthorized Buddhist and Christian seminaries 
to recruit students in local areas, this document calls for a clear-up in order 
to maintain continuity and stability of CCP’s religious policy.
Document 6 lays out its announcement in the order of six subtitles, 
all imperative sentences: (1) comprehensively and accurately implement 
the policy of religious freedom; (2) manage religious affairs according to 
the law; (3) fully expand the function of patriotic religious organizations; 
(4) resolutely strike down criminal activities in the name of religion; (5) 
strengthen work units and establish work teams of religious affairs; (6) 
strengthen CCP’s leadership in religious affairs. Under each subtitle, the 
document elaborates what to rectify and how to improve it with respect to 
10 The Chinese original of this document can be obtained at http://CCP.people.com.cn/
GB/64184/64186/66704/4495639.html, last accessed 20 February 2016.
11 For an excellent exposition of the June Fourth Incident in relation to Document 6, see Ying 
(1999, pp. 36-44).
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chaos among religious groups. For example, regarding implementing the 
policy of religious freedom, it aff irms a citizen’s right to religious belief and 
demands rectif ication of abuses, if any. The purpose of this instruction, as 
explicitly stated, is to more conveniently unite the mass and enhance social 
stability. But when coming to the second instruction, ‘manage religious 
affairs according to the law’, it stresses the necessity of strictly supervising 
religious organizations and their activities and guarding against any illegal 
encroachments from either within or without. It is therefore obvious that 
the intention of Document 6, with a succinct frame of expression, is to bring 
religious believers or communities into alignment, a task CCP is highly 
concerned with in the process of social liberalization.
In line with the aforementioned religious policy and for the purpose of 
effectively realizing it in society, the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs (SARA) of PRC issued the ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs’ (RRA) 
on 1 March 2005.12 This document, in place of the simpler ‘Rules of Man-
agement for Religious Sites’,13 was originally intended to transcribe the 
instruction on religious policy by Jiang Zemin, then CCP’s general secretary, 
into concrete guidelines for the religious groups. SARA would have to make 
sure that Jiang’s ‘three sentences’, that is, ‘to thoroughly implement CCP’s 
religious policy, to tighten management of religious affairs according to 
the law, and to actively guide religion to adapt to socialist society’, could be 
observed and practiced.14 Now the RRA is comprehensive in content and 
thematic in presentation.15 There are forty-eight articles in total, divided 
into seven chapters. Chapter 1 ‘General Provisions’ translates the main 
ideas of Document 19 and Document 6 into f ive articles, emphasizing the 
citizens’ constitutional right of religious freedom and the importance for 
them to abide by the law, uphold national and ethnic unity, and maintain 
social stability. It also makes clear that religious groups, on the basis of 
self-governing, should not be dominated by foreign power, and that local 
governments of all levels have the administrative duty to supervise them.
Chapter 2 ‘Religious Organization’ stipulates how religious groups should 
register with the local governments and conduct their activities, such as 
publication and establishment of school, according to regulations respec-
tively specif ied. Likewise, Chapter 3 ‘Religious Site’ details where religious 
12 The Chinese original of this document can be obtained at www.sara.gov.cn/zcfg/xzfg/531.
htm, last accessed 22 February 2016. 
13 For the Chinese original of this text, SARA (1996, pp. 46-49).
14 SARA (2000a, pp. 18-19); Dunch (2008, pp. 169-174).
15 For a discussion of this document against religious legislation in contemporary China, see 
Ying (2006). 
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groups can or cannot act and how the religious buildings should receive 
the government’s approval before construction and should be subject to 
regular inspection afterwards. Chapter 4 ‘Religious Personnel’ intends to 
identify the clergy and prescribe the contents of their activities, whereas 
Chapter 5 ‘Religious Property’ details the rules that govern the transaction 
of real estate of religious groups. Most restrictive of all the articles are those 
contained in Chapter 6 ‘Legal Responsibility’. They pertain to various pos-
sible conditions in which violators of rules are to be prosecuted by the court 
or penalized by the government’s supervisory off ices. They thus pose much 
pressure on the religious groups, causing them to weigh the result carefully 
when engaging in religious activities. Chapter 7 ‘Appendix’ specif ies how 
religious groups in the mainland should interact with their counterparts 
in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
The three documents introduced above demonstrate a relationship of 
continuity. Document 19 lays the ideological foundation of religion for post-
Mao CCP, Document 6 strengthens it, and RRA transcribes it into rules 
and regulations that can be practically referenced in society. In addition 
to these documents, many other materials, off icially promulgated in the 
form of talks, collections of reading, or textbooks, also serve to inform the 
religious believers about what religion is and how they should behave as 
practitioners.16 The explicit intention on the part of CCP is to highlight 
its off icial boundary from which it can interact with its religious citizens 
legally and practically.
Chinese apologetic writings
Document 19 and Document 6 might be landmarks that reflected CCP’s 
willingness to loosen up its control over religious groups in the post-Mao 
China. Their relative liberating effect, however, was not favorably received. 
Many Christians, particularly those aff iliated with the unregistered ‘house 
churches’, stood up to resist the party-state’s religious policy and voiced 
against its concomitant rules and regulations. As Christian churches, 
notably those of the Protestant evangelical sort, expanded very rapidly, 
how to respond to their needs, such as recognizing their group status, 
f inding proper meeting sites for their congregation, and training qualif ied 
theological students as prospective ministers, has become a thorny problem 
that often resulted in conflicts and discontents. It was common that local 
16 See Zhang (1995); SARA (2000a); SARA (2000b); SARA (2005). 
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governments treated the recalcitrant church members with physical coer-
cion, and this ignited more protests and resentments in return. Against this 
background, leaders of four branches of Protestant house churches in north 
China together published two manifestos in November 1998, to make known 
their grievances: ‘Confessions of China House Churches’17 and ‘Attitude of 
China House Churches toward the Government, Religious Policy, and the 
Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM)’.18 The f irst manifesto concisely 
expresses their fundamental belief, and the second one, based upon this 
belief, speaks out their common stance vis-à-vis the secular authority. The 
two literary pieces are thus intimately related and should be evaluated as 
two sides of one entity.
The ‘Confessions of China House Churches’ reveals that unregistered 
Protestants in north China are theologically very conservative. They believe 
biblical inerrancy, affirming that as it was divinely inspired, the Bible should 
be literally understood and is the ultimate criterion and guidance for the 
Christian’s life. Their exposition of the Trinity and Christology basically 
follows the Nicaean Creed. In an appendix, they vehemently oppose the ‘her-
etic’ proclamation that Christ has returned in his second incarnation. To be 
reborn and saved, they assert, one has to repent, believe in Jesus as the Son 
of God who died for humanity’s sins on the cross and was resurrected from 
the dead, and receive the promised Holy Spirit. The Confessions indicates 
that these unregistered Protestants tend to be Pentecostal-charismatic, as 
they believe that receiving the Holy Spirit is the assurance of salvation and 
that speaking in tongues and working miracles are testimonies to God’s 
mighty acts.
More relevant to our interest is the ecclesiology elaborated in the Confes-
sions. According to this literary piece, the church is composed of members 
called by Christ from various places, both domestic and international. It is 
thus the body of Christ and, as well, God’s house. All Christians worldwide 
belong to the same body, and they should be united in truth and in Christ. 
To manage the church, Christians should follow the biblical principles and 
should not be controlled and manipulated by any secular power, although, 
the Confessions adds, they should obey the constitution so far as legal 
17 The Chinese original of this text can be obtained at www.chinesetheology.com/ChinaRe-
ligiousPolicy/ChinaHouseChurchConfession.htm, last accessed 22 February 2016.
18 The Chinese original of this text can be obtained at http://edenho.info/wp-content/uploa
ds/2015/06/%E4 %B8 %AD%E5 %9C%8B%E5 %AE%B6 %E5 %BA%AD%E6 %95 %99 %E6 
%9C%83 %E8 %81 %B2 %E6 %98 %8E.pdf, last accessed 22 February 2016.
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aspects are concerned. In three strong sentences, the section on ecclesiology 
ends in a high voice:
We oppose alliance or intermingling of church and politics; we oppose 
dependence on domestic and international political power for the devel-
opment of the church; we object to the church’s involvement in activities 
that destroy ethnic and national unity.
That a church’s proclamation of its biblical doctrine would also include 
elements from the current political scene is unusual, but that is exactly 
what the unregistered Chinese Protestants purport to convey, in view 
of the highly politicized environment in which they live. To profess that 
they are politically unambitious at least precludes their being suspected 
of unpatriotic and, in a positive way, makes their religious purposes more 
salient. The second manifesto ‘Attitude of China House Churches toward 
the Government, Religious Policy, and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement’, 
reinforces the Confessions and straightforwardly cast their opinions against 
the secular authority. This apologetic writing begins with four statements 
as a prelude. They serve as an important premise upon which the Chinese 
Protestants assume they could engage in an effective dialogue with the 
government institutionally and ideologically. The unregistered churches, 
the statements proclaim, verify that they love the people and the country 
as they do the Lord and the church; they also uphold national unity and 
ethnic consolidation. They honor the constitution of PRC, political leaders, 
and the government as ordained by God. In an askew tone, they assert that 
they never betrayed any national interests and only did things beneficial to 
the people. Moreover, although misunderstood and persecuted, they never 
fought back either in attitude or in action.
The manifesto immediately turns to raise the f irst rhetorical question: 
‘Why do we refuse to register with the government?’ It then presents f ive 
reasons as the answer, contending that the government’s current religious 
regulations contravene the biblical principles. It specif ically pinpoints the 
so-called ‘three-f ixeds’ (sanding 三定) policy as unbiblical: f ixed site, f ixed 
personnel, and f ixed district. Countering these restrictions, it argues that to 
conduct activities at the designated site only clashes with the Lord’s teach-
ing to hold fellowships anywhere in his name. To the rule that ministers 
licensed by the Religious Affairs Bureau exclusively are permitted to deliver 
sermons from the pulpit, it retorts that anyone called by God and authorized 
or commissioned by the church is entitled to preach. And with respect to 
the rule that a church minister is not allowed to conduct activities beyond 
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the boundary of a village or a province, it alludes to the Bible’s instruction 
that Christians should go to the end of the world to evangelize people and 
to establish churches.
The second reason why the house churches turn their back on the govern-
ment is because the off icial policy forbids them to preach to people under 
eighteen. According to the Bible, the manifesto contends, Jesus commands 
his disciples to receive the little ones. CCP’s religious policy also forbids 
church ministers to pray for spiritual healing or practice exorcism, but this 
obviously denies the similar acts that Jesus performed. As to the rule that 
forbids the church to receive other church members from afar, it is against 
the biblical teaching that the church elders should not treat visitors coming 
from remote places with hospitality and kindness. The last reason why the 
house churches refuse to register is because the religious policy bans foreign 
connections. Against this, the manifesto answers that the church should 
be ecumenical; no distinction should be made among people of different 
ethnic backgrounds because Christ redeems all humans and calls them 
into one unity.
The manifesto proceeds to ask the second rhetorical question: ‘Why do 
we refuse to join the Three-self Patriotic Movement?’ To this question, it 
responds from f ive ideological and practical aspects, arguing in the op-
positional mode of expression. The unregistered house churches accuse 
that TSPM is headed by the government and administers to the off icial 
religious policy, whereas they themselves respect Christ as their head and 
manage the church according to the biblical principles. This contrastive 
fact also applies to the different formations of clergy in the two camps. As 
TSPM was founded by Wu Yaozong 吳耀宗 and followed the liberal theology 
of social gospel, it has departed from the orthodox biblical teachings. The 
unregistered house churches, in contrast, build their foundation upon the 
Bible and inherit the fundamentalist and evangelical traditions. Henceforth 
the two organizations have treaded on two different paths: one, subject to 
the government, engages itself in political movements, whereas the other, 
maintaining the principle of separation between church and state, submits 
itself to God. In this context, TSPM sets tending the congregation inside the 
church as its main task, but the unregistered house churches take evangeli-
cal expansion as their great mission.
The manifesto admits that the Bible-centered orientation in theology 
and action may have to pay a high price, therefore it brings out into the 
open its attitude of being persecuted. In a nutshell, the unregistered house 
churches contend that it is not ethical and political problems that should 
cause the government’s suppression of them; by all accounts their members 
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are patriotic and morally upright. Rather, it is simply because they refuse to 
register with the local government and join TSPM that they have received 
such an ill treatment. Even under persecution, the manifesto continues, 
they would persist in their faith as well as, without any grudges, continue 
to make supplication to God on behalf of the country and the government.
Along this line of attitude, the manifesto ends with an appeal to the 
government for true understanding. It requests that the latter recognize 
the unregistered house churches’ innocent motivation and stop imputing 
the name of heretics or ‘evil cult’ to their group. It also sincerely calls on the 
government to implement the policy of religious freedom, without resorting 
to means of physical violence such as beating, conf iscation, detention, 
f ine, or reeducation through labor. For those Christians imprisoned for the 
sake of preaching the gospel, they ask for earlier release. In conclusion, the 
manifesto claims that if Christian believers increase, they will bring about 
wider social stability and higher spiritual civility, and this is the blessing 
they can contribute to the country.
In contrast to these two manifestos produced from the unregistered 
house churches that disclose their general theological belief and religious 
attitude toward the government, a petition expressly for a church or an 
event deserves our attention. On 10 May 2011, seventeen Protestant church 
ministers or leaders, all unaff iliated with TSPM, wrote to Wu Bangguo 吳
邦國, chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s 
Congress, and asked for the citizen’s true religious freedom. In a concerted 
effort, they spoke for Shouwang Church 守望教會, an unregistered Protes-
tant house church in Beijing which had been barred from worship gathering.
The public letter, titled ‘We Stand for Our Faith: Some Citizens’ Petition to 
the National People’s Congress with Respect to the Church-State Conflict’, 
echoes the letter of protest under the same title (women shi weile xinyang 我
們是為了信仰) which Wang Mingdao 王明道, one of the spiritual progeni-
tors of the house churches, wrote in 1955 against TSPM as a secularized and 
politicized organization. In a stout tone, the 2011 letter opens with lines 
aff irming that the undersigned are Chinese citizens who love their country, 
care about the people’s wellbeing, and obey the government’s administra-
tive authority to secure social order. After this confession of being patriotic, 
they add in tandem that they are also part of the ecumenical Christian 
church, revealing themselves as an integral part of world Christianity. Then 
they describe the Shouwang case by highlighting that the members of this 
church, over one thousand and coming primarily from the intellectual class, 
have been forced out of their meeting site. Without a permanent place for 
worship, they had no choice but to gather outdoors on Sundays. This kind 
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of mass meeting in the public area has incurred the police’s intervention, 
with the result of many members’ detention and the church leaders’ house 
arrest. The petition mentions that the Shouwang Church is by no means an 
isolated case; similar crackdowns have taken place in many cities across the 
country. And, as far as the church leaders can see, the cause of the tension 
lies in the problematic bureaucracy of religious management.
The petition refers to three sources of constitutional or human-rights 
documents, all of which pertain to religious freedom, to buttress their strug-
gle: Article 36 of PRC’s Constitution, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Of the last two, PRC is one of the signatories. In particular, 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is purposefully cited:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
this religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.19
On the basis of this conviction, Christians in most nations of the world, the 
petition continues to argue, enjoy religious freedom that includes the right 
to worship, meeting, speech, education, and evangelism.
The petition protests that Protestants in China, unless they join TSPM 
which is politically manipulated, have been deprived of their religious 
freedom; restrictions and suppressions by many of the government’s su-
pervisory departments are widely seen. To rectify the abuses, the church 
leaders request that a special investigation committee be formed to probe 
into the Shouwang case and urge Beijing City Government to settle it, review 
whether or not SARA’s ‘Regulations of Religious Affairs’ is unconstitutional, 
and draft a ‘Protection Law for PRC’s Religious Freedom’.
Toward the end, the church leaders argue that religious freedom is a 
universal value in the world community. It is the foundation upon which 
other kinds of human rights, such as the political right and the property 
right, are built. Without it, a multiethnic country with plural religions 
is not able to generate a civil society or bring about social stability and 
national unity and prosperity. The petitioners hope that by way of forming 
a special committee, the government could adhere to the principle of ruling 
by the law and serving the people and henceforth initiate a new phase of 
19 This original text can be obtained at www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/, 
last accessed 23 February 2016.
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productive church-state relation. To conclude their petition, they claim that, 
as Christians and patriotic citizens, they will continuously pray for their 
compatriots and the government as well; they will ask God to bestow peace, 
harmony, and stability upon China that is presently rising and, at the same 
time, to f ill Chinese society with righteousness, benevolence, and tolerance.
A group of ministers and elders of the Early Rain Reformed Church 秋雨
之福教會 in Chengdu, headed by Wang Yi 王怡, formulated a theological 
statement, titled ‘Reiteration of Our House Church’s Position’ and paren-
thetically called Ninety-Five Theses, on 18 August, to defend their faith.20 
Apparently modeling their apologetic writing on Martin Luther’s namesake, 
they in this piece of literature expound their political theology with numer-
ous biblical quotes but in a systematic and concise way. In the preamble, 
they express their wish to unite themselves with Christians who share their 
viewpoints and to launch dialogue with governments of all levels. They 
outline their theses in six thematic sections, capping each of them with a 
subtitle that summarizes the central meaning of that particular section.
Theses 1-17 of the Ninety-Five Theses lay out the theological presupposi-
tion that asserts God’s supreme sovereignty on the one hand and, on the 
other, relate it to Chinese people and Chinese government. They state that 
as God is the creator of all, Chinese territory, history, and cultural products 
are necessarily part of God’s creation. And since God creates human be-
ings according to his image, every Chinese, along with other peoples, are 
descendants of Adam; hence equal human dignity and value between the 
Chinese and other races. Based upon this understanding, no one is allowed 
to enslave or oppress others, and unless God permits, no one is allowed to 
rule over others. In Chinese society, all types of authority come from God 
the ultimate source, and submission to the official authority is justif ied only 
with respect to this recognition. Those in power, then, are accountable to 
God for their political, judicial, or moral decisions. As an innate, universal 
faculty, human conscience serves as the seat of judgment that dictates our 
conducts in society. People, the rulers and the ruled alike, have to obey 
their conscience, which equally means that they have to obey God. Because 
conscience may vary according to different individuals, the Bible in this 
connection is the criterion that checks people’s quality of conscience and, 
concomitantly, their deeds. Government off icials who exercise their power 
in contradiction to the biblical principles while asking the people to obey 
therefore ruin human conscience and challenge God’s sovereignty. And 
20 The Chinese original of this text can be obtained at www.cclifef l.org/View/Article/4248, 
last accessed 25 February 2016.
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people who submit themselves to rules or commands that are unbiblical 
simply betray their conscience and live an enslaved life inimical to God.
The second section, from Thesis 18 to Thesis 31, is an exposition of the au-
thors’ soteriology and Christology. The Theses argue that as God intervened 
in the Israelites’ history to save them from slavery in the past, he would do 
the same whenever and wherever he deems necessary. Jesus the Messiah 
comes to save humanity who are enslaved in sins. Chinese, past and present, 
are also sinners, and none of them can save himself or herself. It is God’s 
will to save all, Chinese included. This saving grace, the core of the gospel, 
purports the presence of the Kingdom of God to which all nations, rulers, 
and peoples, China and its inhabitants included, are supposed to turn.
Theses 32-39, the third section, assert that although God’s bestowal of hu-
man conscience and his saving grace are universal, Chinese culture, with its 
emphasis on benevolence and righteousness as the ultimate virtue, does not 
provide the way to salvation. Instead, Chinese people have for long lived in 
idolatry, worshipped the emperor and his autocratic institution, and relied 
upon one’s power for self-perfection. These wrongdoings are unmistakable 
components of the sins that other peoples have similarly committed and the 
Bible severely castigates. In this sense, anyone who advocates or seeks for 
sinicization of Christianity with the purpose to alter the Bible’s fundamental 
teachings denies Jesus Christ; as such he or she is anti-Christ and will fall 
under God’s judgment. The sinicization of Christianity includes proclaiming 
that Chinese culture contains the revelation of the one true God, that there 
are special Chinese ways to salvation unspecif ied in the Bible, and that 
the ecumenical Christian doctrines should be adapted to Chinese social 
and political realities. The church may have to respect Chinese culture 
and people in terms of practicing the truth and preaching the gospel, but 
it stands against distorting the gospel through culture and binding faith 
with political means, both under the pretext of sinicization of Christianity.
Theses 40-44, the fourth section, deal with ecclesiology. They opine that 
Christ redeems people across the world, including Chinese, through his 
blood to form a church. As this resurrected Christ has gained the power to 
rule over the whole world, all that exist, China and its government included, 
are subject to his dominion. This means that no matter how many Chinese 
Christians there are and whatever polity the Chinese government may 
adopt, Christ reigns supreme; it is not the earthly kings, political parties, 
cultures, and wealth that control history or the human heart. Therefore 
the church of Christ may be situated in any place, but it does not belong to 
any country; it may be regarded as a worldly organization, but it pays its 
loyalty only to Christ.
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On the basis of this interpretation, the f ifth section, Theses 45-72, pro-
ceeds to elaborate the theology of two kingdoms. These Theses claim that 
the ‘city of God’ and ‘the city of earth’, one spiritual and the other worldly, 
are two kingdoms qualitatively different from each other. Christ’s kingdom 
is superior to the earthly kingdom, although before the Last Judgment, 
Christ does not materialize his dominion by physical means. Rather, he 
tolerates the earthly kingdom with love and magnanimity and allows it, 
supported by arms, to temporarily exist. In the Chinese context, when 
questioned about their attitude toward the Chinese government, Christians 
would thus answer in three ways. First, the kingdom of God has come to 
China, which cannot be withstood by swords or other physical means. Since 
the church is the body of Christ, every persecution of it only empowers it 
to grow. Second, the church does not belong to any worldly government. 
It does not resist the present government by force nor does it resort to 
administrative privileges to influence society. However, when Christians 
are deprived of civil rights that are their due, they are entitled to defend 
themselves against the illegal encroachments through legal means. Third, 
similar to the case that the worldly government has the authority to regulate 
human society, the church takes it as its mission to preach the gospel and 
call for assembly of those who listen to God’s words. If any government or 
organization impedes the church’s evangelical work, this amounts to resist-
ing God. And the church, in this circumstance, has the duty to reproach this 
sinful act either in private or in public, with the aim to bring the offender 
to repentance. In sum, the government is not justif ied to interfere with or 
discriminate against the church’s activities, such as gathering for worship, 
sending missionaries to different local areas, and publishing religious works, 
unless the secular authority exercises its power for the sake of maintaining 
social order and does it on the principle of universality and equality. The 
relationship between church and the state is one that is mutually independ-
ent. On the part of the Christians, they regard things that belong to God 
above those that belong to Caesar; based upon their conscience, they would 
defend this faith even to the point of losing their life.
Theses 73-95, the last section, strongly express the church’s position 
against TSPM. They point out that this organization, nominally established 
by and composed of Christians, is supported and controlled by the govern-
ment. It is a betrayal of one’s faith, the theses sharply accuse, to accept an 
atheist government’s manipulation of the church’s management. The past 
history of TSPM shows that this organization has actually launched an 
anti-Christ movement in close cooperation with the atheist regime. What 
it has helped to establish, a nationalist church, denies Christ’s sovereignty 
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that stands above all nations. TSPM, as a matter of fact, is a religious guild 
and a vicar of the secular political power. What is urgent today for Chinese 
Christians is to proclaim the true faith, reelect the clergy, and recount the 
church’s property and membership in order to establish a truly independent 
church. That is, religious affairs are not China’s possessions; rather, they 
belong to Christ and every Christian’s conscience. As long as the Chinese 
government gives up its control of the church’s beliefs, personnel, and 
evangelical activities, the church, in consideration of social order and public 
benefit, is glad to register as an independent, civil group.
In addition to the preceding manifestos, letter, and theses we analyzed, 
there are many more apologetic writings that deserve our consideration. 
For example, He Guanghu 何光滬, eminent professor of Renmin University, 
wrote an open letter, titled ‘Stop Persecution, Redeem Conscience, Reduce 
Conflict, Establish Harmony’, to former President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao, and other PRC leaders and spoke for the oppressed Shouwang 
Church and other Christians of similar fate (9  April 2011).21 Over one 
hundred leaders of the unregistered Chinese house churches attended 
the rally of the Lausanne Movement held in Seoul (25-28 June 2013). They 
collectively signed the Seoul Commitment in which they, as part of the 
ecumenical evangelical movement, promised to preach the gospel all over 
China.22 A church-minister couple publicized a petition for the Christians 
arrested in Liuzhou, Guangxi, in which they protested against the local 
government’s power abuse and insisted upon reclaiming their civil right 
to religious freedom (18 February 2014).23 Mother of Zhang Kai, renowned 
Protestant human-rights lawyer, publicly appealed to President Xi Jinping 
for her detained son, asking for objective investigation of the case and 
abiding by the law on the part of the government (15 October 2015).24 In all, 
these writings, explicitly or implicitly, touch upon the religious ideology, 
law, policy, and regulations of the party-state on the one hand, and upon 
the church’s responses to them on the other. In particular, they reveal how 
Chinese Protestants def ine themselves by spelling out their fundamental 
beliefs. Confronting the secular authority, they make clear their boundary 
21 The Chinese original of this text can be obtained at www.chinaaid.net/2011/04/blog-post_9.
html, last accessed 26 February 2016.
22 The text of the Seoul Commitment can be obtained at www.lausanne.org/lang/c160-chinese-
simplif ied/documents-zh/seoul-commitment, last accessed 26 February 2016.
23 The Chinese original if this text can be obtained at www.chinaaid.net/2014/02/218.html, 
last accessed 2 March 2016.
24 The Chinese original of this text can be obtained at http://xgmyd.com/archives/22088, last 
accessed 2 March 2016.
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that enables us to see where their tension against the party-state lies. In 
the following pages, I will expound this tension and highlight ideological 
insistencies on both sides that make their relationship intractable.
Comparative discussion and critique
The CCP adheres to Marxist atheism and, as such, approaches religion with a 
presupposition that implicitly or explicitly negates its legitimacy. Article 36 
of PRC’s Constitution ensures that ‘citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
enjoy freedom of religious belief’ and, it immediately adds, that ‘No State 
organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, 
or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens 
who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion’.25 This article candidly 
divides people into two kinds, religious believers and non-believers, and 
bestows upon them an equal right to repudiate each other’s claim. Respect 
for or protection of religious freedom in the Chinese context, therefore, 
takes on overtones of a dialectic relationship; it protects people’s right to 
religious freedom, but it also puts this freedom in a hazardous position that 
it may be readily challenged. What was originally a positive constitutional 
support for the religious groups thus becomes an excuse for the party-state 
to scheme against its realization, as it also becomes the same source for the 
non-believers to guarantee their anti-religious position. Document 19 and 
Document 6, as we have shown, elaborate Article 36 with an eye to favoring 
the party-state’s ideological preference on the one hand and, on the other, 
reducing religious believers’ freedom to a minimum extent. The 48 articles 
of the 2005 RRA concretize CCP’s interpretation of religion, further setting 
up restrictions of various aspects on the religious groups’ activities. These 
steps of linkage, from the ideological or theoretical to the practical, are 
programmatic in design. They are constructed by a party-state who is ‘a 
circumspect and shrewd monopolist as far as organization and ideology are 
concerned’, although nominally they are meant to help establish a socialist 
harmonious society.26
The CCP’s approach to religion is fundamentally different from that 
adopted by the unregistered Protestant house churches, and this differ-
ence catalyzed the latter’s antagonistic reactions as we have witnessed in 
25 The English version of PRC’s Constitution can be obtained at www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm, last accessed 2 March 2016.
26 Lai (2006, p. 57); Kuo (2011).
326 YeN-zeN tSai 
their apologetic writings. One can detect at least three aspects in CCP’s 
understanding of religion and implementation of religious policy, and 
they are closely interrelated. First, CCP is not interested in what religion 
means to the religious believers but, instead, in what it can achieve for its 
goal to accomplish national unity and social stability. This functionalist 
stance, in contrast to the substantivist one, as William E. Arnal’s insightful 
classif ication of approaches to religion suggests, treats religion as a means 
to an end.27 Quite a few scholars have pointed out this feature of CCP’s 
instrumental rationality when analyzing China’s religious policy in the 
post-Mao era.28 Second, CCP recognizes only f ive institutional religions, 
while relegating the ‘diffused religion’, in which most Chinese’ life is 
embedded, to the negligible background.29 This ‘purist’ cognition, on the 
one hand, discriminates against popular culture that may involve or mix 
with ‘religion’, treating it as non-religion or, worse, ‘superstition’. On the 
other hand, it excludes sectarian groups that may have a long history of 
transmission and new religious movements that may grow into mature 
organizational forms. Narrowing religion down to a limited boundary is 
thus easier to def ine and more expedient to control. That CCP supports 
TSPM and demands all the Christian churches to register with it for off icial 
recognition is the corollary of this position. However, whether or not one 
can define religion without taking cultural, historical, and social contexts 
into consideration is subject to serious inquiry.30 Third, on the level of 
administrative management, CCP strategically devises the rule of ‘three-
f ixeds’ and ask the Christian churches to observe it. This rule is obviously 
meant to restrict the expansion of the church. More than that, it is set up 
to bar different local churches from organizing themselves into a united 
whole, which may pose as a competitor to or a formidable rival against 
the secular regime. In this connection, CCP’s advocacy of the separation 
of church and state is also called into question. With regard to this policy, 
what CCP intends is to keep religion from interfering with secular affairs 
so that its domain of influence would not be impinged upon. But now it 
presents itself as a ‘state religion’ which collapses the sacred and the secular 
or church and state and, consequently, creates more and graver conflicts 
with the def iant Protestant communities.31
27 Arnal (2000).
28 Fällman (2010); Lai (2006); Leung (2005); Storch (2011).
29 Yang (1961).
30 Asad (1993); Geertz (1973).
31 Evans (2002, pp. 770-771); Yu (2005, p. 3).
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By contrast, the unregistered Protestant house churches base their faith 
upon the Bible, the ultimate source of reference. As they believe that it is 
divinely inspired, it is totally credible and trustworthy. And because it is 
revealed to the whole of humanity, the central messages it conveys such as 
the supreme authority of God, death and resurrection of Christ, powerful 
movement of the holy spirit, Jesus’ second coming, salvation through God’s 
grace, love toward God and human fellows, etc., are applicable to peoples 
all over the world. This fundamentalist faith urges them to be Christian 
according to the dictate of their conscience. Against the conventional 
understanding that since religion belongs to the private area and so therein 
should one’s conscience exercise itself, the unregistered Chinese Protestants 
extend their conscience to the public sphere where they confront the secular 
authority.32 Thus their approach to religion is substantivist in nature, with 
an emphasis on relating one’s innate true self to what one says and behaves, 
in private as well as in public. This reflexive and internalist feature stands 
in opposition to CCP’s externalist religious outlook.
The unregistered Protestant house churches repeatedly express that 
they are good citizens. In their apologetic writings, they never forget to 
mention that they love the country, care about the people, espouse national 
and ethnic unity, and are very willing to contribute their efforts to the 
advancement of society. Indeed the Christian virtues they promote are 
compatible with the socialist morality which CCP would like to see prac-
ticed in Chinese society.33 Rarely have accusations occurred with reference 
to Chinese Christians’ moral corruptions or offenses against public moral 
tastes, in contrast to their counterparts in the early centuries of the Ro-
man Empire who were, besides being ‘atheists’, reportedly perpetrators of 
incest and cannibalism.34 Scholars who have researched different Christian 
communities in various places of China agreed that Christians in general 
place high emphasis on moral integrity and have played a signif icant role 
in helping to construct a civil society.35 However, this moral or ethical 
confession, coming sincerely from their conscience, seems unsatisfactory 
both to themselves and to the party-state. To the unregistered Protestants, 
if they are content with being called good citizens, their choice to stay 
away from TSPM would not make sense because the latter exactly takes 
32 Duara (2008, p. 44).
33 Dunch (2008, pp. 167-168).
34 Ehrman (1999, pp. 54-93); de Ste. Croix (2006, pp. 105-152).
35 Cao (2011); Tong (2013); Wielander (2009).
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this feature as its utmost concern.36 On the part of CCP, it does not want to 
let go of the unregistered house churches simply because they are morally 
good. To the party-state, morality is only auxiliary to behavioral conformity 
circumscribed by rules and regulations, and transgression of them easily 
brings one’s morality into suspicion; it prefers politically good citizens to 
morally good citizens.
The CCP’s def inition of religion is intertwined with its insistence on 
Chinese nationalism. The unregistered Protestant house churches, although 
claiming that they are patriotic, f ind this nationalism narrow and restric-
tive. Many of the apologetic writings assert that as Christ is the Lord of all 
human races, those who are called by him are naturally fellow members 
of the same spiritual family. Signatories of the Seoul Commitment, for 
example, joined the ecumenical Protestant Christianity in defiance of CCP 
and TSPM and avowedly committed themselves to world evangelism. What 
the party-state is sensitive about foremost is, through this type of connec-
tion, inf iltration by foreign power that may result in Western domination, 
a historical and national nightmare that it has endeavored for decades to 
terminate. But the unregistered Protestants see the foreign connection as 
a fulf illment of the biblical teaching and as part and parcel of their faith. 
To them, Christianity should be one and undivided; to modify it with any 
national or racial adjectives contradict their self-understanding.
At this point, one sees a crucial cause underlying the tension between 
the unregistered house churches and the party-state. The def iant Chinese 
Protestants intend to affiliate themselves with or incorporate their churches 
into the world Christianity. They henceforth oppose TSPM which, at the be-
hest of CCP, separates Chinese Protestants from this spiritual tie in the name 
of self-government, self-support, and self-propagation. To them, TSPM then 
is secular in nature and political in practice; its nationalist but separatist 
vision is unacceptable. And to register with this organization and obey its 
leadership simply violates against the genuine Christian faith. Further, the 
unregistered house churches stand against the movement of sinicization of 
Christianity, regarding it similarly as an act of breaching the ecumenical 
Christian community. On the contrary, they assemble full enthusiasm to 
Christianize China, its people, culture, and society included. This is not 
a betrayal of their Chinese citizenship, according to them. Rather, it is a 
patriotic act because by Christianizing China, this country and its people 
are to be redeemed out of their present moral and political predicaments. 
36 Kindopp (2004, pp. 133-134).
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If they are requested to love their country more, they would bring forth a 
nationalism of this sort to fulf ill their religious belief.
As mentioned, CCP f inds it expedient to maintain the principle of one-
way ‘separation of church and state’ (zhengjiao fenli 政教分離) in order to 
keep religious groups from meddling in the secular affairs. The unregistered 
house churches, however, f ind this principle detrimental to their existence 
because the party-state often utilizes it as a pretext to control their develop-
ment. If they subscribe to this separation principle, they would have to 
withdraw from many secular engagements. One is reminded that the party-
state has the power to circumscribe the secular domain, just as it is up to it 
to def ine what religion is. In lieu of this principle, the unregistered church 
leaders in the Ninety-Five Theses counter with that of ‘mutual autonomy 
of church and state’ (zhengjiao fenli 政教分立), emphasizing two distinct 
domains that stand separated from but equal to each other.37 The keywords, 
‘autonomy’, ‘separation’, and ‘equality’, are indicative; combined together, 
they allow us to understand more deeply the unregistered Protestant house 
churches’ true intention as well as the goal of their struggle. It is signif icant 
to note that the two camps have come to a new confrontational stalemate. 
Here one sees that CCP starts with political interest and proceeds to take up 
the religious as its sphere of control. By contrast, the unregistered Protestant 
house churches, motivated by spiritual zeal, establish their religious domain 
and expand it to cover the secular territory. The demarcation between the 
sacred and the secular or church and the state becomes blurred through 
their mutual interactions, yet, paradoxically, it also becomes more distinct 
whenever conflicts occur.
Based upon the preceding exposition, it is apt to coin ‘religious national-
ism’ as a useful interpretive term for the tension between CCP and the 
unregistered Protestant house churches. Scholars have argued that such 
key concepts as religion, modernity, and the nation have entered into the 
public discourse in China since the early stages of the twentieth century 
and still remained important points of disputation.38 Our examination 
of this tension issue has shown that for CCP, religion should serve the 
nation. For the interest of the party-state, all religious groups, TSPM and 
unregistered Protestant house churches included, are supposed to follow 
the guidelines promulgated through successive off icial documents. PRC’s 
constitution guarantees religious freedom to its citizens, but this can be 
37 ‘Separation’ (li) and ‘independence’ (li) are pronounced in different tonal accents in Man-
darin Chinese, although when transcribed into Romanization, they appear the same. 
38 Ashwa and Wank (2009); Dunch (2008).
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realized only on the condition of the latter’s being submissively patriotic. 
Religion in this sense is subsumed under the nation, and thus ‘religious 
nationalism’ here puts its emphasis on ‘nationalism’. For the unregistered 
Protestant house churches, the nation should not reign above religion. Their 
Christian religiosity consists of fundamentalist faith and ecumenical spirit, 
and this serves as the basis upon which they perceive the world and conduct 
their activities. They assure the party-state that they are patriotic, but this 
patriotism is a derivative of their religious faith. They would follow the 
government’s religious policy and observe its rules and regulations so long 
as they do not contradict their biblical teachings and Christian conscience; 
to them, religion precedes the nation. ‘Religious nationalism’ here, then, 
should lay its emphasis on ‘religious’. Whichever aspect both sides of the 
tension may stress, ‘religious nationalism’ cogently leads us to frame the 
issue. More importantly, it challenges us to rethink the thorny question of 
the nature of religion and the ideology that lies beneath and, as well, hover 
over the church-state tension.
Conclusion
Karrie J. Koesel in her recent study of the relationship between religion and 
authoritarian states, China and Russia in particular, observed that, based 
upon each side’s interests, religious groups and the state have begun to 
develop cooperative partnerships. As she put it:
Across the authoritarian world, a dynamic process of exchange is at 
play such that innovative government off icials and active religious 
leaders negotiate the rules that govern their relationship. Conflict can 
certainly emerge from this interaction, but there is also ample room for 
cooperation.39
This general trend impressed her to propose an ‘interests-based theory’ that, 
in place of the old ‘domination-resistance’ model, emphasizes negotiation 
and mutual benefiting.40 In China’s case, her thesis could invite echoes from 
quite a few scholars.41 While the converging tendency through negotiation 
and mutual engagement might have taken place in many parts of China, 
39 Koesel (2014, p. 4).
40 Koesel (2014, p. 5).
41 Kindopp (2004); Liu (2010); F. Yang (2006); Wielander (2009).
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one has to be careful about making too quick a conclusion. My examination 
of CCP’s documents on religion and the unregistered Protestant house 
churches’ apologetic writings is a good case that supports a more reserved 
appraisal. SARA’s publication of the ‘Draft for Revision of Regulations on 
Religious Affairs’ on 7 September 2016, further confirmed my position.42 
This new off icial document, although soliciting feedbacks from the public, 
is intended to manage and control religious groups and their activities 
even down to the minute levels. That broader chaos and f iercer conflicts 
between the Protestant community and the party-state would occur seems 
foreseeable.43
It is true that local governments may negotiate with the Christians for the 
sake of better management or for maintaining a ‘harmonious society’. But 
compromise on the local and bureaucratic level should not be interpreted 
as the government’s change of religious policy and its regulations. The 
fundamental interest of CCP is rooted in its ideological belief and inscribed 
in PRC’s constitution. Challenge of this core interest is often met with 
suppression.
The unregistered Protestant house churches which we discussed in 
this chapter represent a substantial portion of Christian population in 
present-day China. They may come from the rural areas in northern China 
or from the metropolitan Beijing, yet they share some common features 
among themselves. Most salient of all is that they all stick to the Bible as 
the ultimate source of inspiration, espouse an ecumenical Christianity, 
and harbor an aggressive evangelical spirit. This fundamentalist theology 
easily clashes with the party-state’s ideology, as both of them appear to insist 
upon their respective ‘interests’. Suppression of the unflinching Christians 
only erupts into more reactions and consolidates them into a f irmer group. 
Historians of Christianity who study the phenomenon of persecution and 
martyrdom have already demonstrated ample precedents in the early his-
tory of this religion.44
The observation that Christians have enjoyed more or less religious free-
dom in post-Mao China is generally correct, but, as my chapter has argued, 
this should not be taken as something stable. The repressive measures Xi 
42 The Chinese original of this text can be obtained at http://rufodao.qq.com/a/20160909/020526.
htm, last accessed 10 January 2017. 
43 Scholars and church leaders have heatedly commented on the Draft since its publication. 
Many of them explicitly pointed out the possible dire consequences if it would be implemented, 
whereas others were reserved about it. For a collection of these public opinions, visit the follow-
ing website: www.chinesetheology.com/ChineseChurches.htm, last accessed 10 January 2017.
44 Frend (1984, 1987); Ehrman (1999, pp. 25-50).
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Jinping launched against the Protestant churches, registered or not, reveal 
what CCP would do when its real interests are challenged. On the other 
hand, some scholars have noted a few Chinese Protestant intellectuals 
who either publicly defended the persecuted fellow Christians or engaged 
in helping establish a civil society.45 Based upon these contributions, they 
thus hoped for the emergence of a ‘democratic China’.46 This expectation 
is unrealistic because the grip Xi Jinping’s government has recently laid 
upon Chinese society does not allow this kind of development to happen, 
at least, so far. Moreover, whether or not church leaders like those who 
composed the Ninety-Five Theses could create a democracy similar to 
that in the West is subject to serious doubt. For one thing, their exclusivist 
Protestant stance conflicts with the phenomenon of religious pluralism 
that has existed in Chinese society for thousands of years, and the staunch 
attempt to Christianize China easily turns ‘a harmonious socialist society’ 
into rifts and disunity. At present and at most, what one can conclude is that 
the relationship between Protestants and the party-state in contemporary 
China is maintained along the line of ‘an uneasy equilibrium’.47
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Abstract
We propose in this chapter that the relationship between religion and 
nationalism in Taiwan has been mediated by two developments that pull 
in different directions. The f irst is state formation, which has erected 
barriers between religion and national identity. The second is a search 
for culturally authentic expressions of modernity, which has shaped 
both religion and nationalism in Taiwan, infusing them with a shared 
sensibility. The emergence of religious movements sharing important af-
f inities with nationalism has reinforced the cultural sources of nationalist 
politics, but also motivated more direct forms of engagement with this 
politics. This is because the forms of religion that display this modernist 
sensibility tend to be this-worldly in their focus, and politically engaged.
Keywords: Religion, nationalism, Taiwan, Buddhism, Christianity
Introduction
Issues of identity and nationhood have combined as a pervasive organizing 
theme in democratic politics in Taiwan since the end of authoritarian rule. 
Political divisions have revolved around the question of whether the people 
of Taiwan, linked by co-residence or shared sociocultural characteristics, 
constitute a nation distinct from the Chinese nation. The rise of identity 
politics in Taiwan has also coincided with a newly vigorous religious scene, 
the main beneficiaries of which have been the reformed Buddhist sects, 
Daoism, Christianity, and popular religion. This chapter aims to explore the 
relationship between religion and processes of national identity formation 
in Taiwan.
Any account of how religion has intersected with nationalism in Taiwan 
must begin with an account of the sources of nationalist sentiment on the 
island and the location of political struggle over national identity. Some 
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have suggested that nationalism has arisen within civil society in the 
post-democratization era to f ill a relative void created by the weakness of 
the Taiwanese state: its retreat from society domestically, its ambivalent 
political situation in relation to the mainland, and its lack of recognition 
internationally. The state, in this view, has been incapable or unwilling to 
sustain a national project, and the retreat of the state has created space for 
new forms of identity politics or the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism. 
Religion, as a body of cultural practices that preexisted the development 
of the state, has once again adapted to become an important site for the 
construction of identity, with Taiwan’s unique political situation and lack 
of full statehood giving it an importance that it otherwise would not have 
had.1 On this account, Taiwanese nationalism is formed in the social space 
occupied by religious groups and other non-state actors, suggesting that 
religious movements are in a powerful position to foster an ‘ecumenical 
nationalism’ (as Richard Madsen predicts) or cut across any attempt to foster 
a monolithic Taiwanese identity (as Robert Weller expects).2
In this chapter, we propose that the relationship between religion and 
nationalism in Taiwan is considerably more complex than the above account 
suggests because it is not only mediated by the loosely regulated processes 
of social negotiation in civil society, but also by the more restricted and 
tightly regulated processes associated with government and state forma-
tion. Whereas Madsen and Weller both suggest that nationalism in Taiwan 
is a post-democratization, civil society phenomenon arising recently in op-
position to the faltering KMT-led project of state formation in Taiwan,3 we 
argue that the common ‘high culture’ promoted as an important tool in this 
state formation project was crucial to the later emergence of a Taiwanese 
national identity. Furthermore, the importance of the state as the protector 
and promoter of a shared national culture in modern societies suggests 
that the state and its institutions will remain an important battleground 
in the struggle to def ine the content of national identity on the island. 
Thus even if the retreat of the state and the development of civil society 
have undoubtedly created new opportunities for the social negotiation 
of national identity, it is also important to understand the relationship 
between religion-led and state-led processes of nation-building.
1 Weller (1987; 2000a; 2000b); Madsen (2007).
2 Madsen (2007, p. 137); Weller (2000, p. 231).
3 Madsen points to the KMTs opposition to Taiwanese nationalism, and its view of Taiwan 
as little more than a launchpad for the recovery of political control in China (2007, p. 11). Weller 
similarly suggests that ‘[i]n a world organized by nation-states, Taiwan falls between all the 
boundaries’ (2000, p. 479).
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We argue that these statist nation-building processes have, as a func-
tional by-product, tended to separate religion from the sphere of politics 
and the state, and by extension inhibit religious involvement in the politics 
of national identity. At the same time, however, this differentiation of the 
religious and the political is never complete. The boundary between the 
sacred and the secular is frequently transgressed and redrawn by both 
political and religious actors on the surface level of public politics. Beyond 
this surface level, though, there is also a deeper discursive level at which the 
evolution of religion in Taiwan has been shaped by a distinctively modern 
moral sensibility, a concern with culturally authentic modernization, that 
has also been crucial in animating the politics of nationhood in Taiwan. This 
moral sensibility provides a mutually energizing point of contact between 
religion and nationalism on the island, but it also motivates a closer religious 
engagement with the politics of national identity.
The argument proceeds in four stages. In the following section, we 
provide an account of national identity formation in Taiwan as driven 
by both state formation processes and a moral concern with culturally 
authentic modernization. In the next section, we argue that the former 
process tended to separate religion from processes of national formation 
through differentiating the religious and political spheres, whereas the 
latter phenomena cut across these boundaries, creating aff inities of moral 
sensibility and motivating greater religious engagement with the politics 
of nationhood. In the f inal sections, we illustrate our argument with a 
comparative discussion of the Foguangshan Buddhist Order (佛光山, FGS), 
and the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT), both of which have been 
actively concerned with the identity and political status of Taiwan.
The development of national identity politics in Taiwan
Ernest Gellner argued that nationalism can be viewed as a functional 
requirement of industrializing economies in modernity.4 A nation is not 
given in nature, or an intrinsic component of the human condition; but 
neither is it a historical accident or the contingent ideological invention 
of European thinkers. It is instead rooted in the structural requirements 
of a very particular kind of society. Specif ically, it is an effect of efforts to 
create the educated workforce sharing a common means of communication 
that is vital for an industrial society. Economic growth in such a society is 
4 Gellner (1983). 
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dependent on a mobile population whose members are able to communicate 
easily with one another, and this in turn demands a single culture and 
common medium of communication. Only with a homogenous culture 
can people in a particular society do business with one another across 
boundaries of family, ethnic group, region, and so on. The development 
of such common cultures over large geographical areas depended on the 
emergence of large and well-centralized states. The need for uniformity, 
and the magnitude of project, mean that the task of inculcating this shared 
culture can no longer be left to institutions such as the family and religious 
groups that had passed on high, literate cultures in premodern times. In 
modernity, the state therefore developed as provider and protector of the 
shared culture. The primary means through which ever-larger sections of 
the population are inculcated into the common high culture is the creation 
of mass public education systems, and to a lesser extent the promotion of 
a common language.
The universalization of the high culture within the state, transmitted 
by a national schooling system rather than through local and regional folk 
traditions, erodes the distinctive cultures of subnational communities. This 
makes the state increasingly dependent on the inculcation of a strong and 
homogenous shared culture to provide social cohesion and moral policing 
that had previously been supplied by more local forms of community. As 
a shared national culture begins to pervade the entire population and 
subgroupings are eroded, it also becomes natural to identify the shared 
national culture as the primary locus of political legitimacy. It is therefore 
in this social context that we see the formation of nationalism, understood 
by Gellner as the belief that the political boundaries of the state and the 
cultural boundaries of the nation should align. Gellner writes that
When general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, 
centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not 
just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-def ined education-
ally sanctioned and unif ied cultures constitute very nearly the only kind 
of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures 
now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only then 
does it come to appear that any def iance of their boundaries by political 
units constitutes a scandal.5 (emphasis in original)
5 Gellner (1983, p. 55).
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One implication of Gellner’s argument here is that ‘nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they 
do not exist’.6 In other words, it is not nations that engender nationalism; 
rather, it is nationalism that invents nations.7 It is in the context of efforts 
to make political boundaries align with the boundaries of a linguistic or 
cultural unit that particular nations are invented as ethno-linguistic unities 
with a shared history and a set of folk traditions. The nation, as a coherent 
cultural unity, does not preexist nationalist projects to win political au-
tonomy and the right of self-determination for a people. While nationalisms 
claim the warrant of the preexisting folk cultures they claim to be defending 
and revitalizing, they use these cultures selectively, transform them radi-
cally, and often invent entirely new traditions. They may be assembled from 
elements of dormant, oppressed or threatened low cultures, but rather than 
reviving these cultures they replace them with a high culture adapted for 
impersonal, industrial-bureaucratic societies, even if it claims continuity 
with local folk traditions. National identities are often given content by a 
process of arbitrary selection and invention, but the nationalism that drives 
this process is rooted in deep structural requirements of modern societies.
Gellner’s account has been criticized for tying nationalism to state 
formation and industrialization. This means it has trouble accounting 
for nationalisms that developed before industrialization, and those that 
lack the aspirations to statehood that Gellner takes as def initive of the 
phenomenon.8 Neither of these criticisms apply in the case of Taiwan, 
however. Here Gellner’s account provides a useful interpretive framework 
that points to two important aspects of the development of nationalism 
in Taiwan.
Firstly, Gellner’s understanding of nationalisms as modern ‘high cultures’ 
that appropriate and selectively reconstruct elements of the folk cultures 
they putatively defend directs our attention to the ways in projects of 
national identity in Taiwan have never been the political expression of 
preexisting national units. Rather, they represent attempts to distill central-
ized, homogenous, and universal island-wide cultures from the extremely 
complex patchwork of locally sustained ethnic, regional, linguistic, and 
6 Gellner (1964, p. 168). Gellner aff irms this in his later work: ‘It is nationalism which engenders 
nations, not the other way round’ (1983, p. 55).
7 Gellner (1983, pp. 55-62).
8 Anthony D. Smith points to Serbia, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, Japan, and West African 
states as examples of preindustrial nationalism (1998, p. 36); Charles Taylor argues that early 
expressions of nationalism in Quebec promoted non-state institutions rather than seeking a 
statist outlet (2011, p. 85).
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religious cultures that have shaped Taiwan’s history. In this f irst respect, 
then, Gellner’s work draws our attention to the arbitrary content of national-
identity projects in Taiwan, and their contingent and often distant relation 
to their source material.
In another respect, however, Gellner’s theory suggests that the develop-
ment of nationalism in Taiwan is intimately connected to state-building, and 
has deeper roots than a focus on recent articulations of Taiwanese national 
identity alone would suggest. Specif ically, it highlights the signif icance of 
intensive efforts by the KMT government to inculcate a shared national 
culture through centralized education, language, and cultural policies 
after it retreated to Taiwan in 1949. While the emergence of a distinctively 
Taiwanese national identity is a much more recent development, taking 
Gellner’s account seriously suggests that earlier KMT-led processes of state 
and national culture formation around a certain conception of Chinese-ness 
were crucial preconditions of the later emergence of Taiwanese national 
consciousness. The content of specif ic accounts of what it means to be 
Chinese and Taiwanese may be arbitrary and highly selective, but the 
movement towards nationalism-in-general is deeply rooted in functional 
requirements that follow from state-building and industrialization.
This combination of contingency and structure can be seen in the process 
through which a complex range of ethnicities and identities, and have 
increasingly been reduced to a simple set of alternatives: Taiwanese and Chi-
nese, understood as mutually exclusive. When people in Taiwan now refer 
to the Taiwanese, they exclude people in mainland China from this identity. 
It was not always so; at times Taiwanese and Chinese have been compatible 
or even complementary categories. Both terms have historically meant 
different things to different people, connoting a variety of elements such 
as ethnic origin, language, culture, residency, citizenship, identif ication, 
and so on. The specif ic meanings of Taiwanese-ness and its signif icance 
vary, vertically across time, and horizontally across individuals and ethnic 
groups. The present constellation of meanings, in which Taiwanese refers to 
a national rather than an ethnic or provincial identity, has emerged since the 
1990s and been enforced under Ma Yingjiu administration’s forceful push to 
link up with China despite societal resistance to it, which represents both 
an expansion and a simplif ication of the category relative to earlier usage.
The diff iculty of the identity question in Taiwan is partly a legacy of 
the island’s complex history of occupation and settlement. The earliest 
Han settlers from China in the fourteenth century encountered an island 
already occupied by aborigines. After brief periods of Spanish and Dutch 
rule in the seventeenth century, the island fell under the control of the 
ReligioN aNd NatioNal ideNtit Y iN taiWaN 345
Qing Dynasty, under which large numbers of Han Chinese from the coastal 
provinces migrated to the island. Taiwan became a colony of Japan after 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, until it once again became a province of 
China in 1945 following Japan’s defeat in the World War II. Four years later, 
the KMT relocated the capital of the Republic of China to Taipei when the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gained ascendancy in mainland China.
The complexity of Taiwan’s history is reflected in its ethnic makeup. It 
has frequently been said since the 1990s that Taiwan has four ethnic groups: 
the Hokkien, Hakka, Aboriginal people, and Mainlanders. None of these 
four ethnic groups formed naturally, however; they are all socially con-
structed.9 The aboriginal people are Taiwan’s f irst inhabitants. Although 
they are discussed as a single group of people, the Aboriginals are in fact 
composed of at least nine tribes. Each tribe has its own language, custom, 
and kinship, and there was no common language among the aboriginals.10 
The Aboriginals compose only 1.7 percent of the population of Taiwan. 
The Hokkien people (福建人), who constitute more than 73 percent of the 
population, are people whose ancestors were from southern Fujian and 
immigrated to Taiwan from the seventeenth century until the inception 
of Japanese colonization. The Hokkien ethnic group is not a perennial 
and homogeneous ethnicity either. Although they all came from southern 
Fujian, their language, customs, and culture diverged greatly among them 
since the region is mountainous.11 The Hakka people (客家人), making up 
12 percent of the population, is a distinct ethnic group in China who has 
their own cultural identity, language, and customs. The Hakka immigrants 
in Taiwan came from different parts of China, mainly southern Fujian and 
northern Guangdong. ‘The Mainlanders’ is the label used by the native 
Taiwanese to describe ethnic Chinese who settled in Taiwan with Jiang 
Jieshi’s KMT regime after 1945, and their descendants. However, there was 
no shared identity among those who immigrated at that time, as they came 
from different parts of China. Not until the early 1990s did the Mainlanders 
form a collective identity and become a ‘singular’ and ‘unitary’ ethnic group. 
This group of people now makes up around 13 percent of the population.
Due to the complexity of its history and ethnicity, the connotations of 
the term ‘Taiwanese’ (taiwanren 臺灣人) differs across different historical 
periods. What it meant to be a Taiwanese in the nineteenth century is 
9 Wang (2003).
10 Tribes, for example, used the Japanese language to communicate with one another under 
Japanese rule.
11 Wang (2003, pp. 25-42).
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different from what it meant in the twentieth century, and in the 1970s it was 
different from the 1990s. For instance, during the Japanese colonial period, 
the term ‘taiwanjin’ (臺灣人, lit., ‘Taiwanese’ in the Japanese language) was 
synonymous with the Japanese term ‘hontojin’ (本島人, lit., the islander) 
in Taiwan, in contrast to another Japanese term ‘naichijin’ (内地人, lit., 
people from Japan proper). While the term ‘hontojin’ referred to Aboriginals, 
Hokkien and Hakkas, ‘naichijin’ indicated the Japanese residents in Taiwan. 
At this time, there was no opposition between the categories of Chinese 
and Taiwanese. In his account of the political movement for a Taiwanese 
parliament during the Japanese occupation, the historian Wang Xiaopo (王
曉波) argues that the elites leading the campaign shared a consciousness of 
a common Han-Chinese identity that looked to the mainland, rather than 
any emergent sense of Taiwanese-ness.12
When it retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT sought to integrate Taiwan 
into the modernizing Chinese nationalist project it had been pursuing on 
the mainland. This was initially a top-down, state-led project that focused 
on the creation of a nation through the generalization of standard Mandarin 
as the language of everyday and official communication, and the promotion 
of Confucian traditions of mainland elites as a shared culture of national 
unification, consistent with the KMT’s position that Taiwan was an integral 
part of China. The term ‘Taiwanese’ became a regional or provincial aff ilia-
tion. It was by then interchangeable with another Chinese term benshengren 
本省人 (lit., people from within Taiwan Province), which referred to those 
Han-Chinese whose ancestors came to Taiwan before the colonization by 
Japan: Hokkien and Hakkas.13 The term was used in contrast to another 
term waishenren 外省人 (lit., people from outside the province), which 
refers to the Mainlanders.14
This nation-building process reached its high-water mark with the 
Cultural Renaissance movement that began in the mid-1960s, a systematic 
program of moral and cultural education that aimed to develop a spiritual 
consciousness of Chinese-ness that could serve as the basis of national 
solidarity, and inculcate traditional values through socialization in schools, 
study groups, and neighborhood associations.15 Chinese culture was el-
evated over indigenous cultural forms, which were represented as crude 
12 Wang (1988/1999).
13 Brown (2004, pp. 9-10).
14 The non-Han Aboriginals simply disappeared in this schema, as if they did not exist on the 
island. They were neither ‘Taiwanese’ nor ‘non-Taiwanese’.
15 Chun (1994).
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and backward, and the use of languages other than Mandarin was banned 
in schools and public places.
The version of ‘traditional Chinese culture’ promoted by the KMT was, in 
Gellner’s terms, a ‘high-culture’ invention of Chinese tradition as a conserva-
tive response to the threat of communism on the mainland, and a cultural 
ethos more compatible with the developing state than locally sustained 
folk cultures. As Chun argues, ‘the crisis of culture in postwar Taiwan 
was one which was predicated by the government’s attempt to nationalize 
Chinese culture… where no such culture (of the nation) previously existed. 
In concrete terms, it was driven by the perceived need to establish new 
foundations of spiritual consciousness, ideological rationality and moral 
behavior that could conform to the dictates of the modem polity or nation-
state in ways that primordial notions of Chineseness could not’.16
When the term ‘Taiwanese’ changed its meaning again in the 1990s, it re-
flected the new context created by the KMT’s efforts to foster a shared high 
culture. It was now often used in Taiwan to speak of the ethnic majority, the 
Hokkien people,17 though this conception of the term was later, particularly 
after 2000, challenged by some Taiwanese politicians and scholars who have 
contended that ‘Taiwanese’ should incorporate ‘the Four Ethnic Groups’: 
the Aboriginals, Hokkien, Hakka, and Mainlander. For instance, Taiwan’s 
former president Li Denghui promoted a new conception of being ‘Taiwan-
ese’ – the so-called ‘New-Era Taiwanese’ (Xinshidai Taiwanren 新時代台灣
人).18 He called for the residents of the island to look upon Taiwan as their 
shared home, unifying together, and establishing a shared future. Anyone 
who identif ies with his appeal can then become a Taiwanese – a ‘New-Era 
Taiwanese’. One could tentatively argue that this ostensibly all-inclusive 
discourse of ‘Taiwanese’ in effect signifies a formation of Taiwanese national 
identity; that is, the belief in the ‘homogeneity’ of the people residing in 
Taiwan and the pursuit of self-determination by all residents in Taiwan.19
By this time, ambiguity, interchangeability, and inclusiveness of these 
two concepts – ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ – had disappeared, and the people 
of Taiwan were accordingly compelled to ‘become’ either Taiwanese or 
Chinese; any other political possibilities in the middle ground or a gray 
area were ruled out. China was invoked as the ‘Other’, against whose image 
16 Chun (1994, p. 54).
17 Brown (2004, p. 9).
18 ref. idem? (2005).
19 While this political rhetoric ostensibly includes all residents of Taiwan, it is not exactly 
all-inclusive. Some groups of people residing on the island are still excluded, e.g. foreign spouses. 
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the Taiwanese ‘Self’ has been redefined and reconstructed. It is plausible 
to argue that there is no ‘homogeneous’ Taiwan due to the complexity 
of Taiwan’s history and ethnicity as mentioned above, but that if such a 
‘homogeneous’ Taiwan does exist, its precondition is that there is an existent 
China to encounter. No matter how people in Taiwan interpreted their 
own history, tradition and culture, the most important and fundamental 
task was now that of demonstrating how ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is different from 
‘Chinese-ness’. The presence/absence and specter of ‘China’ is a crucial 
aspect of the homogenization of Taiwanese national identity. China in fact is 
economically the greatest (potential) market for Taiwan; it is historically the 
source of its ethnicity, culture, and languages; it is politically a contestant 
or enemy; and it’s one of Taiwan’s deepest and most recurring images of ‘the 
Other’. China, as Taiwan’s contrasting image, has helped the Taiwanese to 
define what Taiwan is itself. In this sense, ‘China’ is not simply a physical site 
but a discursive space in which different forms of homogeneity, solidarity, 
aff inity, and identity are constructed and contested. Indeed, when the 
Taiwanese people think of themselves as a people, they nowadays do so 
in contradistinction to the Chinese people; China is their main object of 
alienation/disassociation. The polarization of identities in Taiwan has been 
exacerbated by the rise of the politics of identity since the 1970s, and has 
become especially intense since democratization. Nevertheless, language, 
culture, and identity have been a consistent theme in Taiwanese politics 
at least since the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The emergence of a 
national Taiwanese identity def ined in opposition to Chinese identity was 
made possible by the KMT’s earlier state-building project, and specif ically, 
by its attempt to stimulate national solidarity and loyal patriotism through 
the creation of an island-wide national culture in Taiwan.
The sinicization policies were relaxed in the 1980s, with growing recogni-
tion and promotion of indigenous culture within a policy that was still 
oriented towards China overall.20 The reorientation towards Taiwan and 
indigenous culture gathered pace with the end of martial law and the begin-
ning of democratization. A series of changes exemplified the new movement 
towards a national consciousness centered on Taiwan: most notably, the 
more inclusive rhetoric of the KMT under Li Denghui, and a liberalization 
of the education system introduced in 1968 at the height of the Cultural 
Renaissance, involving a revision of textbooks to increase representation of 
indigenous heritage. The KMT’s effort to reorient national culture towards 
Taiwan, without giving up the cultural connection with China, was then 
20 Chang (2004).
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challenged by the more radical discourse promoted by its main rival the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in which the distinctiveness of Taiwan 
in relation to China has been emphasized much more strongly.
The outcome has been the emergence of a de-sinicization/anti-China 
movement in Taiwan that seeks to def ine Taiwanese national identity 
and culture as opposed to Chinese, and opposes any move perceived as 
threatening the fragile autonomy of the emergent national community. 
This anti-China sentiment was further fortif ied under the President Ma 
Yingjiu administration from 2008 to 2016, a period which saw the warming 
of cross-Strait relations and close political ties and economic integration 
between PRC and Taiwan. There were a number of social movements during 
Ma’s presidency, wherein the participants – many of them overlapping – 
explicitly protested against Ma’s policy and disagreed with Taiwan’s closer 
relationship with China. Those events include: (1) the Wild Strawberries 
Movement of 2008, which protested the visit of Chen Yunlin 陳雲林, 
the chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
(ARATS) to Taiwan; (2) the protests against the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010; (3) demonstrations launched by the 
‘Alliance Against Media Monsters’ in 2012 to oppose the Next Media buyout, 
in which the Hong Kongnese owner of Next Media sold the Taiwan Division 
of the company to Wangwang China Times and its pro-China Taiwanese 
entrepreneur; (4) the Sunflower Movement (Taiyanghua Yundong 太陽花
運動), as well as (5) Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement which sought 
to implement controversial changes to textbook education.21
The ‘Sunflower Movement’ is particularly signif icant as a group of Tai-
wanese students in March 2014 occupied Taiwan’s parliament to protest 
legislation of a cross-strait trade pact – or Trade in Services Agreement 
(TiSA) – that would open Taiwan to further mainland investment. Osten-
sibly, Ma Yingjiu was criticized for failing to inform the public about the 
trade pact, and the issues of democratic governance, accountability, and 
public trust were at the forefront of the movement. More profoundly, the 
protests point to a deeper crisis as Ma sought to further integrate Taiwan’s 
economy with China’s. After Ma took off ice in 2008, he brought Taiwan 
closer to the mainland, signing 21 cross-strait trade agreements in the f irst 
six years of his presidency. His eventual goal was for Taiwan to participate 
in regional economic integration, increasing economic opportunities and 
cooperation with Taiwan’s primary trading partners through participation 
in the Trans-Pacif ic Partnership (TPP), and the Regional Comprehensive 
21 Cole (2015).
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Economic Partnership (RCEP). Nevertheless, Ma faced an angry backlash 
from voters over the improvement of the cross-Strait relationship. The 
Sunflower Movement demonstrated that there is a widespread fear of China 
among Taiwanese people, particularly the younger generation. The essence 
of this movement is not just about a trade agreement; it is rather about 
the risks of opening Taiwan to further economic and political depend-
ence on China. Most Taiwanese who oppose the trade agreement do so 
mainly because they fear that such an agreement will further increase 
the mainland’s political influence in Taiwan, thus gradually killing the 
independence movement in Taiwan.22
Likewise, more recently, the controversies surrounding curriculum 
guideline changes in 2015 channeled all of the themes that have been central 
to political disputes over identity in Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of Education 
under Ma’s administration tried to do what it described as ‘f ine-tuning’ 
textbooks used in the twelve-year compulsory education. Yet, this move 
stimulated a new wave of protests against Ma’s government. Opposition 
groups have alleged that the High School Citizens and Society text redacted 
sections about the White Terror and illustrations of the 2/28 Incident, and 
added content relating to Chinese tradition and culture. Some extremist 
protest groups such as the ‘Taiwan-Centric Textbook Alliance’ have even 
demanded the ‘rejection of a Chinese colonial curriculum’, and the ‘creation 
of a Taiwan-centric curriculum’.
In its state-led and top-down nature (initially at least), the centrality of 
language and education as key battlegrounds, and the selective, almost 
arbitrary reductions of complex cultural histories into island-wide com-
mon identities, Taiwan has followed the path described by Gellner. What 
Gellner’s theory cannot account for in the case of Taiwan is why the KMT’s 
efforts to promote a high culture based on a version of Chinese traditional 
culture have not completely succeeded, and why increasing numbers of 
people have resisted assimilation into this cultural project. Why has a 
rival, ‘Taiwanese’ account of the shared culture of the island emerged in 
opposition to the ‘Chinese’ account? Gellner understands rival projects of 
nationalism as being generated by minority groups forced to assimilate into 
a high culture that is not their own, and where they face discrimination or 
systematic disadvantage that comes from working in a second language.23 
The emergence of Taiwanese nationalism is not adequately explicable as 
the project of an economically and culturally excluded section of society, 
22 Lin (2014); Fan (2014); Ho (2015). 
23 Gellner (1983, pp. 58-62).
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however, and Gellner’s account cannot explain the sense amongst advocates 
of a Taiwanese national identity that asserting the distinctiveness of Taiwan 
is a moral imperative rather than simply a matter of material advantage.
Charles Taylor offers a way of explaining this development without 
falling back on assumptions about a primordial Taiwanese identity that 
has been frustrated and oppressed by mainland impositions.24 Taylor asks 
why some elites passionately resist assimilation into dominant national 
cultures, even when they share many of the values of these cultures, and 
assimilation would be the easiest option? His answer is that such resistance 
can be understood as driven by a desire for a locally distinctive process of 
modernization that builds on rather than obliterates valued local cultural 
traditions. Crucially though, achieving such a distinctive developmental 
path is more than a matter of preserving aspects of a valued folk culture; 
at stake is the dignity and self-worth of a people who desire recognition as 
the equals of other peoples.
A common elite response to modernization outside of the West has 
been a creative adaptation of modern Western social forms that draw on 
indigenous cultural resources. Modernization often engulfs and erodes 
traditional cultures, and where such cultures are not completely destroyed, 
elites have often understood their choice as being between an outright 
rejection of modernity, and f inding resources in the traditional culture to 
sustain the best practices and institutions of other modern societies. This 
search for a culturally authentic path to modernity is driven not only by a 
concern to ensure the wellbeing of co-nationals while preserving familiar 
customs and traditions from erosion, but also by a desire for dignity and 
respect. Modernization has often taken place in the context of global and 
regional hierarchies, constituted by the presumption among members of 
successful and powerful societies that their way of life is superior to others 
they view as being in some way backward or inferior. These hierarchies are 
strongly evident in direct and neocolonial relationships, in which civilized 
is contrasted with savage, but they have come to also structure a world 
public sphere, in which peoples understand themselves and other societies 
through the categories of ‘developed’, ‘developing’, and ‘underdeveloped’. 
Against this background, the search for different, locally authentic forms 
of modernity is an assertion of equality, and a bid for recognition of this 
equality by dominant societies. The emotive power of nationalism, Taylor 
suggests, and the frequency with which themes of pride and humiliation 
24 Taylor (2011, pp. 81-104).
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feature in nationalist discourse, become comprehensible when nationalism 
is understood through this connection between modernization and dignity.
Nationalism as a search for dignity is generated by experience of mod-
ernization against the background of the generalization and universaliza-
tion of modern social, political and economic forms in a world of cultural 
difference. It is modern in another sense, however, for Taylor argues that 
modernity has transformed the conditions of dignity. In a hierarchical, 
network society, dignity and self-worth were grounded in kinship relations, 
lineage, clan, and so forth. In a horizontal, direct access society, by contrast, 
dignity is attached to a common categorical identity that can be threatened 
and humiliated. Nationalism involves the assertion of a particular cat-
egorical identity as the vehicle for the dignity desired. Taylor suggests that 
although nationalism is often generalized as a mass movement through a 
defensive politics of fear directed against a putative threat represented by 
another community, such mass movements often have their origins in a 
moral aspiration to recognition of equality in difference.
In Taiwan, the felt need for political difference in the context of mod-
ernization has arisen within a complex set of relationships.25 The incipient 
Han-Chinese-Taiwanese consciousness of the Japanese colonial period 
sought a more locally authentic adaptation of Japanese modernity (which 
was itself a project concerned in part with the dignity and equal standing 
of Japan alongside the Western powers). The KMT state on the mainland 
during the Republican era took on modernizing Western ideas while 
promoting Confucian values as a source of social stability and unity.26 It 
continued this project in Taiwan, where the model of modernity aspired 
to be that of the United States, but inflected by the identity of the Chinese 
that had developed on the mainland in the early twentieth century, and the 
Confucianism of the mainland.27 Since the 1970s, the Mandarin-US high 
culture of the KMT has been increasingly challenged by the demand that 
Taiwan should f ind its own path, with a national project no longer based 
exclusively on the culture of the Mainlanders. The popularization of this 
challenge, which began as an elite discourse, was helped by the increasing 
divergence of Chinese and Taiwanese societies, fear of potential political 
domination or military threat from the PRC, and the ROC’s indeterminate 
political status. After the loss of its UN seat in 1971, followed by the loss of 
US diplomatic recognition in 1979, Taiwan has been denied by all but a few 
25 Chang (2003).
26 Katz (2003, p. 400).
27 Chang (2003, pp. 44 and 47).
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states the recognition of statehood that is the formal condition of equality 
in international society.
Melissa Brown relates two anecdotal examples that illustrate some of the 
ways the emergent articulations of a distinct Taiwanese national identity 
have been bound up with these dynamics of dignity and equality. One 
concerns a Mainlander whose parents arrived with the nationalists in the 
1940s. Brown describes how this woman recalled a visit to China in the 
1980s:
After expressing shock at the standards of living, at the loss of Confucian 
civility and propriety in relationships, and at the apparent lack of work 
ethic which she found in China, she identif ied herself proudly as from 
Taiwan.
In the second anecdote, Brown describes meeting an academic in 1987 
who wore a hat with a ‘MIT’ logo. She explained that the acronym, for her, 
stood not for the Massachusetts Institute for Technology but for ‘Made in 
Taiwan’. In Brown’s words,
[s]he had bought the hat on a recent visit to Boston, because she had 
been a student in the US during the 1960s and 1970s, when ‘Made in 
Taiwan’ was on so many labels […] and Taiwan was associated with cheap 
products – inexpensive and not very well made. She had been ashamed 
to have Americans associate her with such cheap products. She said that 
now that Taiwan was known for its economic success, she would wear 
her MIT hat proudly.
These examples illustrate the hierarchies associated with modernization – 
China is represented as backward and regressive, while the US is a society 
to be caught up with. Also evident is the desire for recognition of equality 
by an Other who has achieved a standard of development aspired to (the 
US). The second informant’s experiences of shame and pride, meanwhile, 
illustrate individual self-worth at stake in these relationships.28
We have proposed here an account of nationalist politics in Taiwan as 
arising out of two processes: a state-building and modernization process 
initiated by the KMT government, and a felt need for culturally authentic 
forms of modernity. While the former created and consolidated the space 
of shared universal high culture that is crucial for the development of 
28 Brown (2004, p. 12).
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nationalist projects in general, the content of this shared culture has been 
shaped by a desire for dignity and equality in the context of Taiwan’s evolv-
ing social and political relationship with the mainland, and international 
isolation. This account of the forces shaping successive phases of identity 
politics in Taiwan provides a framework for understanding how religious 
movements have engaged with the politics of national identity. In the next 
section, we will argue that the former process tended to separate religion 
from the politics of national identity, while the latter pushed in the op-
posite direction, motivating greater religious involvement in the politics of 
nationhood and increasing the wider public appeal of such involvement. 
In the f inal two sections, we will illustrate the argument by showing how 
the Buddhist Foguangshan Order and the Christian Presbyterian Church in 
Taiwan have interpreted and responded to these constraints and influences 
in different ways conditioned by their own traditions of belief and practice.
Religion and the politics of national identity
Gellner conceived the rise of nationalism as an essentially secular phenom-
enon, in origins and nature. Like other modernization theorists, he tended 
to view nationalism as a replacement for religious modes of identity and 
community that had been eroded by the social changes associated with 
modernity, and religion tended to become socially marginal rather than 
adapting to a role in the new social forms. The rise of nationalism was a 
movement away from the cultural politics of agrarian societies, in which a 
shared high culture was maintained by religious institutions with power 
and authority extending over a patchwork of folk cultures and political 
units. The new nationalist culture required by industrializing economies 
could not be grounded in religion, for two reasons. Firstly, the dogmas of 
religion could not supply the level of sophistication required by a shared 
culture.29 And secondly, the protection and maintenance of this culture 
required a powerful state actively involved in society, rather than the 
relatively weak religious institutions that merely overlaid society.30
Following this perspective, it might be supposed that religion is only 
relevant to understanding nationalist politics in Taiwan as the substance 
of what preceded it – a cultural form that has been displaced in its public 
signif icance by the rise of a new, state-supported mode of social belonging. 
29 Gellner (1983, p. 142).
30 Gellner (1983, p. 141).
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Modernization in Taiwan, as elsewhere, has not been associated with a 
decline in religion though.31 Neither industrialization, state-building nor 
the emergence of nationalist projects have been associated with a collapse 
of religiosity or a decline in the social signif icance of religious institutions. 
Nationalism is signif icant as a secularizing movement in another respect, 
though. In Taiwan as in many other countries, the rise of a national imagi-
nary as the focus for societal unity has a differentiating effect, separating 
politics and religion by def ining citizenship as belonging to a separate 
realm of life with its own identity. As Charles Taylor points out,32 modern 
democratic states are horizontal, direct-access societies, which have a 
functional need for a shared identity. Citizens no longer stand in hierar-
chical relationships through which their access to the state is mediated; 
they stand as individuals, participating as equals in the public sphere, the 
market economy, and the state. Individual identity is no longer def ined 
in networked terms, by a person’s standing in a certain set of hierarchical 
relationships, but in categorical terms: identif ication with a set of imper-
sonal entities, such as nations, ethnic groups, races, religions, or humanity 
in general. Social groupings began to be imagined as ‘sets of equivalent 
persons’, rather than ‘webs of relationships among persons or hierarchies 
of positions’.33 This direct-access social imaginary is given political form 
in the modern state. Membership of these states cannot be mediated by 
membership of a religious community. Modern, and especially democratic 
states, depend for their survival and legitimacy on the mobilization of a 
committed citizenry who identify strongly with the polity, prioritizing their 
identity as citizens and thus their allegiance to the state before all other 
communities. In this context, appeal to a categorical national identity is an 
obvious way to unite a country, but it has the further effect of downgrading 
the public importance of identities – such as religious identities – that divide 
societies into subgroups.
In Taiwan, therefore, as elsewhere in Asia, modes of pious belief and 
practice that had formerly been deeply embedded in social, political, and 
economic life were detached to create a new religious realm that would be 
formally insulated from education, welfare, business, and politics.34 An 
31 For inf luential critiques of models positing linear connections between modernization 
and secularization, see Casanova (1994); Berger (1999); Taylor (2007). For a recent defense of 
secularization theory, see Bruce (2002).
32 Taylor (2011, pp. 81-104).
33 Calhoun (1993, p. 230).
34 Baker (1997); Weller (2015). For an account of comparable processes in China, see Ashiwa 
and Wank (2009).
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important facet of this process was the extension of off icial recognition to 
significant religious traditions, a recognition that comes with autonomy, the 
protection of freedom to practice religion, and even permission for a more 
public role – in the provision of welfare, for example – within prescribed 
limits.
The differentiation of religion from other spheres of life is both enabling 
and constraining. It provides some measure of protection against state 
interference, but it also limits the political role that religious movements can 
legitimately take on. However, taking nationalism as a secular political form 
detached from religion risks neglect of the ways in which the boundaries 
of religion and nationalism are permeable and frequently breached from 
both sides. The differentiation of religion is never complete, for two reasons.
The f irst is that religion is often the object of secular regulation, to 
undermine or reform aspects or forms of religion viewed as incompatible 
with national culture.35 An important part of the Nationalist regime’s gov-
ernment of religion during the martial law period was the creation of large 
umbrella associations that could unify religious organizations belonging 
to particular traditions into manageable, state-regulated organizations. 
The Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), for example, 
represented Buddhist groups to the government, and made it easier for the 
government to regulate and monitor them.36 It was one of many associa-
tions representing interest groups in the Nationalist state, and they were 
all expected to act as conduits for communications between their members 
and the government, mobilize political support for the regime, and help 
the government to implement its policies.37 During the early years of the 
martial law period, the KMT’s concerns about espionage and inf iltration 
by Communist agents led to the surveillance and inf iltration of groups 
considered potentially seditious on account of socialist or pacif ist leanings, 
as well as restrictions on the form religious organizations could take, and 
limitation of the power of temples.38 Indigenous Taiwanese religion came 
under particular suspicion as being incompatible with modernization and 
sinicization projects. Until the 1980s, for example, the KMT actively tried 
to discourage the formation of island-wide cults that could serve as an 
alternative focus of cultural loyalty. During the Cultural Renaissance, the 
35 This point has been forcefully argued by Talal Asad (2003; 2005) and Saba Mahmood (2006). 
36 Laliberté (2009, p. 62).
37 Laliberté (2004, pp. 38-39).
38 Rubinstein (1991, p. 40); Laliberté (2009, pp. 62-63).
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Nationalist government issued guidelines that aimed to rationalize local 
religious traditions it considered superstitious.39
The second reason for not overstating the division between secular 
national politics and religion is that the demarcation of a distinct religious 
sphere has never been stable or complete. The relaxation of state control 
over religion from the 1970s onwards created an atmosphere of greater 
openness, contributing to the pluralization of the religious sphere and 
providing more opportunities for religious voices to be heard in public 
life. Added to this, many religious traditions in Taiwan have never been 
fully ‘religionized’, in the sense of differentiated from other spheres of life 
as a discrete spiritual practice with its own apolitical rationality. Many 
forms of religiosity have escaped the control of the state, and were never 
fully dis-embedded, and while others become re-embedded in everyday 
life.40 Religious rituals are often closely tied to understandings of political 
processes in local religious traditions, for example.41
To summarize then, the boundaries between sacred and secular exercise 
real normative constraints on the place and role of religion, and this is espe-
cially the case in the public political sphere, but this differentiation is never 
complete. The signif icance of religion for the politics of national identity 
in Taiwan resides not only in the formal public interventions of organized 
religious groups though. It can also be found at the deeper discursive level 
at which secularist language of differentiation and separation becomes 
increasingly misleading, suggesting a greater autonomy and self-sufficiency 
than either religious or political discourses can possess. Religious traditions 
are never hermetically sealed off from contextual influences, however many 
modern ‘fundamentalist’ movements may believe that they can be.42 They 
are shaped and strengthened and undermined by historical processes in the 
societies in which they are always embedded. And nationalist imaginaries 
take up elements – symbols, myths, rituals, and narratives – from adjacent 
forms of cultural politics including religion.43
Following William Connolly, these relationships need not be understood 
on the model of eff icient causality: separating out religion and nationalism 
to show how one causes the other, or how they cause each other. He proposes 
39 Katz (2003, pp. 401-402).
40 Weller (2015, p. 15).
41 Ahern (1981).
42 For an illustration, see Sami Zubaida’s (1982) analysis of the modern, Western categories of 
thought, which Khomeini’s ideas about government implicitly relied on, in spite of his desire 
to develop an Islamic politics untainted by Western corruptions. 
43 Van der Veer (2015).
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instead a model involving the mutual constitution of discursive systems 
and relations of aff inity and resonance between their core elements that 
can create intensities of solidarities between different social groups.44 
For Connolly, the discursive elements that resonate are not only ideas and 
doctrines, but also identities and sensibilities. Aff inities of sensibility can 
create powerful political assemblages even where social constituencies 
differ in their religious, political, and economic doctrines and identities.45
We want to suggest that the relationship between religion and nationalist 
politics in Taiwan not only should be understood in terms of the formal 
political interventions of religious groups, but also at a deeper level where 
religious discourses resonate with the moral sensibility that animates 
nationalist politics. Religious engagement has been mediated by the ways 
in which religion has been positioned and contained by the modernization 
and state-building processes associated with the rise of nationalism, but it 
has also been mediated by the same experience of the distinctive conditions 
of moral dignity in modernity. Experiences of shame and pride have been 
at the heart of many nationalist movements, but they have also shaped 
the evolution of religions in modernity. In some cases, the development of 
culturally authentic expressions of religious modernity has involved taking 
the ‘best’ formal elements of the rational religion of Western modernity – 
Christianity – and discovering resources that support the same elements in 
one’s own tradition, as Hindu revivalist movements such as the Arya Samaj 
in South Asia discovered in Hinduism ‘modern’ religious forms such as a 
monotheistic God, foundational scriptures, and congregational worship.46 
It can also take the form of adopting more general themes characteristic of 
modernity: a greater humanitarian concern for this-worldly wellbeing; a 
preoccupation with reconciling the content of the religious tradition with 
the conclusions of modern science; a literalist and pseudoscientific rejection 
of metaphor and allegory in the interpretation of scriptures and traditions; 
or alternatively a thorough rejection of literalism, with the content of tradi-
tion relativized as a mythical framework for the aff irmation of universal 
human goods. Whether they involve the emulation of modern Western 
religious forms or reforming religion on the basis of more generic modern 
cultural emphases, such efforts are driven by a felt need to create modern 
forms of religion worthy of equal recognition and respect in themselves, 
and able to serve as resources for culturally authentic developments of 
44 Connolly (2005, p. 870).
45 Connolly (2005, p. 871).
46 Van der Veer (2002, p. 175).
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modernity more broadly. The influence of these cultural dynamics within 
the religious f ield can provide an impulse towards religious engagement 
with nationalist politics grounded in a similar sensibility, and serve as 
echoes and repositories of moral experience that provide a subtle reinforce-
ment of nationalist politics in the wider society.
In the next two sections, we propose that these moral sensibilities are 
evident in the humanistic Buddhism of FGS and the Asian Christianity of 
the PCT respectively, creating a reservoir of moral impulses that motivate 
engagement with the politics of national identity in Taiwan, and strengthen 
this politics through cultivating in their members moral sensibilities that 
resonate with the moral sources of this politics of nationhood. At the same 
time, however, the formal and explicit engagement of these groups in this 
politics has been constrained by the boundaries between sacred and 
secular that are a by-product of modern state-formation. Yet each group 
interpreted and responded to these constraints and influences in different 
ways conditioned by their own traditions of belief and practice.
Foguangshan
FGS is one of the most prominent Buddhist organizations in Taiwan. It has 
played an important role in the revival of Buddhism on the island, and has 
expanded to establish more than 200 branch temples around the world.47 
FGS’s charismatic founder Xingyun 星雲 was born in Southern Jiangsu, 
and arrived in Taiwan with the Nationalist forces at the end of the civil war. 
He teaches a form of Buddhism with roots in the humanistic Buddhism 
developed in China by the monk Taixu in the early twentieth century. 
Humanistic Buddhism was a modernist reformulation of traditional Bud-
dhist doctrine as a response to the influence of modernization and West-
ernization in China. Major themes in this reform have included: a greater 
concern with this-worldly wellbeing and the improvement of society; a 
narrative of Chinese Buddhism as having been in decline, overly focused on 
other-worldly rebirth, and weighed down with superstitious accretions; and 
f inally, greater emphasis on lay involvement.48 Taixu and other reformers 
saw such changes as necessary not only to revitalize Buddhism to posi-
tion it as a necessary response to the social and spiritual challenges of the 
twentieth century but also saw as a way to strengthen Chinese culture and 
47 Fo Guang Shan Monastery (2013).
48 Pacey (2005, p. 456). 
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society against the threat presented by foreign encroachment in China.49 
Taixu sought to reform Chinese Buddhism away from a concern with the 
dead, ritual, and preparation for rebirth in a supra-mundane pure land, 
a realm in which unhindered study of the Buddhist dharma is possible. 
Buddhism was instead refocused on the living, and efforts to transform 
the human world into a mundane pure land.50
These themes and emphases are all present in Foguangshan. Xingyun has 
sought to strengthen Chinese culture against the countervailing influences 
of Western modernity and globalization. While Western (US) presence in 
Taiwan has provided welcome protection from Communist domination, 
the popularity of Foguangshan and other humanistic Buddhist movements 
such as Ciji Charity Association (Ciji Gongde Hui 慈濟功德會) reflect an 
ambivalence about the cultural implications of this influence. Humanistic 
Buddhism combines what are believed to be the modern ideals of the West, 
such as this-worldly humanism, science, and a democratic elevation of 
‘ordinary life’, with the traditional virtues and roles associated with Confu-
cian notions of morality and human relationships. They provide a way for 
Taiwanese devotees to creatively adapt important facets of modernity in 
a non-Western, locally authentic way that can ground a claim for cultural 
equality.
The humanistic Buddhist concern with establishing a pure land in the 
human world tends to blur the boundaries between supra-mundane and 
mundane and between sacred and profane. In this, it extends the Bud-
dhist idea of the interpenetration of all things to relativize boundaries 
between private life, civil society, and the state. Change in each is linked. 
This in turn has implications for practice: everyday activities such as work 
become legitimate, even exemplary forms of cultivation, lay, and monastic 
life converge, with lay members taking on a more active role in the order 
and monks and nuns active in society.
One expression of this is Xingyun’s commitment to involvement in public 
affairs. He has a ceremonial role on the KMT’s Central Advisory Commit-
tee, maintains close relations with prominent politicians, and endorses 
candidates during election periods. His close links with successive KMT 
governments and frequent appearances in the political sphere have gener-
ated a certain amount of opposition. As a Chinese monk, openly supportive 
of reunification, with a large following among native Taiwanese, he has been 
courted by the KMT as a symbol of unity and has accepted this role. He 
49 Pacey (2005, p. 448).
50 Pacey (2005).
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has engaged in informal diplomacy that furthered the agenda of the ROC 
government in cross-strait relations on a number of occasions.51 He has po-
sitioned himself as a mediator in cross-strait relations, headed a delegation 
visiting the PRC in 1989, given refuge to prominent Chinese dissidents, and 
has been instrumental in organizing a series of World Buddhist Forums that 
bring Chinese and Taiwanese Buddhists together. At the second of these, 
in 2009, he attracted criticism among supporters of Taiwanese independ-
ence for his comments insisting that the Taiwanese are Chinese, and for 
expressing the hope that more cross strait exchanges, like the Forum, will 
encourage unification through generating a sense of commonality between 
mainland Chinese and Taiwanese.52 Recently, he returned the head of a 
sixth-century Buddha statue, stolen from a temple in northern China in 
1996, and subsequently bought by a Taiwanese businessman and donated 
to Xingyun. The return was a symbolic gesture to promote good cross-strait 
relations as president-elect Cai Yingwen prepared to take off ice.53
Xingyun’s political activities have been constrained by the normative 
division between the religious and the secular. Crossing the boundary 
opened him up to criticism from both Buddhist and secular standpoints. He 
has been called in derogatory terms ‘a political monk’ by critics concerned 
about the religious neutrality of the political sphere, as well as Buddhist crit-
ics who charge him with trivializing the sacred by his worldly activities.54 
He endorsed Chen Luan 陳履安, a prominent Foguangshan supporter, in 
the 1996 presidential election, and the flurry of criticism that resulted has 
been connected with the closure to visitors of the monastery in Kaohsiung 
county that serves as the movement’s headquarters. The monastery had 
become one of Taiwan’s premier tourist attractions, drawing thousands of 
tourists every weekend, until Xingyun announced in 1997 that it would close 
to visitors other than devotees. The previous year’s political controversy is 
likely to have played a role in this decision, alongside a number of other eco-
nomic and spiritual considerations. By recloistering the monastery, Xingyun 
would resacralize an important symbol of the Foguangshan movement and 
ward off criticism that it had strayed from its proper religious vocation.55 
Xingyun’s interventions in the politics of Taiwanese identity and cross-strait 
relations have been constrained by his location as a religious f igure.
51 Laliberté (2004, pp. 70-71).
52 Lok-sin (2009).
53 Hornby (2016).
54 Chandler (2004, pp. 104-117).
55 Chandler (2004, pp. 17-24).
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Xingyun’s explicit interventions in the public sphere are not the only way 
in which FGS blurs the boundaries between the religious and the political. 
Even more signif icant than FGS’s forays into electoral politics have been 
FGS’s less high-profile educational activities. These activities are oriented 
towards political change, not through direct intervention in the political 
sphere, but through drawing political f igures, and potential political f igures 
including ordinary democratic citizens, into deeper religious commitment. 
This is intentional, and has its roots in Xingyun’s understanding of politi-
cal change. He has argued that the proper political stance for a monk is 
to ‘show concern’ but without ‘interfering’. This means acting as a moral 
guide, endorsing candidates with the moral character necessary for politi-
cal leadership, and preparing lay Buddhists for political involvement – all 
with the ultimate end of creating the kind of ethical society best suited to 
Buddhist spiritual cultivation.56 ‘Personally,’ he has said, ‘I do not think that 
monastics should engage in any political activities. But we can cultivate lay 
people to be involved in politics’.57 This is a pragmatic rather than a merely 
principled stance: for Xingyun, the long-term social and political change he 
seeks will not come about through exerting pressure on the state to pull the 
levers of government on particular issues. It will rather come about through 
remaking individual lives in ways that alter the social and political relations 
they are involved in: the focus of Foguangshan is accordingly on moral, 
intellectual, and spiritual education, and large campaigns encouraging 
individuals to commit to purifying their intentions and their actions.58
The values promoted in Foguangshan’s educational and spiritual out-
reach are those of a modern, humanistic, and this-worldly Buddhism. The 
‘purification of minds’ that Xingyun regards as crucial to social and political 
change can be achieved through meditation, sutra recitation, retreats, and 
pilgrimages.59 There is also a strong Confucian element, however. Human-
istic Buddhism is an enculturated form of Buddhism, as it belongs to the 
broader tradition of Chinese Buddhist practice that has always been infused 
with Confucian (as well as Daoist) sensibilities. While humanistic Buddhism 
has sought to purge Buddhism of ‘superstitious’ accretions, it has retained 
its Confucianized character, and this is a dimension of the tradition that 
Xingyun openly embraces. For Xingyun and many devotees of the order, 
Buddhism, and especially the Foguangshan movement, are the primary 
56 Chandler (2004, pp. 104-117).
57 Chandler (2004, p. 109).
58 Chandler (2004, p. 117).
59 Laliberté (2004, p. 78).
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means through which Chinese Confucian culture is being preserved in a 
largely post-Confucian world.60 There are clear echoes here of the KMT 
government’s postwar understanding of itself as a guardian of traditional 
Chinese culture.61 The KMT’s appropriation of Confucian traditions was 
selective and symbolic though, intended to legitimize the regime and give 
substance to a nationalist myth of sacred origins and continuous history, 
and the ritual system that gave substance to Confucian values has mostly 
disappeared, leaving little trace of its signif icance in everyday life.62
Foguangshan presents itself as the primary means through which this 
traditional culture is being preserved. Clerics emphasize to devotees the 
importance of ritual acts, in the form of Buddhist etiquette, that sanctify 
every aspect of daily life.63 Foguangshan also encourages state involvement 
in rituals, recalling the role Confucian rites formerly played in Chinese 
society. State off icials visiting Foguangshan monasteries are received with 
elaborate and carefully choreographed rituals that symbolically aff irm 
the spirit and ethos of Confucianism as the basis of Taiwanese society.64 
This role, as a carrier of Confucian values, has been extended through even 
more public ceremonies such as the Buddha Tooth Welcoming Ceremony in 
1998.65 The event marked the arrival in Taiwan of one of the three Buddha 
teeth still in existence, which had been given to Xingyun by a group of 
Tibetan Buddhists no longer able to preserve it. The tooth traveled to Taiwan 
in a specially chartered plane, was welcomed at the airport by a crowd of 
thousands, driven in a cavalcade on a specially closed highway into Taipei, 
and received offerings by senior government off icials, acting on behalf of 
the ten-thousand strong crowd, at a ceremony at the Jiang Jieshi Memorial 
Hall. Xingyun argued that the symbolic power of the tooth meant it could 
play a vital role in promoting social harmony. Chandler has noted that the 
significance of the ceremony exceeded the symbolic power of this particular 
relic, as it served as a reminder of the signif icance of all ritualized activity 
and its importance for social harmony.
Foguangshan presents itself as the primary vehicle for a Buddhist-
Confucian culture that should rightfully be at the center of Taiwanese public 
life, in the subjectivity and habits of lay devotees, and in the shared rituals 
of public life. In this regard, its most signif icant contribution to the politics 
60 Chandler (2004, p. 249).
61 Laliberté (2004, p. 40).
62 Chun (1994). 
63 Chandler (2004, p. 251).
64 Chandler (2004, pp. 249-250).
65 Chandler (2004, pp. 250-251). 
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of identity in Taiwan may be its ‘religious’ and educational outreach work. 
The practical embodiment of Confucian values may have been eroded in 
Taiwan, but the tradition itself still serves as a powerful signif ier of cultural 
unity between Taiwan and mainland China, at a time when it seems to 
many Taiwanese that its long separation from the mainland has opened a 
gulf between the cultures and mentalities of the two societies. The program 
of Foguangshan resonates with many of those who want to stay in touch 
with their Chinese roots.66
FGS challenges the differentiation of religion and the secularity of the 
shared national culture, seeking to ground it in a Buddhist-Confucian 
culture by involving political actors in religious education and ritual. This 
response, conditioned by the emphasis on this-worldly social and political 
outreach characteristic of humanistic Buddhism, can be contrasted with 
the more confrontational approach of the PCT.
Presbyterian Church in Taiwan
The PCT is the largest Protestant denomination in Taiwan, with almost a 
quarter of a million members.67 It developed out of English and Canadian 
missions established in the mid-nineteenth century, but Calvinism had 
earlier been present in Taiwan under Dutch colonial rule in the mid-
seventeenth century. With the expulsion of the Dutch, Christianity with-
ered on the island until the return of the missionaries some two centuries 
later. By the time the KMT took control of Taiwan in 1945, the church was 
largely independent of the missionaries who had founded it, but continued 
the combination of practical, this-worldly religion combined with social 
welfare, education, and medical provision that had characterized the church 
since the earliest days of the mission.68
Under KMT rule, the PCT became increasingly political. Initially, conflict 
was generated by perceptions that aspects of the PCT’s ordinary activities 
threatened the KMT’s rule and state-building project. Presbyterian clergy 
were rounded up as part of the KMT’s crackdown on the island’s social 
and intellectual elites during the 2/28 incident.69 The PCT also found itself 
in conflict with the government over the church’s efforts to develop the 
66 Chandler (2004, p. 254).
67 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (2016).
68 Cheng (2009).
69 Rubinstein (2003, p. 215).
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Romanization of local languages and dialects as a practical shortcut to 
biblical literacy. The translation of bibles and hymnals into Taiwanese, 
Hakka, and tribal languages, and the use of these languages in services, 
conflicted with the KMT’s policy of Mandarinization. Notwithstanding 
these conflicts, the PCT avoided open political engagement in the early 
years of KMT rule, focusing instead on church growth and welfare work.70
It was during the 1970s that the PCT came into open confrontation with 
the KMT regime, publishing a series of outspoken statements criticizing 
restrictions on religious freedom and human rights and calling for democra-
tization and self-determination for the people of Taiwan.71 These statements 
were some of the earliest public attempts to reorient the KMT’s project of 
national consolidation towards Taiwanese autonomy. They articulated a 
model of political community based not on ethnicity or religion, but on 
shared residency in Taiwan and common commitment to living there in 
peace, freedom, and justice. This ideal of civic nationalism, based on the 
right of peoples to self-determination, was aff irmed not only by the UN 
Charter but ordained by God.72
In 1972, the year after its initial statement, the PCT justif ied its interven-
tion in political affairs with an exceptionalist argument.73 Under ordinary 
circumstances, the Church should not become involved in politics as in 
the Middle Ages, but individual Christians have a responsibility to work 
for the good in society and politics. The Church, as a corporate body, also 
has a responsibility to speak out when political authorities violate the life 
of the Church, or human rights and human dignity. In these circumstances 
though, any statement made by the Church will be a theological statement 
– ‘a confession of faith’ – not a political statement. Defense of human rights 
could also be a confession of faith, because they are given by God. The PCT 
thus acknowledged a boundary between religious and political affairs, but 
denied it was stepping over the boundary.
The image of political community that emerges from the PCT’s public 
statements is one in which religion and politics, and religious community 
and political community, are separate things. In a 1994 response to a state-
ment by the China Christian Council, the PCT argue that ‘Christian com-
munity and national community are not equal terms’ and that ‘differences 
70 Rubinstein (2003, pp. 215-223). 
71 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (1971); Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (1975); Presbyterian 
Church in Taiwan (1977).
72 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (1971). 
73 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (1972).
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in national identity should not be an obstacle to Christian solidarity’.74 The 
PCT defends what might be described as a divinely ordained autonomy of the 
political: political community is not the same as religious community, but 
certain basic political principles – rights to a homeland, self-determination, 
human rights, and human dignity – are gifts from God that ought to be 
respected and defended. This argument has been developed over time into 
increasingly blunt statements that the ‘the people’ who have the right of 
self-determination are the people of Taiwan and its islands.75
The PCT may not have regarded their challenge to the KMT as political, 
but the government took a different view. The PCT’s advocacy of self-
determination and democracy, and support for the activist movement that 
later became the DPP, came at a considerable cost during the martial law 
period.76 Its challenge to the KMT’s project of state-building accepted its 
basically secular civic nationalism and its distinctiveness from religion, 
while making arguments on religious grounds for reorienting it towards a 
project of Taiwanese nationalism.
The culturally authentic modernity of the PCT can be contrasted with 
that of FGS. Whereas Humanistic Buddhism reformed the religious tradition 
to introduce modern, Western-influenced emphases, the PCT has sought 
to enculturate Protestant Christianity – the paradigmatic religion of mo-
dernity – by creatively adapting it in a local idiom without sacrif icing the 
essence of the tradition. The public statements of the PCT from the 1970s 
onwards can be understood as expressing the ideal of ‘contextual theology’, 
especially as developed by Taiwanese Presbyterian pastor Shoki Coe 黃彰
輝. This refers to the idea that theology should be open to the social, politi-
cal, and religio-cultural circumstances of its construction as ‘coordinating 
principles’ that interact dialectically with the transcendent truths of the 
gospel.77 Theologian C.S. Song’s 宋泉盛 influential development of this idea 
proposed that Asian Christians should articulate an Asian theology, on the 
basis that God works through all cultures, and not only Western culture 
within which most theology has thus far been done.78 The PCT’s concern 
with the historical experience of the Taiwanese people, its identif ication 
of the people of Taiwan with that of the people of ancient Israel, and the 
emphasis on God’s concern for both, is in continuity with this tradition. 
74 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (1994).
75 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (1990).
76 Rubinstein (2003). 
77 Wheeler (2002). 
78 Lee (2005).
ReligioN aNd NatioNal ideNtit Y iN taiWaN 367
The overall shape of the PCT’s public engagement thus manifests a concern 
with developing a culturally authentic form of Christianity that reflects and 
responds to the Taiwanese context.
In putting that understanding into practice in its public witness, the 
PCT encountered the normative boundaries between the political and the 
religious, just as FGS had done. Rather than seeking to blur and erode these 
boundaries though, as FGS has through its educative and ritual activities, 
the PCT has accepted their basic legitimacy. Nevertheless, while it endorses 
the normative separation of the political and the religious, the PCT has also 
sought to def ine the boundaries between them in such a way that issues 
crucial to the politics of national identity and self-determination become 
religious issues. This puts these aspects of self-determination beyond the 
legitimate veto power of the state and justif ies the PCT’s involvement on 
these topics, while also framing efforts to restrict the PCT’s interventions 
as being illegitimate restrictions on religious freedom.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have argued that the relationship between religion and 
nationalism has been mediated by two processes that pull in different direc-
tions. The process of state formation, which has tended to separate religion 
and national identity, and the search for culturally authentic expressions 
of modernity, which has tended to draw them together. We proposed that 
the signif icance of religion in relation to nationalism in Taiwan has been 
qualif ied by powerful processes of modernization and state formation 
which have created barriers for religious involvement in politics that remain 
potent, in spite of the relaxation of state controls on religion. At the same 
time, however, religious traditions have been shaped by the same impulses 
towards culturally authentic modernity that animate nationalist projects. 
This aff inity of sensibility provides a general reinforcement of the cultural 
sources of nationalism, but it also arguably motivates greater religious 
engagement with this politics. This is partly because the moral sensibility 
encountered in both the religious and political communities takes on the 
aura of common sense, but also because modern expressions of religion 
tend often to be more this-worldly and socially and politically engaged.
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13 Multiple Religious and National 
Identities
Mazu Pilgrimages across the Taiwan Strait after 1987
Hsun Chang
Abstract
After the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, pilgrimages to China have become 
a routine activity for many temples in Taiwan, especially in the case of 
the temples of Mazu. To most residents of Taiwan, Mazu is a symbol 
of Taiwanese identity; to the Chinese, Mazu is a symbol of peaceful 
unif ication between Taiwan and China. Thus, there are two nationalist 
interpretations of Mazu, and many tensions exist among Mazu believ-
ers. This chapter focuses on the cross-strait pilgrimage from Xingang 
Mazu Temple in Taiwan to Yongchun, Fujian in China in 2011, and the 
establishment of a Taiwanese branch temple in Fujian. In addition, the 
author shows that Taiwanese local politicians use Xingang Mazu Temple 
to attract tourists and as a platform for new religious nationalism.
Keywords: Taiwan, Mazu, pilgrimage, cross-strait, religious nationalism
Pilgrimages across Taiwan Strait after 1987
While there has been much research on folk religion in modern Taiwan after 
World War II, there have been relatively few studies on religious changes 
after the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987.1 By comparison, we 
f ind rich documents of the religious revival and its related issues in China 
after 1987.2 The southeastern Chinese province of Fujian was the original 
homeland of most immigrants from China to Taiwan over the past two 
centuries, the majority of cross-strait religious contact has been between 
temples in Fujian and Taiwan. In the early history of Chinese settlement in 
Taiwan, many immigrants would annually return to their Chinese places of 
origin to worship their ancestors, and would often bring statues of deities 
1 Wolf (1974); Jordan (1994); Clart and Jones (2003); Katz and Rubinstein (2003).
2 Yang (2008); Ashiwa and Wank (2009); Goossaert and Palmer (2011).
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back to their ancestral temples to strengthen the statues’ power. Although 
Han Taiwanese no longer make annual trips back to their places of origin 
in China to worship their ancestors, they are still aware of their roots in 
Fujian and the fact that their deities were ‘divided spirits’ ( fenlin 分靈) 
or ‘divided incense’ ( fenxiang 分香) from their predecessors in Fujian. 
When the practice is allowed, believers will bring statues back to Fujian 
to be empowered, which is why there are so many pilgrimages across the 
Taiwan Strait every year. Among dozens of deities from Fujian, Mazu 媽祖, 
the sea goddess, has long been a favorite; Mazu ensured that immigrants 
crossed the Strait safely, brought rain to water crops, protected the safety 
of merchants going back and forth across the Strait, and sheltered the poor. 
Even nowadays, she is said to listen to all those who ask for her help. Among 
the hundreds of deities in the folk religion of Taiwan, Mazu has hundreds 
of thousands believers, and is often considered to be the patron deity of 
Taiwan. There are around one thousand temples in Taiwan dedicated to 
her, and roughly sixty of these temples send their members on regular 
pilgrimages to Meizhou (湄州), Fujian.3
Most group pilgrimages to China are organized by temple committees. 
A pilgrimage group is typically composed of the chief temple manager, 
other temple managers, pilgrims (also called ‘incense-guests’, xiangke 香
客), and entertainers hired by the temple. All these participants have to 
follow certain rules during the trip, such as wearing clean clothes, observing 
a vegetarian diet, maintaining sexual abstinence, and avoiding alcoholic 
beverages, betel nut, and cigarettes, etc. Some of the pilgrims bring their 
own statues of Mazu, and these pilgrims must burn incense throughout 
the trip and have their statue stay at the ancestral temple overnight once. 
Before the pilgrims leave the ancestral temple and start their journey back 
to Taiwan, all the statues are passed over the main giant censer of the 
ancestral temple in order to f ill them with the deity’s eff icacious powers.
The Dajia 大甲 Mazu Temple undertook its f irst recent pilgrimage 
to Meizhou, Fujian in October 1987, which was before Taiwan’s central 
government legalized direct religious contact with mainland China. The 
Dajia Mazu Temple gained a higher status in the hierarchical system of 
Mazu temples throughout Taiwan thanks to the cooperation it obtained 
from Fujian, and it thus earned the reputation of being the headquarters of 
3 According to the Record of the Divine Feats of the Heavenly Imperial Consort (天妃顯聖錄), 
Mazu’s maiden name was Moniang Lin, she was born in Xianliang Harbor in 960 AD, and died 
on Meizhou island, Fujian, in 987 AD. The Meizhou temple was subsequently granted the status 
of the ancestral temple (or mother temple) of Mazu.
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Meizhou Mazu in Taiwan and attracted more believers than before.4 This 
prompted other Mazu temples to undertake the pilgrimage to Meizhou and 
bring back new statues ( fenshen 分身) from Meizhou. Eventually, after 1990, 
not only were Mazu believers busily crossing the strait, but other deities’ 
believers were also making pilgrimages to their deities’ ancestral temples in 
China in order to empower their temples and enhance their reputations.5
The returning believers from Taiwan have provided an opportunity for 
the revival of folk religion in China. Folk religion was severely repressed 
during the Cultural Revolution, and is still not a legal religion in China.6 
Nevertheless, after the modernization and opening in 1987, folk religion has 
been tolerated or permitted in some coastal areas, especially in Fujian.7 
Folk religion is used as a tool for promoting cohesion with the Taiwanese by 
local governments in Fujian. More importantly, the belief and cult of Mazu 
was declared intangible cultural heritage by UNESCO in 2009, and this has 
provided stronger incentives for promotion of the Mazu cult by Fujian’s local 
governments. Many Mazu temples have been rebuilt and rituals reinitiated 
as a token of friendship with people from Taiwan. My own observation is 
that some temples dedicated to other deities that have been rebuilt have 
added Mazu to their altars. According to my informants, when you have 
Taiwanese signatures in the petitions, permission to rebuild a temple will 
be granted faster. The revival of folk religion in Fujian has attracted not 
only people from Taiwan, but also overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia.8
In recent years, many believers from folk-religion temples in China have 
traveled to Taiwan as well. Some of these temples are the ancestral temples 
of various deities, including the Warrior God (Guansheng Dijun 關聖帝
君), Madam Linshui (Linshui Furen 臨水夫人), and the Universal Blessing 
Emperor (Guangze Zunwang 廣澤尊王). These trips are interpreted as visits 
by the deities to inspect their branch temples in Taiwan.9 Some of these 
trips are also made to learn how to run a temple using modern business 
methods. Furthermore, numerous academic conferences, seminars, and 
workshops have been held on both sides of the Strait concerning various 
relevant issues, such as hagiography, ritual, legend, myths of different dei-
ties, architecture, painting, sculpture of different temples, religious tourism, 
religious economy, and religious politics, etc. These meetings have resulted 
4 Chang (2003).
5 Nyitray (1996); Rubinstein (2001); Hatf ield (2010).
6 Yang (2008, p. 8).
7 Dean (2010); Kuo’s chapter in this book.
8 Sangren (2003); DeBernardi (2013).
9 Mio (2003, p. 202); Ting (2012, p. 7).
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in the publication of many proceedings or books, which in turn give rise 
to more events, and induce more scholars to get involved in the study of 
folk religion.
A cross-strait Mazu pilgrimage in 2011
Mayfair Yang has studied the pilgrimage of Dajia Mazu to the Meizhou 
ancestral temple by ship in July 2000.10 In this section I will describe how 
Xingang 新港 Mazu and her followers took a plane to Fujian to establish 
a new branch temple at Yongchun County 永春縣. This was an extraordi-
nary event. Usually an old temple establishes a branch temple in a newly 
developed frontier area. Historically, temples in Taiwan typically received 
images of deities from places of origin in China, and thereby became branch 
temples of mother temples in China. Why would a Chinese village accept 
an image from Taiwan and become a branch temple of a Taiwanese temple?
Originally a local temple in Jiayi County 嘉義縣, Xingang Mazu Temple 
later emerged as a regional temple by holding annual ‘inspection-tour’ 
processions through southern Taiwan. Along with fifteen temple committee 
members, I escorted two Mazu images, one large (about 180 cm) and one 
small (about 45 cm), on a flight from Taipei to Xiamen on 30 December 2011. 
After a careful inspection by the Xiamen airport customs, we took cars 
and trucks to Yongchun County. The two Mazu images, received amid the 
sound of f irecrackers, gongs, drums, and other entertainment groups, made 
an inspection tour around the town, and were f inally taken to Chenban 
Village (陳坂村), which is located in a mountainous area.
Chairman Ho (2008-present) of the Xingang Mazu Temple and other 
committee members had presented one small Mazu statue and two statues 
of guardian generals (‘Thousand-Miles Eye’ and ‘With-the-Wind Ear’ (qian-
liyan 千里眼; shunfenger 順風耳) to Chenban Village in 2010. The friend-
ship between Xingang and Chenban started at an academic conference in 
May 2010, when Professor Chen of the Chinese Academy of Social Science 
in Beijing came to Xingang to present a paper at the f irst International 
Conference on Mazu Culture, which was held by Xingang Mazu Temple. 
After a week spent observing and enjoying the Mazu culture of Xingang, 
Professor Chen decided to recommend Xingang Mazu to his hometown, 
where an existing village temple was dedicated to Daoist Master Zhang 
(Zhang Tianshi 張天師). A compromise was found to build a new back hall 
10 Yang (2004).
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for Mazu. Permission for the construction of the new back hall for Mazu was 
granted by the local government off ice quickly enough so that the statues 
that came from Taiwan in 2011 could be housed. Because this is the f irst 
Mazu in Yongchun county, she is respectfully called ‘Kaiyong Mazu’ – the 
‘f irst Mazu who helped develop Yongchun’ (Kaiyung Mazu 開永媽祖) – by 
the village people.
A branch temple ranks lower than its mother temple. Why would 
Yongchun county off ice approve the construction of a back hall for the 
installation of Mazu from Xingang? Why would Chenban villagers ac-
cept donations and statues from Xingang? Why would this new Mazu in 
Yongchun be respectfully called ‘The f irst Mazu in Yongchun’? Many local 
off icials basically do not believe in folk religion. They do not care about the 
inferior or superior status of Mazu images and temples. If building a Mazu 
hall promotes unity with people from Taiwan, the local off icials might even 
receive appreciation from higher levels of the government. And since the old 
village temple had lost believers for decades, the villagers did not believe 
any harm could come from adding a Mazu image. All the money and statues 
were donated by Xingang, so why not accept them? And in fact, after Mazu 
was installed in the temple, more villagers and outsiders came to worship, 
and even Daoist Master Zhang received more worship and donations.
Professor Chen and his mother, who still lives in the village, were invited 
to be consultants for the Chenban Temple (Chenban gong 陳坂宮). Professor 
Chen suggested that the new Mazu be taken on an annual inspection tour 
around Yongchun County in order to protect her new believers. From 2011 
to 2016, we observed Kaiyong Mazu inspect her new territory, consisting 
of the villages of Yongchun County, during the Chinese New Year holiday. 
Increasing amounts of donations were collected from every village with 
each passing year. Chenban Temple will be able to distribute rice, oil and 
clothes to the poor, and set up a scholarship for middle-school students 
using these donations in 2016. As long as Chenban Temple is doing social 
welfare work, the local government is inclined to be tolerant of folk religion. 
Professor Chen told us that he runs the village temple in accordance with 
the management practices used at Xingang Temple, and is proud of naming 
the Mazu ‘Kaiyong Mazu’: ‘No one ever heard of Chenban village before. But 
now, because of this Mazu, people all over Yongchun County welcome our 
New Year inspection tour and donate money to our temple’.
Why have the people of Xingang donated money and several divine 
images, and why do many travel to Yongchun every year to teach ritual 
techniques, management practices, and f iscal skills, and to maintain their 
relationship with Yongchun? By dividing power and dividing the spirit of 
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Mazu with Yongchun, Xingang now sponsors a branch temple in China. In 
this way, Xingang Temple has increased its rank, as Dajia Temple did in 1988 
using different means. The more branch temples one sponsors, the more 
powerful one’s temple is. Most of the small Mazu temples in Taiwan are 
aff iliated with a larger Mazu temple, and the rivalry between temples in 
Taiwan has nearly reached a deadlock. Ever since 1990, however, the com-
petition among the larger Mazu temples in Taiwan has extended to China. 
Whichever temple has a stronger China connection and more believers, 
the higher its rank in the hierarchy of the Mazu cult. A higher rank means 
the more eff icacious power the temple is able to command, and greater 
ability to attract believers and donations. No temple committee member 
will publicly admit to this competition, and they instead usually attribute 
their actions to the power of Mazu. It is Mazu’s power that decides the rank 
of the order. There is nevertheless a strong sense of parochialism among 
Mazu’s believers. If we compare Mazu and the Virgin Mary, we can imagine 
competition among Our Lady of Fatima, Our Lady of Guadalupe, and Our 
Lady of Lourdes. The Holy Spirit is personif ied, localized, and endorsed in 
conjunction with strong community identity.
Xianliang Harbor 賢良港, in the coastal area of Putian 莆田, Fujian, is 
Mazu’s hometown, and apart from Meizhou Island, Xianliang Temple is the 
most sacred place for Mazu believers. Descendants of the Lin family still 
hold a memorial ceremony on the morning of the day of Mazu’s death on 
the seashore at Xianliang Harbor. Members of the Xingang and Chenban 
temple committees attended the morning ceremony of 23 October 2012 to 
offer incense and bow to Mazu. In the afternoon, the Xingang and Chenban 
temple committee members were invited by the Meizhou Temple to offer 
incense and bow at the same memorial ceremony, but now held on the Shore 
of Meizhou Island. The members of the Chenban temple committee were 
invited by the Xingang temple committee members to the Xianliang and 
Meizhou Mazu temples. To the members of the Chenban temple committee, 
this was an unexpected honor and an acknowledgement of the status of 
Chenban Temple. But had there been no recommendation from Xingang, 
this mountain village temple could not be guest incense-offerer at the 
Xianliang or Meizhou temple. Likewise, if there had not been the unification 
promotion policy from the central government of China, Xingang Temple 
would not have had the prestige to be entertained by Xianliang or Meizhou 
temple. The Mazu temples at Meizhou Island and Xianliang Harbor can 
be likened to the imperial court. Mazu was granted the title of ‘Empress of 
Heaven’ (tianhou 天后) by the Kangxi Emperor in 1684, and was worshipped 
by local governors with subsidies from the state every spring and autumn 
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afterwards. If one recalls that the celestial hierarchy of Chinese folk religion 
mirrors the Chinese imperial bureaucracy,11 one will understand that Mazu 
is the eternal-living empress to its believers. While Meizhou Ancestral 
Temple is the irreplaceable eternal-sacred court that houses the Empress 
Mazu, Xianliang Temple houses the Empress’ parents.
There are thousands of Mazu temples in China, and even the Chinese 
communist government continues to acknowledge the supreme status 
of Meizhou Mazu, and seeks to develop the island into a national scenic 
area welcoming Mazu believers worldwide. Members of both Xingang and 
Chenban temples were proud of having the opportunity to offer incense 
and bow at the hitherto restricted ceremony. Thereafter, the believers of 
Chenban Temple were even more grateful to Xingang Temple. Kaiyong 
Mazu and the believers of Chenban Temple were invited to visit southern 
Taiwan in the spring of 2014, and were asked to take part in the Big Offering 
( jiao 醮)12 of Xingang Temple in December 2015. It was felt that this would 
enable believers in Taiwan and in Fujian to communicate face to face, and 
also enhance the two temples’ social capital.
One Mazu, multiple political interpretations
Associations between symbols and objects are arbitrary, conventional, and 
culturally determined.13 To the boat people in Hong Kong, Mazu promised 
mastery of the seas and protection from storms; to the land elites she 
symbolized territorial control and social stability.14 Mazu was ‘Aunt Lin’ 
(Lin gu 林姑) to the residents of Putian and was ‘Empress of Heaven’ to the 
state. Nowadays, Mazu symbolizes different things for people in Taiwan 
and people in China. Most believers in Taiwan venerate Mazu because 
she was a f ilial daughter, and she is merciful and responsive. In contrast, 
the few Mazu believers in China think that Mazu will bring fortune and 
good luck, otherwise why would the Taiwanese worship Mazu. For the 
local government of Fujian, Mazu is ‘Goddess of Peace of the Taiwan Strait’ 
11 Wolf (1974, pp. 131-182).
12 Most Daoist scholars def ine this Big Offering of Daoism as a seeking of cosmic renewal 
(Saso 1972, p. 36). It is held only by temples, and not by individuals, when a temple has been 
constructed or renovated, or after a disaster, and expresses gratitude to the temple’s deity (Dean 
1993, pp. 45-47; Lagerwey 1987, p. 51; Schipper 1974, p. 313). 
13 Firth (1975, p. 60).
14 Watson (1987, p. 294).
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(Haixia Heping Nushen 海峽和平女神.15 This politically laden title implies 
that Fujian has been authorized to have broad links with Taiwan before 
other provinces.
The believers in Taiwan who escorted Mazu to Meizhou were not neces-
sarily pro-unif ication, and saw the event simply as a religious pilgrimage. 
In the words of some believers, ‘Mazu came from Fujian and she needs to 
enhance her power annually! We are settled in Taiwan. My parents and 
grandparents were born in Taiwan. I am a Taiwanese’. But religious contact 
will bring cultural and economic communication, and the cult of Mazu is 
the most mature platform that can be used by the government in Fujian. 
As a consequence, alliances and coalitions of different Mazu temples on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been growing steadily since 1987. We 
can see that the titles of eighteen temples have been carved on the wall 
of Xianliang Temple. These temples, led by Dajia Temple, made donations 
for the remodeling of Xianliang Temple. Before the renewal of Xianliang 
Temple in 2002, every gate, pavilion, hall, room, tower on Meizhou Island 
that had been renovated in 1980-1990 bore the engraved title of a Taiwanese 
temple. All these donations and inscriptions are suggestive of the intimate 
relationships between the temples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
It is no secret which Taiwanese temples have alliances with or branch 
temples in China. Many, including Xingang Temple, are proud of having 
close relationships with Chinese temples. Another example is Songshang 
松山 Mazu Temple in Taipei, which published a new version of its temple 
brochure in February 2012. In this new brochure, the story of a visit by 
a prestigious Chinese temple in Xianyou 仙遊, Fujian in August of 2011, 
receives great emphasis. The Xianyou temple in question is two-hundred 
years old, and has nine branch temples in Fujian area. It has nevertheless 
been searching for its ancestral temple for a long time, and f inally, on the 
basis of matching historical tablets, Xianyou temple successfully traced 
its origin to Songshang Temple. In the pamphlet, the term ‘acknowledge 
one’s ancestor and return back to one’s lineage’ (renzhu gueizung 認祖歸
宗) is used. To celebrate this reunion, in April 2012, Songshang and Xian-
you temple jointly visited temples in southern Taiwan to strengthen their 
relationships with these temples. Many other temples in Taiwan advertise 
their relationships with Chinese temples. Beigang Temple is allied with 
Meizhou Temple, and they have called each other sister temples since 1988; 
Dajia Temple established a branch temple in Macau in 2003, and one in 
15 This term was coined around 1984 by some scholars in Fujian, and has f inally been accepted 
by the central government of China. 
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Tianjin in 2008. In addition to Yongchun, the Xingang Temple is also allied 
with a temple in Quanzhou. Lugang Temple in central Taiwan established 
a branch temple in Shanghai in 2010.
When discussing Chinese nationalism, there exists a certain degree 
of ambiguity. At the level of the state, the people of Taiwan like to quote 
the ‘1992 consensus’ ( jiuer gongshi 九二共識), which means both sides 
recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its def inition. 
This consensus can also be applied to religious nationalism. For Taiwanese 
temples, ‘to build a branch temple in China denotes to devour, to eat China,’ 
whereas for Chinese temples, ‘The Taiwanese have acknowledged us as 
ancestors and returned to us’. During the 2011 trip to Yongchun, friends 
and team members said, ‘We are triumphantly f ighting our way back into 
China!’ Some Dajia pilgrims challenged the legitimacy of Meizhou by saying: 
‘All the images of Mazu in Meizhou were carved after Cultural Revolution, 
and they are younger than most of the statues in Taiwan’. These believers 
opposed going to China to enhance the power of Mazu. Instead, a small 
number of temples in southern Taiwan rely on shamanism as a localized 
source of power. For example, a Yunlin Mazu temple claims that their Mazu 
is Meiyun Lin 林美雲, instead of the traditional Lady Moniang Lin 林默娘.
We can see that complicated feelings arise when Taiwanese believers go 
to China. Once they have the opportunity to go to Fujian or China, no one 
refuses to take a look at their place of origin. The sense of being orphaned 
which some people in Taiwan feel disappears after one has got to know 
one’s roots.16 Most believers visit their place of origin in Fujian after they 
f inish their pilgrimage to Meizhou. Nevertheless, more than one hundred 
years’ separation has decreased the emotional attachment, and increased 
differences in lifestyle. Temple-to-temple interactions can be linked with 
the production of different levels and types of identity. There exist multilevel 
and multifaceted forms of identity production, and these identities may 
be both spiritual and ethnic, as well as local, regional, provincial (Taiwan-
centered), interprovincial (Taiwan and Fujian), and even international 
(Taiwan and China) as Rubinstein also has observed.17
16 Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty and was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 
1945, at which time the Japanese surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang. Taiwanese 
singer Luo Dayou (羅大佑) dubbed Taiwan ‘the orphan of Asia’ in one of his most famous songs.
17 Rubinstein (2003, p. 182).
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Community consciousness and temple competition
Temples of folk religions have been allying as well as competing with each 
other to survive the political pressure they face in both Taiwan and China. 
As mentioned earlier, temple committee members of Dajia flew to Meizhou 
illegally in 1987 without the Taiwan government’s permission. For self-
protection and for raising funds to rebuild Meizhou Temple, Dajia Temple 
organized a temple association called Taiwan Mazu Fellowship (Taiwan 
Mazu lienyihui 台灣媽祖聯誼會). Its membership increased gradually 
from eighteen temples in 1990 to sixty temples in 2010. Being the richest 
temple and having the widest connections in China, for the past twenty 
and more years, the vice-president of Dajia Temple, Mr Zheng, has won the 
chairmanship of the Taiwan Mazu Fellowship. Chairman Ho of the Xingang 
Temple has won the vice-chairmanship of the Taiwan Mazu Fellowship 
because of his generosity and willingness to serve. Mr Zheng and Mr Ho 
take turns at leading the Taiwan Mazu Fellowship members to visit China 
every year. Members of this association are friendly to China and are willing 
to invest in various items of infrastructure in Meizhou and Fujian.
There is another association organized by Lu-er-men 鹿耳門 Mazu 
Temples in southern Taiwan called Taiwan Golden Orchid Association of 
Temples (Taiwan Simiao Jinlanhui 台灣寺廟金蘭會, TGOAT). Membership 
of this TGOAT is not limited to Mazu temples and has risen to seventy. Their 
main purpose is in-island oriented social welfare for allied communities 
and to enhance inter-temple communication. Though a few temples have 
joined both the Taiwan Mazu Fellowship and the TGOAT, the two temple 
associations have different political stands. The former is more pro-Chinese 
nationalism and the latter is pro-Taiwan nationalism. When there are local 
elections for county mayors or representatives, we can see candidates of 
Kuomintang (KMT) approaching the Taiwan Mazu Fellowship for sup-
port while candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) visit the 
TGOAT.
Temple alliances and competition can be observed in China as well. 
Adam Chau has shown that in northern China, temples of folk religions are 
constantly facing threats from the State. One of the strategies is to expand 
temples’ secular functions. ‘The temple’s functional expansiveness and 
concerns of legitimacy necessarily draw in social forces beyond the village. 
These trans-local maneuvers include former inter-village alliances, securing 
support and protection from local state agencies, attracting media atten-
tion, and engaging with cosmopolitan and even foreign non-governmental 
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organizations.’18 In Mazu’s case, we see that foreign social forces are from 
Taiwan and overseas Chinese communities. From Tianjin 天津 in northern 
China, to Shanghai in central China, to Quenzhou 泉州, Xiamen in Fujian, 
we see Mazu temples along the coastal China have statues from Taiwan 
and these are allied with different temples from Taiwan. All of these Mazu 
temples deliberately lower their status rank by receiving statues and dona-
tions from Taiwan to expand their foreign capital.
After securing approval from the Chinese Ministry of Culture 國家文化
部, the Chinese Mazu Cultural Exchange Association (CMCEA, Zhonghua 
Mazu Wenhua Jiauliou Xiehui 中華媽祖文化交流協會) was organized by 
the Fujian local government, Meizhou Ancestral Temple and CCP local 
members in October 2004. CMCEA supervises 150 Mazu temples and 
organizations in China; its chairman is Mr Zhang Kehui 張克輝, who is 
a Taiwanese who stayed on in China during the civil war between the 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party and has been elected as the vice-
chairman of the CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
全國政協).19 CMCEA has represented the Chinese central government to 
arrange all possible cultural exchange activities with Taiwan and overseas 
Chinese communities. These exchange activities between various temples 
along the coastal cities in China and Taiwan were all approved by CMCEA. 
Even the Chenban village receiving statues from Xingang in 2010 and 2011 
were permitted by CMCEA. I saw a red banner celebrating the alliance with 
Xingang hung on the wall of the Chenban Temple written by Zhang Kehui 
during my trip on 30 December 2011.
The cult of Mazu is not one of the f ive legally recognized religions in 
China and it is not controlled by the State Administration for Religion 
Affairs. It is regulated by the Ministry of Culture and the CPPCC. The CCP 
maintains its control over the rapidly expanding religious and cultural 
activities of the Mazu cult. CMCEA shares the CCP’s enduring efforts to 
eliminate social and ideological competition. Ashiwa and Wank correctly 
pointed out that ‘[t]he Party eliminates competition by such measures 
as: co-opting clergy and believers into state-approved religious associa-
tions; confining religious activities to such registered sites as churches and 
temples; recognizing only clergy trained in state-approved seminaries; 
vetting sermons and monitoring foreign contacts of religions’.20 We can 
notice that the CMCEA is doing exactly the same thing. Putian University 
18 Chau (2009, pp. 214-215).
19 Chen (2012, pp. 92-95).
20 Ashiwa and Wank (2009, p. 4).
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(Putian Xueyuan 莆田學院) established by the Putian City government 
is responsible for research and training scholars for the Mazu cult. The 
Committee Organization of Meizhou Ancestral Temple (Meizhou zumiao 
dongshihui 湄洲祖廟董事會) is the apex organization and no competition 
among Mazu temples in China is allowed by the CMCEA.
Knowing that Mazu temples in southern Taiwan and the TGOAT are 
more pro-Taiwan independence, CMCEA arranged for the statue of Meizhou 
Ancestral Temple to visit Taiwan and had an inspection tour around Taiwan 
in January 1997, in an attempt to earn southern Taiwanese’ hearts. Unfor-
tunately, CMCEA chose Tainan Big Tianhou Temple (Tainan da tianhou 
gong 台南大天后宮) to be its host and overruled Dajia, Beigang, or other 
allied temples. This irritated the allied temples and they refused to receive 
the Meizhou statue. Public opinion in Taiwan thus accused the Meizhou 
Temple’s visit of being more a political event than a religious tour. Why did 
CMCEA choose the declining Tainan Big Tianhou Temple instead of other 
popular temples? Mass media suspected that it was because Tainan Big 
Tianhou Temple was remodeled from Koxinga’s 國姓爺 or 鄭成功 off icial 
residence into a Mazu temple by General Shi Lang 施琅 after defeating 
Koxinga’s grandson in 1683 and hence became the state temple in the Qing 
Dynasty. This off icially favored temple bears the memory of Koxinga’s 
failure and humiliation of Taiwan’s return to China. Thus, during the one-
hundred-day tour in Taiwan, wherever the Meizhou statue stopped, there 
were protest groups. CMCEA or the Chinese Mazu was even more repelled 
in southern Taiwan.
Meizhou Island and Meizhou Ancestral Temple have been planned 
and designed by central government to be the only and the best place 
to host foreign believers and tourists since 1987. Apart from the political 
considerations of isolation, and the ease with which it can be quarantined, 
Meizhou Island was religiously the destination of all pilgrimages for Mazu. 
Committee members of the Meizhou Ancestral Temple are selected from 
smaller Mazu temples on the island by throwing divine blocks (zhijiao 擲
筊). On the island there are fourteen smaller Mazu temples that belong to 
different villages but they are voiceless and are ignored by most visitors. This 
is deliberately arranged by the Meizhou Administration Bureau (Meizhou 
zumiao jingqu guanli chu 湄州祖廟景區管理處) to have better control of 
the island.
Within these state constraints various smaller Mazu temples still man-
age to thrive. They forge new networks and have activities outside of the 
state as mentioned earlier. Competition therefore is unavoidable but it is 
playing underground. Leave alone Quanzhou or Shanghai, just look at Mazu 
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temples in Putian City, where we have heard of competition among Meizhou 
Ancestral Temple, Xianliang Harbor Temple, and the Wenfeng Temple 文
峰宮. The latter two temples dug up all the documents, sediments, cultural 
relics, and created legends to compete with Meizhou Ancestral Temple and 
thus attract believers and tourists from Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
Religious tourists coming from abroad need more sightseeing spots 
apart from Meizhou Ancestral Temple. Airplanes stop at Xiamen or Fu-
zhou, from where one takes a bus to Putian City and spend hours waiting 
for the boat to Meizhou. On their way back to the airport, again, some visit 
Putian City. Taiwanese pilgrims told me that most of the hotels in Putian 
City were built after 1987 to house hundreds of thousands of pilgrims in the 
third month of the lunar calendar each year. These pilgrims pay homage 
to Mazu in the Xianliang Harbor Temple, and the Wenfeng Temple before 
they continue their trip to Meizhou. I have witnessed a new building 
coming up in front of the Wenfeng Temple and a new hall behind the 
Xianliang Harbor Temple in 2012. Chairman Ho of Xingang Temple and 
we were entertained by these two temples with great hospitality showing 
that both temples had received large donations from Xingang/Taiwan 
Mazu Fellowship.
There were many conferences and forums held by the Meizhou Temple 
since 1987. All the proceedings or publications sponsored by Meizhou 
Temple favored Meizhou as the birthplace of Mazu. All the scholars and 
bureaucrats praise Meizhou Temple and no other temple dares to challenge 
its sacredness. Professor Ye of Fujian Normal University invited several 
scholars from both sides of the Strait (I was one of them) to conduct an 
ethnological investigation in Xianliang Harbor in April 2012 and held a 
conference in Xianliang Harbor in October 2012. This conference was, and 
had to be, sponsored by Xingang Temple (from Taiwan), or it would not 
have been permitted. Yet, these two events were initiated by the Xian-
liang temple committee members and the main purpose was to verify 
its sacredness: being the birthplace of Mazu. It was the f irst time temple 
committee members of the Xianliang Harbor openly gathered scholars of 
history, folklore, and ethnology to declare the temple’s sacredness for them. 
Retired local cadres of Zhongmen town 忠門鎮 and Gangli village 港裡村 
were invited to speak at the conference. They were more than pleased to 
see their hometown hosting so many scholars and becoming well known 
to the outside world.
One of the reasons why Xianliang Temple dared to openly hold this 
international conference, I believe, was the implementation of the Project 
of the North Shore Economic Development (湄州灣北岸經濟開發區計畫). 
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This is a ten-year (2007-2017) project undertaken by the Fujian local state.21 
The project plans to connect Xianliang harbor with Meizhou Island and 
build a bridge eventually to link these two areas. This huge project must 
have given local people confidence to compete with Meizhou Ancestral 
Temple. On the seashore of Xianliang harbor we saw construction vehicles 
busy reclaiming land from the sea, villagers were moved to inner-land areas, 
empty houses were abandoned, and shrines of earth gods were ruined. It is 
quite ironic that all this construction is for tourists/believers from outside. 
If there are no foreign worshippers and donations how can villagers sustain 
this newly built gorgeous Xianliang Harbor Temple?
To promote tourism in Putian city meant to help Xianliang Harbor 
Temple and Wenfeng Temple become famous, but that would have triggered 
competition and this obviously was not welcomed by the Fujian government 
or the state. Scholars of the Putian University were in a dilemma and were 
under pressure from the Meizhou Administration Bureau. Professor Ye 
from Fujian Normal University and scholars from Taiwan therefore were 
requested to strengthen their social forces. Thus, when we discern the rela-
tionship between state and religion, we might need to distinguish between 
local and central government and provincial government from the county 
off ice. Different levels of the state administration might have different 
positions. Furthermore, temple competition might just be superficial, what 
is deeply involved is community consciousness.
To conclude this section, we explicate that conf licts among Mazu 
temples in Taiwan mainly focus on which is the oldest temple in Taiwan, 
meaning which has the highest sacredness (ling 靈or eff icacy). In reality, 
disputes among Mazu temples in Fujian have been mainly about which is 
the birthplace of Mazu, the accepted validation of sacredness. The logic 
for competition among temples on both sides of the Strait is about the 
sacredness or eff icacy. But the logic of competition between Taiwan Mazu 
and Chinese Mazu is about the political legitimacy of unif ication. This is 
elaborated in the following sections.
Localized resistance: Xingang Mazu Temple and local factions
Variations in national identity can also be observed among Mazu temples, 
and among believers of one temple. Over the past ten years, Chairman 
21 North Shore Management Committee (2007, p. 1), Putian Newsletter Editorial Board and 
North Shore Management Committee, eds. (2008).
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Ho and the committee members of Xingang Mazu Temple have shown 
enthusiasm for friendship with temples in China, and have developed new 
alliances in southern Taiwan. The price of this is that they have neglected 
the benefit of local people, which has given the opposing faction time to 
make its appearance.
Dr Chen is a well-reputed doctor in Xingang. An NGO organization, 
the Xingang Cultural Educational Foundation (XCEF), led by Dr Chen has 
been famous in Taiwan since the 1980s, which was a time when Taiwan 
was implementing a program of comprehensive community construction. 
Generally keeping a low profile, Dr Chen has been a public opinion leader in 
connection with many community projects. Politically speaking, Dr Chen 
has a strong Taiwanese identity. In Taiwan’s political circles, doctors are 
typically advocators of modernization and democracy. No exception to this 
general rule, Dr Chen has long striven to create a progressive community 
from the poor, backward rural Xingang of the past. During the presidency 
of Chen Shuibian of the DPP, Dr Chen was appointed a state policy advisor. 
Dr Chen also recommended a performance group to design an event for 
Xingang Mazu’s visit to New York. The DPP had been trying through many 
channels to secure Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations. In 2007, 
believers from Xingang Temple flew to New York with their Mazu statue 
and palanquin. While this was nominally for the purpose of making an 
inspection tour to bless Taiwanese immigrants, the group also went to 
the headquarters of the UN to support Taiwanese demonstrators. Today, a 
tablet bearing the inscription ‘UN for Taiwan’ presented by President Chen 
Shuibian hangs from the roof of Xingang Temple.
The New York trip of Xingang Mazu was planned by a performance group, 
Paper Wind Mill Theatre Troupe (Zhifengche jutuan 紙風車劇團) and the 
Paper Wind Mill Cultural Educational Foundation (紙風車文教基金會), 
to be scheduled as part of an international cultural event on 15 September 
2007 in New York. This project was supported by Chairman Lu of Xingang 
Temple at that time, and most importantly, by the Executive Yuan, and 
by President Chen Shuibian, as President Chen visited Xingang Temple 
to show his gratitude after the group had returned from New York. No 
doubt, Xingang Temple attracted the attention of the whole island and 
outweighed Dajia Temple for its boldness. Not only politicians but also 
Mazu temples were involved in this debate of Taiwanese identity. Mazu 
temples were forced to take a position on this issue which made the temple 
competition worse, and which also opened up the political struggle among 
Mazu temples. The DPP was planning to have a referendum on the issue 
of admission to the UN (入聯公投) in March 2008, and the DPP knew this 
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would imply a change of ‘Republic of China’ to ‘Taiwan’. In other words, 
Admission to the UN implied Taiwan’s independence. This issue became 
the top debate of the presidential election at the end of December 2007 
between the presidential candidate of KMT, Ma Yingjiu, and the candidate 
of DPP, Xie Changting 謝長廷.
The XCEF was established in 1987 by Dr Chen as a means for local elites 
to learn local politics and make contact with the government’s bureaucratic 
system up to the central government of Taiwan. The chiefs of Xingang Town-
ship over the past twenty years or more were all members of the XCEF, which 
helped train them in modern political skills. The many projects and branch 
units run by the XCEF include a library, gallery, theater, and restaurant, and 
almost every knowledgeable local person has been recruited to hold a post. 
Xingang Temple is the richest temple in town, and is also supported by the 
XCEF. With the help of XCEF, Xingang Temple and its surrounding area has 
resurged from 1990 to be a new tourist spot and famous for its environmental 
protection.22 There is a biweekly meeting of the members of XCEF, and 
many honorable guests or successful Xingang businessmen are invited 
from other parts of Taiwan to give talks and to share new information. By 
playing these roles, the XCEF serves as a pressure group for Xingang Temple 
and the whole town.
When the KMT instituted local elections for county mayors and repre-
sentatives in the early 1950s, the KMT needed to work with local elites to 
win elections. Native politicians f illed local factions of the KMT, especially 
during the presidency of Li Denghui. As a consequence, not just the members 
of the DPP have a Taiwanese identity, a large number of KMT members also 
have been localized and have a Taiwanese identity. The difference is that 
grassroots KMT members may not be pro-Taiwan independence.
Community temples have long comprised a public sphere in traditional 
Han Taiwanese society, and are still the most eff icient organization for 
public-opinion formation. Both traditional elites and modern politicians 
commonly try to get involved in temple affairs in order to manipulate local 
communities. The localization of the KMT began with involvement in local 
religion. Despite the KMT’s off icial hostility toward popular religion, its 
local politicians have used religion to build up support. Gradually, the higher 
levels of the KMT changed their attitude, and recognized that believers can 
be mobilized to vote. ‘Connection’ (guanxi 關係) and service are the most 
important means of getting elected and reelected in local politics. Most 
22 Chang (2013, pp. 115-160).
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voters do not vote based on issues or the ideological positions of candidates. 
Instead, they vote for those who serve them.23
Although Chairman Ho of Xingang Temple is a KMT member, he never-
theless accepted Dr Chen and former Chairman Lu’s arrangement to visit 
New York, and he also had Dr Chen’s acquiescence for establishment of the 
branch temple in Yongchun. It was for the benefit of Xingang’s development 
that Dr Chen and other local leaders tolerated Chairman Ho for such a 
long time. But ten years was long enough to accumulate many complaints. 
Local elites criticized Ho in these words: ‘He didn’t care about our feel-
ings. He worked with outside scholars and enterprises too much. We are 
humiliated when outsiders think there are no talented persons in Xingang’. 
They disliked Ho’s paying more attention to China than to Xingang, and 
wondered about the benefit to Xingang of constructing a branch temple in 
Chenban village. What they thought was urgent was to protest the building 
of an incinerator in Xingang, or to create more investment in Xingang. The 
Big Offering festival in December 2015 was the f irst victory for the oppos-
ing faction, which successfully replaced some of the temple committee 
members. And preventing the operation of the World Research Center for 
Mazu Culture, Fengtian Temple (奉天宮世界媽祖文化研究暨文獻中心) 
was their second attack. This faction planned to take over the presidency of 
the temple in 2016 but did not succeed.24 Chairman Ho won the election and 
he told us that the election of Xingang Temple became harder and harder. He 
had to put in more money and more personnel to run the temple. Friends of 
the temple are worried that Xingang might follow the step of the expensive 
election of Dajia Temple.25 We can see that, at the local level, all the elites 
and leading f igures are relatives of each other, or are working together. Even 
when a member of KMT wins an election, he has to work with members 
of DPP. Resources have to be shared, and posts in the temple or township 
have to be shared as well.
After the f irst direct presidential election in 1996, the distance between 
local and national politics has drawn closer and closer in Taiwan. The very 
same group of voters can vote for temple chairman, town mayor, legislator, 
and the president of Taiwan. If the times of the elections for these different 
posts are close to each other, voters tend to vote for candidates belonging to 
23 Bosco (1994, p. 118).
24 There are twenty members in the committee organization of Xingang temple. Some of them 
are pro-DPP and some are pro-KMT. Election of the temple presidency therefore overlapped 
and was influenced by local politics. 
25 Local faction and gangsters have intervened in the election of Dajia Temple governing 
committee for the past twenty years (Santos 2007). 
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the same faction. Ideological positions concerning unif ication with China 
are less clearly differentiated in the case of local KMT and DPP politicians. 
The benefit they can derive from a faction, the balance between factions, 
and services received from the candidates are the factors considered most 
by voters.
Identity politics and new religious nationalism
That Mazu may venture into political affairs is not a new thing. After the 
goddess arose from the coastal area of Putian, she was reputed as having 
helped defeat the northern barbarian army of Jin 金 in 1205. The eunuch 
General Zheng He 鄭和 of the Ming Dynasty went to Southeast Asia on 
seven diplomatic missions between 1405 and 1433. Every time he set sail, he 
f irst worshipped Mazu at the harbor of Fuzhou to seek a peaceful journey. 
It was Mazu who helped General Koxinga successfully land on Taiwan and 
defeat the Dutch at Tainan in 1662, after which he took over Taiwan as his 
base for f ighting the Manchu invaders who founded the Qing Dynasty. 
Again, it was Mazu who assisted General Shi Lang to overcome the grandson 
of Koxinga in 1683 and hand over Taiwan to Qing Emperor Kangxi. This was 
also the reason why Emperor Kangxi granted Mazu the title of ‘Empress 
of Heaven’ which was the highest rank of a female deity in Chinese folk 
religion.
After immigrants from Fujian in China settled in Taiwan during the Qing 
Dynasty, Mazu was localized in Taiwan. During a battle between the French 
and Chinese in 1884 in Danshui, the Chinese general Liu Mingchuan 劉銘
傳 sought the blessing of Mazu and won a victory. Lastly, during World War 
II, Mazu was seen by many believers in southern Taiwan catching bombs 
with her skirt to save people. Luckily, Mazu has not appeared in the war 
between the KMT and the CCP after 1949. ‘Mazu has no political stand. 
She protects and blesses whoever has a sincere heart’, a believer explained. 
This provides free space for interpretation. To believers in Taiwan, Mazu 
is the patron goddess of Taiwan and a symbol of Taiwanese identity.26 
Mio also argues that Mazu has intensif ied Taiwan’s new nationalism.27 
To the Fujianese, Taiwanese believers are their descendants, and cultural 
nationalism trumps political nationalism.
26 Sangren (1988).
27 Mio (2003).
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In some way, Mazu reflects Hokkien cultural identity which in a way 
transcends both Taiwanese and Chinese identities.28 Many Taiwanese 
have invested in Fujian and lived in Fujian since 1980. The dialect spoken in 
Xiamen is exactly the same as in Taiwan. There is no gap between living in 
Xiamen or in Taiwan. Retired scholars moving to Xiamen and teaching in 
Xiamen University or students pursuing a Ph.D. degree in Xiamen Univer-
sity told us that direct f lights make it easier to commune between Taiwan 
and Xiamen. Taiwanese who live in Kinmen 金門 spend their weekend in 
Xiamen which is cheaper than Taiwan. The f irst wave of Taiwan business 
migrants from 1980 to 1990 is now accompanied by highly educated elites 
who have attained Ph.D. degrees from Western universities. To these people, 
cultural and religious identities are far more realistic than political identity.
Mazu was mobilized to influence Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election. A 
new giant statue of Mazu was consecrated in the main hall of Xianliang 
Temple on 31 December 2015. As many as 500 temples in Taiwan, Singapore, 
and Indonesia, etc. were invited to partake in the awesome ceremony. 
Twenty-seven statues of Mazu from Taiwan were brought back to receive 
worship in Xianliang Temple. ‘This is an old trick Chinese Mazu temples will 
play whenever Taiwan holds an election’, commented members of DPP in 
Xingang. To members of KMT ‘[t]his is an event to be celebrated’. It turned 
out that the DPP won the presidential election in 2016 and froze the off icial 
communication with China. Cross-strait policy moved backward to that 
of 2007. Many of the pro-KMT temples complained this new policy caused 
them trouble because the Chinese temples resumed the hostility upon them. 
They wonder if the pro-DPP Mazu temples will in any way assist the DPP 
to strengthen the Taiwan independent policy just as they did in 2007. Will 
new religious nationalism in Taiwan beat old Chinese cultural nationalism? 
Under the DPP regime we might anticipate stronger resistance and more 
boycotts to Chinese temples, but the result is hard to foretell.
Conclusions
The relationships between state and religion are far more complicated 
than just seeing their antagonism or conflict. Multiple actors and political 
processes need to be examined.29 In this chapter, I have shown that KMT 
or DPP have different attitudes toward Chinese Mazu, resulting in their 
28 Sangren (2003).
29 Ashiwa and Wank (2009, p. 3).
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involvement in different groups of Mazu temples, and different degrees 
of communication with Chinese temples. I also have revealed that the 
CMECA is the agent of the Chinese central state, and CMECA is consistent 
with Meizhou Administration Bureau in developing Meizhou Island into 
the homeland of Mazu believers from around the world. But the Fujian 
provincial government welcomes foreign religious tourists to visit Xiamen, 
Quanzhou or other Mazu temples. Putian City and Putian University have 
a different planning for Xianliang Harbor and its future.
Politics within the state are unavoidable, just as competition within Mazu 
temples. Debates among politicians and bureaucrats over the interpretation 
of the Mazu cult and its application to cross-strait relations occur in Taiwan 
and in China. To worship a Chinese Mazu symbolizes unif ication with 
China. The religious mirror reflection of the political system reminds people 
that Chinese Mazu tour-inspecting Taiwan in 1997, under the acquiescence 
of the KMT, denoted Chinese political leader tour-inspecting Taiwan. In 
order to balance the symbolic unif ication function of Mazu, the DDP and 
its agent, Xingang Temple, in 2007, carried a Mazu statue and joined the 
demonstration in front of the building of the United Nations, New York, to 
quest for Taiwan’s independence.
Competition among Mazu temples used to dispute on the orthodox/
legitimacy of the history. After 1987, cross-strait relation has made the 
competition more complex. Competition within Taiwan has been extended 
to China. Pro-KMT temples try to ally with Chinese temples in different 
cities to uphold its status in Taiwan. Pro-DPP temples try to collaborate 
with each other to resist forces from China. Still, some temples will change 
their political preferences from KMT to DPP or vice versa. Xingang is one of 
these temples. Chairman Ho of Xingang Temple has changed the temple’s 
political position from pro-independent to pro-unif ication. He is the vice-
chairman of the Taiwan Mazu Fellowship which has deep relations with 
Chinese temples. Nevertheless, he is facing more and more pressure from 
the local faction.
After the Cold War, ideology has no longer def ined the difference be-
tween East and West. To most Taiwanese, the vital issue regarding China 
and Taiwan may not be the choice of unif ication or independence, or even 
economic development, but rather the difference in lifestyle and tastes. 
Taiwanese complain that Chinese tourists create noise and chaos wherever 
they stop. Chinese tourists don’t follow traff ic rules or maintain orderly 
conduct in public spaces. Chinese tourists haggle about everything they buy. 
Taiwanese merchants in China complain that bribery is necessary for the 
local Chinese government to get things done, as well as in hospitals if one 
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wishes to receive decent medical treatment. Taiwanese pilgrims complain 
that Chinese worship Mazu without sincerity, have no accurate knowledge 
of ritual or liturgy, and all the Mazu images in China are too new and young.
Although, at the central-government level, there may be a debate con-
cerning unif ication and independence, at the local-community level, when 
we look at the traditional public sphere, the community temple, Mazu is 
used as a symbol of peaceful unif ication across the Taiwan Strait, which 
is juxtaposed with a symbol of Taiwanese identity. We also see that local 
politicians are involved in the temple affairs and use temples as election 
resources, where believers are mobilized and transformed into voters. The 
very same Mazu temple can be at one time pro-unif ication, and at another 
time pro-independence. Because local KMT politicians and DPP politicians 
are interrelated and intertwined when it comes to temple affairs, they each 
take turns electing the president of the temple committee. Local community 
temples have thereby become a basic unit of local politics in Taiwan.
The ancestor veneration and temple-based deity cults of Taiwan’s tradi-
tional popular religion inevitably have a different performance from those 
of their original places of origin in Fujian. After rapid political liberalization, 
economic expansion, modernization, and urbanization since 1987, there are 
new forms of religious expression, and these have been accompanied by the 
spread of island-wide deity cults and politicization of temple organizations. 
Whereas the power of popular religion is often used as a symbolic lever 
in debates concerning ‘Chinese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ identity,30 Taiwanese 
identity is not necessarily equated with Taiwan independence. In Taiwan, 
the older generation is politically as well as religiously committed to the 
identif ication of Taiwanese and Chinese culture, while the younger genera-
tion has exclusively a Taiwanese identity. They are working on narrating 
the uniqueness of Taiwanese culture and religion.
The situation has been changing rapidly in the past two years. In the 
legislative election of 2016, a new political party, the New Power Party (shidai 
liliang 時代力量) organized by the younger generation won f ive seats in 
the Legislative Yuan. This new party helped the DPP win the presidential 
election in 2016. After DPP has regained its regime, for the next four years, 
we foresee more pro-independent young people trying to participate in the 
public sphere and to join the election to public off ice.
30 Nadeau and Chang (2003, p. 294).
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14 Salvation and Rights in Hong Kong
Mariske Westendorp
Abstract
This chapter details narratives of individual Hong Kong Buddhists and 
their motivations for spiritual and/or activist engagement during the 
2014 Umbrella Movement. I argue that religion as expressed by Buddhists 
indicates political engagement to be more about future salvation and 
personal considerations of how to act as ‘good’ Buddhists than about the 
relationship between religion and politics, and. From this main argu-
ment follow two observations. First, individual motivations for political 
engagement are engendered by personal perceptions which are not always 
compatible with off icial religious doctrines. Second, by emphasizing the 
links between various political struggles, events such as the Umbrella 
Movement take on an extra dimension, in this case reaching beyond the 
specif ic context of Hong Kong.
Keywords: Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, engaged Buddhism, civic 
engagement, salvation
Introduction
On Monday 22 September 2014, the Hong Kong Federation of Students 
(HKFS) and Scholarism organized a class boycott which was attended by 
students of different Hong Kong universities. The boycott was organized in 
response to the announcement of the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee (NPCSC) on 31 August, regarding the method of election of the 
Chief Executive (CE) of Hong Kong in 2017. Hong Kongese students were dis-
satisfied with the proposed method of the NPCSC, regarding it as advocating 
‘fake democracy’ as it ensured only delegates approved by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) could stand for election. Instead, the students 
demanded ‘universal suffrage’. The following Friday, the students, forming 
a group of young pro-democracy activists ‘who, unlike their predecessors, 
had little or no experience of a Hong Kong under colonial rule’ gathered near 
the eastern entrance of the Central Government Offices in Admiralty (Hong 
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Kong Island).1 The same evening, while trying to ‘reclaim’ the recently 
privatized Civic Square by climbing over its fences, they were surrounded 
by policemen. Early Saturday morning, and throughout the rest of that 
day, police used pepper spray and other forms of violence in an attempt 
to clear the site. Many activists were arrested, including Joshua Wong, the 
17-year old Scholarism student leader. Tensions intensif ied, resulting in the 
police using more pepper spray and tear gas. The reaction to the perceived 
police force ‘brutality’ was intense, and resulted in many Hong Kongers 
joining the students in protest from that Saturday onwards.2 On Sunday 
28 September, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement (OCLP) 
also moved in support of the students. Together with the students they led 
the Umbrella Movement, named after the umbrellas used by protesters to 
ward off pepper spray.
The Umbrella Movement lasted 79 days, from 28 September to 15 Decem-
ber 2014. During the Movement, three areas of Hong Kong were occupied: 
Admiralty, the main occupation site; Causeway Bay, the off-shoot of Admi-
ralty; and Mong Kok, often described as the ‘lawless’ occupation site, where 
the leaders of HKFS, Scholarism, and OCLP had no leadership and where 
power was in the hands of the people. It is estimated that approximately 
1.2 million people took part in the protests at various times and in different 
forms, an astonishing number in a city of 7.2 million residents.3 Finally 
on 15 December, the Umbrella ‘revolution’ ended peacefully, albeit without 
concrete solutions, winners or any breakthroughs in the debate surrounding 
universal suffrage.
The 2014 Hong Kong Umbrella Movement was, most def initely, a his-
torical incident, which brought particular issues in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) into sharp focus. At the basis of the Um-
brella Movement was the ongoing debate surrounding the socioeconomic 
and political relationship between the HKSAR and the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) post-1997 Handover. This relationship is shaped by the ‘one 
1 Cheung (2015, p. 100).
2 Prior to the event, the Hong Kong police force was seen as a peaceful and stable form of 
modern governmentalism essential to the economic prosperity of the city (Constable, 2009). 
The only occasion in which the Hong Kong police had exercised strong physical force was during 
the 2006 anti-World Trade Organization protests when Korean farmers demanding free trade 
clashed violently with the police. However, the violence in those protests was directed towards 
the Koreans, not towards Hong Kong’s own people. The violence used in September 2014 signaled 
for the residents of the city that the police and, by extension, the Hong Kong Government had 
turned against the Hong Kong populace (Kuah-Pearce, 2009).
3 Hui (2015, p. 111).
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country, two systems’ policy (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制), a policy promising 
the HKSAR its own judicial, economic, social, and political systems, and 
a continuation of its capitalist way of life for at least 50 years until 2047. 
Regardless of the promises made in this policy, many local Hong Kongers 
feel the def inite threat of an increasing encroachment of mainland China 
on their everyday lives through migration and tourism, investments, and 
political measures. The threat they feel formed the basis for the emergence 
of different localist groups and the Umbrella Movement.
Politics and religion
Although in essence the Umbrella Movement was a political movement, 
mainly joined by members of Hong Kong’s middle class seeking universal 
suffrage, other narratives were present as well, both in the occupied areas as 
in other places. These were for instance the narratives of religious believers. 
Paying attention to these narratives indirectly highlights an aspect of Hong 
Kong life that is often overlooked or perceived to be irrelevant; i.e. the 
importance of religion in the everyday lives of Hong Kong middle-class 
residents. The relevance of religion is often overlooked in research into 
Hong Kong society. In the introduction to a recent special edition of Asian 
Anthropology, Chiara Formichi and Paul O’Connor note that:
Much scholarship has examined the Singapore and Malaysia contexts as 
laboratories par excellence of the multi-religious, multi-ethnic state, and 
due to recent tensions, Myanmar has been gaining increased attention; 
yet Hong Kong has remained at the margins, being generally perceived as 
having a rather homogenous population, for which religion plays hardly 
any role.4
This chapter is an attempt to correct this bias. As I will argue, religion 
informs the daily lives and experiences of many Hong Kongers. It also 
shapes their aspirations, both religious and non-religious. An examina-
tion of religion in the Umbrella Movement clearly indicates the porous 
boundaries between religion and seemingly ‘secular’ politics.
In addition, this chapter adds to the debate on state and religion in China, 
a growing topic amongst social scientists specialized in the country. Many 
studies concerning the Chinese state and religion regard these two subjects 
4 Formichi & O’Connor (2015, pp. 3-4).
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as dichotomous categories, operating separately and often in conflict with 
each other.5 However, as I argue in this chapter, the contemporary relation 
between the Chinese state and religion was not the main factor determining 
spiritual or activist engagement during the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement. 
Instead, it was the ideas regarding salvation, engagement, and rights of 
individuals. This case study indicates that religion is just as much an indi-
vidual conduct, not always situated in the public domains of politics and/or 
religious institutions.6 Instead, it concerns individual actors who transcend 
the debate on state and religion through their individual considerations.
I elaborate on this argument by focusing on the civic engagement of Hong 
Kong Buddhist individuals during the Umbrella Movement, and by analyz-
ing their theological and political responses to the Movement. Narratives 
of these Buddhist individuals were collected during f ieldwork research in 
Hong Kong in the years prior to the Umbrella Movement (from July 2012 
to July 2013, and March to August 2014), and via social media during the 
Movement. In my opinion, the Umbrella Movement not only occupied the 
streets of urban Hong Kong, but likewise occupied different (social) media 
and the conversations I had via these media with my Hong Kong informants. 
A scrutiny of different media channels during the Umbrella Movement, and 
continued conversations with my informants via WhatsApp, Facebook, and 
email afforded me insights into their religious reflections on the Movement 
and their levels of civic engagements, either actively or spiritually. In the 
highly digitalized city of Hong Kong, this research method proved extremely 
valuable.
The narratives presented are of individual Buddhist practitioners who 
do not necessarily feel represented by, nor represent a particular Buddhist 
organization or school. However, most of them do feel primarily attracted 
to Theravāda Buddhism. They attend dharma teachings and meditation 
classes organized by international Buddhist masters, mostly Theravādin.7 
Moreover, most of my informants describe Buddhism as being a ‘modern’ 
religion, characterized by a wish to recover the original Buddhist tradition 
5 Ashiwa & Wank (2009).
6 Asad (2003).
7 In contemporary Hong Kong, as in virtually all Chinese contexts, Mahāyāna Buddhism 
(mainly Pure Land, but also Chan and Taintai) is the most popular form of Buddhism practiced. 
Theravāda Buddhism is the least popular. Although Theravāda Buddhism is the least popular 
stream of Buddhism practiced in Hong Kong, it is gaining popularity among the younger genera-
tion of Hong Kong Buddhists (Yeung and Chow, 2010). It has also become the most popular form 
of Buddhism among the Hong Kong middle class.
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as a reaction to ‘the dominant problems and questions of modernity’.8 I 
elaborate further on this in the next section.
In response to the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement and the rise of 
localism, these Buddhist individuals referred to personal religious values 
and notions to explain why and how they participated in the Movement 
as ‘good’ Buddhists. What their different narratives highlight is a preoc-
cupation with not only questions of localism and politics, but also with 
questions of belonging and salvation. The encroachment of the PRC on 
everyday life in the HKSAR has given rise to a deeply felt perception among 
my informants that their Hong Kong identity is under threat. However, 
this was not the only meaning attributed to the Movement. The ways in 
which the threat was interpreted and the subsequent ways in which my 
informants have responded to the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement are 
in many and important ways related to their personal religious ideas and 
ideals. Some went out into the streets when circumstances allowed, some 
joined social media discussions, and others decided to stay away entirely, 
choosing inaction or private meditation as forms of civic engagement. By 
combining the f ight for civic values, e.g. democracy and universal suffrage, 
with religious values the line between the religious and the secular has 
become blurred.
In the f irst part of this chapter, focus is on the civic engagement of Hong 
Kong Buddhist organizations during the Umbrella Movement. According to 
Hao Zhidong et al., civic engagement is composed of two parts: social ser-
vices and civic activism.9 Below, I focus on the civic activism of Hong Kong 
Buddhist organizations and leaders during the Umbrella Movement which 
included ‘such activities as protest rallies, demonstrations, and declarations 
of positions on various social and political issues’.10 In the second and most 
prominent section of this chapter, I detail the narratives of my Buddhist 
informants and their individual motivations for civic engagement. In this 
section, I define civic engagement as ‘the ways in which citizens participate 
in the life of a community in order to improve conditions for others or to 
help shape the community’s future’.11 I demonstrate two ways in which 
my informants became civically engaged with the Umbrella Movement; 
i.e. through spiritual engagement and/or through activist engagement. For 
them, the different positions of Buddhism in the PRC and the HKSAR are 
8 McMahan (2008, p. 5).
9 Hao et al. (2014).
10 Ibid., p. 50.
11 Adler & Goggin (2005, p. 236).
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not as important as for organizations; instead, their narratives highlight 
their attachment to perceived Buddhist notions of salvation.
Setting up this chapter in this two-tiered manner allows me to bring to 
the fore two interesting observations. First, I will indicate that individual 
motivations for participating in the Umbrella Movement were engendered 
by individual perceptions pertinent to the concept of salvation, a concept 
which is not always compatible with off icial doctrines dispensed by 
religious leaders (although they are in part shaped by them). Regardless 
of the teachings of Buddhist organizations and leaders, individuals often 
express their own perceptions of what should take priority within their 
faith and how to be a ‘good’ Buddhist. In many cases, Buddhist individuals 
choose their own trajectories. Second, by emphasizing the links between 
the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement and other iconic Buddhist struggles 
fought in other countries during different times, the Movement took on an 
extra dimension as a way of aspiring to societal and eventually personal 
salvation beyond the specif ic context of Hong Kong and its relation to the 
PRC. It was viewed as one of a host of other Buddhist movements, aspiring 
to the creation of just and equal societies. Knowledge of these companion 
uprisings made my informants reflect more actively upon salvation and 
enlightenment at very personal levels. As such, the Movement not only 
transcended the artif icial boundaries between the religious and the secular, 
but also transcended temporality and spatiality. It became a Movement 
reflecting a larger temporal and spatial dimension than it might appear to 
have had at f irst sight.
Modern Hong Kong Buddhism and salvation
As Kuo (see Introduction, this volume) argues, the emerging civil society 
of Hong Kong is mainly constructed by Christian leaders and intellectuals. 
An increasing number of Hong Kong’s Christians belong to an elite group 
that has been active in Hong Kong’s political life from the early twentieth 
century onwards. These Christians are the ones that want to preserve the 
status quo in post-Handover Hong Kong, and are therefore most politically 
active.12 In the next section of this chapter, I give some examples to sup-
port these arguments. During the Umbrella Movement, many Christian 
organizations and leaders were actively supporting the students and in 
some cases even f ighting for universal suffrage themselves. In contrast, 
12 Smith (2005 [1985]); Wang (2016).
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Buddhist organizations and leaders were less present during the Movement, 
perhaps because they are known to ‘tilt more towards Chinese patriotism’.13 
For this reason, studying the motivations for civic engagement of Buddhist 
individuals more prominently highlights the relationship between religion, 
politics, and belonging on personal levels.
As indicated, what characterizes most of the Buddhists I interviewed is 
a personal attraction to a ‘modern Buddhism’. In this modern form of Bud-
dhism various aspects of the religion are demythologized, psychologized, 
and rationalized, making it better adjusted to a ‘modern’ lifestyle.14 Other 
characteristics of modern Buddhism are: being more socially engaged, less 
ritualistic and hierarchical, and more focused on the individual instead 
of the deif ied Buddha. These features are reflected in the increasing im-
portance attached to the role of the laity in modern Buddhist practices.15 
Personal experience has become central. The aspiration to reach enlighten-
ment is no longer merely associated with monastic vocation, but can equally 
be aspired to by the laity. There is also a heavy emphasis placed on the 
practice of meditation by the laity, which was originally only a practice 
of the clergy.16 Commenting on ‘Reformist Buddhism’ in contemporary 
Singapore, Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng concludes that members of a new genera-
tion of local Chinese Buddhists in the city
are not only interested in the functional aspects of religion, but rather are 
intent on seeking solutions to their individualized religious needs and 
personalized spiritual fulf ilment. As with other modern religious trends, 
they see their religious needs as personal, no longer tied to religious needs 
of their families or community.17
As a result of these modern trends, the distance between clerical and lay 
Buddhists has become less; egalitarianism between the two has increased. 
It should therefore come as no surprise that many of my informants picture 
Buddhism as an individually practiced religion, highlighting their individual 
commitment to it, and their own responsibility to act as ‘good’ Buddhists. 
These notions feature in the narratives of most of my informants, also with 
13 Kuo, this volume, pp. 13-51.
14 Lopez Jr. (2002); McMahan (2008).
15 Gombrich (1988/2006).
16 Mak (2012); Swearer (1995/2010).
17 Kuah-Pearce (2003/2009, p. 6), my emphasis.
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regards to their individual motivations for civic engagement during the 
Umbrella Movement.
The main focus in this chapter is on my Buddhist informants’ personal 
notions regarding salvation. Ideas of salvation (and damnation) feature 
prominently in most religions, including Buddhism. Salvation forms a cen-
tral doctrine of this religion, stated in authoritative documents, describing 
ideas of a Nirvāna that can be accessed through the eradication of suffering. 
Rachel McCleary considers the effects of religious participation and beliefs 
on economic growth. She argues that
[s]alvation is a spiritual goal that may or may not be attained through 
human effort. If people believe in the possibility of salvation through their 
own efforts, it makes sense that they are likely to perform the actions 
that contribute to attaining such an end. Therefore, religious beliefs have 
implications for behavior, such as work effort, saving, and charity.18
This quote highlights the links between personal action and the aspiration 
to reach salvation. This link is also clearly visible in the narratives of my 
informants. However, contrary to McCleary (who has explored economic 
behavior) I look at the civically engaged behavior performed by my inform-
ants in response to the political Umbrella Movement.
Ideas centered on salvation feature prominently in the religious nar-
ratives of my informants: through living a spiritual life and sanctifying 
one’s actions in the here and now (thus living as ‘good’ Buddhists), my 
informants aspire to attain salvation in the (near) future. As I will argue, 
their ideas are not necessarily the same as def ined by religious doctrines, 
institutions, and leaders. Therefore, instead of focusing on the practices that 
my Buddhist informants should be performing and the beliefs they should 
observe according to doctrines or theologies, my focus in this chapter is on 
the practices they actually perform and, primarily, the beliefs and notions 
they actually hold.19 These beliefs and notions do not necessarily follow the 
particular doctrine prescribed by Buddhist leaders or texts, but are histori-
cally and culturally contextualized. Because all religion is lived, it is f luid 
and creative; and, by extension, it is adjustable to particular socioeconomic, 
political, and personal circumstances.20
18 McCleary (2007, p. 51).
19 McGuire (2008); Orsi (2005).
20 Swearer (1995/2010).
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Buddhist presence in the Umbrella Movement
In early November 2014, Winston, a Buddhist in his early 30s, sent me a mes-
sage via WhatsApp.21 I had been in contact with Winston throughout the 
whole period during which the Umbrella Movement took place, reflecting 
on the daily happenings in the streets (he never joined them, but he read 
many articles online and heard stories from friends) and debating which 
steps should be taken next. Winston sent me the following message:
See the mess that Occupy has made. They’re stuffed, they have no bar-
gaining power left and they are f ighting among themselves. It’s because 
they had no spiritual guidance. Social activists fall into this trap of 
thinking that their cause is the highest one. They get burned out and 
bitter. Religious guidance helps them to see the longer term, and the 
bigger picture.22
I found Winston’s message remarkable, given that although he is Buddhist, 
he had never before mentioned the signif icance of religion for and in the 
protests. His words further intrigued me, as they alluded to the visible 
absence of Buddhist spiritual guidance in the streets. In Hong Kong, Bud-
dhist masters are overall not directly involved with political activities, nor 
do they directly adhere to specif ic Buddhist political theologies. In fact, 
Buddhist presence from all Buddhist schools was mostly absent during the 
Umbrella Movement.
During the initial weeks of the Umbrella Movement, media were quick to 
emphasize the religious aspects of the protests, both the religious symbols 
present ‘on the ground’ and those that were absent from the occupied sites. 
English-language media sources of Hong Kong news providers and inter-
national sources mainly placed emphasis on the presence of (Protestant) 
Christian groups and leaders, and on the support churches provided to the 
protestors. Mention was made of how some churches opened their doors to 
protesters and police alike, offering f irst aid, snacks, and water, refuge, or 
simply a place for people to go to the bathroom. Other sources indicated the 
presence of prayer groups, crosses, and people reading their Bibles in the 
occupied areas.23 Particular attention was paid to Christian leaders, both 
21 To ensure anonymity, I use pseudonyms throughout this chapter. 
22 Personal communication via WhatsApp, Winston, 8 November 2014.
23 Sources: (1) Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra (13  October 2014). Hong Kong Christians Lead Pro-
tests for Democracy. Christianity Online. See http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/
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clerical leaders of Christian groups and lay Christian leaders of different 
protest groups. For example, sources mentioned that the Occupy Central 
with Love and Peace Movement was led by, amongst others, Benny Tai, a 
committed Christian, and Reverend Chu Yiuming of the Chai Wan Baptist 
Church. And the student organization Scholarism is led by Joshua Wong, 
an evangelical Christian who had attended a Protestant private school and 
the United Christian College.
Emphasis was also placed on the position adopted by some Christian 
clergy members; for example, on the outspoken Catholic Cardinal Zen, 
who had supported the f ight for democracy from its earliest moments (but 
later changed his position slightly). The media also singled out Anglican 
Archbishop Paul Kwong, who was heavily criticized following a sermon he 
delivered in early July 2014, in which he urged Anglicans to remain silent, 
just as Jesus remained silent when awaiting his crucif ixion, ‘like a lamb 
awaiting slaughter in silence’.24 The spotlight likewise fell on certain Prot-
estant ministers, e.g. the Reverend Tin Yau Yuen of the Methodist Church 
who, in an open letter which he wrote in October 2014, seemed to suggest 
that the Christian faith supports the f ight for democracy. He stated: ‘The 
gospel we believe in is necessarily related to social and political issues. It’s 
impossible to be politically neutral, as who can have no political view?’25
Only few English media sources noted the responses of Buddhist organi-
zations and leaders in the protests. Reference was made to Buddhist symbols 
seen in the streets, the building of makeshift Buddhist shrines at the protest 
october-web-only/hong-kong-christians-lead-protests-for-democracy-china.html. (2) Jack Jen-
kins (12 October 2014). Why Christians are Helping Lead Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. 
Think Progress. See http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/10/12/3579154/why-christians-are-
helping-lead-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement/. (3) Ned Levin (3 October 2014). Hong Kong 
Democracy Protests Carry a Christian Mission for Some. Wall Street Journal. See http://www.wsj.
com/articles/hong-kong-democracy-protests-carry-a-christian-mission-for-some-1412255663.
24 The off icial explanation provided by the Reverend Peter Koon (Provincial Secretary General 
of the Hong Kong Anglican Church) was that Kwong was merely ‘trying to remind fellow Chris-
tians of the church’s role as a “facilitator of peace”’. Sources: (1) Oiwan Lam (12 July 2014). Hong 
Kong’s Anglican Archbishop Says Pro-Democracy Protesters Should be Like Jesus and Keep Quiet. 
Global Voices Online. See http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/07/12/hong-kongs-archbishop-tells-
democracy-protesters-to-keep-quiet/. (2) Ernest Kao (9 July 2014). Archbishop’s Sermon on Occupy 
Central was ‘Taken Out of Context’. Church says Controversial Remarks on Occupy were Meant as 
Humor, Not a Public Statement. South China Morning Post. See www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/
article/1550314/church-defends-reverend-paul-kwong-who-told-pro-democracy-residents.
25 Source: Reverend Tin Yau Yuen (10 June 2014). Pastoral Letter From the President, Reverend 
Tin Yau Yuen to the Methodist Congregations of Hong Kong: A Church at Crossroads. Methodist 
Congregations of Hong Kong. See http://www.methodist.org.hk/media/f ilehotlink/2014/10/06/
Pastoral_Letter_to_MCHK_congregationsEng.pdf.
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sites, and the gathering of Buddhists in occupied areas.26 Buddhist monks 
volunteered as f irst-aid workers, or wrote articles to express their concern 
about the protests. Nevertheless, as these media articles showed, these 
Buddhist efforts were minimal compared to the Christian presence. It could 
be argued that the relative absence of commentaries on Buddhist symbols 
during the Movement might be an artifact of the English languages sources 
writing about the protests. However, my Buddhist informants told me the 
same: there was almost no Buddhist presence in the streets. Moreover, 
in early October 2014, the Hong Kong Buddhist Association released an 
official statement which advocated ‘that Buddhists and students at Buddhist 
schools should avoid the protest locations and nearby areas (and likewise 
exhort their friends and children to do so)’.27
Multiple reasons may be given for the apparent difference in the level of 
civic activism between Hong Kong Buddhist and Christian organizations 
during the Umbrella Movement. A f irst explanation is based upon the 
historical legacy of both religions. Buddhism and Christianity have different 
foundations in Hong Kong society. Both developed differently in relation to 
the political and social situation on the Chinese mainland, and in relation 
to the British colonial government. For example, feeling threatened by the 
rise of communism in mainland China, the British colonial government 
sought ways to promote Christian education in Hong Kong. This education 
was thought to raise people that could resist communism.28 Therefore, 
Christianity was favored by the British as an ally in the f ight against Chi-
nese communism – more so than non-Christian or ‘Chinese’ religions, e.g. 
Buddhism.29 As a result, Christian organizations (mainly Catholic and 
Anglican) were encouraged to provide education and other social services. 
They had the opportunity to become important, elite institutions in Hong 
Kong, a position they still hold in the city today. This legacy is amongst 
others visible in the contemporary social service sector of Hong Kong. In 
the school year 2008-2009, 23 of Hong Kong’s 458 secondary schools were 
26 Source: Jennifer Ngo (27 October 2014). Religion on the Front Line Puts Faith into Practice: 
Christians, in Pursuing Equality and Justice, Have Long Been Part of the City’s Fight For Free-
dom. South China Morning Post. See http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1625126/
religion-occupy-central-front-line-puts-faith-practice?page=all.
27 Source: Buddhistdoor (24  October 2014). Unattached Involvement: Expressing So-
cially Engaged Buddhism. Buddhistdoor Global. See http://www.buddhistdoor.net/features/
buddhistdoor-view-unattached-involvement.
28 Esler (2015).
29 Leung & Chan (2003).
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Buddhist, approximately 5 % of all the schools in Hong Kong.30 While 
this may seem signif icant, it pales in comparison to the services (mainly 
educational) provided by the Hong Kong Catholic Church and Catholic 
missionary organizations. At the end of the twentieth century, 35 % of all 
social services in Hong Kong were still provided by Catholic organizations. 
As of 2014, the Catholic Church ran 264 schools with over 165,000 students, 
six hospitals, and thirteen clinics.31
A second reason for the difference in the presence of Buddhist and 
Christian symbols and leadership during the Umbrella Movement is the 
position that both religions hold in the contemporary PRC. As several of 
my informants stressed, ideas regarding the freedom of religion are critical 
here. For example, a professor I met at Hong Kong University – after I told 
him that I was interested in learning more about Buddhist and Christian 
engagement in Hong Kong’s political life – said that in the ‘one country, 
two systems’ policy, Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism emphasize the 
‘one country’ part, whereas Christianity in Hong Kong mainly emphasizes 
‘two systems’.32 Similar assumptions were made by media sources, some of 
whom suggested that Buddhist organizations appear to be relatively satis-
f ied with the status quo of Buddhism in the PRC and with recent attempts 
by the CCP to promote ‘Chinese religions’ such as Buddhism and Daoism.33 
Most media sources argued that for these reasons, Hong Kong Buddhist 
organizations kept a low profile during the 2014 Umbrella Movement. In 
the same light, some media sources suggested that for Christian groups, 
the protests were not merely about attaining universal suffrage; they were 
more a way of expressing anxiety vis-à-vis Communist inf iltration in Hong 
Kong’s society, and the likely decrease in religious freedom in the city. One 
news report for instance observed that ‘the protests now roiling in Hong 
Kong are about democracy. But there is an undercurrent of another, much 
older tension: between Christianity and Communist China’ (see also the 
chapter of Tsai on the tensions between Christianity and the state in the 
PRC, this volume).34
30 Yeung & Chow (2010, p. 6).
31 Catholic Truth Society (2013, p. 667).
32 Personal communication, professor, HKU, 7 September 2012.
33 Source: Shai Oster (25 October 2014). How Smashed Jesus Shrine Reveals Christian Undercur-
rent to Hong Kong Protests. Bloomberg. See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-10-28/
christians-lead-h-k-protests-in-test-of-china-s-control.html. 
34 Source: Ned Levin (3  October 2014). Hong Kong Democracy Protests Carry a 
Christian Mission for Some . Wall Street Journal . See http://www.wsj.com/articles/
hong-kong-democracy-protests-carry-a-christian-mission-for-some-1412255663.
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If one looks beyond politics in the PRC and in the HKSAR one can discern 
different reasons underpinning the absence of Buddhism in the Hong Kong 
Umbrella Movement. One reason has its genesis in the ways religion is 
organized in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong today, off icial Buddhist leadership 
is exercised by the Hong Kong Buddhist Association. Founded in 1945, the 
Association is
an umbrella body based on individual, voluntary membership rather than 
temple or sect affiliation. Its members tend to be of the Mahayana, or Daai 
Sing, northern tradition, and include Taiwanese and Japanese sects whose 
members have Hong Kong resident status, but have less aff inity with 
Tibetan and Nepali traditions. HKBA, in addition to representing Bud-
dhists locally, enjoys membership in the World Fellowship of Buddhists.35
Even though on paper the Hong Kong Buddhist Association is the overarch-
ing Buddhist organization in Hong Kong, only a small minority of Hong 
Kong Buddhist organizations are aff iliated to it. Moreover, the fact that this 
Buddhist Association has no political organ makes it hard for it to express 
a strong activist voice.
In contrast, an important and strong organization within the Hong Kong 
Catholic Diocese is the Justice and Peace Commission. This Commission was 
established in 1977 to increase the Church’s participation in social actions 
and to promote civic participation among Hong Kong’s lay Catholics.36 In 
early October 2014, the Justice and Peace Commission issued an off icial 
statement on behalf of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, calling for dialogue 
and reconciliation between different parties involved in the Umbrella 
Movement. Public prayer meetings were organized during the Movement 
by the Commission, some for the purpose of promoting democracy, others 
to promote dialogue and peace.
Another factor determining Hong Kong Buddhist organizations’ pres-
ence or absence during the Umbrella Movement relates to local religious 
leadership. As I wrote earlier, the Hong Kong Buddhist Association issued 
a statement in early October 2014 urging Buddhists not to become involved 
in the protests. Consequently, no Buddhist clergy of the Hong Kong Bud-
dhist Association was seen in the streets. However, even though off icially 
the Hong Kong Buddhist Association was not so much involved with the 
protests, at local levels, nor in individuals’ appreciation of the visibility 
35 Nedilsky (2009, pp. 217-218).
36 Leung & Chan (2003); Li, Cheung & Chan (1998); Nedilsky (2014).
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of their religious leaders, the picture was slightly different. Leaders of lo-
cal Buddhist organizations made personal decisions whether to join the 
protests or not. One example is the newly appointed abbot of a temple in 
Tsuen Wan, who maintained that ‘a monk should be involved with social 
work, not political’. He did, however, explain the diff iculty underpinning 
this decision: ‘When I talk about politics, they say I’m a political monk. 
If I don’t, they think I don’t care about social issues. That’s a dilemma’. 
His personal solution is to focus on and teach the dharma, rather than 
touching on issues of political concern.37 However, some Buddhist monks 
in Hong Kong chose to do otherwise. Francis, a Theravāda lay Buddhist in 
his mid-40s, made mention of a Buddhist monk who actively commented 
on the protests on Facebook, based on his observations and experiences in 
the streets. While Francis appreciated the monk’s engagement, his friends 
scorned the monk for being too attached and for not seeing clearly the 
impermanence of the situation.38
Regardless of the teachings of the Buddhist organizations and leaders 
mentioned above, my informants’ perceptions of what should take prior-
ity within their faith, and how to be a ‘good’ Buddhist are mostly based 
on personal considerations. Individual believers do not always follow the 
actions of faith leaders. In many cases, they choose their own trajectories. 
In the rest of this chapter, I focus on this by presenting and analyzing some 
narratives of my informants. Even though I present only a handful of these 
narratives, they are representative of far more Buddhist individuals I spoke 
to. By focusing on their ideas regarding salvation, I will show that it was not 
only the reasons stated above (the ways in which Buddhism is organized in 
Hong Kong and the position its holds with regard to politics in the HKSAR 
and the PRC) that were of relevance to my informants’ motivations for 
civic engagement: their decisions were also made on the basis of personal 
considerations.
Individual motivations for civic engagement
Nearly a month after the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement started, the edi-
tors of the Internet organization Buddhistdoor commented on the following:
37 Personal communication, Venerable A., Wang Fat Ching She, Tsuen Wan, 19 May 2014.
38 Personal communication via WhatsApp, Francis, 6 October 2014.
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In Hong Kong, the question is whether Buddhists could have had more of 
a presence in the streets – not to support a particular side, but to bridge 
the physical and ideological divide between opposing parties. (…) Maybe 
Buddhist temples and charities could have set up tents and booths where 
protesters and police alike could enjoy refreshments for free. When the 
scuffles and brawls broke out, perhaps Buddhists could have been present 
to physically protect belligerents from one another, without worrying 
how others might react to their mediation. Another powerful statement 
might have been to hold a meditation ‘f lash mob’.39
In their article, the editors attempted to discuss how Hong Kong Buddhists 
might respond to the protests in a Buddhist manner, especially consider-
ing – as indicated above – the absence of visible Buddhist leadership in 
the streets. They posed the following question: ‘Can Buddhists be socially 
engaged while remaining ideologically and emotionally unattached?’40
For my Buddhist informants, their individual decision to join the protests 
or not was less colored by the example set by Buddhist organizations and 
leaders, probably because the latter were distinguished by their absence. 
For example, Adam, a Buddhist in his early 40s, said, after I asked him in the 
f inal weeks of the Umbrella Movement if he thought that Buddhist leaders 
in Hong Kong could have done more, that they should have promoted: 
‘COMPASSION! COMPASSION! COMPASSION!’41
The individual reflections on the Umbrella Movement resulted in differ-
ent manners of civic engagement. Teresa, a Buddhist in her late 30s, opted 
not to join the Umbrella Movement. Her reasoning was that when it comes 
to fulf illing one’s aspirations, personal effort will be more effective than 
economic or political involvement. She wrote: ‘Buddhist teaching is about 
how to be mindful and achieve physical, psychological and mental peace 
by evaluating our thinking process’.42 Eventually, becoming mindful will 
lead to a change in the environment. In effect, Teresa was saying that ‘when 
one’s mind becomes purif ied, society will also be purif ied’.43
In contrast to Teresa, Francis, the Buddhist in his mid-40s, engaged more 
actively in the Umbrella Movement, being guided by spiritual engagement. 
39 Source: Buddhistdoor (24  October 2014). Unattached Involvement: Expressing So-
cially Engaged Buddhism. Buddhistdoor Global. See http://www.buddhistdoor.net/features/
buddhistdoor-view-unattached-involvement.
40 Ibid.
41 Personal communication via email, Adam, 22 November 2014.
42 Personal communication via email, Teresa, 22 November 2014.
43 Cho (2000, p. 77).
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In early October 2014, Francis actively began using his Facebook account 
again after nearly two years of relative silence. He started by changing his 
prof ile picture into the picture of a yellow ribbon. When I questioned him 
about his reappearance on the social media platform, he replied:
I try only to share articles which are written by people who hold mild 
opinions or express their feelings, but not any ‘reports’ or ‘facts’, as you 
can’t be sure what is true or false. (…) As a Buddhist, we are told to be 
aware of how we use our words: we should try not to spread any informa-
tion we are not sure about in order to avoid others being influenced by our 
words. (… ) We can voice our own opinion, but should not be spreading 
uncertain information.44
By using Facebook as a medium, Francis expressed his engagement with the 
protests in a manner he saw justified by Buddhist doctrines. His engagement 
could lead to the elimination of societal obstacles (often called ‘defilements’) 
derived from the three poisons of desire, hatred and ignorance.45 Although 
Francis did not directly attempt to eliminate desire, hatred or ignorance, 
he steadfastly avoided spreading information that might feed these root 
causes. By doing this, he related spirituality to activist engagement. He 
also indirectly related his engagement to the ideals of ‘engaged Buddhism’.
‘Engaged Buddhism’ is an academic category that alludes to the teachings 
of particular Buddhist teachers in Asian and non-Asian countries, of all 
different Buddhist schools. Through advocating particular teachings and 
practices, engaged Buddhist leaders seek to achieve ‘a stable order and a just 
society, seen as necessary or prior conditions for the discovery of genuine 
freedom (or awakening) by each person’.46 According to this def inition, 
a just society is seen as a prerequisite for reaching salvation. This can be 
achieved through offering social services and/or being politically active. 
Even though the movement of engaged Buddhism is not as well-developed 
in Hong Kong as in other Asian countries, its ideologies have played a 
signif icant part in the ways in which my informants responded to the 
Umbrella Movement, either actively or spiritually.
In many countries in Asia today, Buddhist organizations and leaders 
adhere to the values of engaged Buddhism. Even though ‘socially and 
politically engaged Buddhism continues to grow and diversify in Asia and 
44 Personal communication via WhatsApp, Francis, 6 October 2014.
45 Cho (2000).
46 Queen (2003, p. 20), original emphasis.
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the West, [and] continues to challenge conventional assumptions about 
the nature and direction of Buddhism’,47 it is at the same time ‘too diverse 
to be considered a single movement, and still too new to have developed 
a theoretical framework for Buddhism’s engagement with contemporary 
issues’.48 The teachings of engaged Buddhist masters are often a ‘response 
to a grave crisis facing the country, such as war, invasion, deep poverty, 
ecological crisis, or human rights abuse’.49 By responding to such crises in an 
engaged and nonviolent manner, particular Buddhist masters highlight the 
relevance of Buddhist teachings for the modern world.50 Included among 
renowned Buddhist leaders who adhere to these engaged Buddhist values 
are the Vietnamese master Thich Nhat Hanh, His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
of Tibet, Cambodian monk Maha Ghosananda, Dr. Ahangamage Tudor 
Ariyaratne in Sri Lanka and Taiwanese nun Cheng-yen, the foundress of 
the charitable Tzu Chi Foundation.51 Among lay practitioners are the Thai 
activist Sulak Sivaraksa, and Burmese politician Aung San Suu Kyi, a noted 
Buddhist lay person who is often seen acting out the ideals of engaged 
Buddhism.52
Being an academic category, ‘engaged Buddhism’ entails many differ-
ent aspects, and is somewhat controversial. For example, some scholars 
and Buddhist leaders consider social services and political activism to 
be traditional components of the Buddhist religion, while others argue 
that Buddhist spirituality is separate from civic activism.53 Another issue 
regards salvation, and the question of whether suffering is the consequence 
of individual tendencies to cling to the self which can only be eradicated 
through personal liberation,54 or whether it can in part be collective and 
caused by the state and other social institutes.55 A last point of discussion 
regards the actual practices that need to be undertaken to eliminate, or 
at least reduce, individual and/or collective suffering. For Buddhist monk 
Maha Ghosananda, one way of becoming spiritually engaged in the conflict 
in Cambodia was to organize meditative ‘peace walks’. Ghosananda recog-
nized ‘the need for inner peace to create social peace and [suggested] the use 
47 Queen (2003, p. 1).
48 Cho (2000, p. 78).
49 King (2012, p. 196); see also Truong (1998/2000).
50 King (2005).
51 Bond (2003); Huang (2003); Park (2010); Weiner (2003).
52 Henry (2006); Kittel (2011).
53 For a good discussion on this debate, see Queen (2003); Yarnall (2003).
54 Deitrick (2003).
55 Cho (2000); Hershock (1999).
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of Buddhist meditation to reach this goal’.56 For him, mental purif ication 
forms the basis for reaching salvation. On the other hand, in response to the 
2011 Occupy Wall Street Movement, American Zen teacher Lewis Richmond 
offered his reflections on the question of how Buddhists should respond to 
the protests.57 While some of his Buddhist friends instructed occupiers to 
emphasize non-violence, compassion, and meditation, Lewis expressed a 
more active approach. He argued for a true awakening, one similar to the 
awakening that Prince Gautama experienced when he left his palace and 
was confronted with the ‘four sightings’ (the old, the poor, the sick, and the 
dying). His awakening was not based on meditation (‘Gautama, after all, was 
not schooled in meditation when he experienced the four sightings’) but on 
anger. Thus, emphasis on anger, and consequent civic activist engagement, 
might lead people to gain positive merit, as ‘performing morally good deeds 
with the right intention earns the individual karmic merit necessary for 
movement toward nirvana’.58
Consciously or unconsciously, my Hong Kong Buddhist informants relate 
in important ways to these discussions concerning engaged Buddhism. 
Most of them express a wish to reduce suffering (both individual suffer-
ing and the suffering in society), attain happiness in the ‘here and now’ 
(reflected in Thich Nhat Hahn’s famous quote: ‘happiness is here and now’) 
and eventually reach enlightenment. Salvation is an aspiration that needs to 
be reached individually. However, opinions differ as to how this should be 
done: through focusing on individual salvation or by attempting to reduce 
suffering in society.
This was most prominent in the narrative of Adam, the Theravāda Bud-
dhist in his early 40s. Adam is one of my few Buddhist informants who 
actively went to the occupied areas to show his support. In an interview in 
2012, he said: ‘I hope the philosophy of Buddhism can be applied in Hong 
Kong. The world would be a lot lovelier’.59 With this statement, he clearly 
expressed his wish for being engaged, not only with himself but with society. 
Adam grew up without a religious belief. He went to school and university, 
and got himself a good job at a local airline company. For many years, 
he was ‘rushing and running’ to earn enough money to be able to have a 
luxurious lifestyle, to own an apartment, to drive around in his own car, 
56 Weiner (2003, p. 116).
57 Source: Lewis Richmond (16 November 2011). Occupy Buddha: Ref lections on Occupy 
Wall Street. Huffington Post. See http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/lewis-richmond/occupy-
Buddha_b_1114139.html.
58 McCleary (2007, p. 55), original emphasis.
59 Interview, Adam, Thai restaurant, Tai Mei Tuk, 19 January 2012.
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and to wear fashionable clothes. Then, through an alumni event at his 
previous university, he came into contact with Buddhism. This changed his 
outlook on life. He no longer only focused on securing a luxurious material 
lifestyle for himself, but became concerned with the welfare of others. 
He quit his job and went to Malawi, to work in a Buddhist orphanage. 
Upon returning to Hong Kong, he started working in a newly constructed 
Buddhist monastery in the New Territories. In his own words, Buddhism 
showed him happiness, and it is this happiness that he hopes every Hong 
Kong resident can experience.
Nevertheless, in June 2014, before the Umbrella Movement had actually 
started, when I pressed him further on the actual engagement he desired 
from Buddhist leaders, he rhetorically asked:
What did the Buddha do 2,600 years ago, when his kingdom was overtaken 
by other rulers? He didn’t say they should f ight; he didn’t do anything. 
And what about Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama? They don’t f ight. 
When Thich Nhat Hanh was expelled from his country, he didn’t f ight 
his way back in.60
Perhaps paradoxically, Adam did join the occupation. For him, it is impor-
tant to always try to f ind the middle path. Both physically f ighting and not 
engaging are reflections of choosing sides. For Adam, choosing the middle 
path, that is, not becoming attached to an opinion or side in the debate, 
is an important condition of his aspiration to salvation. In his response to 
my questions, he mentioned other Buddhist leaders – the Buddha himself, 
Thich Nhat Hanh, and the Dalai Lama – who, in his eyes, expressed similar 
ways of engagement.
Similar to Adam, Emily, a Buddhist in her mid-30s, explicitly placed her 
response to the Umbrella Movement in the broader context of Buddhist 
teachings vis-à-vis struggles over social justice, in effect implicitly relat-
ing the Umbrella Movement to the ideals of engaged Buddhism. Initially, 
Emily supported the Movement, especially in the f irst days, right after 
the police violence had taken place. On Sunday 28 September, she tried to 
go out into the streets at night, but could not get further than Admiralty 
station. During the weeks that followed, her attitude changed as a result 
of the increasing violence occurring in the streets. In mid-October, she 
indicated via WhatsApp that she wanted to take a break from the restless 
environment and protests. She said: ‘We need to learn how to manifest 
60 Personal communication, Adam, small Buddhist temple, Lantau Island, 28 June 2014.
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democracy in a peaceful way’. I asked her if staying away from the protests 
was not an act too passive in the struggle for universal suffrage. ‘Not re-
ally’, she answered, ‘Buddhist noble silence is the most powerful [method]. 
Think about Thich Nhat Hanh and his sangha: how did they react to the 
Vietnamese Government?’61 Similar to Adam, by emphasizing the links 
between the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement and other iconic struggles 
fought in other countries during different times, the Movement took on an 
extra dimension for Emily as a way of aspiring to societal and eventually 
personal salvation that reaches beyond the specif ic context of Hong Kong.
Emily and Adam mentioned the struggles fought by the Dalai Lama and 
by Thich Nhat Hanh. While the Dalai Lama has never visited Hong Kong 
due to political reasons, Thich Nhat Hanh travels to the region once every 
few years, attracting crowds of almost 10,000 people for his public speeches. 
In conversations with other informants, other Buddhist leaders were men-
tioned as well. Some referenced the progressive Australian Theravāda monk 
Ajam Brahn, who advocates nuns’ rights in the sangha, or the Sri Lankan 
monk Ariyaratne’s emphasis on non-violence. Being closely situated to 
Taiwan, most of my Buddhist informants spoke highly of the Buddhist nun 
Cheng Yen, foundress of the charitable organization Tzu Chi, and some of 
them looked to the civic engagement of this movement during the 2014 
Sunflower Movement in Taiwan for guidance. By relating to these and other 
Buddhist leaders and movements, my informants signif ied their personal 
engagement as part of the larger movement of engaged Buddhism and 
related their struggles as Buddhists to other historical struggles, e.g. in Sri 
Lanka, Tibet, Taiwan, or Vietnam. As such, their engagements transcended 
the specific locale of Hong Kong and reached beyond Hong Kong and China.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I showed how my informants engaged with the Umbrella 
Movement in a variety of spiritually and actively engaged ways. While 
some went to the protest sites, others stayed at home to meditate. Again 
others decided to disengage from the protests altogether. While different in 
terms of civic engagement, there is signif icant similarity in these narratives 
regarding the perception of how to act as ‘good’ Buddhists. Taken together, 
all of these personal narratives are related to religious notions of salvation: 
being spiritually or actively engaged or disengaged will lead to a reduction 
61 Personal communication via WhatsApp, Emily, September-October 2014.
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of suffering and, by extension, will bring people a step closer to reaching 
Nirvāna.
Based on the individual narratives presented above, I argue that religion 
as expressed by my Buddhist informants indicates civic engagement in 
politics to be not so much an issue of the relationship between religion and 
politics, but more about future salvation and personal responsibilities to 
act as ‘good’ Buddhists. For my informants, the Umbrella Movement was 
not solely a sociopolitical movement aimed at achieving universal suffrage 
and keeping the HKSAR a politically and economically unique city within 
the PRC. Equally important were the ideals of engaged Buddhism that were 
indirectly highlighted, and that developed alongside and in response to 
other religious movements and institutions in both mainland China and 
globally.
My Buddhist informants’ ref lections on the Umbrella Movement 
revealed that their decisions to engage in the Movement were related to 
commitments made on an individual basis. While some Buddhists found 
it important to actively or spiritually engage with the protests, and to try 
to bring an open mindset to the movement, others used similar arguments 
to not get involved, and to not worsen the polarities already rife in Hong 
Kong society. Even though Buddhist motivations were all based on the same 
religion, my informants all expressed different answers and subsequent 
outcomes, indicating the diversity of the religion and, more specif ically, 
the plurality of (engaged) Buddhism.
This shows that although informed by disciplinary and historical reli-
gious decrees, aspirations to salvation are primarily personal. Individuals 
need not necessarily follow the same political practices as those advanced 
by the religious organizations to which they belong, nor of the religious 
leaders representing them. In effect, while many individuals are undoubt-
edly influenced by religious structures and leadership, they make decisions 
based on personal considerations and choices. This is most apparent in cases 
where the authority of religious leaders and organizations is fragmented, 
such as in the case of Buddhism.
It also attests that the Umbrella Movement was not merely a local move-
ment sparked by context-specif ic politico-economic factors. Instead, the 
narratives surrounding the Umbrella Movement were related to larger 
temporal religious movements taking place in different times and regions. 
This can be compared to Kuo’s argument that, influenced by social gospel 
agenda and ‘public theology’ (following American Christian fundamental-
ism of the 1980s), Christian leaders started to promote ‘public theology’ 
post-1997, by commenting on social, economic, and political policies in 
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both Hong Kong and the PRC, much to the annoyance of the CCP. For my 
Buddhist informants, international norms have come to play a role in the 
Umbrella Movement as well, although less present. For them, these larger 
temporal movements were initiated by renowned engaged Buddhist leaders 
of various Buddhist schools; for example, Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai 
Lama. Consequently, for them the Umbrella Movement extended beyond 
the spatial boundaries of the HKSAR and the PRC, and beyond the temporal 
dimension of the Movement.
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